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Abstract 
Too often, patients in low and middle income countries receive inadequate quality 
healthcare. Technical capacity constraints - insufficient availability of competent 
health professionals, medicines and other essential inputs - are often seen as the 
cause. Whilst undoubtedly important, these constraints cannot fully explain poorly 
delivered health services. This thesis explores how supply-side incentives also 
influence the quality of healthcare doctors deliver to patients. It uses the analytics of 
the principal-agent model as the starting point for illustrating the impact of different 
incentives on medical effort, and through this effort, the quality of healthcare. 
Insights and testable hypotheses emerging from this conceptual approach are then 
evaluated through empirical studies of doctors working in 30 districts in the 
Philippines, using a variety of econometric methods. 
Data came from both primary and secondary sources. A first study explored the 
relationship between empirical measures of medical effort and the technical quality 
of healthcare. A second study analysed how various financial and non-financial 
incentives affect the amount of medical effort exerted by doctors on public hospital 
inpatients. A third study addressed the phenomenon of physician ownership of 
private pharmacies, and whether this has any adverse impacts on patients. 
Results showed that whilst the relationship between medical effort and quality is not 
straightforward, low effort typically results in lower quality care. Subsequent results 
illustrated how supply-side incentives can lead to public hospital patients with equal 
health need being treated unequally; and pharmacy-owning physicians unduly 
influencing a patient's use and expenditure in pharmacies. Suggested policy reforms 
are based on reshaping the incentive structure within which doctors operate, 
including reform of provider payment mechanisms and patient charges; improved 
monitoring and regulation; and policies to encourage greater use of generic drugs. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Why incentives matter 
Too often, patients in low and middle income countries receive inadequate quality 
healthcare. This reduces the likelihood of patients making a full recovery from 
illness, and also deters them from utilising health facilities. Technical capacity 
constraints - insufficient availability of competent health workers, medicines and 
other essential health inputs - are often seen as the cause of low quality healthcare. 
Whilst undoubtedly important, these factors cannot fully explain poorly delivered 
health services, particularly as the quality of care received by patients is not constant 
across or even within health facilities (WHO 2000; World Bank 2004). Moreover, 
studies have shown that doctors often under-perform relative to their actual clinical 
knowledge (Das et al. 2008), with interventions focused on training having mixed 
and sometimes disappointing results (Rowe et al. 2005). That is, provision of low 
quality healthcare is not simply a technical problem that can be resolved through 
extra resources for training and other activities, or indeed a better allocation of these 
resources. 
The central premise underlying this thesis is that low quality healthcare provision is 
also an incentive problem (Pritchett and Woolcock 2004; Saltman 2002). These 
incentives are the various factors that influence individuals to behave in a particular 
way. The incentive structure can impact on the behaviour of both the providers and 
recipients of healthcare. In terms of supply-side incentives, the focus of this thesis, 
incentives affect the quality of health service delivery through the impact on the 
amount of medical effort health providers exert on patients. Incentives can be 
financial or non-financial, explicitly designed or more implicit in nature, have 
positive or perverse effects, and vary in their intensity (Frey 2000; Holmstrom and 
Milgrom 1991; Le Grand 2003). 
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The supply-side incentives most commonly studied in the literature relate to the 
methods by which health providers are reimbursed. These have been shown 
theoretically and empirically to affect health service delivery (Ellis and McGuire 
1986; Evans 1974; Chaix-Couturier et al. 2000; Gosden et al. 2001). A specific 
provider payment mechanism can result in doctors (and other health workers) 
providing too little or too much healthcare, both of which have negative implications 
for the quality of health service delivery. This literature also shows a trade-off 
between risk selection (whereby providers prefer low-risk patients because they are 
cheaper to treat) and efficient production (Newhouse 1996). Moreover, the method 
of provider payment can lead to doctors giving preferential treatment to some 
patients over others, as in the case of differential patient charges (McPake et al. 
2007). In light of these effects, policymakers in developed and developing countries 
have tried to design provider payment schemes that reward good quality care 
(McNamara 2005; Petersen et al. 2006). 
The incentives faced by doctors are not only related to the method in which they are 
paid. Doctors, by virtue of their central role in a patient's healthcare coupled with 
the difficulty in observing their behaviour, also have the opportunity to engage in 
additional income-generating strategies. This can create perverse financial 
incentives. For example, physician dual practice and other financial links with health 
facilities may adversely affect a doctor's prescription and referral behaviour, 
because of the potential for financial gain (Eggleston and Bir 2006; Ferrinho, Van 
Lerberghe et al. 2004). These incentives can be especially strong in low and lower- 
middle income countries, due to a health worker's need to cope with inadequate 
salaries (Van Lerberghe et al. 2002). 
More broadly, the incentive structure within which doctors and other health workers 
operate is shaped by the institutional environment: the laws and regulations 
governing the health sector, as well as conventions and norms of behaviour (North 
1990). This determines to what extent doctors respond to the incentives inherent in 
provider reimbursement mechanisms and additional income-generating strategies. 
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For example, third-party monitoring of the healthcare delivered by providers, 
through formal or more informal contractual arrangements, can help offset provider 
responses to perverse financial incentives of a specific provider payment mechanism 
(Perrot 2006). Regulations that limit physicians from referring patients to other 
health facilities in which they have a financial interest can reduce perverse 
incentives related to additional income-generating strategies, as with the Stark Laws 
in the US (Manchikanti and McMahon 2007). More intrinsic psychological or 
sociological incentives will also counteract a doctor's response to perverse financial 
incentives, since most doctors are motivated by a sense of professionalism and 
concern for a patient's well-being, as well as by their income level (Mooney and 
Ryan 1993). 
Thus the various incentives doctors face, that together make up the incentive 
structure within which doctors operate, play an important role in determining the 
quality of healthcare a patient receives. This thesis explores how the incentive 
structure influences the quality of healthcare doctors deliver to patients in low and 
lower-middle income country settings. It uses the analytics of the principal-agent 
model as the starting point for illustrating the impact of different incentives on 
medical effort, and through this effort, the quality of healthcare. Insights and testable 
hypotheses emerging from this conceptual approach are then evaluated through 
empirical studies of doctors working in 30 districts in the Philippines, using a variety 
of econometric methods. Data comes from both primary sources (interviews of 
pharmacy customers) and secondary sources (from the Philippine Child Health 
Experiment). 
1.2 Thesis outline 
The thesis is structured as follows. It starts with a review of the literature on how 
supply-side incentives affect the quality of health service delivery (chapter 2). This 
review incorporates the main theories that have been used to characterise the impact 
of incentives on healthcare quality, and the related empirical evidence that assesses 
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how different aspects of the incentive structure have influenced health service 
delivery. It also includes discussions of how quality has been measured in relation to 
healthcare, and the different types and characteristics of incentives faced by 
individuals. 
The following chapter, building on findings from the literature, develops a 
conceptual framework and associated empirical methodology (chapter 3). The 
conceptual framework shows the expected theoretical effects of different incentives 
on medical effort, and consequently the quality of healthcare. The empirical methods 
used to test these theoretical insights are then introduced. This includes a description 
of the data used. Background information on the Philippines is given in chapter 4, 
with details of how healthcare is financed and organised, factors that influence the 
incentive structure within which doctors operate. 
Three results chapters follow (chapters 5,6 and 7). The first of these explores the 
relationship between empirical measures of medical effort and the technical (as 
opposed to interpersonal) quality of health service delivery. The second results 
chapter analyses how various financial and non-financial incentives affect the 
amount of medical effort exerted by doctors on public hospital inpatients. The last 
results chapter assesses whether the financial incentives inherent in physician 
ownership of private pharmacies can cause them to unduly influence a patient's 
pharmaceutical purchasing decisions and expenditure. 
The final chapter (chapter 8) brings together the main findings from these results 
chapters, considering them in relation to the literature and the conceptual 
framework. This is followed by reflections on the broad methodological strengths 
and limitations of the thesis. The chapter concludes by discussing policy 
implications, both for the Philippines and for low and lower-middle income 
countries in general, and potential areas for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Supply-side incentives have an effect on the quality of healthcare a patient receives 
through their impact on the amount of medical effort' health providers exert on 
patients. A number of theories explore the implications of different incentive 
structures on the delivery of health services. Most prominent amongst these are 
those based on the principal-agent model, the new institutional economics literature 
and theories examining the determinants of worker motivation. Empirical evidence 
comes from research on the consequences of different provider reimbursement 
mechanisms on health service delivery; the role of various income-generating 
strategies adopted by health workers; and the effect different patient characteristics 
has on provider behaviour. 
A common problem examined by this theoretical and empirical literature is the 
potential for conflicts in the incentives faced, particularly between the doctor and 
patient (or, more generally, between the health provider and purchaser of 
healthcare). Better incentive alignment can be understood as the fundamental policy 
challenge addressed by this literature. 
However, before this theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of incentives 
on the quality of healthcare is explored, it is useful to first clarify what is meant by 
incentives and quality in the context of the health sector. Thus section 2.2 examines 
how the quality of health service delivery has been understood and measured by 
researchers; and section 2.3 discusses how incentives can be conceptualized. 
Subsequently, section 2.4 considers the theories that have analysed the impact of 
supply-side incentives on healthcare quality, with section 2.5 reviewing the relevant 
1 See the conceptual framework in the following chapter (section 3.1) for a definition and detailed 
discussion of effort in the context of healthcare. 
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empirical evidence. Finally, section 2.6 highlights some of the main limitations of 
the literature, and how these limitations have shaped this thesis. 
The search strategy for identifying the relevant literature to review was based on 
keywords and MeSH terms related to one or more of sections 2.2 to 2.5, namely: 
-"Quality" and associated MeSH terms ("quality assurance, health care", "quality 
indicators, health care", "outcome and process assessment", "patient satisfaction", 
"guideline adherence", "program evaluation"), combined with terms related to 
healthcare delivery or measurement. 
-"Incentives" and associated MeSH terms ("motivation", "reward", "employee 
incentive plans", "physician incentive plans", "reimbursement mechanisms"), 
combined with terms related to worker behaviour or healthcare delivery. Note that 
this strategy focused on supply-side incentives, excluding studies examining the 
effects of demand-side incentives. 
Three electronic databases were used: PubMed, Embase and ISI Web of Science. 
The search was limited to articles written in English. This search strategy was 
complemented by manual reviews of the references of papers identified in these 
databases, and subsequent database searches of keywords emerging from these 
papers (including: principal agent/agency, new institutional economics, provider 
payment mechanisms, contracting, dual practice, pharmacy/ancillary facility 
ownership). Reference was also made to economics and public health textbooks, the 
Handbook for Health Economics, and the World Bank and World Health 
Organization websites. 
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2.2 Evaluating the quality of health service delivery 
2.2.1 Healthcare quality: definitions, dimensions and scope 
Before exploring how the quality of health service delivery has been measured in the 
literature, one needs to understand what is meant by quality. But defining quality of 
healthcare is problematic, since quality is an intangible concept, whose definition 
depends on the values of an individual or society (Reerink 1990). That is, quality is 
an essentially subjective concept. Nevertheless, it is useful for researchers and 
policymakers alike to define what are likely to be crucial components or dimensions 
of healthcare quality valued by society (Donabedian 1966; Ibrahim 2001; Klein 
1998). 
In arguably the landmark paper on measuring healthcare quality, Donabedian stated 
that: "the effectiveness of care... in achieving or producing health and satisfaction... 
is the ultimate validator of the quality of care" (Donabedian 1966). More recently, 
the US Institute of Medicine (IOM) defined quality healthcare as "the degree to 
which health services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of 
desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge" 
(Institute of Medicine 2001). The IOM stressed that poor quality can mean too much 
(unnecessary) as well as too little (insufficient) care. 
These influential papers point to two important components of healthcare quality, ' 
components which various authors suggest as pervasive in all quality of healthcare 
definitions (Blumenthal 1996; Brook et al. 2000; Evans et al. 2001). These are: 
- Technical quality (or clinical effectiveness). That is, healthcare should be as 
effective as possible in improving patients' health, given current scientific 
knowledge. Moreover, patients should only receive health services whereby the 
health benefits significantly outweigh any health risks, and these services should 
be delivered in a technically excellent manner. 
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-Interpersonal quality (or patient-centeredness). That is, patients should be treated 
in a humane and culturally appropriate manner, and be involved in decisions about 
their own treatment. 
Stakeholders, depending on their circumstances, are likely to differ in the value 
attached to these dimensions of quality. For example, patients with chronic diseases 
may place more value on interpersonal quality relative to the technical quality of 
healthcare, as compared with patients that have more eminently treatable illnesses. 
Trade-offs may also exist, both within and across these two quality components. For 
instance, for certain complex cases, healthcare with the greatest chance of clinically 
benefiting the patient may also carry higher risks to the patient than other treatment 
strategies. More broadly, patient preferences may be at odds with the clinical 
effectiveness of healthcare. 
The remainder of this review on the quality of health service delivery focuses 
primarily on the technical quality of the health provider (either the individual 
clinician or the health facility as'a whole). Note that the focus is solely on the 
clinical side of healthcare, although it is recognised that non-clinical aspects of a 
health provider's care can also improve a patient's health outcome, for instance by 
improving access to care and adherence to drug regimens. See Chandler 2008 and 
Harris et al. 2001 for a further discussion of this literature. 
2.2.2 Quality, equity and efficiency 
In discussions of healthcare quality, an important conceptual issue is how to 
incorporate the notions of equity and efficiency. An interpretation of quality in the 
most fundamental of senses includes both equity and efficiency, assuming people 
value them, since quality is ultimately an endpoint composed of an individual's or a 
society's values (Reerink 1990). 
However, efficiency and equity have typically been understood as conceptually 
distinct from the technical (and interpersonal) component of healthcare quality 
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defined in the last section. For instance, the World Health Report 2000, in defining 
the health system goals of improved health and better patient responsiveness, 
stressed that the distribution as well as the overall level of these goals mattered 
(WHO 2000). It also included an equity-related goal of fair financial contribution, 
which is distinct from the technical or interpersonal quality of healthcare. 
Furthermore, the World Health Report evaluated health systems' performance in 
relation to the resources available, thus implicitly incorporating the concept of 
efficiency. 
Numerous other examples of hospital or broader health system performance 
measures adopted by policymakers exist. These include indicators related to the 
equity and efficiency of health service delivery, that are separate from technical or 
interpersonal healthcare quality (Evans et al. 2001; Groene et al. 2008; and OECD 
2002 for examples from this literature). 
Technical quality and equity 
Equity in healthcare relates to a fair or socially just distribution of health, healthcare 
or healthcare financing (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2000; Williams and Cookson 
2000). An important definition is that of horizontal equity, which is when there is 
equal treatment for individuals with equal health need, irrespective of income, 
gender or other non-health characteristics. Vertical equity, in contrast, refers to the 
unequal treatment of individuals who are unequal in relevant respects. 
In relation to the technical quality of healthcare, equity can be understood as the fair 
distribution of clinically effective healthcare amongst a population. Further, 
horizontal equity implies that all individuals with equal need should receive the 
same technical quality of healthcare. 
A broad literature has analysed how equity can be measured in the health system. 
Examples of equity measurement in the health system include health or illness 
concentration curves; benefit-incidence analysis; comparison of the utilization of 
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health services by different population groups; comparison of healthcare payments 
with ability to pay; analysis of the extent of catastrophic expenditure and 
impoverishment caused by healthcare payments. See O'Donnell et al. 2008 for an 
introduction into this literature. 
Of most relevance to this thesis is comparison of health service utilization by 
different socioeconomic groups, particularly analysis of any variation in the quality 
of health services received. The main point of interest relates to whether incentives 
effect the distribution of good quality health services. The equity literature, though, 
rarely measures quality directly, instead assuming that the cost of healthcare is an 
accurate proxy for quality. This literature is included in the review of the impact of 
incentives on the quality of health service delivery in sections 2.4 and 2.5. 
Technical quality and efficiency 
Economists define efficiency as obtaining the best possible output from available 
resources (Varian 2006). In relation to the technical quality of healthcare, this output 
can be understood as improvement of a patient's health outcome. More generally, 
this output can be understood as any quality dimension (or, indeed, combination of 
dimensions) valued by society. That is, more output equates to more/better quality, 
with efficiency occurring when healthcare quality (however defined) is maximised 
given existing resources. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between efficiency2 and the technical quality of 
healthcare. The horizontal axis refers to input X (for example, healthcare); the 
vertical axis refers to output Y (for example, improved health outcome of an 
individual or population). Points A, B, C, El and E2 can be interpreted as different 
health providers. 
2 This figure is limited to analyzing technical (as opposed to allocative) efficiency, since only one 
input and one output are considered. 
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Figure 2.1 Efficiency and the technical quality of healthcare 
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Note: HH' has been drawn to intersect the y-axis at a point above zero. This reflects that some improvement in the patient/s 
health outcome can occur irrespective of the healthcare provided by a health provider. 
The curve HH' represents the production frontier: the maximum possible 
improvement in health outcome (Y) for any given amount of healthcare (X). That is, 
all points on the curve HH' are efficient, and equivalent to the best technical quality 
of healthcare given available resources. 
For instance, comparing health provider El with provider A, the same improvement 
in the patient/s health outcome Yj is achieved with less healthcare (Xj<X2). Likewise, 
at E2 compared with A, a higher health outcome (Y2>Yj) is achieved with the same 
amount of healthcare X2. 
Point B illustrates potential trade-offs between efficiency and the technical quality of 
healthcare. Provider B achieves a better health outcome than provider El (Y'Yj). 
However, this is only because of greater resource use. That is, provider B is less 
efficient than El, since B is not on the production frontier (for instance at point E2, a 
better outcome Y2 can be achieved with less health care). 
In contrast, provider C is efficient and maximises technical quality. However, 
whether this is preferable to other points on the production frontier depends on the 
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relative value attached to improved health outcome as compared with the cost of 
increased healthcare. 
Figure 2.1 also illustrates the relationship between technical quality and the quantity 
of care. The shape of the curve HH' implies diminishing returns to scale: increases 
in the input of healthcare lead to less than proportional increases in the output of 
improved health outcome. Further, after point C more healthcare results in worse 
health outcomes. This reflects the possibility of doctors giving too much care as well 
as too little care. 
In summary, a health provider that provides a higher technical quality of care may 
be less efficient than a provider that provides a lower technical quality of healthcare, 
because of differences in quantity of resources used. At the same time, for health 
providers with the same resources, efficiency maximisation is theoretically 
consistent with quality maximisation. Finally, more care does not necessarily mean a 
better technical quality of care. 
In empirical work on efficiency, though, measured outputs are typically related to 
the quantity of care (such as the number of inpatient days, outpatient consultations), 
with little account of the actual technical quality of the healthcare provided (Hussey 
et al. 2009). Exceptions include the work of McKay and Deily 2008; Mutter et al. 
2008; and Zuckerman et al. 1994, which incorporate controls for quality differences 
when analysing hospital efficiency. 
2.2.3 Quality measurement: the structure-process-outcome paradigm 
Almost half a century ago, Donabedian suggested that quality of healthcare can be 
measured by observing its structures, processes and outcomes (Donabedian 1966). 
This general approach to quality measurement has remained at the centre of quality 
measurement today (Rubin et al. 2001). Structure, process and outcome measures 
can all be used to ascertain a health provider's technical quality. The key criteria are 
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that any measure be attributable to the health provider and be clearly associated with 
improved patient health outcomes. 
Structure measures 
`Structure' relates to the setting in which healthcare is delivered. This comprises 
attributes of labour inputs (such as the number and level of skill of health personnel), 
non-labour inputs (such as availability of medical equipment and drugs) and 
organisational structure (such as provider reimbursement methods). 
The main advantage of structural quality measures is that they are relatively cheap 
and easy to measure: health provider surveys and inventories are often sufficient. 
However, although structural differences may well explain differences in provider 
behaviour, they do not have a direct causal relationship to better patient health 
outcomes (Donabedian 1980). Furthermore, they cannot measure the behaviour, and 
thus technical quality, of individual health workers. That is, they are useful in 
evaluating whether health facilities have an adequate structure to potentially provide 
clinically effective care, rather than whether they actually provide effective care. 
Process measures 
`Process' covers all aspects of the interaction between patient and health provider. It 
encompasses how well structural inputs are transformed into outputs by the health 
provider. Process of care is the most direct measure of a health provider's technical 
quality, since process measures can be more easily attributed to the provider than 
structure or outcome measures. This strength of attribution is the key reason why 
many commentators on quality of care view process indicators as an essential 
measure of a health provider's technical quality (such as Brook et al. 2000; Eddy 
1998; Peabody, Taguiwalo et al. 2006; Rubin et al. 2001). 
However, to be a valid indicator of technical quality, process measures need to have 
ä strong relationship with patient health outcomes (Donabedian 1988). Hence 
process indicators are based on comparing a provider's actual health service delivery 
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with adherence to guidelines on `best practice' care, such as whether a patient 
received a particular medicine, procedure, diagnostic test or advice. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated the clinical effectiveness of particular 
processes of care. Indeed, guidelines for best practice should ideally be based on 
strong evidence, such as (meta-analyses of) randomized clinical trials, with various 
observational study designs being valid alternatives under certain circumstances 
(Atkins et al. 2004). 
However, guidelines are not always based directly on actual clinical evidence. 
Instead, the preferences of health workers and patients, as well as expert opinions 
and societal priorities, are often more important in setting guidelines than research 
results (Naylor 1995). Even when robust clinical evidence has been used to 
determine best practice, the translation of such evidence into guidelines is hampered 
by heterogeneous populations, case-mix and problems of implementation (Grol 
2001). Further, most feasible process measures are usually data-driven indicators for 
very specific elements of the care process, rather than comprehensive measures of 
how care is delivered (Rubin et al. 2001). Process measures are also not valid for all 
patients undergoing a given procedure, and are more easily misunderstood than 
health outcomes (Birkmeyer et al. 2004). These pitfalls demonstrate that process 
measures need to be well designed if they are to be accurate measures of a 
provider's technical quality. 
Outcome measures 
`Outcomes' refer to the outputs of healthcare, particularly better health outcomes (in 
terms of both mortality and morbidity) and patient satisfaction. Intermediate health 
outcomes can also be defined, such as blood pressure for hypertensive patients, 
blood tests-(HbA I c) for diabetics and lost school days for children (Mainz 2003; 
Mangione-Smith and McGlynn 1998). 
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The key advantage of outcome quality measures is that they directly reflect health 
outcome (or other quality dimensions, such as interpersonal quality). Consequently, 
outcome measures focus attention on key health system goals, and can promote 
innovation (Evans et al. 2001; Goddard et al. 2002). Conversely, changes in patient 
health outcome are not fully attributable to health providers, with biological, 
socioeconomic and environmental factors all crucial determinants of changes in a 
patient's health status, together with stochastic factors. Thus for outcome measures 
to evaluate the technical quality of a particular provider, they need to control for 
differences in case-mix and other such factors, through appropriate risk adjustment 
measures (lezzoni 1997b). Even with such controls, two literature reviews on risk- 
adjusted hospital mortality rates found them an inaccurate measure of the technical 
quality for individual hospitals, because of attribution issues (Pitches et al. 2007; 
Thomas and Hofer 1998). 
Indeed, because of this extra statistical noise, outcome measures typically require 
comparatively large sample sizes. Mant and Hicks 1995 illustrated this, showing that 
if real differences in technical quality between 2 hospitals arising from different 
uptake of an effective intervention resulted in a 30% difference in mortality (30% V 
21%), data would have to be collected on 369 patients in each hospital to show the 
mortality difference was not simply chance (with 80% power and 95% significance). 
This compares with needing only 12 patients per hospital if one compared 
differential uptake of this intervention. In low-income and lower-middle income 
countries (LIC and LMIC), such high data requirements limit the usefulness of 
outcomes as measures of health providers' technical quality. 
Evidence on the links of structures and processes with health outcomes 
In theory, structure, process and outcome are interconnected. Better outcomes are 
more likely when the process of healthcare is of good quality, which in turn is more 
likely when the provider has sufficient and appropriate resources available. 
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However, empirical evidence from high-income countries has typically indicated at 
best only a weak link between structural measures and health outcomes (Donabedian 
1988; Brook et al. 2000). Still, some studies have found positive associations 
between the type and quantity of health personnel, and intermediate or final health 
outcome measures (Needleman et al. 2002; Pronovost et al. 1999). 
More evidence has shown links between process measures and patient health 
outcomes. Indeed, Chen et al. 1999 found that process indicators were a far more 
important determinant of hospital mortality rates than structural factors in the US. A 
number of other studies in high-income countries found positive associations 
between process quality measures and in-hospital mortality or post-hospital survival, 
although the strength of these associations varied widely (see, for instance, Bradley 
et al. 2006; Granger et al. 2005; Higashi et al. 2005; Peterson et al. 2006). 
In LIC and LMIC settings, studies have used process or structure measures to assess 
the technical quality of healthcare, and subsequently the determinants of technical 
quality (discussed in section 2.5). However, these studies have rarely linked process 
or structure measures explicitly to health outcomes (Das et al. 2008). Some of the 
few exceptions to this are studies by Barber and Gertler 2002 in Indonesia and 
Peabody et al. 1998 in Jamaica, who both found positive associations between 
process measures (vignettes) and intermediate health outcomes (child 
anthropometrics); and Peabody, Nordyke et al. 2006, who found a positive 
association between vignettes and self-reported health status in Macedonia. 
Taken together, this evidence suggests that process measures are linked to patient 
health outcomes, and thus are useful measures of the technical quality of healthcare. 
The evidence on links between structural measures and health outcomes, though, is 
less apparent. 
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2.2.4 Technical quality measurement: methods of data collection 
Sources of data for structural quality measures are relatively uncomplicated. These 
include health provider surveys and inventories of facilities' medical equipment and 
pharmacy stocks. Data sources for outcomes are more costly and time-consuming, 
and can require large samples, but are also conceptually straightforward. They 
involve following up patients to measure mortality rates or assess morbidity 
(through quality of life measures or use of intermediate health outcomes). 
Methods of data collection for the process of care, though, are more challenging. At 
the one extreme, the `standardized patient' has been seen as a gold standard for 
measuring process of care (Beullens et al. 1997; Luck and Peabody 2002). 
Standardized patients are individuals who have been trained to accurately and 
consistently present a particular case, and after consultation with a doctor, report or 
judge the behaviour of the doctor on fixed criteria (Beullens et al. 1997). However, 
they are costly and can only be used for certain (less severe) conditions. 
At the other extreme is the use of administrative data. This could be data used by 
health insurers to reimburse health facilities or individual doctors, such as the 
medicines and other health inputs used to treat patients with specific illnesses. 
Another example is routine data collected by hospitals or other entities to account 
for the use of medicines and other health inputs, assuming such data are linked to the 
actual health services delivered. Administrate data are cheap and readily available, 
but are unlikely to be detailed enough to accurately measure the actual processes of 
care. For instance, Peabody, Luck, Jain et al. 2004 found that administrative data 
recorded the correct primary diagnosis in only 57% of consultations in the US. 
Other retrospective data sources are provider surveys, patient exit surveys and record 
review. Provider surveys ask health workers how they treated particular patients; 
patient exit surveys ask patients with specific illnesses to describe the healthcare 
they received from a health provider. Both are cheap and straightforward to 
administer, but may suffer from recall problems. Further, provider surveys are more 
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prone to self-reporting bias: health workers may systematically exaggerate the 
amount of health services they provided to a patient (Adams et al. 1999). 
Record review (also called chart abstraction) is where a patient's medical record 
(handwritten or electronic) is reviewed. These are cheap and can potentially offer 
greater detail on the actual health services delivered by a health worker than surveys 
or administrative data. However, in high-income countries, they are imperfect 
measures: for instance, Luck et al. 2000 found that in the US medical records 
identified only 70% of clinically necessary items performed, as recorded by 
standardized patients. In LIC and LMIC settings they may provide even less 
information on healthcare provided. 
In comparisons of retrospective data collection methods in LIC settings, patient exit 
surveys were shown to give much more accurate measures of process quality than 
both provider surveys and record review (Franco, Franco et al. 2002; Hermida et al. 
1999). This was based on comparisons with standardized patients or direct 
observation. However, patient exit surveys were also found to be the most resource- 
intensive of these three methods. 
An alternative to retrospective data sources is to use clinical vignettes. This is where 
physicians are presented with case scenarios, and then asked how they would care 
for the patient in such scenarios. Although based on hypothetical behaviour, 
'vignettes have been validated against standardized patients and shown to out- 
perform record review as well as administrative data (Peabody et al. 2000). They are 
relatively cheap and easy to administer, and also have the added benefit of 
controlling for severity and case-mix more accurately than all other data collection 
methods described here. However, debate continues on whether vignettes measure 
all aspects of quality, with some arguing that they only measure a doctor's health 
knowledge, and not actual behaviour (Das et al. 2008). 
311 Page 
Like the standardized patient approach, other methods use data collected during a 
provider-patient interaction. These are direct observation (where a trained observer 
sits in on physician-patient consultations), recorded visits (the use of audio or video 
equipment) and physician self-recording (where the physician records their own 
actions). By their nature, these approaches are more accurate than retrospective data 
sources or vignettes in recording what actually happened in a provider-patient 
interaction. However, recorded visits will not capture all aspects of the physician- 
patient interaction if physicians can control what is recorded. Physician self- 
recording, like provider surveys, are likely to be more prone to self-reporting bias. 
That is, physicians may over-report the amount of health services they provided, so 
that their technical quality of care appears better than it actually was. Moreover, all 
of these methods potentially suffer from the "Hawthorne effect". That is, the doctor 
may give the patient better healthcare when the interaction is observed or recorded. 
Some studies, though, have shown this is likely to wear off after repeated 
consultations (for example, Leonard and Masatu 2006). They are also likely to be 
comparatively expensive, particularly the method of direct observation. 
Figure 2.2 summarises these different methods of data collection in terms of their 
relative cost and accuracy in measuring the technical quality of a health provider. 
The figure is purely illustrative, being based on expected rather than actual relative 
costs and accuracy of the different methods. 
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2.2.5 Obtaining quality scores 
In all of the data collection methods described above, an important challenge is how 
to weight results such that the quality of different providers can be compared. For 
instance, it is not immediately evident whether a doctor who gave a patient a 
thorough physical examination but failed to give or request either of two needed 
laboratory tests, offers better or worse technical quality of healthcare than a doctor 
who gave an imperfect physical examination but requested one of the two needed 
laboratory tests. 
Various approaches can be used to obtain a single quality score (with confidence or 
credible intervals) for each health provider. These (with quality-related examples in 
parentheses) include: Bayesian methods (Goodson and Jang 2008), multivariate 
approaches (Scanlon et al. 2005), nonpararnetric techniques (Lieberthal 2008), item 
response theory and other factor analysis related approaches (Das and Hammer 
2005b) and expert panels / Delphi techniques (Peabody et al. 2000). 
Finally, many of the quality measures are based on analysis of a small selection of 
health conditions. The validity of using a handful of conditions to evaluate broader 
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health system quality, or the `tracer' methodology as its initial proponents Kessner, 
Kalk and Singer called it, depends on the nature of the tracer conditions chosen. 
These tracers are more likely to be more broadly applicable if they are frequent 
health conditions with a high associated burden of disease that are affected by 
healthcare, and with an agreed appropriate care and known epidemiology (Kessner 
et al. 1973, cited by Neuhauser 2004). 
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2.3 Conceptualizing incentives 
Incentives, according to standard dictionary definitions, are anything that encourages 
an individual to behave in a particular way. They have been variously classified by 
incentive type, whether they are explicit or more implicit, the extent to which they 
have potentially undesirable as well as beneficial effects (i. e. if they create perverse 
incentives), and in terms of their intensity. These incentives can affect the behaviour 
of both the providers (supply-side) and purchasers (demand-side) of healthcare or 
other goods and services, although this literature review is limited to reviewing 
supply-side incentives. 
2.3.1 Incentive types 
In recent discussions on health policy, supply-side incentives have often been 
interpreted as being limited to financial benefits that are linked to certain behaviours 
(Saltman 2002). These can include non-pecuniary financial benefits, such as access 
to training, if they increase the probability of higher future earnings. 
The importance given to financial benefits assumes that health workers have, at least 
to some extent, materialistic motivations. Whilst evidence demonstrates that this is 
undoubtedly the case, and the empirical component of this thesis focuses mainly on 
financial incentives, non-financial incentives have also been shown to influence 
worker behaviour, for both sociological and psychological reasons (see, for example, 
Fehr and Falk 2002; Frey and Jegen 2001). 
Accordingly, incentives can be categorised into one of three broad types: financial, 
sociological and psychological. Table 2.1 summarises these three general incentive 
types, in terms of how they are expected to influence a health worker's behaviour, 
and examples of implications for patients. 
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Fable 2.1 Financial, sociological and psychological incentives 
Incentive type Why it is expected to influence Some implications for patients: 
behaviour referential treatment for whom? 
Financial Maintains or improves a health worker's Patients from whom more revenues 
wealth: e. g. standard neoclassical are received 
microeconomic theory'_ 
Sociological Maintains or improves a health worker's Patients with whom health workers 
social relations: e. g. theories of reciprocity, socially interact with, especially those 
trust, reputation and social capital2 who can influence a health worker's 
social standing 
Psychological Intrinsic altruistic value attached to Patients who are perceived as being 
improving a patient's health: e. g. empathy, most in need (compassion), most 
beneficence, professionalism' deserving (justice), or who the health 
worker best empathises with 
1 Varian 2006; 2 Woolcock and Narayan 2000; 3 Beauchamp and Childress 2001; Eisenberg and Miller 1987 
Financial incentives are sometimes referred to as economic incentives (as, for 
example, by Lindbeck I997). however, in this thesis, economic incentives are more 
broadly defined as any incentive which has an impact on an individual's utility. 
They therefore can include non-financial sociological and psychological incentives. 
See Rabin 1998 for a further discussion of incorporating non-materialistic factors 
into the utility function. 
As well as explaining differences in healthcare delivery across patients, these 
incentive types can also explain why different health workers would treat the same 
patient differently. This is of particular relevance to the psychological literature 
related to incentives. 
2.3.2 Explicit, implicit and perverse incentives 
The health economics literature has focused predominantly on how explicit financial 
incentives can be used to shape health provider behaviour, particularly through the 
use of different provider payment mechanisms and regulation (Scott and Farrar 
2002). But policymakers can also design explicit incentives that are more 
sociological or psychological in nature. Examples include setting up patient 
complaints boards and formally recognising good quality service provision (both of 
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which can additionally become financial incentives if accompanied by financial 
reward or penalty). 
More implicit incentives may also be important influences on health worker 
behaviour. Sociological and psychological incentives are often implicit (Frey 2000; 
Le Grand 2003). For instance, the sociological incentive to give preferential 
treatment to patients with whom the health worker is more likely to receive 
reciprocal gains in the future is implicit in nature. Similarly, the psychological 
incentive for health workers to prioritise patients with whom they most closely 
empathise is also an inherently implicit incentive. Literature on the interaction 
between explicit financial incentives and more implicit non-financial incentives is 
reviewed in section 2.4.4. 
Financial incentives can also be implicit. As noted by Scott and Farrar 2002, much 
of the research into this topic has come from the area of labour economics known as 
personnel economics3. This literature has demonstrated, for example, how concerns 
for future employment prospects or job promotions ("career concerns") provide an 
implicit financial incentive for employees to work harder in their current 
employment. 
Implicit incentives may also explain why explicit incentives sometimes result in 
perverse (undesired) as well as intended effects on a health worker's behaviour. For 
instance, whilst replacing a payment system based on out-of-pocket patient 
expenditures with flat capitation payments removes the financial incentive for health 
providers to give preferential treatment to patients paying more, it also creates an 
implicit and perverse financial incentive to favour patients with less complicated 
illnesses, since these are cheaper to treat (known as `cream-skimming'). 
3 See, for example, Lazear, E. (2000). "The future of personnel economics. " The Economic Journal 
110: 611-639., for an introduction into this field. 
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Indeed, much of the theoretical literature that applies the principal-agent model to 
healthcare has focused on the perverse incentives of different financial compensation 
schemes (reviewed in section 2.4.1). This literature was informed by the 
groundbreaking paper of Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991. They introduced the 
concept of `multitasking' - workers with jobs involving multiple related tasks - to 
demonstrate the likelihood of perverse incentives emerging in complex jobs. Using a 
principal-agent based model, they demonstrated how rewarding individuals on 
measured dimensions relevant to the firm's output leads them to substitute effort 
away from other important but unmeasured dimensions. A large literature has 
discussed the consequences of targets and pay-for-performance (see section 2.5.1). 
2.3.3 Incentive intensity 
Financial incentives are often described in terms of their intensity, or whether they 
are high-powered or low-powered (Frant 1996; Tirole 1994; Williamson 1985). 
More intense or high-powered incentive schemes are those where the affected 
individual receives a large fraction of his or her marginal product (Tirole 1994). This 
is the case for most retrospective payment mechanisms, such as in fee-for-service. 
High-powered incentives are also inherent in organisational forms where any 
financial surpluses or losses are the responsibility of the health provider (whether 
this is a health facility or individual physician) - that is, where the provider is the 
residual claimant (Jakab et al. 2002). 
Incentive intensity is also a useful concept in assessing the interactions between 
different incentive types: financial incentives are more likely to override conflicting 
psychological and/or sociological incentives the more high-powered they are, 
relative to these non-financial incentives. Interestingly, this implies that the notion of 
incentive intensity can be conceptualised for non-financial incentives as well. For 
instance, a high-powered sociological incentive could be inherent in treating a 
patient with significant influence on that health worker's social standing. In general, 
the intrinsic psychological value attached by a health worker to treating a patient as 
effectively as possible is (hopefully) high-powered. 
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2.4 The impact of incentives on the quality of health service delivery: 
theoretical insights 
2.4.1 The principal-agent model 
Asymmetric information 
Within the field of economics, the principal-agent model is established as the 
predominant theory to study how one group or individual (the principal) can affect 
the behaviour of another group or individual (the agent) through incentives (Dixit 
2002; Laffont and Martimort 2002; Prendergast 1999) 4. It is particularly useful in 
modelling the situation where the principal cannot perfectly observe the agent's 
actions: that is, where there is asymmetric information. 
In his seminal paper on medical care markets, Arrow 1963 stressed the importance 
of asymmetric information problems in health care provision. Patients and secondary 
purchasers (insurers or government) are at an informational disadvantage to the 
health providers on the nature of health services delivered, which can have adverse 
effects on the healthcare patients receive. 
Since this paper, the principal-agent model has been extensively applied to the 
health sector. The application most relevant to this thesis is where a health provider 
acts as the agent for a purchaser by providing health services in return for a payment. 
The provider/agent is usually interpreted as an individual physician or a health 
facility, with the purchaser/principal the patient or a third party purchaser acting on 
behalf of the patient. 
Optimal contract design 
Many papers have used the principal-agent model to explore optimal contract design 
(payment and monitoring mechanisms), where a health provider acts as the agent for 
` Also often referred to as agency theory, where the term `agency' is understood in a broadly 
legalistic sense: that is, where an agent acts on behalf of others (the principaVs). This is distinct from 
more philosophical interpretations of agency, which are concerned with a human's capacity to make 
and impose (typically moral) judgments or choices. 
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a purchaser by providing health services in return for a payment. Central to all of 
these is the problem of moral hazard: to the extent that agents have better 
information than the principal on their oA performance, they may engage in 
unobservable behaviours (hidden actions) which are not consistent with the 
principal's preferences (Varian 2006). 
Zweifel and Breyer 1997 model the effects of alternative provider remuneration 
methods on the provision of healthcare. Chalkley and Malcomson 2000 present a 
comprehensive review of how, under various assumptions about the utility functions 
of principals and agents (including adaptation of the principal-agent model to 
include the interaction of these utility functions), government as the third party 
purchaser can design contracts with appropriate incentives for health providers. Liu 
and Mills 2007a show how agency theory in the labour economics and reward 
management literature can be used to compare different payment mechanisms, and 
give examples of how principal-agent theory has been applied to healthcare. The 
literature review of McGuire 2000 focuses on physician behaviour and their central 
role in influencing the health services used by patients. Scott 2000 examines the 
particular agency role of general practitioners. In the review of physician dual 
practice by Eggleston and Bir 2006, most economic theories of physician dual 
practice are based on the principal-agent framework. 
From this large theoretical literature, some general implications for the payment and 
regulation of health providers (both health facilities and individual doctors) emerge: 
- Retrospective payment systems linked to health services create financial incentives 
to deliver as many services as possible. 
The main examples of such payment systems are fee-for-service and performance- 
based payments that are linked to health services provided. In these payment 
systems, the health provider is paid by the patient or secondary purchaser for the 
services delivered (that are reimbursed as part of the contract), and therefore no risk 
is borne by the provider. 
401Pagc 
Such retrospective payments can encourage the provision of a good technical quality 
of care, in the sense of discouraging under-provision. This is because providers are 
reimbursed for all services provided. However, they can also potentially lead to 
demand inducement by the health facility/physician (as first shown by Evans 1974)5. 
This can reduce the technical quality of care by encouraging the provision of 
unnecessary treatments. At a minimum, they provide no financial incentive to keep 
costs down. 
More narrowly-based retrospective payments, such as pay for performance for 
specific actions, create financial incentives for health providers to undertake these 
actions, though to the detriment of other related but unrewarded actions (Scott and 
Farrar 2002). 
-Salaries and prospective payment systems create financial incentives to deliver as 
few services as possible. 
Common prospective payments are capitation, daily or case payments, and budgets. 
With such payment methods, the health provider is paid independently of the 
quantity of services delivered. Consequently, the provider can keep any surplus 
(prospective payment minus the cost of providing health services), but bears all the 
risk of any financial losses. 
Whilst salaries and prospective payment methods provide incentives to keep costs 
down, they may also negatively affect the technical quality of care. This is because 
they reduce the financial incentive of providers to give patients all needed healthcare 
(Ellis and McGuire 1986). They can also encourage providers to refer patients to 
other health providers (which can have negative or positive quality impacts). 
3 This reference and the other references included in these bulleted points refer to some of the key 
texts which have analysed each of these specific issues in the health sector. 
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Related to this is the concern that prospective' payments can lead to patient `cream- 
skimming'. That is, health providers will prefer low-risk patients, since these 
patients are likely to be cheaper to treat. They may therefore adopt strategies to 
encourage such patients, and discourage higher risk patients from utilising their 
health services (Ellis and McGuire 1986; Hausman and Le Grand 1999; Newhouse 
1996). However, risk-adjustment, such as the use of diagnosis-related groups, can 
mitigate the financial incentive to favour low-risk patients in prospective payment 
methods. 
-Mixed systems can offset these adverse effects. 
The rationale behind this is that the perverse incentives of any single payment 
method are counteracted by incentives working in opposite directions in other 
payment methods (see, for instance, Barnum et al. 1995; Normand and Weber 1994; 
Robinson 2001). Examples include fee-for-service with decreasing reimbursement 
scales, fee-for-service combined with a total budget, and salaries or capitation with 
additional payments if specific production targets are met. 
However, the precise optimal payment system will be a function of, amongst other 
things, the nature of information asymmetry between the principal/s and agent/s 
(Blomqvist 1991; Dranove 1988) and what exactly is under the control of the agent 
(Ellis and McGuire 1990). More fundamentally, the optimality of a mixed payment 
system is dependent on the relative importance of a physician's concern for the 
patient's health compared with his or her material self-interest (Chalkley and 
Malcomson 1998; Ellis and McGuire 1986). 
-Physician dual practice creates both perverse and desirable financial incentives. 
Physicians who work in both the public and private sectors in parallel face a 
perverse incentive to shirk, pilfer public supplies and to redirect patients to their 
private facilities, since this increases their income (see, for example, Brekke and 
Sorgard 2007). These negative incentives, though, may be counteracted by positive 
effects on the technical quality of care. For instance, dual practice may attract more 
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skilled health workers to work for the public sector (Bir and Eggleston 2003), and 
dual practice physicians may improve their public service quality because of 
reputation concerns (Gonzalez 2004). The net effect of dual practice is an empirical 
question, depending on the relative importance of these desired and perverse 
incentives. 
-Regulation ofprovider behaviour can reduce the unfavourable characteristics of 
any specific payment system. 
One set of solutions are based on improving the observability of an agent's actions. 
Examples include monitoring of the health provider by a secondary purchaser (such 
as a health insurer), peer review, and health education policies to improve patients' 
healthcare knowledge (see, for instance, Casalino 2001 and Shaw 2001). Another 
solution is direct regulation, such as limited lists or generic-only prescribing and 
rules on referrals. All of these solutions can be encouraged through the use of 
financial penalties or rewards. 
Summary 
Applications of the principal-agent model therefore demonstrate how various 
provider payment mechanisms all potentially create perverse as well as desired 
financial incentives. These can negatively impact on the technical quality and/or 
efficiency of health service provision. They also point to mixed payment methods, 
information-related policies and regulation of provider behaviour to counteract these 
perverse supply-side incentives. 
2.4.2 New institutional economics 
Institutions and incentives 
The new institutional economics (NIE) literature does not analyse incentives per se. 
Its relevance to this thesis is instead in how institutions affect the incentive structure 
within which health providers operate. Institutions are, according to an influential 
NIE text, "the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They 
are composed of formal rules (statute, common law, regulations), informal 
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constraints (convention, norms of behaviour and self-imposed rules of behaviour); 
and the enforcement characteristics of both" (North 1990). 
The main relevance of NIE to health service delivery can be interpreted as analysing 
when governance structures with high-powered incentives are likely to be preferable 
to structures embodying low-powered incentives, and vice versa (Frant 1996; 
Williamson 2000). Figure 2.3 illustrates how these different governance structures 
relate to health facilities: 
Figure 2.3: Different governance structures for hospitals (and other health 
facilities) 
High-powered Incentives Market Private hospitals operating In unregulated market 
Low contractual safeguards 
Self-regulation (e. g. franchising) for private hospitals 
Government regulation of private hospitals 
Neoclassical Formal contracting between government and private hospitals or 
contracting autonomous public 
hospitals, with independent arbitration of V 
disputes 
Medium-powered Incentives 
Medium contractual safeguards 
Relational Longer-term agreements between government and hospitals 
Contracting than in neoclassical contracting, with greater emphasis on trust 
V 
Semi-autonomous public hospitals 
Low-powered Incentives 
High contractual safeguards Hierarchy Public hospitals within command-and-control hierarchy 
Williamson argued that the high-powered financial incentives embodied in 
unregulated market governance structures are preferable when there are low 
transactions costs. These are frequent transactions with low uncertainty, where 
outcomes can be easily measured and monitored, and assets used are not specific to 
the activity in question. 
However, hierarchy or hybrid forms of contractual governance (relational and 
neoclassical contracting), which have lower-powered incentives, are expected to be 
more efficient for complex transactions, because of associated high transaction costs. 
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Such governance forms may have lower production efficiency than markets, but they 
are more effective at reducing transaction costs because of better contractual 
safeguards (such as provider regulation or cooperation/integration between 
purchaser and provider). 
Health sector applications 
Theories of NIE have been used by some authors to compare health providers with 
different ownership types, as well as analyse what form of governance is best suited 
to purchaser-provider relations and other aspects of the health system. Sloan 2000, in 
his review of private not-for-profit hospitals, points to lower transaction costs in 
these hospitals as compared with private for-profit hospitals as an important reason 
explaining why not-for-profits outnumber for-profits in all developed countries. 
Leonard 2002 argues that the hierarchical governance structure, coupled with 
decentralised flexibility in dealing with staff, helps explain why nongovernmental 
organizations have performed consistently better than both for-profit private 
facilities and public health facilities in Africa. 
Preker et al. 2000 posited that in low-income countries most health inputs (other 
than human resources and knowledge) and simple outputs such as routine 
diagnostics and ambulatory care can be efficiently produced or delivered by the 
private sector, but this was less likely for the more complex outputs of hospital care. 
McKee et al. 2006 highlight quality and cost problems associated with experience in 
public-private partnerships for hospitals in various high-income countries, due to the 
complexity of the relationship. 
Goddard and Mannion 1998, based on evidence from non-health sectors in high- 
income countries, argue that relational contracting is likely to be more efficient than 
more competitive governance structures for purchaser-provider relationships in the 
health sector. Palmer and Mills 2003 analysed the contracts private GPs had with the 
government in South Africa. They found that relational contracting more accurately 
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described this relationship than neoclassical contracting, and argued this was likely 
to be the case in most LIC and LMIC settings. 
Summary 
Institutions affect the incentive structure, and consequently how different actors are 
likely to respond to different incentives. That is, the NIE literature applied to 
healthcare shows how the incentives faced by health providers are shaped by the 
institutional environment. Further, because the transaction between providers and 
purchasers is often complex, NIE suggests high-powered incentives are likely to be 
less efficient than lower-powered incentives (with accompanying contractual 
safeguards, such as regulation) in the health sector. This does not preclude private 
providers, but does suggest that relational contracting or hierarchy are likely to be 
preferable to a less regulated market. 
2.4.3 Incentives and group dynamics 
Hospital behavioural models 
A number of economic models have been developed to explain hospital behaviour. 
They assume that hospitals seek to maximise income, quantity of health services 
and/or service quality (see Liu and Mills 2007c). However, the majority of these 
models have been criticised for not reconciling their conceptual model with the 
internal hospital production structure (McGuire and Hughes 2002); and not being 
designed to predict changes in hospital behaviour occurring from exogenous 
changes, such as different hospital payment mechanisms (Liu and Mills 2007c). 
They have also been based predominantly on the US medical market (McPake and 
Normand 2008). 
Most hospital models are therefore less relevant to the study in this thesis of the 
impact of supply-side incentives on health service delivery. One important exception 
to this is the recent model of hospital behaviour by McPake et al. 2007. This 
analyses the equity and quality implications of hospital two-tier charging schemes 
which are being pursued in many LIC and LMIC settings. They show that under 
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some circumstances extracting profit from a superior service requires a hospital to 
drive down the quality of the basic service. That is, two-tier charging can create 
financial incentives for a hospital to focus on patients paying the higher tier charge 
to the detriment of others. 
Further, some earlier hospital models shed light on how the transmission of hospital 
level incentives to the medical staff actually providing health services depends on 
who are the key decision makers with hospitals, as well as the hospital's objective 
function. Newhouse 1970 identified hospital managers (administrators) as the 
decision makers. However, he assumed their goals (joint quantity-quality 
maximisation subject to a budget constraint) were perfectly aligned with the 
hospital's medical staff, implying no conflict between hospital level incentives and 
those of medical staff. Pauly and Redisch 1973 assumed physicians control decision 
making (with the aim of maximising their group income). Still, their model also 
implies no conflict in incentives, since physicians are the only decision making 
group. 
In contrast, Harris 1977 analysed the impact of hospital management and medical 
staff having different objectives, arguing that both were key decision makers. This, 
he posited, explains internal allocation problems, such as cost overrun or excess 
capacity. It also implies that incentives introduced at the hospital level (by hospital 
management or external actors) will only transmit effectively to the medical staff if 
they are well aligned with the medical staff's objectives. Indeed, Crilly and Le 
Grand 2004 found that in the UK, consultants (health professionals) were motivated 
by the volume and quality of health services, whilst managers were motivated 
primarily by financial breakeven. However, they also found that consultants were 
more likely to influence a manager's motivation than managers were to influence the 
motivation of consultants. 
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Incentives in teams 
Understanding how incentives impact upon team performance is important in 
healthcare because the treatment of a sick patient often requires coordination 
between multiple health professionals (Ratto et al. 2001; Scott and Farrar 2002). 
Team incentives arise when an individual's reward depends on the performance of 
others in a team, or the team is rewarded as a whole. That is, they can be understood 
as group level or interdependent individual level incentives. 
Team incentives encourage cooperation. They also have the benefit of sharing risk, a 
desirable characteristic assuming health professionals are risk averse (Bradford 
1995; Gaynor and Gertler 1995). However, team incentives suffer from a potential 
free rider problem: individuals have a financial incentive to shirk (Holmstrom 1982). 
This reduces the effectiveness of team incentives in encouraging greater effort by 
individuals, with consequently negative effects on the technical quality of care. 
Monitoring can counteract this, especially in small teams. More compressed wage 
structures may also reduce shirking, by improving cooperation in teams (Lazear 
2000). 
The target income hypothesis, though not explicitly analysing teams, also suggests 
interdependent incentives between individuals. It hypothesises that doctors have a 
target income, which is related to the income of other doctors (McGuire 2000). The 
target income can be related to incomes of doctors separate from the health facility 
(or team) where a doctor works, but is likely to be most closely related to doctors 
undertaking the most similar tasks. Further, it implies that below the target income, a 
doctor will be concerned with income and thus driven by financial incentives; but 
above the target income, a doctor will incorporate non-financial incentives that 
affect utility (Liu and Mills 2007b). However, the review by McGuire 2000 finds 
little empirical evidence supporting the target income hypothesis. 
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Summary 
This theoretical work related to group dynamics illustrates the importance of a 
number of factors in financial incentive design. First, two-tier charging in hospitals 
can create an incentive for the hospital to favour patients paying more, to the 
detriment of other patients. Second, the relative influence of different individuals 
within a hospital (or other group) will determine how incentives at the hospital level 
impact on individual health workers. Third, because of risk aversion individuals may 
prefer group level incentives to individual incentives, but such incentives can lead to 
shirking and thus dilute their effectiveness. Fourth, the effect of individual level 
incentives on a health professional's behaviour may depend in part on his/her 
income relative to other comparable health professionals. 
2.4.4 Theories of motivation 
In understanding the impact of supply-side incentives on health service delivery, a 
number of authors have stressed the importance of more closely analysing the 
underlying determinants of worker motivation. This is in contrast to principal-agent 
theory, the new institutional economics literature and hospital behavioural models, 
where the implications of different assumptions about worker motivation are 
reflected in how different incentives are expected to influence behaviour, but 
motivation itself is treated as an exogenous factor. 
Conflicts between different incentive types 
A commonly cited concern in healthcare is how the introduction of explicit financial 
incentives can adversely affect more intrinsic psychological or sociological 
incentives related to a health worker's inner motivations (Franco, Bennett et al. 
2002; Giacomini et al. 1996; Mooney and Ryan 1993; Scott and Farrar 2002). This 
concern is borne from theory and evidence on the determinar}ts of motivation. 
Early work on voluntary blood donation hypothesised that paying donors could 
undermine social values and thus actually reduce blood supply (Titmuss 1970). 
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More recent theoretical and empirical work, particularly from the fields of cognitive 
social psychology and behavioural economics, has formalised this hypothesis. 
Fehr and Falk 2002 showed how the motive to reciprocate, the desire for social 
approval and the desire to work on interesting tasks can all potentially conflict with 
financial incentives. More generally, Frey 1997,2000 demonstrated how extrinsic 
financial incentives can `crowd out' the intrinsic reward of an activity, reducing the 
supply of an activity if it dominates the `relative price' effect: the price, or financial 
opportunity cost, of not doing the activity. Frey and Jegen 2001 provided empirical 
evidence to support this theoretical insight. 
Le Grand 2003 posited that small financial rewards can reinforce, or `crowd-in', 
more intrinsic non-financial rewards; but as payments increase, the crowding-out 
and relative price effects predicted by Frey dominate. Le Grand stressed the 
importance of adopting `robust incentives': financial incentives that align, and 
appeal to, self-interested ('knavish') and altruistic ('knightly') motivations. 
Examples in healthcare include allowing budget-holding professionals to keep 
surpluses on their budget if these surpluses are spent on improving patient care; or 
paying professionals fee-for-service at a rate that incorporates some sacrifice 
compared with alternatives. 
Franco, Bennett et al. 2002 provide a conceptual framework outlining key 
determinants of health worker motivation, and how they are expected to interact. 
They posit multiple layers of influences: internal individual-level factors, 
organisational factors and broader cultural and community influences. Franco et al. 
2004 apply this framework to selected hospital workers in Jordan and Georgia, 
finding that non-financial interventions may be more effective than financial reward 
in improving worker motivation. 
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The importance of context 
The context in which health workers operate can also affect how they respond to 
incentives. Lipsky 1980 demonstrated that frontline providers had significant 
discretion in how they delivered services (hence he called them `street-level 
bureaucrats'), even in strictly regulated environments. 
In healthcare, frontline providers are the health professionals who interact directly 
with patients. Consequently, understanding the context in which such health 
professionals work, including the incentives they face, is essential. If this is ignored, 
policies introduced can have unexpected effects when implemented. 
Walker and Gilson 2004 applied these ideas in studying how nurses in busy urban 
primary care health clinics experienced and responded to the policy of fee removal. 
They found that although the nurses supported the policy's broad principles, they 
resented its negative effect on their working conditions, and in implementation, they 
were slow in granting free access to certain patient groups. That is, a higher level 
policy directive only partially influenced frontline providers' behaviour. 
Summary 
These theories of motivation stress not only the limitations of financial incentives, 
but also how they can negatively affect more intrinsic non-financial incentives. 
Further, the effectiveness of introducing policies with explicit incentives (financial 
or non-financial) is likely to depend on the context in which health workers work. 
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2.5 The impact of incentives on the quality of health service delivery: 
empirical evidence 
2.5.1 Provider reimbursement mechanisms 
Classical payment methods (salary, capitation, fee-for-service); different 
governance structures 
Many empirical studies in high-income countries have analysed the effects of 
different provider payment mechanisms on health service delivery. In one 
systematic6 review, Gosden et al. 2001 found that primary care physicians paid by 
fee-for-service delivered more services than those paid through capitation or salary, 
although the evidence for secondary services was more mixed. The review by 
Chaix-Couturier et al. 2000, more broadly exploring the effects of financial 
incentives on medical practice, found that capitation-based payment schemes 
reduced hospital days by up to 80% and prescriptions by 0-24%, as compared with 
fee-for-service. Further, annual caps on a physician's income increased referrals 
when this cap was reached. 
In both of these reviews, it is unclear whether the higher quantity levels associated 
with fee-for-service as compared with capitation or salary reflects more complete 
care and/or induced demand. Therefore the quality effects are not immediately 
apparent. McGuire 2000 argues that evidence demonstrates physicians are able to 
induce demand (which negatively affects the quality of care), and sometimes do so 
for their own materialistic purposes. Bickerdyke et al. 2002 reach a similar 
conclusion, but suggest that evidence shows when demand inducement occurs it is 
small both in absolute terms and relative to other influences on service provision. 
The review of Iversen and Luras 2006 posits that evidence shows capitation gives 
incentives for improved continuity of care and cost containment, but that it may also 
lead to insufficient care. However, Dudley et al. 1998, in a review of the US 
evidence, found no consistent difference in quality of care between fee-for-service 
6 All references referred to as "reviews" of evidence in high-income countries were, unless otherwise 
stated, systematic. That is, they had transparent search strategies with clear inclusion and exclusion 
criteria. 
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systems and health maintenance organizations (which typically have prospective or 
mixed payment mechanisms). 
Studies of provider payments in LIC and LMIC settings indicate largely consistent 
results. Most of this research has compared different forms of payment methods 
through comparisons of public and private health providers7. In such cases, it is not 
clear whether observed differences are fully attributable to the payment method or 
also to other aspects of a provider's governance structure (see section 2.4.2). 
Exceptions to this includes the work of Yip and Eggleston 2001,2004, who analysed 
the switch from fee-for-service to prospective payment in Hainan province, China. 
They showed that prospective payments reduced hospital spending and patient co- 
payments on expensive drugs and high technology services, and had slower rates of 
overall expenditure growth. In the Philippines, Gertler and Solon 2002 found that 
health providers (both public and private) faced a financial incentive to increase the 
price-cost margins of insured patients, resulting in providers extracting most of the 
benefits of insurance. This was explained by providers being reimbursed on a fee- 
for-service basis, and because benefit packages had first-dollar coverage with low 
caps, with patients paying the excess. 
Evidence based on comparisons of public and private health providers found that 
provider reimbursement mechanisms influenced the behaviour of health 
professionals. In New Delhi, India, Das and Hammer 2004,2005a showed that 
private doctors, who were paid on a fee-for-service basis, were more susceptible to 
over-treating patients, as compared with salaried public doctors. However, the 
authors also found that private doctors were closer to their clinical `knowledge 
frontier' than public doctors. They conclude that fee-for-service had a positive 
In high-income countries, a large literature has compared the quality of care provided by health 
providers with different governance structures (particularly the comparison of for-profit, private not- 
for-profit and public hospitals), with mixed results. See Eggleston, K., Shen, Y. C., Lau, J., Schmid, 
C. H. and Chan, J. (2008). "Hospital ownership and quality of care: what explains the different results 
in the literature? " Health Econ 17(12): 1345-62. for a review and explanation of these disparate 
findings. 
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impact on quality in terms of reducing under-treatment, but also the potentially 
negative quality impact of over-treatment, as compared with a fixed salary. In 
Paraguay, Das and Sohnesen 2007 found that doctors on temporary contracts, female 
doctors and those working in certain facilities exhibited more effort; doctors with 
higher salaries exerted less effort. They hypothesised this variation in doctor effort 
could be explained by differential incentives: doctors with less bargaining power 
have more to gain financially, and thus face higher-powered financial incentives to 
provide good quality care. 
Research in Tanzania found that clinicians working in nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) facilities were more likely to correctly diagnose and treat 
patients than clinicians in government facilities (Leonard et al. 2005; Leonard and 
Masatu 2007). The authors posit this is due to NGO managers having greater 
discretion over human resources and more financial independence, and perhaps also 
differences in intrinsic motivation. Similar results were found in Cameroon, in 
comparisons between government, mission and traditional health providers (Leonard 
2003). 
Payment methods linked to quality measures 
The evidence in high income countries on provider payment methods explicitly 
related to quality of care (often termed `pay-for-performance') is mixed. In a recent 
review, Petersen et al. 2006 found that 13 of 17 studies had positive effects between 
financial incentives and process quality measures, though group-level incentives had 
much smaller effects than bonuses for individual physicians. However, 4 studies 
showed unintended (perverse) effects, such as providers avoiding severely ill 
patients, or exhibiting gaming behaviour to increase payment. The authors 
concluded that financial incentives can improve quality, but cautioned against 
unequivocal support of such incentives due to these perverse effects, and because the 
studies evaluated very different incentive strategies and adopted different research 
methodologies. Reviews limited to randomized trials reached similar conclusions 
(Dudley et al. 2004; Institute of Medicine 2006). 
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However, Town et al. 2005, limiting their analysis to preventive care, found that 
only one of eight financial interventions led to significantly increased provision of 
prevention services. This was based on a review of randomized trials. The authors, 
though, stressed that their finding may reflect the small size of financial rewards 
offered in these interventions. 
Evidence on quality-based payment strategies has also started to emerge in LIC and 
LMIC settings, although this literature remains limited. Eichler 2006 found that the 
success of a number of tuberculosis programmes was often hypothesised to be due to 
the introduction of pay-for-performance schemes. However, these project appraisals 
were not able to disentangle incentive effects from other programme characteristics. 
In Haiti, Eichler et al. 2001 found that giving bonuses (penalties) if specific 
performance targets were met (not met) led to positive quality impacts in terms of 
improved immunization coverage. Evidence from Nicaragua also suggested that 
performance-based incentives had positive effects, in terms of greater local 
accountability and autonomy (Jack 2003), although the study did not analyse health 
service delivery impacts directly. However, the long-term sustainability of these 
schemes is unknown (McNamara 2005). Further, Liu and Mills 2005 found that 
whilst bonus payments in Chinese hospitals increased hospital revenue, there were 
also marked increases in unnecessary care. 
Soeters and Griffiths 2003, analysing the contracting out of health services to NGOs 
in five districts in Cambodia, found that utilization rates for essential primary care 
services improved in these districts relative to control sites. A key characteristic of 
NGO districts was changes to provider reimbursement, with doctors receiving 
performance-based incentives (linked to utilization rates and punctuality bonuses). 
In the Philippines, Quimbo et al. 2008 found that insurance payments and 
accreditation had positive quality impacts (as measured by vignettes). This was 
because they give financial incentives for providers to meet quality standards: health 
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insurance accreditation is based on external assessment of a provider's quality; 
insurance payments are not made if healthcare is inappropriate or fraudulent (on the 
basis of a claims review). 
2.5.2 Income-generating strategies 
Physicians and other frontline health providers, through their central role in a 
patient's healthcare, have the opportunity to engage in additional income-generating 
strategies. Evidence suggests that such activities can adversely affect the quality of 
health service delivery. As well as the traditional literature on supplier-induced 
demand (described in section 2.5.1), evidence has shown that health professionals 
sometimes demand informal fees, pilfer medicines, and alter their prescribing 
behaviour because of the incentive for financial gain. These incentives can be 
particularly strong in LIC and LMIC settings, due to health workers' need to cope 
with inadequate salaries (Van Lerberghe et al. 2002). 
Physician links with health facilities 
Physician dual practice, as discussed in section 2.4.1, has in theory both perverse 
and desirable incentive effects that can affect the quality of healthcare. However, 
there is scant empirical evidence related to its impact on health service delivery 
(Eggleston and Bir 2006; Ferrinho, Van Lerberghe et al. 2004; Garcia-Prado and 
Gonzalez 2007). 
There is some empirical evidence on physician links with ancillary health facilities, 
mainly from the US. For example, in the US physicians linked to ancillary private 
facilities consistently had different referral behaviour, resulting in policy regulations 
- the Stark laws (see Manchikanti and McMahon 2007 for details) - that severely 
limited self-referrals. Many studies showed how utilization and profits of facilities 
providing ancillary and outpatient services in the US were higher if these facilities 
had financial links with physicians (Lipper et al. 1995; Lynk and Longley 2002; 
Hillman et al. 1992; Scott and Mitchell 1994). In Taiwan, researchers analysing 
outpatient clinics found that the probability of prescription and drug expenditure per 
561 Page 
visit were, respectively, 17-34% and 12-36% less amongst visits to clinics without 
"on-site" pharmacists - pharmacists hired by physicians to dispense the drugs they 
prescribe (Chou et al. 2003). Later studies found that pharmacies linked with 
physicians accounted for a large and growing proportion of prescriptions in Taiwan 
(Chen et al. 2006; Lee et al. 2007). 
Dispensing physicians 
Other studies have evaluated the prescribing practices of dispensing physicians. A, 
review by Trap 2001 found that dispensing doctors typically prescribed more and/or 
more expensive medicines than non-dispensing doctors, with negative implications 
for the cost and technical quality of care. For instance, in Zimbabwe, dispensing 
doctors were found to deliver lower quality care - in terms of rational drug use and 
patient safety - than non-dispensing doctors (Trap et al. 2002). 
More recently, researchers found in South Korea that prescriptions for antibiotics 
and injections fell following the separation of drug prescribing and dispensing in 
2000. However, these were offset by physician demands for compensatory higher 
medical fees and an increase in prescriptions of high-price drugs (Kim and Prah 
Ruger 2008; Kwon 2003). 
Other coping practices 
Misappropriation of medicines occurs in poorly regulated environments and where 
health professionals have a low public sector income (see, for example, Ferrinho, 
Omar et al. 2004). They contribute to worse quality care by reducing medicine 
availability in public facilities. 
There is also widespread evidence of the existence of informal, or under-the-table, 
payments in healthcare (see, for instance, Balabanova and McKee 2002; Ensor 
2004). However, they do not adversely affect the quality of healthcare directly: their 
impact is instead on the distribution of healthcare financing. This can, though, 
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influence who receives better quality care if health providers exert more effort in 
treating patients who make informal payments. 
2.5.3 Incentives and patient characteristics 
Financial incentives 
A large and diverse literature has shown widespread inequities in many LIC and 
LMIC health systems (World Bank 2004). Whilst this reflects differential ability-to- 
pay and other demand-side factors related to the financing of healthcare, it may also 
be explained in part by health providers facing a financial incentive to discriminate 
between patients. 
Experience with waivers and exemptions from user fees help disentangle the 
provider incentive effect from demand-side factors. Bitran and Giedion 2003 show 
that waiver systems which compensate providers for the revenue forgone from 
granting exemptions have been more successful than those who expect the provider 
to absorb the cost of exemptions. In the latter system, providers are less willing to 
implement waivers, because of the financial disincentive to do so. 
Evidence on two-tier charging also suggests the importance of provider incentives, 
since differential ability-to-pay is reflected in part by differential patient charges. In 
Zambia, McPake et al. 2004 found that patients in private wards within public 
hospitals received more drugs and better access to minor operations than patients in 
standard public wards. This occurred despite policy stating public and private ward 
patients should receive healthcare of comparable clinical quality. Comparable 
findings were reported in Indonesia (Suwandono et al. 2001). 
Non-financial incentives 
Evidence shows that non-financial supply-side incentives are also important, with 
race, education, socioeconomic status and gender all frequently identified patient 
characteristics determining the quality of care (Chandler 2008). Much of this 
research has been qualitative, although some studies have explored this 
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quantitatively. For example, Sodemann et al. 2006 highlighted the importance of 
sociological incentives in Guinea-Bissau, where acquaintance with a physician was 
associated with a reduction in 30-day mortality risk by 48%. In Mexico, indigenous 
women received fewer prenatal procedures than non-indigenous women in private 
facilities, even after controlling for income and socioeconomic differences (Barber 
et al. 2007). In the US, Street et al. 2005 found that better educated patients were 
more able to influence the healthcare they receive from physicians. 
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2.6 Summary and some limitations 
A substantial literature has analysed how supply-side incentives can affect the 
behaviour of health workers, and consequently impact on the quantity and technical 
quality of healthcare patients receive. On the theoretical side, principal-agent models 
explored how provider payments and monitoring mechanisms can be designed to 
better align the incentives faced by health providers with patient needs. The new 
institutional economics literature showed how the incentives faced by health 
providers are shaped by the institutional environment. Hospital models and analysis 
of incentives in teams illustrated that an individual doctor's response to incentives 
are moderated by their interactions with other health providers. Theories of 
motivation demonstrated the importance of non-financial incentives, and how these 
can conflict with financial incentives. In terms of empirical evidence, many studies 
have shown the effects of different provider reimbursement mechanisms on 
healthcare delivery. Evidence has also found that doctors sometimes engage in 
additional income-generating strategies (such as dual practice and ownership of 
ancillary health facilities) because of the incentive for financial gain, and how such 
strategies can adversely affect healthcare. Other research has shown that health 
providers sometimes discriminate between patients, and that this may be due in part 
to financial and non-financial incentives inherent in treating different patients. 
The review also highlighted some gaps and unanswered questions in the literature. 
The research in this thesis seeks to address some of these gaps. For example, whilst 
the relative importance of various financial and non-financial incentives has been 
well studied in analysis of the determinants of health worker motivation, there has 
been little analysis of their relative impacts on actual health service delivery. 
Similarly, research has typically analysed how doctors facing different incentives 
can give different healthcare or how for one doctor the incentives inherent in 
treating different patients can lead to differential care, but has rarely combined these 
two aspects into one analysis. 
60IPage 
In terms of the literature on physician links with health facilities, most research has 
been on the impact of ancillary health facility ownership in the US. But there has 
been little analysis of this issue in LIC or LMIC settings. 
A more conceptual limitation relates to analysis of the relationship between the 
quantity and quality of healthcare provided. Though well-recognised, this has rarely 
been studied. The healthcare quality measurement literature focuses on whether 
health providers have done everything necessary to give good quality care, whereas 
the efficiency literature focuses on wasteful or unnecessary care, but neither analyse 
the relative importance of insufficient as compared with unnecessary care. 
In the next chapter, the methods used in this thesis to address some of these 
limitations are described. These include the theoretical and empirical approaches of 
the thesis, which form the basis for the subsequent results chapters. 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
The fundamental premise underpinning this study, that the healthcare a patient 
receives depends in part upon the incentives a doctor faces, was made in the 
introductory chapter. The literature review in chapter 2 expanded on how the 
incentive structure can have a profound effect on the quality of health service 
delivery. In this chapter, the research aims and objectives of the thesis are first 
specified. Then a conceptual framework and associated empirical methodology are 
developed. The conceptual framework builds on findings from the reviewed 
literature to highlight how different incentives can influence the healthcare doctors 
give to patients, and proposes a number of hypotheses. Empirical methods for testing 
these hypotheses and other theoretical insights emerging from the conceptual 
framework are then outlined. This includes a description of the data used. Discussion 
of the limitations of the methodological approach is reserved for the concluding 
chapter of the thesis. 
3.1 Research aim and objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse how the incentives faced by doctors in a lower- 
middle income country setting influence the quality of healthcare a patient receives. 
Specific objectives are to: 
1. Explore the conceptual and empirical relationship between the quantity and 
quality of healthcare; 
2. Analyse the impact of supply-side incentives on the quantity and quality of 
healthcare received by public hospital inpatients; 
3. Assess if doctors unduly influence patients' use and expenditure in ancillary 
health facilities with which they have financial links; 
4. Use the empirical results to inform discussion of incentive-related health policy 
reforms. 
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3.2 Conceptual Framework 
3.2.1 Rationale for the approach 
To understand how incentives affect the quality of health service delivery, this 
conceptual framework uses a simple application of the principal-agent model to 
analyse the doctor-patient relationship. It draws from the theoretical literature 
analysing incentives in healthcare. Of particular relevance are applications of the 
principal-agent model to healthcare (key references include: Chalkley and 
Malcomson 2000; McGuire 2000; McPake et al. 2007) and the role of non-financial 
factors in motivating health workers (key references include: Fehr and Falk 2002; 
Franco, Bennett et al. 2002). These and other articles were reviewed in section 2.4 of 
the last chapter. 
Although the principal-agent model has highly restrictive assumptions, it is chosen 
as the basis for this conceptual framework because it provides a robust foundation 
from which incentives can be analysed. Indeed, the main aim of the conceptual 
framework is to explore the problems arising in incentive design when these 
assumptions are relaxed, such as patients paying different amounts for healthcare 
and allowing for referrals. It also includes incorporating theories of motivation (and 
related empirical findings) to rationalise non-financial incentives within the 
principal-agent model. 
To keep the model parsimonious, the focus of the conceptual framework is on the 
doctor-patient interaction. This has the advantage of making hypotheses more 
straightforward and therefore easier to test empirically. But it does mean that there is 
only limited analysis of how group dynamics within a health system can affect an 
individual doctor's response to incentives (as shown by models of hospital 
behaviour and analysis of incentives in teams). Further, the conceptual framework 
does not analyse how institutions affect incentives. This does not present a major 
limitation here, given that the empirical chapters predominantly analyse doctors 
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working within similar governance structures (see section 2.4.2 fora review ot'the 
relevance of this literature to healthcare). 
3.2.2 Incentives, medical effort and quality 
Incentives have an eflcct on a patient's health outcome through their impact on the 
amount of medical effort a doctor (or other health worker) exerts on a patient, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. This effort is not only the medical equipment and drugs 
used in caring for a patient, but also the thought given by a doctor to the patient's 
diagnosis and treatment. That is, medical effort is defined here as the cognitive and 
physical activities that are required in caring for a patient. This is consistent with 
standard dictionary definitions of efforts. 




Medical effort exerted ýI Health outcome 
on patient by doctor of patient 
Technical Capacity 
-Quantity of inputs 
-Quality of inputs 
Health system characteristics; Patient characteristics 
Medical eFfort, though, can only have a positive impact on a patient's health ii' it is 
of good technical quality. Indeed, whilst more effort is generally expected to 
improve or at least not worsen a patient's health, too much physical effort can in 
some cases actually be harmful to the patient. For instance, prescribing a patient 
" For example, physical or mental exertion (Collins Dictionary); the physical or mental activity 
needed to achieve something (Cambridge Dictionary); strenuous physical or mental exertion (Oxford 
Dictionary). 
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medication that is not required could have a detrimental effect on the patient's 
health. Incentives to increase effort therefore may not always be health improving. 
Indeed, the supplier-induced demand literature (see sections 2.4 and 2.5) shows that 
doctors sometimes induce demand for healthcare, even though this care is not 
clinically needed. The relationship between medical effort and quality ofcare is 
explored in the first empirical results chapter. 
3.2.3 A simple application of the principal-agent model 
Model senup 
Consider a single patient (principal) - doctor (agent) interaction, where each is fully 
informed about each other's behaviour. Further, assume initially that the reward a 
doctor receives from treating a patient is limited to explicit financial rewards. The 
patient wants to improve his health outcome h at minimum cost: the reward r that is 
paid to the doctor, giving him a utility function: Up =k-r. Improving a patient's 
health requires costly medical effort from the doctor: Ii =f (e), with e assumed to be 
positively related to h. As stated earlier, effort can be understood as the cognitive 
and physical effort required in caring for a patient. The doctor's utility function is 
the reward received from the patient minus the effort in doing so: U,, =r-e. 
For the patient to maximise health outcome at minimum cost, he needs to pay the 
doctor in a way that motivates the doctor to provide an effort level e*, where the 
marginal cost and product of effort are equal: MC(e*) = MP(e*). If effort can be 
perfectly observed, the patient could simply pay the doctor r= e* if e* is provided, 
and zero otherwise. 't'his represents an effort dependent contract, with the penalty of 
no payment if effort level e* is not met. Similarly, government/insurers paying the 
doctor on behalf ofthe patient could pay a wage per unit of effort equal to the 
marginal product of the doctor at c*: r= iv x e, where ii' = MP(e*). This represents a 
wage contract that perfectly reflects a doctor's performance. In both cases, payments 
have high-powered financial incentives encouraging e*. More generally, payment 
methods need to be linked to e* to encourage an appropriate level of effort. 
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The remainder of this section analyses the implications for incentive design when 
assumptions inherent in this initial model setup are relaxed. In particular, sub-section 
[A] addresses asymmetric information; [B] explores the consequences of 
heterogeneous patients; [C] discusses the importance of various non-financial 
factors; [D] and [E] allow for multiple principals and multiple agents respectively; 
and [F] incorporates the possibility of referrals into the analysis. 
[A] Payment methods under asymmetric information 
Unless the effort a doctor exerts can be perfectly observed by the patient (or 
government / insurers), payment methods linked to e* are not feasible. Complicating 
incentive design further is the difficulty in gauging the extent to which 
improvements in a patient's health are attributable to a doctor's effort. These 
characteristics of healthcare are well-established (see, for example, Chalkley and 
Malcomson 2000). 
Alternatives to payments linked to e* can be grouped into payments that are 
retrospective and those that are prospective. Salaries and prospective payment 
systems (capitation and budgets) are expected to lead to under-effort, since they are 
not directly linked to effort exerted on a patient. That is, in each of these payment 
types, there is no direct financial incentive to exert effort on a patient, other than the 
risk of the patient seeking care from other doctors in the future (or the doctor losing 
their job within a health facility). In this sense, they have low-powered financial 
incentives. 
Conversely, commonly used retrospective payments (fee-for-service and many 
performance-based payments) have high-powered financial incentives. They 
encourage higher levels of effort, but only in the effort proxies for which a doctor is 
reimbursed. For example, in fee-for-service reimbursement, the doctor will be prone 
to providing too many reimbursed services (i. e. the marginal cost of providing these 
services being higher than their marginal benefit), at the expense of the less 
measurable aspects of healthcare that are not reimbursed. Similar incentives hold 
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true for many performance-based payments. For instance, financially penalising a 
doctor for not meeting quality standards (or equivalently, paying a bonus for 
meeting such standards) only encourages more appropriate effort if these standards 
are an accurate indicator of good quality care. In other words, more effort as 
measured by any of these proxies is only desirable when effort proxies are well 
correlated with e*. 
In summary, doctors paid retrospectively will exert more observable effort than 
doctors paid prospectively. However, retrospective payments will only encourage an 
appropriate effort level if payments are well correlated with e*. Consequently, it is 
therefore not evident whether prospective or retrospective payment systems should 
be preferred9. 
[B] Heterogeneous patients 
When the model is extended to multiple patients, and if the amount paid by (or on 
behalf of) patients to a doctor varies across patients, then doctors have a financial 
incentive to exert more effort on patients paying more. This incentive is accentuated 
if the doctor has significant time and other resource constraints. 
To illustrate, a doctor treats 2 patients. Patient 1 is able and/or willing to pay r1, 
whereas patient 2 is only able and/or willing to pay r2, where r> > r2. If the doctor 
exerts the same effort on each patient (el = e2), then she derives more utility from 
treating patient 1. That is, [ri - ei] > [r2 - e2] where r> > r2 and e1= e2. She will only 
be indifferent between treating these two patients when [r j-e j] = [r2 - e2]. Given rl 
> r2, this can only be when el> e2i that is when she exerts more effort on the patient 
who pays her more. This shows that more effort will be exerted on patients from 
9 The New Institutional Economics literature (see section 2.4.2) would suggest that payment methods 
with lower-powered incentives are preferable if the transaction between patient and doctor is 
complex, with the converse holding true for high-powered incentives. Given that effort cannot be 
easily observed, and that a patient's health outcome occurs after a time lag, with improvements not 
necessarily attributable to the doctor, many patient-doctor interactions can be interpreted as complex. 
However, new institutional economics says little about a doctor's expected behaviour, the focal point 
of this study. Instead, it is more appropriate instead for comparisons of the relative virtues of different 
governance structures. 
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whom a doctor receives a higher financial reward. Thus although differential pricing 
benefits poorer patients financially, there is a risk that it disadvantages them in terms 
of the amount of medical effort exerted. 
[C] Non-financial factors 
As discussed in the literature review, doctors are not only motivated by financial 
concerns. Professionalism and concern for a patient's well-being moderate a 
doctor's response to financial incentives. More precisely, the extent to which a 
doctor responds to financial incentives depends on the relative weight s/he places on 
personal financial gain vis-ä-vis a patient's well-being, assuming these two 
objectives are not aligned. 
Nevertheless, non-financial factors may still enter into a doctor's decision to 
discriminate among patients in their application of effort. Specifically, if non- 
financial rewards differ amongst patients, then doctors will exert more effort on 
patients from whom they receive a higher non-financial reward. This is for the same 
rationale as described above for differences in the amount paid by patients. Reasons 
for variation in non-financial reward among patients include doctors expecting 
higher reciprocal gains from some patients compared with others, or because doctors 
perceive certain patients to be more in need or more deserving of healthcare (see, for 
example, Fehr and Falk 2002). 
Patients may also differ in their ability to advocate for more effort from a doctor (as 
shown, for instance, by Street et al. 2005). For example, some patients may be more 
knowledgeable about appropriate care, and thus better at influencing the doctor to 
provide this (independently of the financial reward paid to a doctor). More generally, 
information-related policies, such as performance monitoring and feedback, can 
improve the identification of effort. When linked to financial or non-financial 
rewards (or penalties), they can be used to encourage doctors to provide effort levels 
closer to e* for all patients. 
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In summaiy, non-financial factors imply that more effort will be exerted on patients 
that a doctor receives a higher non-financial reward from, and on patients who are 
better able to advocate for more care. Such effects, though, will be moderated if 
doctors are effectively monitored, and by a doctor's concern for a patient's well- 
being, both of which will encourage a doctor to provide a more appropriate effort 
level. 
[D] Multiple principals 
Secondary principals (government or insurers) often pay in part for a patient's 
healthcare, particularly within public health facilities. Within this conceptual 
framework, whether the patient pays directly or a secondary principal pays on behalf 
of the patient, the incentives a doctor faces are conceptually identical. That is, a 
doctor's utility function remains as Ud =r-e, whoever pays the doctor reward r. 
Further, the objectives of the patient and secondary principal are aligned in the sense 
that they both want to improve the patient's health at minimum cost. 
However, the health insurance literature demonstrates that insured patients with 
comprehensive coverage (i. e. zero or low co-payments) have little incentive to 
contain healthcare costs once they fall sick, since insurance will reimburse their 
healthcare costs. This is referred to as ex post moral hazard (see Cutler and 
Zeckhauser 2000 for a detailed discussion of moral hazard in health insurance). 
Within this model, it means that the negative value of r in an insured patient's utility 
function is less than the positive value of r in a doctor's utility function. Coupled 
with the insured typically being able to pay more for healthcare than the non-insured 
in low-middle income countries, doctors therefore face an incentive to exert more 
effort on insured patients. 
[E] Multiple agents 
A doctor's response to incentives is the focus of this study. However, doctors are 
only one of multiple agents responsible for the healthcare a patient receives. Whilst 
all health workers can be described as having the same general utility function, the 
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value and components of r and e in treating a patient may vary across different 
agents. Of most relevance here is how the incentives faced by doctors responsible 
for the patient's treatment plan may conflict with incentives at the hospital (or other 
health facility) management level. For instance, if a doctor receives a flat annual 
salary, then the incentive to, exert more effort on patients paying more only exists at 
the hospital management level. Similarly, the incentive to contain healthcare costs is 
stronger at the hospital management level than the individual doctor level. 
Such differences matter because doctors, as a frontline provider, have significant 
discretion in how health services are ultimately delivered (Lipsky 1980). Whether a 
doctor is affected by hospital-level incentives thus depends on how able hospital 
management is to influence the doctor's behaviour. This occurs when hospital 
management level and doctor level incentives are aligned. In relation to differential 
patient charges, incentives are aligned when doctors receive a share of these 
revenues. For cost containment, there is greater incentive alignment when doctors 
are held accountable for their input use. 
[F] Referrals 
As well as healthcare provided within a health facility, patients may need to be 
referred to ancillary health facilities for additional healthcare. For example, a patient 
may need to visit a pharmacy if prescribed drugs are not available within the 
doctor's health facility. Similarly, a patient may have to go to a diagnostic clinic if 
the doctor's health facility does not have the medical equipment to undertake the 
required diagnostic tests. A doctor, as the patient's agent, is responsible for such 
referral decisions. If the doctor has no connection with these external health 
facilities, then her utility is unaffected by the facility to which she refers the patient. 
In contrast, if a doctor owns or has financial links with an external ancillary health 
facility, then she has a financial incentive to refer patients to such facilities. In the 
case of pharmacy ownership, it creates a perverse financial incentive to over- 
prescribe. If the doctor owns a diagnostic clinic, the perverse incentive is for the 
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physician to recommend tests that are not medically necessary. In both cases, 
patients are therefore likely to spend more on healthcare than they strictly need to. 
By this, it means that the marginal benefit of this healthcare is less than its marginal 
cost. These perverse incentives are more marked when patients pay directly for 
drugs themselves or when drugs are retrospectively reimbursed by insurers on a fee- 
for-service basis (as compared with prospective drug reimbursement), since financial 
gain is then directly linked to prescribing and referral strategies. 
In summary, this theoretical framework demonstrates that doctors face financial and 
non-financial incentives to discriminate between patients, irrespective of actual 
health need. It also shows that a doctor's referral behaviour is affected by potential 
financial gain, and more generally that doctors respond to the method in which they 
are paid. Effective monitoring, and better informed patients, can encourage doctors 
to provide more appropriate healthcare. These theoretical insights are based on the 
impact incentives have on the amount of medical effort a doctor exerts on a patient, 
with the impact of incentives on a patient's health outcome depending on the 
technical quality of this medical effort. . 
From this conceptual framework, 11 hypotheses are proposed (with the section from 
which the hypothesis is derived in square brackets). The following 8 hypotheses are 
empirically tested: 
1. Retrospective payments only encourage an appropriate effort level if payments are well 
correlated with e* [A]. 
2. More effort will be exerted on patients that a doctor receives a higher financial reward 
from [B]. 
3. More effort will be exerted on patients from whom a doctor receives a higher non-financial 
reward [C]. 
4. More effort will be exerted on patients who are better able to advocate for more care [C]. 
5. Doctors that are effectively monitored will provide a more appropriate effort level [C]. 
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6. More effort will be exerted on the insured than the non-insured (independent of the reward 
a doctor receives from a patient) [D]. 
7. Doctors owning (or having financial links with) external ancillary health facilities will refer 
patients to such facilities [F]. 
8. Patients referred to doctor-owned ancillary facilities will spend more on healthcare than 
they need to [F]. 
A further 3 hypotheses are not empirically tested, due to data constraints: 
9. Doctors paid retrospectively will exert more observable effort than doctors paid 
prospectively [A]. 
I O. Concem for a patient's well-being moderates the impact of financial incentives [C]. 
11. Incentives at the health facility level will have less effect on individual doctors if these 
doctors face different incentives [E]. 
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3.3 Overview of empirical methodology 
In this section, the empirical methods used to test the theoretical insights of the 
conceptual framework are introduced. Subsequently, details of the data used are 
described, including study site characteristics, sampling strategies and methods of 
data collection. Note that the econometric models used in the empirical analysis are 
discussed in detail in each of the three results chapters (chapters 5,6 and 7). 
3.3.1 Links with conceptual framework and research* objectives 
The conceptual framework, building on an extensive literature, analysed the impact 
of incentives on health service delivery. It demonstrated how incentives can 
influence the amount of medical effort a doctor exerts on a patient, and through this 
effect, alters the quality of healthcare a patient receives. A variety of empirical 
methods are used to test these theoretical insights, with data coming from both 
primary and secondary sources. Table 3.1 illustrates how these empirical approaches 
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Secondary data were used to address the first and second research objectives. 
Primary data were used to evaluate the third research objective. 
SECONDARYDATA 
The following description of secondary data that was used for the thesis draws 
heavily from project documents. Unless stated, facts and figures in this section are 
from Peabody, Solon et al. 2004; Peabody and Solon 2003; or Shimkhada et al. 
2008. 
Secondary data came from the Philippine Child Health Experiment, known locally 
as QIDS (Quality Improvement Demonstration Study). This large-scale study, 
covering thirty districts in the Philippines, explored the impact of policy 
interventions on provider behaviour and access to healthcare for children aged five 
years or under. As part of the QIDS study, facility, patient exit, physician (including 
clinical vignettes) and household surveys were conducted, although household 
survey data were not used in this thesis. Facility and patient exit surveys were 
collected exclusively in district hospitals; physician data in district hospitals and 
private clinics. The secondary data were used for the first two empirical results 
chapters (chapters 5 and 6). 
Study site characteristics 
The QIDS study randomly sampled 30 districts in the Visayan island group and the 
northern tip of Mindanao. Study districts are marked on the map in Figure 3.2. The 
focal point of each study district was its public hospital. These were typically located 
in the district's main commercial centre, usually a municipality or small city 
(hereafter referred to collectively as a town). 
Study districts were situated within one of 11 provinces, which in turn were located 
in one of regions 6,7,8 and 10 of the country (the Philippines has in total seventeen 
administrative regions). Table 3.2 shows that per capita incomes in the study regions 
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were close to or below the national average and much lower than in Metro Manila 
(the National Capital Region). Similarly, the percentage of families living below the 
national poverty threshold (defined as food plus non-food basic needs) was higher 
than the national average in all study regions. 
Table 3.2: Income and poverty incidence in the study area 
GDP per capita index (national Poverty incidence of 
average=100), 20071 families, 200611 
Philippines (national average) 100 26.9% 
National Capital Region 261 7.1% 
Region 6 90 31.1% 
Region 7 96 30.3% 
Region 8 45 40.7% 
Region 10 107 36.1% 
'National Statistical Coordination Board http: //www. nscb. gov. ph/jzrdp/2007/2007concap. a s 
" Family Income and Expenditure Survey (2000). 
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QIDS policy interventions and their assignment to study districts 
The 30 study sites were matched into blocks of three districts, each block being 
similar in terms of health system, socioeconomic and population characteristics. 
More precisely, each matched block had a similar (within 10-25% of the block's 
average) population size, average income, labour force participation rate, functional 
literacy, infant and maternal mortality rates, health insurance coverage, rural-urban 
population mix and proximity to Manila. 
Within each block, one district was randomly assigned to the QIDS `access' policy 
intervention, the second to the QIDS `bonus' intervention, with the third being the 
control site. In access sites, the breadth and scope of health insurance coverage was 
expanded. Population coverage was increased by making PHIC membership freely 
available to all families with indigent children aged five years and under. The scope 
of PHIC insurance was expanded by increasing the reimbursement ceiling, so that 
most ordinary pneumonia and diarrhoea cases treated at a participating public 
hospital. would have 100% financial coverage. 
In bonus sites, physicians and other public hospital staff received increased 
reimbursement if pre-determined quality standards were met. Standards were based 
on a weighted average of- 
-The clinical vignette scores of physicians randomly selected from within the 
hospital (weight=0.7). Vignette scores are equal to the percentage of vignette 
items correctly answered by these physicians. 
-Hospital-level patient satisfaction scores (weight=0.1). A hospital's percentage 
scores were based on the average response of patients to 18 patient satisfaction 
questions they were asked in the exit survey. 
-The hospital meeting a minimum patient case load (weight=0.2). The hospital 
scored 100% if at least 10 patients were visited by sampled physicians per 8 hours 
worked, with caseloads below this scored proportionally. 
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A qualification threshold was set ex ante twice yearly by the QIDS study team, so 
that approximately half of the physicians would be expected to qualify for a bonus. 
If this threshold was met, half of the bonus payment went to physicians, with the 
other half distributed amongst the remaining hospital staff. 
Table 3.3 describes the distribution of public hospitals across the 30 study districts 
to the access and bonus policy interventions. 
Table 3.3 Public hospitals and policy interventions 
Province Public Hospital Intervention 
Roxas Memorial Provincial Hospital Access 
Capiz Mambusao District Hospital Bonus 
Bailan District Hospital Control 
Pedro Trono Memorial Provincial Hospital Access 
Iloilo Ramon Tabiana Memorial District Hospital Bonus 
Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Memorial_District Hospital Control 
Valladolid District Hospital Access 
Negros Occidental Kabankalan District Hospital Bonus 
wýýýMµ w Wýý w 
Alfredo Maranon Sr. Memorial Hospital 
M 
Control 
Teodoro P. Galagar Memorial Hospital Access 
Bohol Cong. Simeon Toribio Memorial Hospital Bonus 
Cong. Natalio P. Castillo Memorial Hospital Control 
Danao District Hospital Access 
Cebu Lapu-lapu District Hospital Bonus 
Severn Verallo Memorial Hospital 
..... _.... ___.................. _..... 
Control 
Bais District Hospital Access 
Negros Oriental Gov. William Villegas Memorial Hospital Bonus 
Bayawan District Hospital___ Control 
Island Triplet (Biliran Biliran Provincial Hospital 
Access 
, Camiguin S Siquijor) 
Hospital Islnd General l i Bonus 
S qu or n ial Hospital Pro v Control 
Leyte Provincial Hospital Access 
Carigara District Hospital Bonus 
Leyte Hilongos District Hospital 
Control 
Dr. Manuel B. Veloso Memorial Hospital Access 
Abuyog District Hospital Bonus 
Burauen District Hospital Control 
Taft District Hospital Access 
Eastern Samar Albino M. Duran Memorial Hospital Bonus 
Oras District Hospital Control 
Note: based on table from the QIDS Implementation Manual. 
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QIDS surveys used 
Each of the QIDS surveys was conducted twice, in two distinct time periods 
(November 2003-December 2004, and September 2006-June 2007). The first time 
period was a pre-intervention baseline study; the second time period reflected a post- 
intervention study. 
The QIDS surveys were developed in conjunction with the Philippine Department of 
Health, and were based on previously validated survey instruments used in other 
country settings. Each survey was pre-tested in pilot locations separate to the study 
sites but with similar socioeconomic and health system characteristics. Data 
collectors received extensive training on survey methods. All interviews were 
conducted in the local dialect, although questionnaires were printed in English (other 
than the consent portion, which was written in both English and the local dialect). 
The QIDS surveys used in this thesis are described below, and can be found in the 
appendix. 
For the patient exit survey, the sample comprised inpatient cases of children aged 
five years or less. The child's mother (or other carer) was interviewed immediately 
after the child was discharged. The relevant questions for this research were those 
related to the child's admission, the child's health status and their household's 
socioeconomic status. In each of the 30 hospitals, interviews were conducted for at 
least 30 children with pneumonia, 30 with diarrhoea and 30 with other illnesses. 
These were identified from a hospital's daily activity reports, with the mother (or 
other carer) of all children with a final diagnosis of pneumonia or diarrhoea 
sequentially interviewed until the sample size of 30 was achieved. 
The facility survey was undertaken in all 30 hospitals, with the relevant questions for 
this thesis being related to the availability of essential medical inputs and the 
hospital's case load. The hospital director or senior administrative officer completed 
this survey. 
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For the physician survey, a list of public and private clinicians was collected for the 
catchment areas of all 30 hospitals (the following sampling information for the 
physician survey comes from Quimbo et al. 2008). For inclusion in the study sample 
frame, physicians needed to be graduates of an accredited medical school. Public 
physicians had to work full-time in public hospitals; private physicians had to live in 
the same district as the public hospital and serve the same geographic population. 
Although doctors were not required to be paediatricians, children had to account for 
a significant amount of their practice. For doctors who met these conditions, three 
randomly selected public physicians per public hospital, and two randomly selected 
private doctors were interviewed in each of the 30 study districts. Clinical vignettes 
on paediatric pneumonia, diarrhoea and dermatological cases were administered to 
these doctors. Questions on their clinical experience and training were also asked. 
PRIMARYDATA 
Primary data were collected from seven of the thirty QIDS study districts. These 
were pharmacy customer exit surveys, conducted after a customer had just 
purchased medication from a private pharmacy. This survey was used for the third 
results chapter (chapter 7). 
Sample frame 
Six districts were purposively selected from among the thirty districts used in the 
QIDS study. District selection was based on: 
-The district having at least one pharmacy in the district's main commercial centre 
owned by a public hospital physician 
-Representation of each QIDS intervention type - access and bonus policy 
interventions, as well as control sites. 
A seventh district (Palompon) was added because in one of the districts (Bais) the 
pharmacy owned by a public hospital physician was closed throughout the study 
period. The selected districts are located in Regions 7 and 8 of the Philippines (the 
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QIDS study was conducted in Regions 6,7,8 and 10). In each district, the research 
was conducted in its main commercial centre. 
The selected sites have similar health system infrastructure, although the income per 
capita in Region 8 is less than half of that in Region 7 (see Table 3.4). For each site, 
all pharmacies within a 30 minute walk of the town's public district hospital were 
included in the sampling frame, giving a total of 46 pharmacies. 
Table 3.4: Health infrastructure in study sites 
District Region QIDS type 
Health system infrastructure 
# Pharmacies # Private 
Clinics 
Closest tertiary hospital 
Bais 7 Access 7 2 1 hour / 45 km 
Guilhulgnan 7 Bonus 5 2 3.5 hours / 117km 
Bayawan 7 Control 11 6 2.5 hours / 102km 
Palompon 8 Access 6 1 3.5 hours / 140km 
Taft 8 Access 4 2 2 hours / 49km 
Abuyog 8 Bonus 7 2 1 hour/ 58km 
Oras 8 Control 6 2 4 hours / 85km 
Sample selection 
To select the sample of pharmacies for the exit survey, a screening interview was 
administered with the pharmacy owner and/or chief pharmacist (see the appendix for 
the topic guide used for these interviews). The interview was conducted in English, 
with a translator present to assist on demand. The screening interview provided 
information on the pharmacy's ownership and location. The screening interview was 
administered to 39 of the 46 pharmacies. Of the 7 pharmacies not available for 
screening, 3 refused to be interviewed (all independently owned), and 4 more 
pharmacies were closed throughout the study period (two independently owned; two 
owned by, or with familial links to, public hospital physicians). 
Consequently, the following pharmacy types were chosen for the pharmacy exit 
surveys: 
-All pharmacies owned by, or with direct familial links (parent, sibling or offspring) 
to, a public hospital physician. 
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-All pharmacies owned by, or with direct familial links to10, a private clinic 
physician. 
-All pharmacies located next to the hospital (i. e. on the same street and within a two 
minutes' walk). 
- Controls of two or more randomly selected independent pharmacies per site. An 
independent pharmacy is defined as: a pharmacy that is not owned by, nor has 
direct familial links with, a public or private physician. 
This gave a sample of 29 from a total of 46 pharmacies, of which 39 were available 
for the screening interview. 
The screening interview also enabled data to be collected on the price and 
availability of certain essential medicines. This was done in 35 of the 39 pharmacies 
that took part in the screening interview. Three of the four pharmacies that did not 
provide data on medicine price and availability were independently owned; one had 
familial links with a public hospital physician. Medicine price and availability data 
were also collected in the public hospital pharmacies in each of the seven sites. 
Data collection 
Data collection took place over the four month period of March-May 2007 (March 
2007 in Region 7 districts, followed by mid-April to end of May in Region 8 
districts). Exit surveys of pharmacy customers were chosen in preference to the 
alternative of interviewing patients directly after physician consultations. This was 
because in the latter, purchasing intentions may not reflect reality, the interview may 
bias a patient's subsequent purchasing behaviour, and no analysis of over-the- 
counter purchases is possible. 
Sample size calculations were made to determine minimum sample requirements. 
The fundamental statistical question driving this was the expected difference in the 
10 The terms 'owned by', with 'familial links' to, or 'linked with', a physician, are used interchangeably from 
this point on. 
83IPage 
proportion of referrals from a public district hospital to: (1) public physician owned 
pharmacies, and (2) independent pharmacies. There were no data available on this in 
the literature, so piloting of the exit survey was done in a district with a similar 
health infrastructure and socioeconomic characteristics (but located much closer to 
the capital city, Manila, for logistical reasons). 
From this piloting exercise, the expected proportion of users referred from the local 
public district hospital was estimated to be one-third for public physician owned and 
one-sixth for independent pharmacies. Given a significance level of 95% (two-sided) 
and a study power of 90%, this yielded a required sample size of 92 pharmacy 
customers in public physician owned pharmacies and 268 for independent 
pharmacies. Data clustering is likely, but there is no prior information from other 
studies in the literature to estimate what the design effect would be. Clustering was 
therefore controlled for in the analysis, with the potential risk that models would not 
have sufficient power. 
The actual sample size was 358 and 992 pharmacy customers for public physician 
owned and independent pharmacies respectively, with data pooled across the 7 
district study sites. Such a large sample (relative to sample size calculations) was 
used for opportunistic reasons as well as likely data clustering: there were high fixed 
costs of reaching pharmacies in the sample, so as many pharmacy customers as 
possible were interviewed during field visits. 
A cross-sectional study design was used, with respondents interviewed immediately 
after purchasing medicines from a pharmacy. They were asked if they received a 
prescription, and if so, from whom, what they bought, and questions related to their 
socioeconomic status (see appendix for the questionnaire used). 40-60 customers 
were interviewed per pharmacy, with a minimum timeframe of one day per 
pharmacy. In each pharmacy, all customers purchasing any kind of medication were 
interviewed. Interviewing was sequential. At busy times this meant some pharmacy 
customers left before they could be interviewed. 
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The pharmacy exit surveys were conducted by six local research assistants. All had 
previously undertaken hospital exit surveys in the district/s they were assigned to as 
part of the QIDS study, and consequently had received substantial training on survey 
methods. Additional training was given, explaining to the assistants the purpose of 
this study as well as a step-by-step explanation and practice run of the actual exit 
survey. The data collectors interviewed pharmacy customers in the local dialect 
(Cebuano for Region 7, and Waray-Waray for Region 8), although questionnaires 
were printed in English (other than the consent portion, which was written in both 
English and the local dialect). Standardised translations into the local dialect were 
provided to the data collectors to ensure uniform interpretation of English words. 
During the screening interview, pharmacy owners were told that their pharmacy may 
be selected for these exit surveys, and that if they were to be conducted at their 
pharmacy, this would be done sometime within the two weeks following the 
screening interview. Pharmacy owners were not informed beforehand of the exact 
day/s of interview. 
Data collected were entered twice by two different people. Checks for errors in data 
entry were done using the computer programme Epi Info, version 3 
(http: //www. cdc. gov/epiinfo/). This programme highlighted any discrepancies 
between the two data entrants. Such discrepancies were then checked against the 
hard copies of the completed questionnaires, and any errors corrected. 
3.3.3 Impact of funding on the research 
Funding for the thesis came from a joint interdisciplinary studentship from the 
Economic and Social Council and the Medical Research Council. After being 
offered the studentship, no conditions on the content of the thesis were imposed. 
Nevertheless, the nature of this funding influenced the topic of the thesis, since 
funding was only available to PhD theses that cross the social science and medical 
851Pagc 
disciplines. Indeed, a requirement of the studentship was that the PhD candidate 
should have one social science and one clinical supervisor. 
3.3.4 Ethical considerations and permissions; obtaining data 
Ethical approval and government permissions were obtained for both primary and 
secondary data. For primary data, ethics approval was obtained from the University 
of the Philippines and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. For 
secondary data, ethics approval was obtained from the University of the Philippines 
and the University of California San Francisco. 
For both primary and secondary data, permissions to undertake the research were 
first given by the Department of Health. Subsequently, for each study site, approval 
from the mayor's office was acquired before conducting data collection. In all data 
collection methods, participation was entirely voluntary and anonymity was 
guaranteed. Permission to use the secondary data was obtained from the principal 
investigators of the QIDS study (John Peabody and Orvile Solon). 
3.3.5 Overview of empirical approaches 
Results part 1 (chapter 5): Medical effort and quality of care 
As shown in Table 4.1, in a first results chapter the relationship between the quantity 
and quality of care is explored. Clinical vignettes are used to compare a doctor's 
recommended treatment plan for a specific condition with a standard treatment plan 
that reflects best practice in a low to middle-income setting. This treatment plan is 
an empirical proxy for medical effort, incorporating cognitive and physical aspects 
of care. Vignettes are disaggregated, enabling empirical measurement of both 
insufficient and unnecessary care. Insufficient and unnecessary care are both 
analysed in terms of their expected cost and health consequences, and their 
determinants. Finally, patterns of inappropriate care are explored, that is, whether 
doctors are more likely to provide too little or too much care. 
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This stage of analysis also provides a quality perspective for subsequent empirical 
analyses of the impact of incentives on medical effort. Chapter 5 provides a 
comprehensive description of how these vignettes were used to analyse the 
relationship between medical effort and quality of care, and corresponding empirical 
results. 
Results part 2 (chapter 6): Incentives and hospital inpatient care 
In a second results chapter, analysis focuses on the impact of incentives on the 
amount of medical effort a hospital inpatient receives. Empirical measures of 
medical effort are based on both the volume and type of health services a patient 
receives. These are used as dependent variables in a variety of regression 
specifications. 
Explanatory variables test some of the conceptual framework's key insights, 
particularly the financial and non-financial incentives a doctor faces to discriminate 
between patients, and the role of monitoring and information. Regressions also 
controlled for variation in hospitals' technical capacities and patients' illnesses (both 
severity and disease type). Chapter 6 provides information on the exact set of 
dependent and independent variables used. Modelling strategies, and subsequent 
empirical results, are also described in that chapter. 
Results part 3 (chapter 7): Incentives and a doctor's referral behaviour 
In the final results chapter, a doctor's referral behaviour is scrutinised, assessing 
whether doctors unduly influence a patient's use and expenditure in private 
pharmacies. A first set of regressions analyse whether physicians with direct familial 
links to a private pharmacy influence patients to use their pharmacy. A subsequent 
regression set evaluates the determinants of health expenditure, assessing whether 
patients with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning physicians spend more in 
pharmacies than patients with prescriptions from other physicians. Finally, observed 
pharmaceutical expenditures are compared with simulated generic expenditures, to 
assess whether patients with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning public physicians 
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would spend less if generic medicines were fully available within public district 
hospitals. Chapter 7 details the regressions and simulations required for this analysis, 
along with corresponding empirical results. 
Before the results from these three empirical chapters are presented, the next chapter 
describes the study setting. This provides a context for the empirical research of this 
thesis. 
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Chapter 4: Study setting 
This chapter provides a general overview of the Philippines. In later chapters, there 
are additional discussions of specific aspects of the Philippine health system relevant 
to individual results chapters and associated policy implications. 
4.1 Country characteristics 
The Philippines is an archipelago of 7107 islands. It is a lower-middle income 
country located in Southeast Asia, in the western part of the Pacific Ocean. The 
Philippines has development characteristics that are broadly comparable with other 
countries at a similar income level, although it has a relatively high level of income 
inequality (see Balisacan 2003 for an analysis of inequity in the Philippines). Table 
4.1 provides some key data on its demography, socioeconomic characteristics and 
health profile. 
Table 4.1 Key data on the Philippines 
Population [millions, 2007]. 88.6m [Census] 
Population growth rate [%, 2007] 2% [Census] 
Population living in urban areas [%, 20041 52% [NSO] 
Socioeconomic characteristics 
GNP per capita [in USD, 2007] $1620 [WB-WDI] 
GDP per capita [in USD, 2007] $1363 [WB-WDI] 
GDP per capita [at purchasing power parity, 2007] $3730 [WB-WDI] 
Growth rate [of GDP per capita, 2007] 7% [WB-WDI] 
Inequity and poverty: 
- GINI coefficient [2006] 0.4580 [FIES] 
- Households living below poverty threshold [%, 2006] 26.9% [FPS] 
- Households living below food subsistence threshold [%, 20061 11 % [FPS] 
Health profile 
Female/Male life expectancy at birth [2005] 73 / 68 [NSO] 
Infant Mortality Rate [per 1000 live births, 2006] 24 [FPS] 
Under-five Mortality Rate [per 1000 live births, 2006] 32 [FPS] 
Maternal Mortality Rate [per 100,000 live births, 2006] 162 [ FPS] 
Note the website htto: l/www. nsob. gov. iDh/ collates statistical information from various sources for the Philippines. It was the 
data source for the Census data; FIES (Family Income and Expenditure Survey); FPS (Family Planning Survey); and NSO 
(National Statistical Office). The other data source used was WB-WDI (an acronym for: World Bank-World Development 
Indicators). 
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Figures 4.1 a and 4. lb compare selected health indicators of the Philippines with 
other countries. They show that the Philippines has a health profile that is broadly in 
line with other countries which are at similar levels of economic development. 
Figure 4.1 a Plot of Under-five mortality rate -G DP per capita (131 low and 
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4.2 Government administration and political economy 
In the Philippines, government is divided into the central level and three local 
government unit (LGU) levels - 81 provinces, 1631 municipalities/cities, and 41995 
barangays (villages) as of December 2008 - with elections occurring at each of these 
levels http: //www. nscb. gov. ph/activestats/pslzc/. These LGUs are grouped into 17 
administrative regions. 
Since the Local Government Code in 1991 instituted a major devolution of 
government, LGUs at each of the three levels receive a block grant through the 
Internal Revenue Allotment. This grant is split between the different LGU levels, 
and uses a predetermined formula fixed by law that is based on population, land and 
equal sharing per LGU (Manasan 2007). LGUs have had considerable autonomy in 
the use of revenues across health and other services, and some limited scope to raise 
revenues locally". More ad hoc categorical grants provide some additional funding 
for specific purposes, and are typically targeted at the poorer LGUs. 
The government's civil service, responsible for public sector health services and 
regulation of private healthcare, operates within a democratic multi-party system. A 
free media and active civil society provide in principle checks and balances on the 
executive power of the president (de Dios and Hutchcroft 2003). Together, these 
offer important monitoring mechanisms for health system performance: the 
population can choose whether to re-elect politicians at local levels as well as the 
central level, and are better informed through the media and civil society 
movements. 
However, political economy factors can hinder the effectiveness of LGUs to deliver 
healthcare and other services. Balisacan and Hill 2003 stress the `highly 
personalised' nature of the political system as an impediment to policy reform and 
" Note that the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) has greater scope on fiscal 
policy than elsewhere in the country, and also receives additional financial support from the central 
government. 
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implementation. Similarly, de Dios 2007 highlights the conflicts between `elite 
factions' as an adverse affect on economic development. Such political economy 
concerns are relevant because after each regime change (nationally or locally) there 
are concurrent personnel changes within the civil service. This can affect the relative 
priority afforded to the health sector and, more generally, policy consistency, over 
time. 
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4.3 The financing and provision of healthcare 
Facts and figures in this section, unless otherwise stated, come from the Philippine 
National Objectives for Health (NOH) 2005-20 10 (Department of Health 2005). 
4.3.1 Healthcare financing 
According to the latest National Health Accounts (NHA) figures, total health 
expenditure was 181 billion Philippine Pesos (PHP) in 2005 
(http: //www. nscb. gov. ph/stats/pnha/2005/default. asp). This amounted to 3.3% of 
GDP and was equivalent to 2120 PHP per capita ($38.5 USD). For the period 1991- 
2005, per capita health expenditures have, in real terms, been growing at an average 
annual rate of 3.6%. 
Healthcare is financed through a variety of sources (chapter 6 explores how this mix 
of sources can affect the quality of hospital care). Government contributes to the 
operating expenses of public health facilities, as well as a variety of public health 
programmes (section 4.3.2 describes the government's role in the provision of health 
services). This funding is paid to providers through budgets for health facilities and 
fixed salaries for public health workers. 
The Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC) reimburses members for the 
inpatient services they receive in accredited public and private hospitals. 
Reimbursement to members is on a first peso basis, with budget ceilings for different 
health service categories (Obermann et al. 2006). The hospitals providing these 
services are reimbursed by PHIC through a fee-for-service system, with the hospital 
manager distributing these to hospital staff (the attending physician, though, always 
receives some payment for treating a PHIC member). In 2006, PHIC had reached 
nearly 70 million beneficiaries, covering approximately 79% of the population 
(Shimkhada et al. 2008). Following the National Health Insurance Law of 1995, 
PHIC aims to move towards universal population coverage, expand insurance 
benefits and ensuie high quality care (both the technical and interpersonal aspects of 
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healthcare quality). Private insurance provides supplementary insurance, particularly 
in the National Capital Region. 
Despite these different prepayment sources, insured as well as uninsured households 
continue to spend significant amounts in the form of out-of-pocket (OOP) 
expenditures. These expenditures are made within public and private hospitals 
(including consultations, room and board charges, and, when available, medicines 
and diagnostic services), as well as in private pharmacies and other ancillary health 
facilities. Further, the amount charged to patients can vary within and as well as 
across hospitals (Capuno 2006). 
NHA figures illustrate that OOP health expenditures by households were the 
principal source of funds in 2005, amounting to 88 billion PHP, and equivalent to 
1032 PHP ($18.7 USD) per capita. Table 4.2 shows how this compares with the 
other main sources of funds for health in the Philippines. 
Table 4.2 Sources of funds, 2005 (NHA figures) 
Billion PHP As % of Total health expenditure 
Total health expenditure 181 (100%) 
Government 52 29% 
... central government ... 
29 ... 16% 
... local government ... 
23 ... 13% 
PHIC 20 11% 
Out-of-pocket 88 49% 
Others 21 12% 
" Includes private insurance, private schools, international aid. 
The shares of health expenditure from government and PHIC sources remain below 
national targets of 40% and 30% respectively (Department of Health 2005). These 
targets reflect the risk that OOP expenditures can result in households facing 
catastrophic expenditures or being impoverished. Indeed, cross-country analysis has 
shown a strong positive association between the share of OOP in total health 
expenditure and the proportion of households facing catastrophic expenditures, and 
consequently the need to move towards financing systems based on prepayment 
(Carrin et al. 2008; Xu et al. 2003). 
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4.3.2 Healthcare provision 
The organisation of the public aspects of the health system broadly mirrors that of 
the government administration as a whole, with devolved LGUs responsible for the 
provision of most personal health services. Provincial LGUs manage secondary level 
healthcare (provincial and district hospitals); primary care services (rural health units 
and barangay health stations) are under the jurisdiction of municipal LGUs. These 
LGUs have considerable discretion from the central level in how much of local 
government budgets are allocated to healthcare as compared with other, competing 
departments (Bossert and Beauvais 2002). At the same time, concerns have been 
raised that devolution has actually led to health facilities having less managerial 
autonomy and budgetary support than previously (Department of Health 2005; 
Grundy et al. 2003). 
Nevertheless, within this devolved system of health provision, the Department of 
Health (DOH) at the central level continues to finance and manage tertiary hospitals, 
and certain other speciality health facilities, throughout the country. The DOH is 
also closely linked to LGUs through its mandate to formulate and maintain national 
policies, plans, standards and guidelines, and through its contribution to 
communicable disease control. 
The private sector also plays a significant role in the delivery of personal health 
services. For example, private hospitals provided 47% of the nation's hospital beds 
in 2002. These private hospitals are made up of both for-profit and not-for-profit 
facilities. 
A number of actors in the health system help monitor the quality of healthcare 
provided in health facilities (chapter 5 analyses the quality of care in relation to the 
quantity of care provided). As mentioned above, the DOH is responsible for 
formulating standards and guidelines. Further, the DOH, in partnership with LGUs, 
set up `Inter-Local Health Zones' in 1999 (with 73 of these zones established by 
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2005). These are designed to improve coordination between facilities, and across the 
central and local levels (Department of Health 2005). The DOH also instituted the 
`Sentrong Sigla' movement, whereby accreditation signals to patients that the health 
facility has met certain structural quality standards (Catacutan 2006). In addition, the 
PHIC plays a role in quality assurance by monitoring hospitals (public and private) 
through its accreditation process and claims review (Quimbo et al. 2008). 
In terms of the use of public and private facilities, data in table 4.3 below suggests 
that private hospitals cater mostly for wealthier members of the population. In 
contrast, in the public sector there is a more equal distribution of utilisation across 
income groups. For instance, over a six month period 22% of the richest income 
quintile utilised a private hospital, as compared with 2% of the lowest income 
quintile. In contrast, the equivalent figures for public district hospital utilisation were 
2.6% and 3.7% for the richest and poorest income quintiles respectively. 
Table 43 Percentage of households that utilized public and private health 
facilities in the 6 months preceding the survey, by wealth index quintile (2003) 
Primary health facilities Hospitals 
Income Public Rural Private Public district Public provincial Public Private 
quintile Health Unit Clinic hospital hospital tertiary hospital 
hospital 
1(Iow) 16.4 5.4 3.7 4.0 1.9 2.1 
2 19.4 8.9 3.9 6.2 3.4 4.1 
3 18.1 12.4 3.7 4.9 3.6 7.6 
4 17.1 19.1 3.1 5.3 3.5 11.7 
5 (high) 9.9 25.2 2.6 4.1 3.9 22.4 
Source: National Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS), 2003 
The health workers responsible for staffing public health facilities receive salaries 
that, although noticeably higher than the country's GDP per capita, are much lower 
than what they could earn in alternative employment. For instance, the average 
reported annual salary of physicians working in public secondary level hospitals was 
just under 200,000 Philippine Pesos in 2002 (less than $4000) in the Visayas island 
group (source: QIDS dataset). This is considerably less than the mean annual salary 
of approximately 526,000 ($13,500) for self-employed physicians in 2002 (Refre et 
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al. 2004) and, more strikingly, the $36,000-48,000 that they could earn, after 
retraining, as a nurse in the US (Choo 2003). Indeed, the Philippines is believed to 
be the leading exporter of nurses (Aiken et al. 2004), and the second major exporter 
of physicians (Bach 2003). 
Ancillary health facilities (such as dental practices, diagnostic clinics, employer- 
based outpatient facilities, indigenous healers, maternity centres and pharmacies) 
supplement the provision of health services in hospitals and primary health facilities. 
These are most often privately owned and run on a for-profit basis. For example, in 
relation to the pharmaceutical retail market, commercial private pharmacies account 
for 85% of drugs sold in the Philippines. Public doctors are widely believed to own 
pharmacies and other ancillary health facilities as a way of boosting their low public 
v 
sector salaries (chapter 7 explores this phenomenon). 
This chapter has described the Philippine study context. The following three 
chapters present the empirical results of the thesis. 
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Chapter 5: Do doctors provide too little or too much 
care? Which matters more? 
5.1 Introduction 
For healthcare provision to be effective in improving a patient's health, health 
workers require not only adequate medical inputs, but also need to use these 
resources correctly. Consequently the technical quality of healthcare has been 
evaluated in a wide variety of ways 12. This chapter investigates the relationship 
between the technical quality of care provided and the amount of medical effort a 
doctor exerts on a patient, corresponding to the first objective of the thesis. The 
premise is that doctors can provide too little or too much care, both of which can 
negatively impact upon healthcare quality. 
The focus of the present chapter is on the doctor-patient interaction, commonly 
referred to as the process attribute of quality (Donabedian 1980). Furthermore, it 
analyses only the clinical skill of the doctor: how skilfully a doctor diagnoses and 
treats a patient, commonly referred to as technical quality. Data are not available on 
more interpersonal aspects of care, such as showing respect and kindness to the 
patient. 
The general empirical approach is to compare a doctor's suggested treatment plan 
with a predefined essential treatment plan that equates to best practice for a specific 
medical condition. Data comes from clinical vignettes, administered to public and 
private physicians in the Philippines. These vignettes simulate specific clinical 
encounters, and include precise definitions of best practice (see section 5.2.1 for 
further details). 
12 Chapter 2 discusses the different dimensions of quality, and how technical quality has been 
measured and evaluated. 
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Using these vignettes, inappropriate care can be separated into care that is 
insufficient and care that is unnecessary. Thus medical effort is empirically 
evaluated in terms of the quantity of healthcare given to patients. In a first stage, the 
extent of insufficient care is measured in terms of which aspects of the essential 
treatment plan were not given. Next, unnecessary care is measured by a doctor's 
treatment suggestions that are not part of the essential treatment plan. Both 
insufficient and unnecessary care are then analysed in terms of their expected cost 
and health consequences, and their determinants. Finally, the relationship between 
insufficient and unnecessary care is explored. This illustrates patterns of 
inappropriate care - that is, whether doctors are more likely to provide too little or 
too much care. 
Research elsewhere has already highlighted that some doctors in the Philippines, in 
common with other LIC and LMIC, provide a poor technical quality of healthcare 
(see, for example, Peabody and Liu 2007). Exploration of this quality-quantity 
relationship adds to these findings by evaluating whether under- or over-provision is 
likely to be of greater concern to policymakers. By distinguishing when more health 
care is desirable (in terms of being part of essential care) as compared with being 
unnecessary, it also contributes to the efficiency literature. This is relevant because 
studies that explicitly evaluate a health provider's efficiency have been criticised as 
not adequately accounting for quality of care (Hussey et al. 2009). Finally, this 
chapter frames analysis in the following chapter on the effect of incentives on public 
hospital care. This subsequent chapter analyses how incentives influence the 
quantity of care a doctor provides to a patient. More normative inferences about 
quality of care are then made from findings in this chapter, based on when more 
(less) care is likely to equate to better or worse quality. 
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5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Clinical vignettes and the quality-quantity relationship 
As part of the QIDS study, clinical vignettes were administered to both public and 
private physicians (see chapter 3 for full details on the dataset used). Physicians 
were asked how they would care for a range of paediatric cases, which are then 
compared with a predefined essential treatment plan. These predefined treatment 
plans were based on international evidence-based standards that were then reviewed 
by national (Philippine) experts. By assessing how close doctors are to providing a 
set of actions needed to improve the sick child's health, these vignettes provide a 
quantitative measure of a physician's technical quality of care. 
The QIDS study defined fifteen vignettes, five related to each of pneumonia, 
diarrhoea and dermatological infections. During the study period, physicians 
answered one or more vignette of each disease type. Within each disease type, the 
vignette/s a physician was assigned to answer was randomly chosen. 
Vignettes are made up of five sequential domains of care, evaluating a doctor's 
ability in terms of. 
-asking questions about the patient's symptoms and medical history 
- performing physical examinations 
- ordering laboratory tests 
- arriving at a diagnosis for the patient 
- compiling a recommended treatment plan for the patient 
After each of these stages, the doctor is given the details of the patient's condition 
for that domain. For instance, after describing the questions she would ask about the 
patient's symptoms and medical history, the doctor would then be told the child's 
actual complete medical history and symptoms. This means that at the end of the 
vignette, when the doctor is asked what her treatment plan would be, she would be 
fully informed about the child's medical condition. 
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In this chapter, the interest is in disaggregating these vignettes, so that deviations 
from best practice can be separated into insufficient and unnecessary care. As noted 
earlier, doing so contributes to a better understanding of the relationship between 
quantity and quality of care. This chapter focuses on one of the five dimensions of . 
care that vignettes measure, namely a doctor's recommended treatment plan for the 
patient. This is because the expected health and cost consequences of over-treatment 
are more likely to be substantial than over-provision in other dimensions of care. For 
example, unnecessarily giving a child certain medications can be expensive and 
harmful. In contrast, asking too many questions about a patient's symptoms and 
medical history, or performing too many physical examinations is only marginally 
more expensive (by increasing consultation time), and rarely harmful. Further, 
whilst ordering too many laboratory tests can be as expensive as over-treatment, it is 
rarely harmful to a patient. 
Four of the fifteen vignettes included in the QIDS study are used in the present 
analysis. These. were vignettes where over-treatment as well as under-treatment is 
particularly likely to occur (for instance, giving antibiotics or other medicines 
unnecessarily). Further, pneumonia and diarrhoea vignettes were chosen (two of 
each), for better linkages with the analysis in chapter 6 on hospital care given to 
pneumonia and diarrhoea inpatients. Box 5.1 describes each of the four vignettes 
used in this chapter. 
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Box 5.1 a: Description of Diarrhoea Vignette #1 
Description of case 
"A mother comes to the clinic with her daughter, an 8-month old baby. She states that her daughter has 
had diarrhoea and is vomiting. 
" Symptoms/medical history: The diarrhoea started 2 days ago at the same time as the vomiting. The baby 
has had very loose, watery stools, without blood or mucus, in her diaper about 6 -7 times throughout the 
day and night. She has had a low-grade fever and has not eaten very much. She vomited 3 or 4 times 
yesterday but only twice today. The child has been almost weaned from breast milk, breastfeeding twice 
a day for the past month. Yesterday, she drank a little water from a cup but would not breast-feed. Today 
she has breast-fed once and has been drinking some diluted mango juice. She has urinated once today, 
about 6 hours ago. The little girl's older sister, aged 2, had a similar problem about 1 week ago but the 
symptoms lasted only a day. She has no prior history of similar episodes, any known drug allergies or 
other medical problems. Her mother reports that the delivery was normal. 
" Physical examinations: The child is alert and interactive, but tearful and irritable. The pulse is strong at 
170 beats per minute. Temperature is 39 C. Eyes are sunken. Mucus membranes are somewhat dry. 
The skin pinch goes back in 1 second. The fontanelle is not depressed. The head is normal without 
nuchal rigidity, the abdomen is mildly tender but there is no guarding, rigidity or rebound. Bowel sounds 
are normal. Her capillary refill time is approximately 3 seconds. Faeces in the diaper are negative for 
blood. Weight is 7.5 kg, the length is 68cm. 
" Laboratory tests: All laboratory tests are normal. 
Essential treatment plan 
Essential treatment plan is made up of 9 different components, with 4 related to advice on homecare and 
supplements, 3 to medication and 2 to monitoring of the child's condition. 
Box 5.1b: Description of Diarrhoea Vignette #2 
Description of case 
"A3 year old boy is brought to the clinic by his mother. She states that her son has diarrhoea and 
vomiting. 
" Symptoms/medical history: The diarrhoea started 2 days ago at the same time as the vomiting. The stool 
was described as loose and watery without blood or mucus. The diarrhoea episodes occur 7-8 times 
throughout the day and night. He vomited 3-4x yesterday and today; there is no blood in the vomit. He 
had a low-grade fever and has not eaten well. His mother offered some water but he refuses and drinks 
only a small sip. He has not been given any medication nor has he ingested any new foods or foods that 
might be contaminated. His mother does not know when he last urinated. No one else has been ill in the 
(his) family. He has no previous history of similar symptoms, any known drug allergies or other medical 
problems. His mother reports the delivery was normal. 
" Physical examinations: The boy appears calm and he is lethargic. He weighs 10 kilograms and his 
height is 96cm. He is afebrile, the pulse rate is 150 beats/minute, his blood pressure is 70/35 and his 
respiration 55. The mucus membranes are dry and the eyes are sunken. The skin pinch returns to 
normal in 3 seconds. The chest exam is normal. The abdomen is soft with no guarding, rigidity or 
rebound and the bowel sounds appear increased by otherwise normal. Stool/rectal exam is negative for 
blood. 
" Laboratory tests: The only laboratory results that are available are a CBC which shows a haemoglobin of 
12.5 and a WBC of 6. Fecalysis reveals no RBCs or excessive WBC in the stool. All other laboratory 
tests are pending. 
Essential treatment plan 
Essential treatment plan is made up of 9 different components, with 2 related to advice on homecare and 
supplements, 4 to medication, 2 to monitoring of the child's condition and 1 requiring hospitalisation. 
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Box 5.1c: Description of Pneumonia vignette #1 
Description of case 
"A mother brings her 6-month old baby to the clinic. She states that her daughter has had cough and 
fever. 
" Symptoms/medical history., The baby's condition started 1 week ago with cough and colds with whitish 
nasal discharge. She later developed moderate- to high-grade fever temporarily relieved by 
Paracetamol. She is active, cries easily but is consolable but irritable and the mother reports that she 
continues to feed. The mother does not report any difficulty breathing or any episodes of cyanosis, 
convulsion, or any rashes. The baby was breastfed for the first 2 months and formula fed thereafter. No 
solid food has been introduced yet. The baby has received the following immunization through the local 
health center. BCG, DPT (3 doses), OPV (3 doses). The mother denies any history of asthma in the 
family or the patient having been with a respiratory disease in the past. 
" Physical examinations: The baby weighs 8 kilograms and is 68 cm long. She is awake but crying. She is 
febrile with temperature of 38.5 oC. Her heart rate is 140 beats/minute; respiratory rate is increased at 
42/minute but she has no circumoral cyanosis. There is no tonsillopharyngeal congestion. No stridor is 
noted. There is supraclavicular and intercostals retractions but there does not appear to be any lower 
chest indrawing. There are crepitant rales on all lung fields, bilateral. There is no wheezing and there 
are no cardiac thrills or murmurs. The nailbeds are pinkish. There is no evidence of dehydration. 
" Laboratory tests: The CBC showed an elevated white blood count of 14,000 with predominance of 
polymorphonuclear leukocytes. No chest x-ray is available. 
Essential treatment plan 
Essential treatment plan is made up of 5 different components, with 1 related to advice on homecare and 
supplements, 2 to medication and 2 to monitoring of the child's condition. 
Box 5.1d: Description of Pneumonia vignette #2 
Description of case 
"A mother brings her 3-year-old boy to the clinic. She states that her son has fever and cough. 
" Symptoms/medical history: The mother states that her son was previously well until 1 week ago when he 
started to have fever and cough. The fever is low to moderate grade and occurs intermittently. She also 
reports that he had some sneezing and a runny nose. It is temporarily relieved by Paracetamol. The 
cough is noted to be getting somewhat worse since its onset and it is productive of moderate amounts of 
clear-white phlegm. He did not have any episode of cyanosis or difficulty breathing however. His appetite 
is fine and the child is not extremely thirsty. His immunizations are updated. His 8-month-old sister also 
had similar symptoms and has just been discharged from the hospital 1 week ago. He has no other 
medical problems, and has not been sick like this in the past. The child has no known allergies and is on 
no other medications. 
" Physical examinations: The boy weighs 13.5 kilograms and is 90 cm tall. He is awake and active. He is 
febrile with temperature of 38.7C. The cardiac rate is 120 beats/minute, respiratory rate is 33/minute. 
There is no circumoral cyanosis, the nailbeds are pink, and no tonsillopharyngeal congestion. There is 
no intercostal retraction or lower chest wall indrawing. There are no rales or wheezes but there is 
occasional ronchi. There are no thrills or murmurs. 
" Laboratory tests: The CBC showed white blood cell count of 11,000. The haemoglobin is 13.2 grams 
The mother refused to have the chest X-ray done. 
Essential treatment plan 
Essential treatment plan is made up of 4 different components, with 1 related to advice on homecare and 
supplements, 1 to medication and 2 to monitoring of the child's condition. 
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5.2.2 Measuring the extent of inappropriate care 
Insufficient versus unnecessary care 
For these four vignettes, a doctor's response to how they would treat the sick child is 
disaggregated into: 
- How much of the essential treatment plan was completed, measuring the extent of 
insufficient care. For each vignette, a number of essential actions are defined (9 
actions for each diarrhoea vignettes; 4 and 5 actions for the pneumonia vignettes), 
and the doctor is evaluated in terms of what percentage of this essential treatment 
plan is completed. 
-The number of additional non-essential treatments that were given, measuring the 
extent of unnecessary care. These are treatments a doctor recommended that are 
not on the essential treatment plan. 
Both insufficient care and unnecessary care are then evaluated in terms of their 
expected health and cost consequences (see section 5.2.3). 
Patterns of inappropriate care 
Having evaluated the extent and consequences of insufficient and unnecessary care, 
the relationship between the two is explored. This provides added insight into the 
relationship between quantity and quality of care by illustrating different patterns of 
inappropriate care. That is, whilst it is evident that reducing the extent of insufficient 
care and unnecessary care both improve quality of care - in terms of moving a 
doctor's healthcare provision closer to best practice - analysing patterns of 
inappropriate care determines whether doctors more often provide insufficient care, 
unnecessary care or indeed both simultaneously. 
Figure 5.1 helps illustrate this. Q* refers to optimal quality of care (best practice), 
whereby doctors provide both fully sufficient care and do not provide any 
unnecessary treatments. Doctors whose treatment plan is positioned along the line 
AQ* do not give any unnecessary treatments, but fail to provide fully sufficient care. 
Doctors along the line BQ* provide fully sufficient care, but also give unnecessary 
treatments. If doctors are grouped near the point OA, then insufficient care is more of 
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a concern for policymakers than unnecessary care. Conversely, if doctors are 
grouped nearer point OB, then unnecessary care is more common than insufficient 
care. Moreover, if doctors are grouped along either or both of lines AQ* and BQ*, 
then the relationship between quantity and quality of care can be summarised in one 
dimension: doctors give either too much or too little care. However, if doctors are 
instead typically inside the OAQ*B box, then doctors provide insufficient and 
unnecessary care simultaneously. 
Figure 5.1 Different patterns of inappropriate care 
Insufficient care, no 
unnecessary care 
(1) A ................. 
Ca Paths to better 






More sufficient care 
5.2.3 Evaluating the consequences of inappropriate care 
Evaluating the consequences of inappropriate care is important in assessing whether 
insufficient or unnecessary care is more of a concern to policymakers, and the 
consequences of observed patterns of care. Both the cost and health consequences of 
inappropriate care are analysed. 
Expected cost consequences 
Non-essential treatments and each aspect of the essential treatment plan are 
classified according to their likely (societal) cost implications. Classifying 
treatments in terms of their expected cost enables evaluation of the costs incurred 
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from giving non-essential care, as compared with the inputs required to switch from 
providing insufficient to sufficient care. 
Four broad treatment categories are distinguished: 
-Hospitalisation 
-Medications (drugs and therapies) 
-Monitoring of condition by doctor 
-Advice on homecare / Supplements 
Given data limitations, only approximate cost estimates are possible. Treatment 
categories' expected costs are defined in terms of being low, medium or high. 
Estimations are based on extrapolations from pharmacy exit, facility and physician 
surveys used for other empirical chapters in the thesis (see chapter 4 for details on 
these surveys). 
Hospitalisation of a patient is expected to be relatively costly compared with the 
other treatment aspects specified. It is classified as medium to high cost. For 
example, facility survey data from 30 hospitals indicate that the total healthcare 
charges inside a public district hospital was just under 1700 PHP ($32 USD) for 
pneumonia patients, and 1200 PHP ($23 USD) for diarrhoea patients, during the 
time period 2003-2007. These are lower-end estimates, as they exclude associated 
indirect costs such as travel and food costs. 
Medications are classified as low to medium cost. Pharmacy exit data from 29 
private pharmacies in the Philippines estimate an average pharmaceutical 
expenditure of 260 PHP ($6 USD) in 2007 for customers with a prescription. Private 
pharmacy data was preferred to data on drug expenditure within Philippine public 
hospitals, since these hospitals typically have incomplete stock, and thus patients 
have to purchase some or all of their prescribed medicines outside of the hospital 
(see chapter 7 for further details). 
1061 Paäe 
Monitoring of a patient's condition by the doctor is also classified as low to medium 
cost. In these vignettes, monitoring includes checking for, and reassessing, vomiting, 
urination and normalisation of heart rate. The main cost is that associated with a 
doctor's time, but also includes other health facility costs. Physician survey data 
indicate an average reported public physician salary (all sources) to be just under 
25,000 PHP ($470) per month. Assuming a doctor works 160 hours per month, and 
that monitoring of a patient's condition takes one hour, the time cost is 
approximately 150 PHP ($3 USD). Other health facility costs include the use of 
medical instruments and time costs of nurse and other support staff, but there are no 
data available on these costs. 
The treatment category advice on homecare / supplements is classified as low cost. 
Advice on homecare only adds a few minutes to consultation time, and supplements 
can be purchased cheaply from pharmacies (and sometimes freely from primary 
health centres). Thus the cost for this category is expected to be less than the cost of 
monitoring and of prescribed medications. 
Table 5.1 Treatment categories and expected costs 
Treatment category Expected cost 
Hospitalisation of patient Medium-High > $20 
Medication (drugs, therapies, ORS) Low-Medium - $5 
Monitoring of condition by doctor Low-Medium - $5 
Advice on homecare I Supplements Low < $5 
Expected health consequences 
To examine the health consequences of a doctor's recommended treatment plan, 
three physicians were asked to evaluate independently the health consequences of: 
(a) not undertaking different aspects of essential treatment plans, and (b) each non- 
essential treatment given. These were evaluated in terms of the probability that they 
would be harmful, health neutral or beneficial to the patient, and, if harmful, their 
likely severity. Evidently, insufficient care cannot be beneficial or health neutral to a 
patient. 
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The treatments were classified as: 
- Definitely harmful 
-Probably harmful 
-Possibly harmful 




and if harmful, whether they were expected to cause a: 
- Severe adverse event (involves hospitalisation or being life threatening) 
-Moderate adverse event (neither lasting nor severe) 
-Mild adverse event (minor) 
The physicians chosen to evaluate expected health consequences were all 
paediatricians and markers for the clinical vignettes. After their independent 
evaluations of the expected health consequences of insufficiency and unnecessary 
care, results were returned to the physicians with disparities in their answers 
highlighted. The three physicians then met to discuss these disparities until 
consensus was reached. 
5.2.4 Determinants of inappropriate care and pooling validity issues 
Determinants of inappropriate care 
Whilst the focus of this chapter is on analysing the relationship between quantity and 
quality of care given (and consequently the implications of inappropriate care), the 
determinants of inappropriate care are also briefly explored. 
Public and private doctors were compared in terms of: 
-The extent of insufficient care 
-The probability of providing unnecessary care with harmful health effects 
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This was done across each of the four vignettes used in this chapter. 
Multinomial regressions were also run to analyse the determinants of different 
patterns of inappropriate care. However, this approach was limited by the properties 
of the sample, particularly small cell sizes for certain types of insufficient and 
unnecessary care. Consequently, results from these regressions did not provide any 
additional information to the bivariate comparisons of public and private doctors 
across vignettes (even when including additional explanatory variables), and are 
therefore not presented in this chapter. 
Pooling validity issues 
The analysis uses data from two time periods. However, two policy interventions 
(expanded insurance coverage and higher reimbursement ceilings for children in 
`access' public hospitals, and bonus payments for meeting quality standards in 
`bonus' public hospitals: see chapter 3 for details) were introduced after the baseline 
that were expected to positively impact upon the quality of care provided. Whilst 
this chapter is not an analysis of these interventions' impacts on quality of care, it is 
nevertheless important to ascertain whether it is valid to pool data across the two 
time periods in the context of the analysis in this chapter. 
Assessing the validity of pooling over time is based on two criteria: 
- Whether there is a statistically significant difference in the extent of inappropriate 
care between the two time periods. If there are no differences, then pooling is 
deemed valid. This is evaluated for the full sample and for sub-samples reflecting 
the two policy interventions. 
- If inappropriate care is statistically less significant in the second (first) time period, 
whether it is still of policy significance in the second (first) period. If 
inappropriate care remains a concern in both time periods, then pooling is deemed 
valid. For insufficient care, policy significance is taken to be if the average 
percentage of the essential treatment plan completed remains statistically less than 
75%. For unnecessary care, policy significance is assumed to be if the average 
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number of non-essential treatments given remains statistically greater than zero. If 
so, then pooling is deemed valid. 
Another potential pooling validity issue relates to how many of the 4 vignettes used 
in this chapter a doctor answered. If doctors learn over time how to answer vignettes 
better, then doctors answering multiple vignettes can be expected to score 
systematically higher than doctors answering only one of the vignettes. However, 
this potential bias is reduced by the fact that no doctor answered the same vignette 
twice. Further, 15 vignettes were used in the QIDS study, with most doctors 
answering multiple vignettes even if they only answered one of the four vignettes 
used in the chapter. Thus systematic bias seems unlikely. Nevertheless, to ensure 
that pooling data on doctors answering one or multiple vignettes is valid, the two 
criteria used to assess the validity of pooling over time are used here. 
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Validity of pooling 
The sample was composed of 160 vignettes, with the number of different doctors 
answering these vignettes equal to 143. Of these, 128 doctors completed one of the 
four vignettes used in this chapter, 13 doctors undertook two of four vignettes, and 2 
doctors completed three of four vignettes. 
Table 5.2 Number of doctors and vignettes 
Number of doctors Number of vignettes 
Doctor completed 1 of 4 vignettes 128 128 (128"1) 
Doctor completed 2 of 4 vignettes 13 26 (13*2) 
_Doctor 
completed 3 of 4 vignettes 26 (2*3) 
Total 143 160 
There were no significant differences in the extent of insufficient or unnecessary 
care between doctors who answered one vignette and doctors who answered more 
than one of the four vignettes used (see table 5.3). Thus pooling across these two 
sub-groups was deemed valid. 
Table 5.3 Validity of pooling doctors answering 1 vignette with doctors 
answering more than 1 vignette 
1 vignette >1 vignette Difference: 
per doctor per doctor p-value 
Insufficient care: average % of essential treatment plan given 50% 49% 0.4313 
Unnecessary care: ave. # of non-essential treatments given 1.37 1.5 0.2946 
Number of doctor-patient interactions (n) 128 32 
Number of doctors 128 15 
There were also no significant differences in the extent of insufficient care between 
the two time periods, either for the full sample or for the sub-samples (see table 
5.4a). Further, the percentage of the essential treatment plan completed was 
significantly less than 75% in all sub-samples. Unnecessary care, though, actually 
increased in the second round (see table 5.4b). However, unnecessary care was still a 
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concern in the baseline, where the average number of non-essential treatments given 
was significantly greater than zero in all sub-samples. Thus for the remainder of this 
chapter, analysis was based on data pooled across the two time periods. 
Table 5.4a Validity of pooling over time: insufficient care 
Average percentage of essential Baseline Round 2 Difference: 
treatment plan given %n%n p-value 
Full sample 50% 112 48% 48 0.3351 
Access intervention sub-sample 45% 17 49% 16 0.3238 
Bonus intervention sub-sample 48% 22 54% 17 0.2240 
Control group sub-sample 42% 19 30% 5 0.1642 
Private doctors sub-sample 56% 54 48% 10 0.1865 
Percentage of essential treatment plan significantly < 75% in all sub-samples (p-value <0.01) 
Table 5.4b Validity of pooling over time: unnecessary care 
Average number of additional Baseline Round 2 Difference: 
non-essential treatments given # Treatments N # Treatments n p-value 
Full sample 1.15 112 1.96 48 0.0001 
Access intervention sub-sample 1.53 17 1.63 16 0.4249 
Bonus intervention sub-sample 0.82 22 2.24 17 0.0002 
Control group sub-sample 1.37 19 2.4 5 0.0352 
Private doctors sub-sample 1.09 54 1.8 10 0.0342 
Number of non-essential treatments given significantly > zero in all sub-samples (p-value<0.01) 
Sample characteristics 
Public doctors answered 96 of the vignettes, private doctors answered 64 vignettes. 
More private doctors answered the two pneumonia vignettes used in this chapter 
(49/64) than public doctors (29/96), with the converse true for diarrhoea vignettes. 
Female physicians made up 64% of the sample (103/160). The average physician 
age was 42. Table 5.5 provides further details, disaggregated by vignette. 
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'Fable 5.5 Sample characteristics, full sample and by vignette 
Full Diarrhoea Diarrhoea 






Vignette answered in baseline 112 (70%) 27 28 27 30 
Vignette answered in round 2 48 (30%) 13 14 12 9 
Doctor's place of work 
Doctors working in private clinic 64 (40%) 6 9 24 25 
Doctors working in public hospital 96 (60%) 34 33 15 14 
.. of which working 
in access' site 33 13 11 5 4 
.. of which working 
in bonus' site 39 12 13 8 6 
.. of which working 
in control' site 24 9 9 2 4 
Gender and age 
Vignette answered by female doctor 103 (64%) 24 29 25 25 
Vignette answered by male doctor 57 (36%) 16 13 14 14 
Average age of doctor 42 40 42 43 43 
Full sample 160 (100%) 40 42 39 39 
Note 2 doctors moved from the private to public sector between the baseline and the god round 
5.3.1 Insufficient care: extent, consequences and determinants 
Univuriute analysis 
For the majority of doctor-patient interactions, less than half of the recommended 
essential treatment plan was given. In 30 vignettes (19%), doctors gave less than 
25% of the essential treatment plan; in 86 vignettes (54%), doctors gave less than 
50%. In only 8 doctor-patient interactions (5%) was fully sufficient treatment given. 
The average (mean) percentage of the essential treatment plan given was 50%, the 
median 44%, with a standard deviation of 24%. 
Table 5.6: Too little care? Percentage of essential treatment plan given 
Percentage of essential treatment plan given n% 
-[a] Gave <25% of essential treatment plan 30 19% 
... of which gave none of essential 
treatment plan (4) (3%) 
-[b] Gave 25-49% of essential treatment plan 56 35% 
-[c] Gave 50-74% of essential treatment plan 31 19% 
-[d] Gave >= 75% of essential treatment plan 43 27% 
... of which gave all of essential 
treatment plan (8) (5%) 
Total: 160 100% 
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Disaggregated by category, results show that the majority of treatment plans were 
characterised by insufficient advice, monitoring and medication (see table 5.7). In 
particular, III vignettes (69%) were characterised by doctors giving insufficient 
advice, 118 (74%) by doctors not adequately monitoring the patient, and 116 (73%) 
by doctors giving insufficient medication. In a lower proportion of vignettes (17%), 
doctors failed to hospitalise a patient when hospitalisation was required. 
Table 5.7: Too little care? Essential treatment plan, disaggregated by category 
Doctors giving Average % of 
Treatment category Expected cost insufficient care treatment 
n% category given 
Hospitalisation` Medium-High 7 17% 83% 
Medication (drugs, IV fluid, ORS) Low-Medium 116 73% 56% 
Monitoring of condition by doctor Low-Medium 118 74% 49% 
Advice on homecare / Supplements Low 111 69% 40% 
'only required for 1 of the 4 clinical vignettes used. 
Not giving any individual part of the essential treatment plan always had potentially 
negative health consequences. Often, this would be likely to have serious health 
consequences, as table 5.8 shows. For instance, in 126 doctor-patient interactions 
(79%) part of an essential treatment plan was not given that would have 'definitely 
harmful' consequences for the patient; 104 (65%) of these would also cause a 
'severe adverse event'. 
Table 5.8 Negative health consequences of insufficient care 
Did not give at least 1 part of essential treatment plan that is: n % 
Possibly harmful 82 51% 
mild adverse event 82 51% 
moderate adverse event 0 0% 
severe adverse event 0 0% 
Probably harmful 57 36% 
mild adverse event 0 0% 
moderate adverse event 57 36% 
severe adverse event 0 0% 
Definitely harmful 126 79% 
mild adverse event 0 0% 
moderate adverse event 72 45% 
severe adverse event 104 65% 
Note some doctors did not give more than 1 part of the essential treatment 
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Bivariale analysis 
Doctors treating diarrhoea patients gave a lower percentage of the essential 
treatment plan than those treating pneumonia patients (36% V 63%, /)- 
value<0.0001). Although public doctors gave, on average, less sufficient care than 
private doctors, this result was driven entirely by disease type. That is, the majority 
of private doctors were randomly assigned to one of the two pneumonia vignettes 
used in this analysis (50 of 64 doctor-patient interactions), whereas public doctors 
more commonly answered one of the two diarrhoea vignettes (64 of 96). Figure 5.2 
clarifies that disease type is more important than public/private differences, by 
comparing public and private doctors across each of the four clinical vignettes. 
Figure 5.2: Average percentage of essential treatment plan completed - public V 
private doctors, by clinical vignette 








D#1 Di#2 [In #1 Pn#2 
Vignette type 
After controlling for vignettes, there was no statistical difference in the sufficiency 
of care given by public versus private doctors other than for diarrhoea vignette # 1, 
where public doctors were closer to meeting the complete essential treatment plan 
(38% V 24%, r-value=0.0403). 
115 1 !' 
Instead, differences between vignettes were more important predictors of the 
percentage of essential treatment plans completed than public/private differences, 
with doctors treating diarrhoea patients giving less sufficient care than those treating 
pneumonia patients. More specifically, doctors answering either diarrhoea vignette 
gave a significantly lower percentage of the essential treatment plan than those 
answering pneumonia vignette #I or #2 (in all cases, p-value<0.0001). Doctors 
answering pneumonia vignette #2 gave a higher percentage of the essential treatment 
plan those answering pneumonia vignette #1 (69% V 58%, p-value=0.0209). There 
was no statistical difference in the sufficiency of care between the two diarrhoea 
vignettes. 
Disaggregation by category provides some further insights. It shows that the 
difference in sufficiency of care between public and private doctors for diarrhoea 
vignette #I was driven principally by private doctors giving less essential advice on 
homecare and supplements than public doctors (table 5.9a). Comparisons by vignette 
disease type illustrate that doctors treating diarrhoea patients gave less sufficient 
treatment across all treatment categories (table 5.9b). 
Table 5.9a: Percentage of treatment plan completed, by category: public V 
private doctors (for diarrhoea vignette #1) 
Average percentage of essential treatment plan 







Medication 56% 56% 0.4875 
Monitoring of condition by doctor 32% 17% 0.1488 
Advice on homecare / Supplements 26% 4% 0.0181 
Total 38% 24% 0.0403 
Table 5.9b: Percentage of treatment plan completed, by category: diarrhoea V 
pneumonia 
Average percentage of essential treatment 







Medication 30% 69% <0.0001 
Monitoring of condition by doctor 20% 60% <0.0001 
Advice on homecare / Supplements 47% 66% 0.0001 
Total 36% 63% <0.0001 
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5.3.2 Unnecessary care: extent, consequences and determinants 
Univariate analysis 
Approximately three-quarters of the sample (74%) gave non-essential care. This 
ranged from 1 to 5 additional treatments, with a mean of 1.39, median of 1 and 
standard deviation of 1.24. 
Table 5.10: Too much care? Number of non-essential treatments given 
Number of non-essential treatments given n % 
Did not give non-essential treatments 41 26% 
Gave 1 or more non-essential treatments 119 74% 
- gave 1 non-essential treatment 60 38% 
- gave 2 non-essential treatments 29 18% 
- gave 3 non-essential treatments 17 11% 
- gave 4 non-essential treatments 11 7% 
- gave 5 non-essential treatments 2 1% 
Disaggregating non-essential treatments by category provides some further insights 
into the expected cost implications. Of the 118 cases where hospitalisation was not 
needed, in 40 vignettes (34%) doctors recommended hospitalisation. Doctors also 
frequently gave non-essential drugs, particularly antibiotics (75 doctor-patient 
interactions) and antihistamines or expectorants (34 doctor-patient interactions). 
Table 5.11 provides further details of the type of non-essential care given to patients. 
Table 5.11: Too much care? Type of non-essential treatments given 
Treatment category Expected cost 
Doctors giving non-essential care 
n% 
Hospitalisation' Medium-High 40 34%' 
Medication: Antibiotics" Low-Medium 75 47%b 
Medication: Antiemetic (metoclopramide) Low-Medium 8 5% 
Medication: Bronchodilators Low-Medium 7 4% 
Medication: Antihistamine/Expectorant Low-Medium 34 21% 
Medication: Antipyretics (paracetamol) c Low 12 29%` 
Medication: Other drugs Low-Medium 6 4% 
Supplements Low 12 8% 
Medication/Advice : Other (not drugs) Low 11 7% 
required for 1 of the 4 clinical vignettes analysed. Not required for 118 doctor-patient interactions. 
b cotrimoxazole or amoxicillin required for 1 of the 4 clinical vignettes analysed. Antibiotics included here indicate that doctor 
gave antibiotics that were not required. 
required for 3 of the 4 clinical vignettes analysed. Not required for 42 doctor-patient interactions. 
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In terms of expected health consequences, for 23 vignettes (14%) doctors gave non- 
essential treatments that were potentially harmful to patients; although none of these 
had 'definitely harmful' health consequences. 14 doctor-patient interactions (9%) 
were characterised by doctors giving non-essential treatments that had potentially 
positive health effects. More often, doctors gave non-essential treatments that were 
health neutral (108 doctor-patient interactions, equal to 69% of the sample). 
Antibiotics were given unnecessarily in 75 vignettes (47%), with 11 of these 2 
different courses of antibiotics were given, and in I vignette the doctor giving 3 
antibiotics. 
Table 5.12a: Non-essential treatments - harmful, neutral or beneficial to 
patients? 
Gave at least 1 treatment that is: 
Harmful to patient 
- possibly harmful 
- probably harmful 









Health neutral 108 68% 
........ Beneficial to patient 14 9% 
possibly beneficial 7 4% 
probably beneficial 3 2% 
definitely beneficial 6 4% 
Note, 119 doctors gave 1 (or more) non-essential treatments 
Table 5.121): Unnecessary antibiotic use 
Number of different antibiotic types given N% 
Did not give antibiotics (unless required) 85 53% 
Prescribed 1 course of antibiotics 63 39% 
Prescribed 2 courses of antibiotics 11 7% 
Prescribed 3 courses of antibiotics 11% 
Bivariale analysis 
Doctors treating diarrhoea patients were more likely than those treating pneumonia 
patients to give harmful non-essential treatments (22% V 6%, P-value=. 0024) and 
unnecessarily hospitalise patients (50% V 26%, p-value=. 0039). Indeed, for 
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pneumonia vignette #2, no doctor gave harmful non-essential treatments or 
unnecessarily hospitalised patients. 
Figure 5.3 compares public and private doctors across each of the clinical vignettes. 
Figure 5.3a shows that public doctors were more likely to give harmful non-essential 
treatments tör pneumonia vignette #1 (27% V 4%, p-value=. 0209), but somewhat 
less likely to give harmful non-essential treatments than private doctors for each of 
the diarrhoea vignettes (15% V 33% and 24% V 38%, though p-values>. 1). Figure 
5.3b shows that public doctors were more likely than private doctors to 
unnecessarily hospitalise patients for pneumonia vignette #1 (73% V 38%, jý- 
value=. 0248), but no differences between public and private doctors for other 
vignettes. 
Figure 5.3: Comparison of public V doctors, by clinical vignette 
Probability of (a) giving harmful non-essential treatment, (b) unnecessarily hospitalising 
patient 


















I lowever, more systematic differences between public and private doctors emerge in 
unnecessary antibiotic use, as illustrated in Figure 5.4. Public doctors were more 
likely than private doctors to recommend unnecessary antibiotics to patients for 
119 
Di #1 Fh #1 Pn #2 
Vignette type 
D #l Di #2 Pn #1 
Vignette type 
diarrhoea vignette #2 (64% V 33%, p-value=. 0542) and pneumonia vignette 41 
(73% V 33%, p-value=. 0071). Differences between unnecessary antibiotic use for 
pneumonia and diarrhoea cases, though, were not statistically significant. 
Figure 5.4: Public V private doctors' unnecessary antibiotic use, by vignette 
Public dr Private dr -A--- Full sample 
100 













5.3.3 The relationship between insufficient and unnecessary care 
Most doctors gave insufficient and unnecessary care simultaneously. That is, doctors 
typically replace needed aspects of the essential treatment plan with non-essential 
treatments. For 111 (69%) vignettes, doctors gave both insufficient and unnecessary 
treatment. This compares with 41 (26%) cases of inappropriate care in which doctors 
gave insufficient treatment only (i. e. did not give unnecessary treatments), and 8 
(5%) cases where doctors gave unnecessary treatment only (i. e. did not give 
insufficient treatment). 
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Di#1 Di#2 Pn1$1 Ri#2 
Figure 5.5 Nature of inappropriate care: too little, too much or both? 
[b] 41 
[c] 6 
ýýý [d] 0 
[a] 1i1 
Nature of inappropriate care given by 
doctor. - 
[a] insufficient and unnecessary treatment 
[b] insufficient treatment 
[c] unnecessary treatment 
[d] neither (gave appropriate treatment) 
When insufficient care and unnecessary care are disaggregated, distinct distributions 
of practice emerge. Doctors who gave less sufficient care were typically more likely 
to unnecessarily hospitalise patients (table 5.13) and give harmful non-essential 
treatments (table 5.14 and figure 5.6); and less likely to give beneficial non-essential 
treatments (table 5.15b). 
More precisely, the probability of unnecessarily hospitalising a patient was higher 
for doctors who gave less than half of the essential treatment plan as compared with 
those giving more than half (44% V 26%, p-value=. 035). Similarly, unnecessary 
hospitalisation was more likely for doctors who gave insufficient as compared with 
sufficient medication (50% V 2%, p-value<0.00I). 
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Table 5.13 Sufficiency of care and probability of unnecessary hospitalisation 
Sufficiency of essential treatment plan Was patient hospitalised unnecessarily? 
given (general and by category) Yes (40) No (78) Total (118) Proportion=Yes 
General: gave <50% of ess. treatment plan 23 29 52 44%*" 
gave >=50% of essential treatment plan 17 49 66 26% 
Chit=4.43; p-value=0.035 
Advice: insufficient 26 45 71 37% 
Sufficient 14 33 47 30% 
Chi2=0.59; p-value=0.443 
Monitoring: insufficient 24 56 80 30% 
Sufficient 16 22 38 42% 
Chit=1.68; p-value=0.194 
Medication: insufficient 38 38 76 50%, 
Sufficient 2 40 42 2% 
Fisher's exact p<0.00 p-value<0.00 
Note: Fisher's exact test. rather than Pearson's chi-squared test. used when samale size of any cell in 2x2 table is less than 
10 (i. e. for Medication 2x2 table). 
The probability of giving harmful non-essential treatments was higher for doctors 
who gave less than half of the essential treatment plan as compared with those 
giving more than half (21% V 7%, p-value=0.009). Similarly, the likelihood of 
giving harmful non-essential treatments was higher for doctors who gave insufficient 
as compared with sufficient advice (19% V 4%, p-value=0.009), and insufficient 
versus sufficient medication (20% V 0%, p-value<0.00 1). 
Table 5.14: Sufficiency of care and probability of giving harmful non-essential 
treatment 
Sufficiency of essential treatment plan given Doctor gave harmful non-essential treatment? 
(general and by category) Yes (23) No 137) Total (160) Proportion=Yes 
General: gave <50% of ess. treatment plan 18 68 86 21 %""' 
gave >=50% of essential treatment plan 5 69 74 7% 
Fisher's exact p=0.009 (Chi2=6.49; p -vvalue=0.011) 
Advice: insufficient 21 90 111 19%""' 
Sufficient 2 47 49 4% 
Fisher's exact p=0.009 Chit=6.08; -value=0.014 
Monitoring: insufficient 18 100 118 15% 
Sufficient 5 37 42 12% 
Fisher's exact =0.403 (Chi2=0.28; p -value=0.595) 
Medication: insufficient 23 93 116 20%'*" 
Sufficient 0 44 44 0% 
Fisher's exact p<0.001 Chit=10.19; -value<0.001 
Note: Fisher's exact test, rather than chi-squared test, used when sample size of any cell in 2x2 table is less than 10. 
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There were no clear correlations between sufficiency of care and the probability of 
doctors giving health neutral non-essential treatments. Conversely, the probability of 
giving beneficial non-essential treatments was positively related to sufficiency of 
care. Doctors who gave less than half of the essential treatment plan were less likely 
to give beneficial non-essential treatments as compared with those giving more than 
half (5% V 14%, p-value=0.044). Similarly, the likelihood of giving beneficial non- 
essential treatments was lower for doctors who gave insufficient as compared with 
sufficient advice (6% V 14%, p-value=0.093), and insufficient versus sufficient 
medication (5% V 18%>, p-value=0.014). 
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Table 5.15a: Sufficiency of care & probability of giving health neutral non- 
essential treatment 
Sufficiency of essential treatment plan given Doctor gave health neutral non-essential treatment? 
(general and by category) Yes 108) No (52) Total (160) Proportion=Yes 
General: gave <50% of ess. treatment plan 58 28 86 67% 
gave >=50% of essential treatment plan 50 24 74 68% 
Chi2<0.01; -value=0.986 Advice: insufficient 71 40 111 64% 
Sufficient 37 12 49 76% 
Chi2=2.07; p-value=0.151 
Monitoring: insufficient 77 41 118 65% 
Sufficient 31 11 42 74% 
Chi2=1.03; p-value=0.309 
Medication: insufficient 78 38 116 67% 
Sufficient 30 14 44 68% 
Chit=0.01; p-value=0.910 
Table 5.15b: Sufficiency of care & probability of giving beneficial non-essential 
treatment 
Sufficiency of essential treatment plan given 
(general and by category) 
Doctor gave beneficial non-essential treatment? 
Yes (14) No(146) Total (160) Proportion=Yes 
General: gave <50% of ess. treatment plan 4 82 86 5% 
gave >=50% of essential treatment plan 10 64 74 14%** 
Fisher's exact p=0.044 (Chi2=3.91; p-value=0.048) 
Advice: insufficient 7 104 111 6% 
Sufficient 7 42 49 14%* 
Fisher's exact p=0.093 (Chi2==2.71; p-value=0.100) 
Monitoring: insufficient 10 108 118 8% 
Sufficient 4 38 42 10% 
Fisher's exact p=0.527 (Chit =0.04; p-value=0.836) 
Medication: insufficient 6 110 116 5% 
Sufficient 8 36 44 18%*" 
Fisher's exact a=0.014 (Chi2=6.76: n-value=0.009) 
Note: Fisher's exact test, rather than chi-squared test, used when sample size of any cell in 2x2 table is less than 1 
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5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 Main findings 
Judged against vignettes, doctors typically provided too little care and too much care 
simultaneously. That is, the relationship between quality and quantity of care is not 
two-dimensional. This implies there is not an `optimal' amount of care reflecting 
maximum quality of care, below which care is too little, and above which care is too 
much. Instead, doctors are replacing needed aspects of an essential treatment plan 
with non-essential treatments. 
Indeed, in only 5% of the vignettes analysed in this chapter did doctors provide the 
complete essential treatment plan. Not giving part of an essential treatment plan was 
always expected to have negative health consequences, and in 65% of vignettes such 
insufficient care was adjudged by a panel of physicians to result in the patient 
suffering a severe adverse event (hospitalisation or life-threatening). Moreover, the 
essential treatments not given were most often only low to medium cost items. Thus 
moving from insufficient to sufficient care is not that costly in terms of required 
health inputs. Still, this does, not account for the non-trivial cost associated with 
changing a doctor's behaviour. 
Unnecessary care was also widespread. In 74% of vignettes, doctors gave one or 
more non-essential treatments. These were particularly costly when doctors 
unnecessarily hospitalised patients, which occurred 34% of the time. The health 
implications of unnecessary care, though, were less harmful as compared with 
insufficient care, most often being health neutral. That is, unnecessary care most 
often reflected "flat-of-the-curve" medicine, healthcare that is not harmful but 
equally provides no incremental benefit to the patient (Fuchs 2004). Still, doctors 
recommended potentially harmful non-essential treatments in 14% of vignettes. 
Further, doctors frequently prescribed antibiotics unnecessarily. Although these were 
rarely harmful to the patient, overuse of antibiotics is a public health concern 
because it can lead to higher antibiotic resistance in the community (Kunin 1993). 
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Unnecessary hospitalisation also increases the risk of individuals suffering 
nosocomial infections within the hospital. 
For both insufficient and unnecessary care, disease type was generally a more 
important determinant than whether the doctor worked in the public or private 
sector. Doctors treating diarrhoea patients provided less sufficient care, and were 
more likely to provide harmful or costly non-essential care, as compared with 
doctors treating pneumonia patients. However, public doctors were more likely than 
private doctors to unnecessarily recommend antibiotics to patients. 
Finally, clear patterns of inappropriate care emerge when comparing insufficient and 
unnecessary care. In particular, doctors providing the least sufficient care are also 
the most likely to give harmful and costly non-essential treatments. For instance, 
doctors who gave insufficient advice on homecare and supplements were much more 
likely to give harmful non-essential treatments than doctors who gave sufficient 
advice (19% V 4% probability of giving harmful non-essential treatments). 
Similarly, 20% of doctors who prescribed insufficient medication also gave harmful 
non-essential treatments, whereas none of the sampled doctors who prescribed 
sufficient medication also gave harmful non-essential treatments. 
5.4.2 Limitations of analysis 
In addition to the limitations inherent in clinical vignettes (discussed in section 2.2.4 
of the literature review), this chapter's application of vignettes also had its own 
specific limitations. First, only one dimension of care -a doctor's recommended 
treatment plan - was analysed. This is in contrast to other clinical vignette studies 
that analyse multiple dimensions of care. Still, a doctor's treatment plan is the most 
relevant dimension for analysing costly and potentially harmful consequences of 
overprovision, and consequently the relationship between quality and quantity of 
care. 
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A second limitation is that measures of the overall extent of both insufficient and 
unnecessary care were simple aggregates (the percentage of the essential treatment 
plan or number of unnecessary treatments given). Other vignette studies use expert 
panels (Peabody et al. 2000) or item response theory (Das and Hammer 2005b) to 
weight doctor's responses. Then again, although there was no weighting of 
individual items as contributors to a single vignette score, the expected health and 
cost consequences of these individual items were evaluated. 
Third, after disaggregating data to conditions and the sector a doctor works in, cell 
sizes are small. This limited multivariate analyses of the determinants of insufficient 
and unnecessary care. 
More generally, quantity of care as measured by vignettes was used as the empirical 
measure of medical effort. Whilst vignettes allow both cognitive and physical 
aspects of effort to be accounted for in a doctor's recommended treatment plan, a 
limitation is that doctors did not actually have to undertake these physical aspects 
(rather, they described the physical aspects of effort they would do). There is no 
basis for judging whether actual practice is likely to be characterised by more 
unnecessary care and/or less sufficient care. 
5.4.3 Links to incentives 
By analysing the adverse health and cost consequences of insufficient and 
unnecessary care, these vignette results also provide a quality perspective to analysis 
in the next chapter on the impact of supply-side incentives on hospital care. The 
following chapter, as part of the analysis, classifies diarrhoea and pneumonia 
paediatric inpatients as receiving less than the standard inpatient package or (at least) 
the standard inpatient package. However, receiving less than this inpatient package 
did not always equate to lower quality care because of the potential for doctors to 
misdiagnose patients (see section 6.2.2 in the next chapter for further details). 
Vignette results in this chapter cannot clarify when receiving less than this inpatient 
package in the next chapter is likely to equate to worse (or better) quality care than 
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receiving at least the inpatient package. Indeed, vignette results caution against 
inferring that more care always equates to better (or worse) quality healthcare, 
because of the complex relationship between quality and quantity of care. But they 
can provide some insights on the type of poor quality healthcare patients are most at 
risk of encountering. 
Interpreting vignette results literally, for patients incorrectly receiving the standard 
inpatient package (i. e. misdiagnosed patients), the most likely negative consequence 
is purely cost-related, since vignettes showed that unnecessary care more often had 
neutral than adverse health outcomes. That is not to imply there is no risk of adverse 
health outcomes: in 14% of cases, doctors recommended potentially harmful 
treatments. However, this interpretation assumes that the patient does not have 
another serious illness unrelated to either diarrhoea or pneumonia. Conversely, 
patients incorrectly receiving less than the inpatient package do not spend more than 
they need to on healthcare (at least initially1) . However, they are much more 
likely 
to suffer an adverse health event than patients incorrectly receiving the standard 
inpatient package. 
These insights provide general quality implications for analysis of incentives in the 
following chapter. For instance, PHIC insured patients are not only more likely to 
receive more care than the non-insured. They are also at less risk of suffering 
adverse health outcomes, but more at risk of receiving costly medicine that has no 
incremental health benefit (with the converse holding true for the non-insured). 
More generally, the incentive to provide more care to certain patients, whilst not 
guaranteeing better clinical quality because of the possibility of flat-of-the-curve 
medicine, does seem to reduce the risk of a patient experiencing adverse health 
outcomes. 
13 In the longer term, patients could spend more on healthcare as a consequence of worse health 
outcomes. But during this specific hospital visit, they do not spend more than they need to. 
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However, this application of vignette results to findings in the following chapter 
need to be qualified, since vignettes are based on hypothetical rather than actual 
healthcare scenarios. When doctors are asked in a vignette how they would care for 
a patient, their answers are based on the implicit assumption that there are no 
significant resource constraints. That is, vignettes can be understood as reflecting a 
situation where all essential health inputs are available. This provides an incentive 
for a doctor to err on the side of caution, and may explain why so many doctors 
recommended non-essential treatments that were health neutral. Doctors may have 
been aware that such treatments were not essential, but still suggested them because 
they thought these treatments could have some kind of marginal benefit for the 
patient and at worse were not harmful to the patient. In contrast, healthcare given by 
doctors in the previous chapter is constrained by the limited resources they have, 
time constraints and the knowledge that patients cannot always pay for a 
comprehensive treatment plan. 
Notwithstanding these issues, this chapter shows that whilst the relationship between 
medical effort and quality is not straightforward, low effort (as empirically measured 
in this chapter) does typically result in lower quality care, and is more of a quality 
concern than too much effort. In contrast, unnecessary care (too much effort) has 
less adverse health impacts on the patient, though it remains a concern for 
policymakers because it can be costly and due to the potential public health concern 
of antibiotic overuse. 
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Chapter 6: Public hospital care: equal for all or 
equal for some? 
6.1 Introduction 
In LIC and LMIC settings, government budgets are rarely sufficient to cover a 
public hospital's operating costs. Shortfalls are typically financed through a 
combination of health insurance contributions, user charges and other income- 
generating mechanisms (English et al. 2006). The conceptual framework in chapter 
3 demonstrated how the mixed nature of this financing arrangement can create 
perverse incentives to differentiate between patients for reasons other than health 
need, though effective monitoring and various non-financial factors were also shown 
to influence a doctor's behaviour. In this chapter, related hypotheses derived from 
the conceptual framework are tested. 
A mix of funding sources is apparent in Philippine public hospitals. Although the 
majority of funding comes from budgets financed publicly by LGUs, like other 
hospitals in LIC and LMIC settings, these are not sufficient to cover their operating 
costs (Department of Health 2005). Public hospitals are therefore reliant on 
additional income-generating mechanisms, namely PHIC contributions and user 
charges. As a consequence of such a mixed financing arrangement, the amount paid 
by patients for healthcare can differ considerably, both within and across public 
district hospitals. 
Patients using public hospitals in the Philippines are charged by line item (e. g. for 
medicines, laboratory services and other medical procedures used, type of 
consultations). That is, it is a fee-for-service based system. For PHIC insured 
patients, these charges are reimbursed by PHIC up to pre-specified limits for various 
medical benefits. The patient pays the excess if the bill is above these limits. 
1301PagC 
PHIC, though, does not yet provide universal population coverage. For the 
uninsured, hospital charges are paid out-of-pocket. However, there are reductions or 
exemptions from charges for the poorest patients. Such discounts are based on a 
patient's ability to pay, as determined by hospital social workers, with these 
discounts financed by the hospital itself (Capuno 2006). Patients' health 
expenditures also differ in the amount paid for room and board. This depends on the 
type of ward a patient is admitted in. Wards vary in terms of hotel amenities, but the 
healthcare provided in each is meant to be of equal technical quality. In addition to 
standard ('Charity') wards, public hospitals often have separate, less crowded 
(sections of) ward/s for the insured and those choosing to pay extra for this privilege 
('Pay' or `Medicare' wards), and occasionally private rooms (Gertler and Solon 
2002). The exact number and type of wards, though, varies across public hospitals, 
as do the charges for each ward type. Consequently, the amount patients have to pay 
can vary considerably. 
The financial incentives for doctors to differentiate between patients, though, are 
diluted by the fact that it is the LGU which has official discretion over the extent to 
which public hospitals can retain revenues generated from health insurance or user 
charges. Moreover, healthcare given by some public doctors are formally monitored 
through internal and/or external monitoring mechanisms. Further, the intensity of 
these financial incentives is likely to be lower for the actual physicians interacting 
with patients, since the majority of a public physician's income is salary-based. Still, 
most public hospital physicians receive professional fees for insured patients from 
PHIC. For example, 85% of physicians across 30 public hospitals in the Philippines 
received PHIC fees (source: QIDS dataset, 2006). This implies that, at least for 
insured patients, most public physicians also face direct incentives to differentiate 
between patients for financial reasons. 
This chapter explores how this incentive structure within which public hospital 
doctors operate affects the medical effort doctors exert on patients. Analysis is based 
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on assessment of the determinants of the amount and type of health services given to 
hospitalised children aged five or under, diagnosed with pneumonia or diarrhoea. 
The data used comes from the QIDS study, which was described in chapter 3. 
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6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Links with hypotheses from conceptual framework 
The amount of medical effort a physician exerts on a patient should - under 
conditions of perfect information or perfect agency - depend only on a patient's 
health need. Yet the conceptual framework (see chapter 3) showed how with 
imperfect information or imperfect agency, a physician faces incentives to 
differentiate between patients for reasons other than health need, and consequently 
provide too little or too much healthcare to a patient. 
Six hypotheses derived from the conceptual framework are tested in this chapter. 
These are given in Table 5.1, along with their testable empirical versions. The 
sufficiency (volume) and appropriateness (type) of health services received are used 
as empirical measures of medical effort, since medical effort itself is not directly 
observable. Details on the medical effort measures and empirical proxies used to test 
hypotheses are given in sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 respectively. 
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Table 6.1: Testable hypotheses 
1. Performance-based payments Physicians working in AIDS 'bonus' hospitals 
encourage a more appropriate effort level (receiving bonus payments for meeting quality 
if they are well correlated with e*. standards) are less likely to provide insufficient and 
inappropriate care14. 
2. More effort will be exerted on patients - Patients paying a higher daily rate for room and board 
that a doctor receives a higher financial are less likely to receive insufficient and inappropriate 
reward from. care. 
- Physicians working in QIDS 'access' hospitals (where 
there is increased depth and breadth of insurance 
coverage in the district) are less likely to provide 
insufficient and inappropriate care. 
3. More effort will be exerted on patients 
from whom a doctor receives a higher 
non-financial reward. 
4. More effort will be exerted on patients 
who are better able to advocate for more 
care. 
Patients coming from wealthier households are less 
likely to receive insufficient and inappropriate care. 
- Patients whose mothers have attained higher 
education levels are less likely to receive insufficient 
and inappropriate care. 
5. Doctors that are effectively monitored - Physicians working in hospitals that are externally 
will provide a more appropriate effort monitored through Sentrong Sigla accreditation are 
level. less likely to provide insufficient and inappropriate 
care. 
- Physicians working in hospitals that have internal 
quality control committees are less likely to provide 
insufficient and inappropriate care. 
6. More effort will be exerted on the - Patients who have (and use) PHIC insurance are less 
insured than the non-insured likely to receive insufficient care, but more likely to 
(independent of the reward a doctor receive inappropriate care. 
receives from a patient) 
6.2.2 Measuring medical effort 
Medical effort was defined in chapter 3 as the cognitive and physical activities that 
are required in caring for a patient. Empirical proxies, though, are necessarily 
limited to measuring the more observable aspects of medical effort. Given the 
14 Measures of insufficient and inappropriate care are discussed in section 6.2.2. 
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available data, five measurement types were considered 15. These were based on the 
sufficiency (volume) or appropriateness (type) of health services received: 
a. Comparison of individual health services 
b. Aggregation of health services: summation and weighted summation 
c. Aggregation of health services: `clinical packages' 
d. Patient perceptions on the volume and type of healthcare received 
e. Medical administration type 
a. Comparison of individual health services 
As part of the patient exit survey, the sick child's parent or other carer was asked 
which of the following health services the child received during their inpatient 
admission: 
- Laboratory tests 
- X-ray 
- Oral medication 
- Intravenous medication 
-Other injected medication (intramuscular or, rarely, intracutaneous) 
- Intravenous fluids 
- GP visit during admission (after initial visit upon admission) 
-Specialist consultation during admission 
- Lumbar puncture 
- Intubation 
Whether or not a patient received each of these services gives simple measures of 
the volume of health services received. However, such analysis of individual health 
services does not provide a measure of the overall quantity of health services 
received, and so does not adequately reflect a doctor's medical effort. Thus various 
approaches to aggregating these data were explored instead. 
1s A sixth option could have been to use the disaggregated clinical vignettes from chapter 5. However, 
such data did not correspond to individual doctor-patient interactions, and this option was therefore 
not considered. 
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b. Aggregating health services: summation and weighted summation 
" The simplest approach to aggregation is to sum the 10 health services. But this 
makes the unrealistic assumption that there are no differences in the medical effort 
required between these health services. For instance, it seems inappropriate to 
assume that a patient given IV fluids is receiving an equal volume of services to a 
patient given a specialist consultation. 
Applying weights to these health services can potentially provide a more accurate 
reflection of the overall volume of services provided. For instance, in the resource- 
based relative value study in the US (Hsiao et al. 1988), a wide range of health 
services were weighted by the time taken, skill required and risk of iatrogenic harm 
in providing a given health service. This was done so that health providers' pay 
more accurately reflected the work involved with different health services. 
However, there are a number of methodological difficulties associated with 
weighting that are especially difficult to resolve for this dataset. In particular, 
assigning the relative importance attached to each weight category; and specifying 
appropriate functional relationships between weight categories, and between weight 
categories and health services are problematic to address here as there is insufficient 
detail known about each patient case. That is, although it is known whether the child 
was admitted with pneumonia or diarrhoea, details of the child's syndrome, etiology 
and any secondary diagnosis are not known, all of which are likely to affect the 
accuracy of the weighting system. 
An alternative and simpler approach is to use the prices of health services as 
weights. Medical effort would then be measured by a patient's health expenditure. 
This assumes that prices accurately reflect differences in effort exerted by doctors 
across health services. Of more fundamental concern is that in the public hospitals 
from which data are drawn, prices charged to patients vary, depending on health 
insurance status and ward type. These are characteristics of the incentive structure 
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that this thesis specifically seeks to analyse, making health expenditure analysis 
unsuitable for the research aim of this thesis. 
c. Aggregating health services: `clinical packages' 
Given the problems associated with summation and weighted summation, an 
alternative approach to aggregating health services based on 'clinical packages' was 
adopted. This defined broad packages of care for pneumonia and diarrhoea cases. 
Five clinical packages are specified, based on various combinations ofthe 10 health 
services listed in section 6.2.3a. They represent sequentially increasing volume of 
health services, and are described in table 6.2 below. 
Table 6.2: Package details for pneumonia and diarrhoea 
0 Nothing 
1 Tests only Lab tests and/or X-ray Lab tests 
2 Incomplete package Package 1+ only 1-2 of: [a] Medication Same as pneumonia package 
(oral or IV or other injected) [b] IV fluid 2, but excluding X-ray. 
[c] Doctor visit during admission (by GP 
or Specialist) 
-------------------------------------------------- Same as pneumonia package 
3, but excluding X-ray. 
3 Standard package I Package 1+ all of: [a] Medication [b] IV 
fluid [c] Doctor visit during admission 
4 Severe case Package 3+ lumbar puncture or 
intubation. 
Same as pneumonia package 4 
(i. e. including X-ray). 
Definition of'these packages was based on discussions with local physicians from 
the Philippines on what constitutes a `standard inpatient package' for pneumonia and 
diarrhoea paediatric cases, and consequently different packages of 'non-standard' 
care. These are consistent with clinical guidelines giving more specific advice on the 
diagnosis and treatment of pneumonia and diarrhoea paediatric cases, such as the 
Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses (WHO and UNICEF 2005). 
The standard package therefore defines a basic set of items needed to provide quality 
inpatient care. II' fewer items are provided, it is reasonable to interpret this as 
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insufficient - and thus lower quality - care. However, if more than this is provided, 
it is not possible to ascertain whether this is unnecessary care or instead reflects 
more severe cases. 
















Nothing Tests only Incomplete package Standard package Severe case 
Less than standard inpatient package At least standard inpatient package 
It is important to note that determining the first three clinical package categories to 
be insufficient assumes that the child has been correctly diagnosed and admitted. But 
if, for instance, an inpatient only has moderate diarrhoea (and so should be seen as 
an outpatient case), then not receiving medication or IV fluid does not necessarily 
imply insufficient care. Given a lack of data on the accuracy of diagnosis, results are 
presented in terms of the quantity of care, with quality judgements left to the 
discussion. 
d. Patient perception variables 
These variables provide more qualitative measures of the sufficiency of care, in 
terms of patient perceptions regarding the amount of care or the time devoted to a 
patient. A child's parent or other carer were asked to specify how much they agreed 
or disagreed (using a standard 5-point likert scale: Strongly Agree, Agree, Uncertain. 
Disagree, Strongly Disagree) with the following statements: 
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i] "I think my doctor has done everything needed to provide complete medical care. " 
ii] "When I go for medical care, they are careful to check everything when treating and examining my 
child. " 
iii] "Those who provide my child's medical care sometimes hurry too much when they treat my child. " 
iv] "Doctors usually spend plenty of time with my child. " 
The first two statements (i & ii) correspond to the overall amount of healthcare, 
asking the respondent to specify to what extent the volume of care received was 
perceived by them as sufficient or insufficient. The second two statements (iii & iv) 
relate to the sufficiency of time spent with the patient. Regression diagnostics found 
significant problems related to model specification (based on the link test) and 
heteroscedasticity when these four variables were reduced to two (volume 
sufficiency and time sufficiency) or one variable. Therefore, each of the four 
perception variables was modelled individually. 
e. Medication administration type 
This empirical measure involves analysing the method of medical administration 
given to the sub-sample of patients receiving medication intravenously or by 
injection. This is because intravenous medication is, for most pneumonia and 
diarrhoea inpatient cases, preferable to other injected medication in terms of 
minimising patient discomfort, but is typically more time-consuming. 
Intravenous medication is therefore defined as being a more appropriate method of 
medical administration than other injected medication, and also requires more effort 
from the doctor. Note that data on whether patients received medication orally was 
not used as a comparator. This was because it is not evident whether oral 
administration requires more or less medical effort than intravenous or injected 
medication, and as a doctor's decision to not administer orally is likely to be driven 
to a larger extent by the severity of a patient's illness. 
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Summary 
From these various approaches to empirically measuring medical effort, three sets of 
measures are used in the analysis. These are summarised in "Fable 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Empirical measures of medical effort used in analysis 
Medical effort measure Specification 
A. Clinical Packages [CP] Whether the package of care received was less than 
Sufficiency of the volume of services given the standard inpatient package (=0) or not (=1). 
to a patient. Note: alternative specification using all clinical packages (on an 
ordinal scale from 0-4) provides an additional measure of volume of 
services, though this does not evaluate the sufficiency of service 
volume. 
B. Patient Perceptions [PP] 
Sufficiency of the volume of services and 
time given to a patient. 
- Carer's perception on sufficiency of volume of 
services given to child (model i& ii, each on 5-point 
scale) 
- Carer's perception on sufficiency of time spent with 
child (model iii & iv, each on 5-point scale). 
Note: responses were inverted for 3 of 4 measures, so that the 
value 1 (5) consistently pertained to dissatisfaction (satisfaction) 
C. Medication Administration Type - Whether child received medication via injection (=1) 
[MAT] rather than intravenously (CO). 
Appropriateness of care given to a patient. Note: in contrast to the CP and PP measures above, a higher value 
(1) represents less effort than a lower value (0). 
6.2.3 Model specification 
The general empirical approach can be summarised as Ibilows: 
E, =Q, X+ß, Y+li,, 
where the dependent variable E; denotes the medical effort patient i receives, as 
measured through Models A, B and C. In Models A and C, a logit specification is 
used (since outcomes are binary in nature); in Model B, the specification is ordered 
logit (since outcomes are ordinal and categorical). Logit and ordered logit 
specifications were chosen because of the nature of the dependent variables, with 
linear regression alternatives having interior statistical properties (Greene 2007). 
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Explanatory variables are made up of vectors of patient-related characteristics (X) 
and hospital-related characteristics (Y), with 1c, ß a vector of residuals. For all model 
specifications, the approach was to first estimate a full model, which includes the 
full variable set. Then a restricted model is estimated. This is a reduced (nested) 
form of the full model, excluding statistically insignificant control variables on the 
basis of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). It reflects the model which best 
forecasts the dependent variable in each of Models A, B and C beyond the sample 
set. In the results section, only the restricted model is presented 16. Note that results 
are based on logistic specifications and are therefore interpreted in terms of their 
effects on the odds ratio. 
To control for case-mix or disease severity, separate regressions are run for patients 
with pneumonia and those with diarrhoea in Models A and C. In Model B, though, 
the full sample is used (though dummy explanatory variables for the two illnesses 
are included). This is because case-mix/disease severity is not expected to be as 
crucial a determinant of users' perceptions as it is for the actual volume or type of 
healthcare received. 
This model utilises data from two time periods before and after the QIDS 
intervention. The effects of most of these explanatory variables are expected to be 
constant over time, and thus are pooled across the two time periods. However, the 
model also includes two hospital-level policy interventions introduced after the first 
time period, as part of the QIDS study. The interventions were expanded insurance 
coverage for children (in `access' hospitals), and increased reimbursement for 
providers meeting quality standards (in `bonus' hospitals). Section 3.3.2 in chapter 3 
provides further details on these policy interventions. The effects of the two policy 
interventions are isolated using a difference-in-difference methodology (see, for 
instance, Yip and Eggleston 2001): 
16 Full model estimates were consistent to restricted model estimates in the sense that there were no 
drastic changes in the odds ratios and standard errors of explanatory variables. 
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E, =A3, IAccess+/3,, 
Bonus +/3-, Time +/34, Access *Time +/3, Bonus * Time + 13, X 
+ßiY+, u 1 121 
This model is an expanded form of the more generalised regression model [II above. 
Access and Bonus are dummy variables taking the value 1 if the patient is treated in 
a hospital with one of these policy interventions, and Time is a dummy variable 
equal to I for the second data period. Access*Time and Bonus*Time are the variables 
of interest, as they show the impact of the reforms after accounting for time trends. 
That is, their coefficients /14 and /1 measure the difference over time for access or 
bonus hospitals. as compared with the difference over time for control hospitals (i. e. 
the difference-in-difference). The interpretation of these and other difference- 
in-difference coefficients are summarised in table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: The difference-in-difference (DD) approach 
QIDS Policy intervention ty 
Before (2003-4, Time = 0) ß, ß2 
After (2006-7, Time = 1) ß, + ß, + 94 ß2 + 93 + 95 ß, 
Difference (After minus Before) 93 + ßa 93+95 93 
DD (Access or Bonus V Control) ß4 95 
6.2.4 Explanatory variables 
The rationale for explanatory variables are based on the conceptual framework, or 
act as controls for non-incentive related factors that impact upon the medical effort 
exerted (such as a patient's severity of illness). 
Patient-related variables 
The daily charge for a patient's room and board (Daily Charge RB) tests hypothesis 
2. Its coefficient is expected to be positive for Models A and B, and negative for 
Model C, since the financial reward to the health provider is higher for patients 
paying more. The room and board charge was preferred to using total health 
expenditure because it is independent of expenditures on actual health services 
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received (such as medications). Thus, unlike total health expenditure, it is exogenous 
to all of the dependent variable specifications. 
Household income (HHlncome, using income quintiles) is a proxy for a patient's 
social standing, testing hypothesis 3. Its coefficient is expected to be positive for 
Models A and B, and negative for Model C. This is based on potential reciprocity, 
assuming doctors are more likely to expect future reciprocal gains from patients with 
a higher income (Fehr and Falk 2002). The type of ward a child is staying in, an 
arguably more visible measure of social standing, was not used because of non- 
uniform interpretations of ward types across hospitals. - 
The education level of a child's mother (Education) is a proxy for the ability of a 
mother to advocate for more effort being exerted in treating her sick child, testing 
hypothesis 4. Its coefficient is expected to be positive for Models A and B, and 
negative for Model C. 
A variable reflecting whether a patient has, and uses, PHIC insurance (PHIC insured 
+ claim) tests hypothesis 6. Its coefficient is expected to be positive for Models A 
and B: because the insured are typically able to pay more for healthcare than the 
non-insured, and due to the potential for ex post moral hazard (see Cutler and 
Zeckhauser 2000 and the conceptual framework). However, for Model C the 
coefficient is expected to be positive for a different rationale: administering 
medication by injection is quicker than intravenous administration, yet 
reimbursement from PHIC is the same either way, and so physicians are likely to 
prefer administering medication by injection for such patients. 
Hospital-related variables 
A first set of hospital variables account for the QIDS policy interventions. The 
`bonus' intervention (Bonus*Time), reflecting bonus payments to the hospital for 
meeting quality standards, tests hypothesis 1. These bonus payments are anticipated 
to encourage a more appropriate effort level. Therefore its coefficient is expected to 
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be positive for Models A and B, and negative for Model C, if one assumes that more 
medical effort as measured in these models also represents more appropriate effort. 
The `access' intervention (Access *Time17), indicating expanded insurance coverage 
in the district, tests hypothesis 2. Its coefficient is expected to be positive for Models 
A and B, since doctors are aware that more services will be reimbursed for these 
patients than before. For Model C, the coefficient is unknown a priori. 
A second set of variables reflect monitoring of a doctor's health service delivery, 
and test hypothesis 5. The variable Internal Monitoring indicates that a hospital has 
a mortality or morbidity review committee, thus providing doctors with information 
on appropriate care. The variable External Monitoring reflects that a hospital was 
Sentrong Sigla accredited. Such hospitals have to meet structural quality standards to 
be accredited, and then are monitored to ensure this quality is maintained (Catacutan 
2006). In both cases, monitoring is anticipated to encourage a more appropriate 
effort level. Coefficients are expected to be positive for Models A and B, and 
negative for Model C, if one assumes (as with hypothesis 1) that more effort as 
measured in these models also represents more appropriate effort. 
Control variables 
Variables controlling for a patient's severity of illness (Age of Child variables, # 
Symptoms) are included. Patients with more severe illnesses are expected to receive 
more health services (relevant to models A and B), and also more likely to receive 
medication by injection than intravenously (Model Q. Note that case-mix is already 
controlled for by running separate regressions for pneumonia and diarrhoea 
inpatients in Models A and C, and in Model B by including dummy explanatory 
variables for the two illnesses. 
All other control variables account for a hospital's technical capacity. These also 
include physician characteristics averaged at the hospital level (Ave. Vignette Score, 
17 Note that an alternative set of interaction dummies based on combining the Access dummy with 
whether a patient had PHIC insurance were also run. These produced near identical results in all 
model variants. 
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measuring a physician's clinical ability; and Ave. Physician Age). Four variables 
measure input availability (Lab services, Stethoscopes, Otoscopes, Sterilizers). Note 
also that the coefficient for External Monitoring could also be partially reflecting 
input availability, since Sentrong Sigla. accreditation is based on meeting quality 
standards which include input availability. The number of beds (# Beds) provides a 
general measure of a hospital's capacity to cope with high patient loads. The 
variable Caseload controls for a potential trade-off between the average effort level 
per patient and the total medical effort exerted at the hospital. 
Table 6.5 describes all explanatory variables used in the regression analyses, 
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6.2.5 Regression diagnostics 
This section performs various diagnostic checks related to the model specified in 
section 6.2.3. These check for and, if necessary, correct common econometric 
problems. Unless otherwise stated, references used for this section were Greene 
2007; Gujarati 1999; and StataCorp 2007a. The computer programme Stata was 
used for all econometric analyses (StataCorp 2007b). 
Data clustering 
There is potential clustering of data at the hospital level. This occurs if patients in a 
particular hospital have some kind of shared characteristics and/or shared 
influencing factors (that are not captured by existing explanatory variables). Note 
that there is no separate clustering issue at the physician level, since physician data 
is averaged at the hospital level. Data clustering is statistically important because it 
means error terms are not independent; treating them as if they are independent 
results in estimated standard errors that are too small, increasing the likelihood of 
rejecting the null hypothesis. 
To evaluate if data clustering at the hospital level is likely to be an issue, intraclass 
correlations were calculated for each model specification. For all models, this 
correlation was statistically significant at the 99% level. For Model A variants 
(clinical packages), the intraclass correlation was between 0.16-0.2. The respective 
figures were 0.04-0.22 for Model B specifications (patient perceptions) and 0.15- 
0.19 for Model C (medication administration type). Since data clustering was 
statistically significant, it was adjusted for in the modelling process. In addition to 
hospital-level explanatory variables, the cluster command in Stata was used. This 
treats observations as independent across clusters/groups (hospitals), but not 
necessarily within the cluster. Note also that t tests undertaken in analysis of 
clustered data used the clttest Stata add-on command (Herrin 2002), and were 
one-sided unless otherwise stated. 
1471Pagc 
Specification errors 
A link test was performed to evaluate model specification (testing both dependent 
and independent variable specifications). This involves including the square of 
predicted values as an additional explanatory variable. In all Model A variants, no 
problems were found. 
For Model B variants, though, the predicted value squared was significant in all 
cases. Using alternate independent variable specifications did not fix the problem. 
When each dependent variable was reduced from an ordered logit (with values 1-5) 
to logit specification (values 1-3 recoded as zero, 4-5 as one), the general model 
specification problem identified by the link test was resolved. Another rationale for 
using a logit specification was because observations were strongly concentrated 
around one value (4, whereby a respondent has a moderately positive perception), 
and consequently regression results for the ordered logit specifications were very 
weak. 
Specification problems were also identified in Model C for the pneumonia sub- 
sample. As with Model B, alternative independent variable specifications failed to 
remove the problem. However, dependent variable specification is unlikely to be the 
issue here, since the dependent variable is binary in nature (and using a probit 
specification did not help). Removing the most influential observation did resolve 
the problem. See the section on outliers below on the validity of such a solution. 
Hetereoscedasticity 
Hetereoscedasticity occurs when the error terms do not have constant variance. It 
was tested for with a likelihood ratio test - whereby a full model with 
heteroscedasticity (assuming that one or more of the patient-level explanatory 
variables is correlated with the residuals) is compared with the same model with 
homoscedastictiy. This uses the hetprob18 Stata extension. 
18 I. e. using a probit specification. Stata did not provide such a command application for a logit 
specification. 
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In some model variants (across Models B and C), evidence of heteroscedasticity was 
found, most commonly in relation to the number of symptoms variable. However, in 
most cases this did not noticeably change regression results: all hypothesis-related 
variables in the heteroscedastic-adjusted probit models had near equivalent 
coefficients (the same sign and similar magnitude), standard errors and z statistics to 
the homoscedastic models. In the Model C pneumonia sub-sample, though, there 
was one noticeable change in regression results, with the education variable 
insignificant in the homoscedastic specification but strongly significant in the 
heteroscedastic specification. Consequently, in this case, heteroscedasticity-adjusted 
results are presented. 
Outliers, Leverage and Influence 
To evaluate if any observations substantially changed regression results, the general 
strategy was to first identify the most `influential' (i. e. variables that are outliers and 
have high leverage) observations. The diagnostic statistics used to identify such 
observations were the difference of chi-squares and standardised Pearson residuals. 
Once identified, each regression model was re-run without the most influential 
observations, to explore if explanatory variables' coefficients are sensitive to the 
removal of such outliers. Note that there are no set definitions on what should be 
labelled an `influential' observation, but some rule-of-thumb cut-offs have been 
suggested in the statistical literature (see, for example, Hamilton 2006, page 210). 
These cut-offs were used, along with re-running each regression model without its 
most markedly influential observations. 
In all models, coefficients and standard errors of explanatory variables were not 
noticeably different. Further, in all but one of the models, diagnostic statistics did 
not identify observations that were markedly influential. The one exception was in 
the pneumonia sub-sample for Model C. Here, there was a large jump in the 
difference of chi-squares for I observation: from 116 for the second most influential 
to 345 for the most influential. Removing this observation did not change the 
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direction of any significant odds ratios, but the odds ratios of all significant variables 
became more marked (i. e. moved further away from one). Further, it resolved the 
model's specification errors. Therefore, regression results presented for this model 
excluded this outlying observation. 
Multicollinearity 
To assess if there is high (imperfect) multicollinearity amongst two or more 
explanatory variables - whereby they are approximately linearly related - the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) was calculated for each explanatory model across all 
estimated models. As with `influential' observations, there is no set cutoff for 
multicollinearity, but rules of thumb exist to assess if it is likely to be a major 
problem. For instance, an explanatory variable with a 1NIF value of less than 0.1 
(or VIF>10) is often interpreted as being a cause for concern (Chatterjee et al. 
2000). In all of the regression models, there was no evidence of significant 
multicollinearity, with INIF values always higher than 0.16. 
Endogeneity 
The control variable Caseload is potentially endogenous. That is, in addition to 
effort depending on. a hospital's caseload, caseload may be higher in hospitals where 
the amount of medical effort exerted is higher (as measured by Models A, B and Q. 
This brings up fundamental causality concerns. To test whether caseload was 
significantly endogenous, an approach used in the health econometric literature was 
adopted (see, for example, Waters 1999). This approach is computationally 
equivalent to an omitted variable version of the Hausman test. It first involved 
running an auxiliary regression on caseload, but excluding effort (as measured by 
Models A, B and C) from its explanatory variables. The predicted values for 
caseload from this secondary regression were then used as an additional explanatory 
variable in the original medical effort regressions. If the coefficient of the predicted 
value term was significantly different from zero, it indicates that caseload is indeed 
endogenous. 
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As the predicted values for caseload were not statistically significant in any of the 
models, exogeneity of the variable caseload cannot be rejected, and thus endogeneity 
is unlikely to be a significant problem. Other variables, though, were excluded from 
the model because there were strong reasons to believe they were endogenous. This 
was the case for length of stay (an additional severity control variable). It was also 
the reason why a patients' daily charge for room and board (Daily Charge RB) was 
used, rather than total charge for room and board, and other health expenditures. 
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6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Facility surveys were conducted in 30 districts, with a total of 6098 patients 
interviewed. Amongst the 30 hospitals, 17 had internal monitoring mechanisms and 
26 were externally monitored in one or both time periods. Nearly a third (30%) of 
patients had and used PHIC insurance. Tables 6.6a and 6.6b give some of the main 
hospital and patient characteristics respectively. 
Table 6.6a Hospital characteristics 
Number of hospitals % 
Internal monitoringa 17 57 
External monitoringa. 26. 





.M . _ _ 
Median Med 
# Key laboratory servicesb ... _ . . ___ __... _. _.. _. _.. __. 3.3 ........ _.... __........ _. _..... _. __........ _ __ 3 
# Stethoscopes 6.5 7 
# Otoscopes 1.4 1 
# Sterilizers 2.5 2 
# Beds 63 55 
Inpatient caseload (in last month) 361 349 
" In either or both time periods. b Refers to which of 5 lab services are performed in the hospital: fecalysis, CBC, gram stain 
electrolytes and bacterial culture. 
Table 6.6b Patient characteristics 
Number of patients % 
Pneumonia inpatients 1746 30%c 
Diarrhoea inpatients 1539 29%c 
PHIC insurance 
- Yes (and will claim) 1812 30% 
- Yes (but will not claim) 190 3% 
- Not PHIC member 4096 67% 
Education of child's mother 
- None (0) 38 1% 
- Less than primary (1) 779 13% 
- Primary (2) 1214 20% 
- Secondary (3) 2666 44% 
- Tertia 4 22% 
Mean Median 
_ Annual Household income ýýýý-- MMý 65,177 PHP ($1240d)-ý 43,500 PHP ($828)ýý- ~ýM 
Daily Room and Board Charge 159 PHP ($3.03) 125 PHP ($2.38) 
c These percentages are by construct (see section 3.3.2 in chapter 3), rather than reflecting a hospital's inpatient mix 
d Using the average Philippine Peso to US dollar exchange rate in the study period 2003-7. 
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6.3.2 Clinical packages 
De/pendenl variable's, 
Just over half ofthe sample received less than the standard inpatient package for 
both pneumonia (54.9%) and diarrhoea cases (59.6%). Of these, most received the 
`incomplete package' (category 2), rather than nothing (category 0) or only 
diagnostics tests (category 1), as the figure below illustrates. 
Figure 6.2: Clinical package received 










Nothing Tests only Incomplete Standard package Severe case 
package 
Less than standard inpatient package At least standard inpatient package 
Figure 6.1 illustrates how the distribution is concentrated around package categories 
2&3. It is also important to note that 11.9% of pneumonia patients and 1 1.7°/0 of 
diarrhoea patients did not fit into any of these package categories. These were 
excluded from the analysis. 
Cross-luhulnlion. c and hivariute analyses 
The daily charge for room and hoard is a statistically significant determinant of the 
volume of'health service received, as measured by clinical packages (hypothesis 2). 
The average daily charge for patients receiving less than the standard inpatient 
package was 137PI II' for pneumonia cases and 145P1 1P for diarrhoea cases, 
significantly lower than 185111111 and 182111111 for those receiving (at least) the 
standard inpatient package, fier pneumonia and diarrhoea cases respectively. 
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Table 6.7: Impact of ºlaily charge for room and board on clinical package 
received 
Average daily charge for room and board 
Volume of health services received Pneumonia Diarrhoea 
Less than the standard inpatient package 137 PHP [n=941] 145 PHP [n=1088] 
At least the standard inpatient package 185 PHP [n=598] 182 PHP [n=523] 
Difference (associated p-value) 48PHP (p=0.0172) 37PHP (p=0.0919) 
Further, comparisons of'children by PI IIC insurance status show that children with 
PI IIC insurance are less likely to receive less than the standard inpatient package, as 
compared with the uninsured and those not making a claim (hypothesis 6): 
Figure 6.3: Children receiving less than the standard inpatient package (`%O) 







That is, for children with pneumonia, 48% of'those with PHIC (and making a claim) 
received less than the standard inpatient package, as compared with 67% for the 
uninsured/insured but not making a claim (p-value=0.0199). The respective figures 
for children with diarrhoea were 56% and 72% (gyp-value=0.0433). 
External monitoring also increased the likelihood of receiving (at least) the standard 
inpatient package (hypothesis 5), as shown in table 6.5. In contrast, internal 
monitoring had no statistically significant effect. 
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Table 6.8: Impact of external monitoring on the clinical package received 
Children receiving less than standard inpatient package 
(%) 
External Monitoring Pneumonia Diarrhoea 
Yes 52% 60% 
No 71% 75% 
Difference (associated p-value) -19% (p =0.0080) -15% (p =0.0277) 
Other variables measuring incentives (financial or social) were not statistically 
significant predictors of the clinical package received. For hypothesis 3, the 
proportion of children receiving less than the standard inpatient package was not 
statistically different between the poorest (first income quintile) and other 
households. The education of a child's mother (hypothesis 4) did not significantly 
affect the likelihood of a child receiving less than the standard inpatient package. In 
relation to hypotheses 1 and 2, no significant differences across hospital `access', 
`bonus' and `control' types and over time were found (using a difference-in- 
difference approach without other explanatory variables). 
Regressions 
Regression results were broadly consistent with the cross-tabulation analyses, as 
table 6.9 shows: 
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Table 6.9 Model A regression results 
Pneumonia cases (n=1525) Diarrhoea cases (n=1588) 
Wald chi2 =229 (Prob>chi2 <0.001) Wald chit =1 15 (Prob>chi2 <0.001) 
Log pseudolikelihood = -855.6 Log pseudolikelihood = -8 31.7 Pseudo R2 = 0.1597; AIC*n=1 755 Pseudo R2 = 0.1676; AIC*n=1709 
Variable OR. se P>Izl O. R. se P>Izl 
Access 1.1298 0.747 0.8540 0.7497 0.450 0.6310 
Bonus 1.0734 0.607 0.9000 1.1855 0.574 0.7250 
Time 1.0516 0.640 0.9340 0.9364 0.684 0.9280 
Bonus*Time 0.6153 0.503 0.5220 0.8518 0.791 0.8630 
Access*Time 0.5634 0.672 0.6300 0.9772 1.129 0.9840 
Daily Charge RB 1.0014 0.001 0.0880 1.0006 0.001 0.5650 
HH Income Q2 0.8528 0.191 0.4760 1.0011 0.202 0.9960 
HH Income Q3 1.0721 0.283 0.7920 0.9188 0.172 0.6510 
HH Income Q4 1.3089 0.319 0.2690 0.9660 0.214 0.8760 
HH Income 05 1.1235 0.307 0.6700 0.8043 0.193 0.3640 
Education 0.8802 0.069 0.1050 1.0886 0.074 0.2140 
Internal Monitoring 0.9736 0.365 0.9430 - 0.3849 0.170 0.0300 External Monitoring 1.9125 0.596 0.0380 2.2597 0.812 0.0230 
PHIC Insured + claim 2.0806 0.264 <0.0001 2.4573 0.607 <0.0001 
# Symptoms 1.0757 0.038 0.0380 
Treated before 1.7316 0.309 0.0020 
Lab services 2.0466 0.704 0.0370 
Stethoscopes 0.8599 0.060 0.0300 
Sterilizers 1.3759 0.160 0.0060 1.6518 0.197 <0.0001 
# Beds 1.0133 0.008 0.0920 
Caseload 1.0037 0.001 0.0020 
Notes: (1) other control vanables were included, but only those that were statistically significant at the 90% level shown here (see table 6.3 
for details); (2) ordered logic specifications produced similar and consistent results. 
Children using PHIC insurance had 2.09 (pneumonia cases) or 2.46 (diarrhoea 
cases) times greater odds of receiving (at least) the standard inpatient package, as 
compared with children not having or utilising PHIC insurance. Physicians working 
in hospitals that were externally monitored had 1.91 (pneumonia cases) or 2.26 
(diarrhoea cases) times greater odds of providing the standard inpatient package, as 
compared with physicians working in hospitals without external monitoring. 
For pneumonia cases only, a 100PHP ($1.91 USD) increase in the daily room and 
board charge increased the odds of receiving a standard inpatient package by 14% 
(i. e. 0.0014* 100, since the odds ratio for this variable is based on a single peso 
increase). For diarrhoea cases only, internal monitoring was also statistically 
significant, although contrary to expectations its odds ratio was less than one. 
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6.3.3 Perception variables 
Dependent variables 
For all lour dependent variable specifications, a majority of respondents reported 
being satisfied, with a concetration of responses around the dependent variable value 
4- equivalent to moderate satisifaction: 
Figure 6.4 Patient perceptions on the sufficiency of volume of services (i & ii) & 
time devoted (iii & iv) to the sick child 









Adjusted Likert Scale (1-2=dissatisfied, 3=uncertain, 45=satisfied) 
Using an ordered logit specification produced regressions with very limited 
explanatory power (with pseudo-R2 values of only 0.03-0.05), as well as 
specification errors (see section 6.2.6). Thus each dependent variable was reduced to 
a logit specification. Values 1-3 were recoded as zero, representing the patient's 
mother (or other carer) not being satisfied (i. e. dissatisified or uncertain); values 4-5 
were recoded as one, representing a satisfied response. 
('russ-tahulutions / hi 'ariate analyses 
In model (i), patients receiving care from physicians working in 'bonus' hospitals 
were 5.33 times greater odds ot'being satisfied with sufficiency of service volume 
than those working in `control' hospitals, after controlling for trend effects 
(ßonu. s"*7inw), but without other explanatory variables (hypothesis 1). '[here were, 
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though, no significant differences between `bonus' and `control' hospitals in models 
ii-iv. Nor were there between `access' and `control' hospitals in all four model 
variants (hypothesis 2). 
In model (iv), the daily charge for room and board, and whether a physician worked 
in an externally monitored hospital, were statistically significant determinants of 
sufficiency of time spent with the child. Other cross-tabulations between the various 
dependent variable specifications and explanatory variables did not produce 
statistically significant results. 
Table 6.10 Significant predictors of satisfaction with sufficiency of care, from 
cross-tabulation analyses 
Factors affecting whether child received insufficient care 
1. QIDS bonus payments (Model Bi) Change in % children receiving insufficient care 
Bonus hospital: round 2- baseline -17% (8%-25%) 
Control hospital: round 2- baseline +2% (8%-6%) 
- Difference significant, after controlling for trend effects through difference-in-difference methodology 
2. External monitoring (Model Biv) 
Yes 
No 
Difference (associated p-value) 




3. Daily charge for room and board (Model Average daily charge 
Biv) 
Insufficient care 139PHP 
Sufficient care 176PHP 
Difference (associated p-value) 37PHP (p=0.0556) 
Regressions 
Some of the variables reflecting financial incentives were statistically significant, 
although never consistently across all four model variants, as shown in tables 6.11 a 
and 6.11 b below. 
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Table 6.11a: Model B regression results - sufficiency of volume of services 
Model B1 (n=5994) Model BY (n=6001) 
Wald chit= 1 55 (Prob>chi2 <0.001) Wald chi2 =1218 (Prob>ch i2 <0.001) 
Log pseudol ikelihood = -1802.9 Log pseudolikelihood = -1563.4 Pseudo R2 = 0.0985; AIC*n=3652 Pseudo R2 = 0.0414; AIC*n=3165 
Variable OR. se P>IzI OR. se P>Izl 
Access 0.8368 0.244 0.5410 0.8756 0.431 0.7870 
Bonus 0.1469 0.066 <0.0001 0.9765 0.453 0.9590 
Time 1.1274 0.535 0.8010 1.3188 0.550 0.5070 
Bonus*Time 4.5225 3.507 0.0520 0.9655 0.614 0.9560 
Access*Time 1.2463 0.969 0.7770 2.4929 1.931 0.2380 
Daily Charge RB 0.9997 0.001 0.6810 1.0015 0.001 0.0370 
HH Income Q2 0.9605 0.183 0.8330 1.0263 0.187 0.8860 
HH Income Q3 1.3549 0.284 0.1470 1.2780 0.248 0.2070 
HH Income Q4 1.1870 0.258 0.4310 1.2004 0.273 0.4220 
HH Income Q5 1.0676 0.256 0.7850 0.9713 0.196 0.8850 
Education 0.9012 0.056 0.0930 0.9573 0.056 0.4510 
Internal Monitoring 0.9578 0.261 0.8740 1.0887 0.304 0.7600 
External Monitoring 0.9906 0.261 0.8740 0.7587 0.258 0.4170 
PHIC insured + claim 1.0426 0.128 0.7340 0.8360 0.141 0.2880 
Otoscopes 1.5909 0.216 0.0010 
Caseload 0.9986 0.001 0.0290 
Diarrhoea cases 0.7178 0.081 0.0030 
Note: other control variables were included, but only statistically significant (90%) shown here 
Table 6.11b: Model B regression results - sufficiency of time spent with child 
Model Biif (n=5991) Model Biv (n=5996) 
Wald chi2=1254 (Prob>chi2 <0.001) Wald chi2 =155 (Prob>chi2 <0.001) 
Log pseudolikelihood = -30 20.9 Log pseudolik elihood = -3722.6 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0762; AIC*n=6096 Pseudo R2 = 0.0995; AIC*n=7497 
Variable O. R. se P>Izl OR. se P>Izj 
Access 1.3918 0.757 0.5430 1.0495 0.617 0.9340 
Bonus 1.2550 0.642 0.6570 1.2139 0.638 0.7120 
Time 1.8035 0.796 0.1810 1.9041 1.053 0.2440 
Bonus*Time 0.7932 0.701 0.7930 0.3724 0.305 0.2270 
Access*Time 1.3506 1.214 0.7380 1.0010 0.688 0.9990 
Daily Charge RB 1.0010 0.001 0.2460 1.0009 0.001 0.2140 
HH Income Q2 0.9581 0.123 0.7400 0.9362 0.106 0.5600 
HH Income Q3 1.1859 0.173 0.2420 0.9958 0.137 0.9760 
HH Income Q4 1.0487 0.162 0.7580 0.8081 0.143 0.2300 
HH Income 05 0.8711 0.156 0.4410 0.8092 0.121 0.1570 
Education 0.9520 0.048 0.3260 0.9853 0.054 0.7850 
Internal Monitoring 1.1686 0.462 0.6940 0.7686 0.294 0.4910 
External Monitoring 0.8124 0.291 0.5620 1.5968 0.541 0.1670 
PHIC Insured + claim 0.7417 0.119 0.0630 0.8834 0.104 0.2930 
Otoscopes 1.7220 0.462 0.6940 1.7946 0.380 0.0060 
Diarrhoea cases 0.7723 0.100 0.0450 
Note: other control variables were included, but only statistically significant (90%) shown here. 
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Model Bi showed that patients receiving care from physicians working in 'honiiv' 
hospitals had 4.52 times greater odds of being satisfied with sufficiency of service 
volume than those working in 'control' hospitals, after controlling for trend effects 
(honus*lime). This model also found that a one unit increase in a child's mother's 
education level elecrea. tiecl the odds of being satisfied with sufficiency of service 
volume by 10%, in contrast to hypothesis 5. In Model Bii, a IOOPHP increase in the 
daily room charge increased the odds of a respondent being satisfied with the 
sufficiency of'service volume by 14°/x. In Model Biii, those with (and using) PI IIC 
insurance had 26% lower odds of being satisfied with the sufficiency of care. 
6.3.4 Medication administration type 
Dependent variable 
Of the full sample, 33.3% of children received medication intravenously as 
compared with 2.5% by injection. Note also that 1.9% received both forms, and 
62.3% received medications orally or did not receive any medication: 
Figure 6.5 Medication administration type (full sample) 




Patients receiving care from physicians working in `bonus' hospitals were less likely 
to receive medication by injection rather than intravenously, for both pneumonia 
(82%) and diarrhoea (84%) cases than those working in `control' hospitals, after 
controlling for trend effects (Bonus*Time) but without other explanatory variables 
(hypothesis 1). However, all other cross-tabulations between the dependent variable 
and explanatory variables did not produce statistically significant results, for both 
pneumonia and diarrhoea cases. 
Regressions 
In contrast to cross-tabulations results, multivariate regression analyses found that a 
number of both hospital- and patient-level explanatory variables were statistically 
significant, particularly for the pneumonia sub-sample (see table 6.12). This can be 
explained by the presence of better controls for confounding in multivariate 
regressions; and, for the pneumonia sub-sample, by adjusting for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 6.12: Model C regression results 
Pneumonia cases (n=758) Diarrhoea cases (n=521) 
Wald chi2 =1735 (Prob>chi2 <0. 001) Wald chi2 =127 (Prob>chi2 <0.001) 
Log pseudolikelihood = -132.5 Log pseudolikelihood = -135.7 
Heteroscedastic-adjusted model* Pseudo R2 = 0.1404; AIC*n=313 
Variable Coeff. OR* se P>Izl O. R. se P>IzI 
Access -0.027 0.9550 0.159 0.8650 1.4188 1.272 0.6960 
Bonus 0.195 1.3931 0.138 0.1590 0.7743 0.453 0.6620 
Time 0.097 1.1786 0.113 0.3930 6.6322 5.922 0.0340 
Bonus*Time -0.492 0.4336 0.209 0.0190 0.0765 0.098 0.0450 
Access*Time 0.067 1.1206 0.156 0.6670 0.1229 0.146 0.0770 
Daily Charge RB -0.001 0.9986 <0.001 0.0200 1.0003 0.001 0.8450 
HH Income Q2 -0.180 0.7365 0.105 0.0850 0.9080 0.478 0.8550 
HH Income Q3 -0.255 0.6487 0.096 0.0080 1.2373 0.778 0.7350 
HH Income Q4 -0.116 0.8210 0.070 0.0960 0.9177 0.609 0.8970 
HH Income Q5 -0.141 0.7870 0.086 0.1030 0.3034 0.281 0.1990 
Education 0.168 1.3310 0.025 <0.0001 0.9488 0.112 0.6560 
Internal Monitoring 0.109 1.2044 0.086 0.2050 0.8628 0.436 0.7700 
External Monitoring -0.204 0.7067 0.101 0.0430 0.3871 0.226 0.1040 
PHIC insured + claim 0.198 1.3994 0.078 0.0110 0.9882 0.403 0.9770 
# Symptoms -0.035 0.9430 0.017 0.0460 0.8710 0.054 0.0260 
Caseload 2.9581 1.085 0.0030 
Note: other control variables were included, but only statistically significant (95%) shown here. See table 6.3 for details. 
Note: regressions with patients receiving medication intravenously and by injection gave broadly consistent results. 
* For the pneumonia sub-sample, a probit model adjusted for heteroscedasticity in the Education variable was used. This 
reports a probit coefficient, and a "logit-equivalent" odds ratio (this is reached by m ultiplying the probit coefficient by 1.7 , to 
give an approximately equiva lent log it coefficient, then taking the ex ponential of thi s to acquire the logit-equivalent odds 
ratio). 
For both pneumonia and diarrhoea cases, physicians working in `bonus' hospitals 
were less likely to administer medication by injection rather than intravenously, as 
compared with those working in `control' hospitals and after controlling for trend 
effects (hypothesis 1). In particular, such physicians were 50.8% and 92.3% less 
likely to administer medication by injection rather than intravenously (Bonus*Time). 
For diarrhoea cases only, the same was true for `access' hospitals (Access*Time), 
with physicians working in such hospitals 87.7% less likely to administer 
medication by injection than intravenously. 
For pneumonia cases only, patients paying higher daily room charges were less 
likely to receive medications by injection (hypothesis 2). In particular, a 100PHP 
increase in charges decreased the odds of receiving medication by injection rather 
than intravenously by 14%. Further, patients with (and using). PHIC insurance had 
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39.9% greater odds of receiving medications by injections than patients not using 
PHIC insurance or being uninsured (hypothesis 6). 
Patients in the bottom income quintile were the most likely to receive medications 
by injection, as shown by the odds ratios for the household income quintile variables 
(hypothesis 3). A mother's education was also statistically significant, although its 
odds ratio was greater than one, contrary to expectations (hypothesis 4). Physicians 
working in externally monitored hospitals had 29.3% lower odds of administering 
medications by injection rather than intravenously, as compared with physicians 
working in hospitals without external monitoring (hypothesis 5). 
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6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 Evaluation of testable hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Performance-based payments encourage a more appropriate effort level if they are 
well correlated with e*. 
Empirical proxy: Physicians working in QIIDS 'bonus' hospitals (receiving bonus payments for meeting 
quality standards) are less likely to provide insufficient and inappropriate care. 
Bonus payments based on quality of care were effective in improving the 
appropriateness of the type of health services provided. Physicians working in 
`bonus' hospitals were 51% less likely to administer medication by injection than 
intravenously for pneumonia cases, and 92% less likely for diarrhoea cases (Model 
Q. There was also some limited evidence that bonus payments reduced the 
probability of providing insufficient care (Model Bi, but not in Models Bii-iv or 
Model A). A child's carer had 4.52 times greater odds of agreeing with the 
statement: "I think my doctor has done everything needed to provide complete 
medical care" if treated by physicians working in `bonus' hospitals, as compared 
with 'control' hospitals. 
Hypothesis 2: More effort will be exerted on patients that a doctor receives a higher financial reward 
from. 
Empirical proxy: Patients paying a higher daily rate for room and board are less likely to receive 
insufficient and inappropriate care. 
There was some evidence that paying more for room and board improved the 
sufficiency of care received. In Model A, for pneumonia (but not diarrhoea) cases, a 
100PHP increase in the daily room charge increased the odds of receiving (at least) 
the standard inpatient package by 14%. In Model Bii (but not Models Bi, iii or iv), 
children paying 100PHP more for daily room and board had 15% time greater odds 
of being satisfied with the sufficiency of care. For pneumonia (but not diarrhoea) 
cases, paying more for room and board also improved the type of care received 
(Model Q. A 100PHP increase in charges decreased the odds of receiving 
medication by injection than intravenously by 14%. 
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Empirical proxy., Physicians working in QIDS 'access' hospitals (where there is increased depth and 
breadth of insurance coverage in the district) are less likely to provide insufficient and inappropriate 
care. 
No evidence could be found to support this hypothesis (in Model A or B). 
Hypothesis 3: More effort will be exerted on patients from whom a doctor receives a higher non- 
financial reward. 
Empirical proxy: Patients coming from wealthier households are less likely to receive insufficient and 
inappropriate care. 
Although a child's household income did not have any significant effect on the 
sufficiency of care received (Models A and B), there was some evidence that it did 
impact on the type of healthcare given (Model Q. That is, for pneumonia cases, 
children from the bottom income quintile had 28-35% times greater odds of 
receiving medication by injection rather than intravenously, as compared with 
children from the other four income quintiles. No significant results, though, were 
found for diarrhoea cases. 
Hypothesis 4: More effort will be exerted on patients who are better able to advocate for more care. 
Empirical proxy: Patients whose mothers have attained higher education levels are less likely to 
receive insufficient and inappropriate care. 
No evidence could be found to support this hypothesis (in Models A, B or Q. 
Indeed, Model Bi found that higher education levels' increased the likelihood of 
being dissatisfied with the sufficiency of care. Since Model B is based on a child's 
carer's perceptions of sufficiency, this result may be due to differences in 
expectations rather than actual differences in sufficiency of care received, with more 
educated mothers having higher expectations. Higher education also increased the 
likelihood of receiving medication by injection rather than intravenously, for 
pneumonia cases (Model C), potentially because more educated mothers actually 
preferred their children to receive medications by injection. 
1651 Page 
Hypothesis 5: Doctors that are effectively monitored will provide a more appropriate effort level. 
Empirical proxy: Physicians working in hospitals that are externally monitored through Sentrong Sigla 
accreditation are less likely to provide insufficient and inappropriate care. 
External monitoring improved the sufficiency and type of care received. In Model A, 
physicians working in externally monitored hospitals had 1.9 (pneumonia cases) and 
2.3 (diarrhoea cases) times higher odds of providing (at least) the standard inpatient 
package, as compared with other physicians. Physicians in externally monitored 
hospitals were also 29% less likely to administer medications by injection rather 
than intravenously for pneumonia cases, as compared with other physicians. 
Empirical proxy: Physicians working in hospitals that have internal quality control committees are less 
likely to provide insufficient and inappropriate care. 
In contrast, internal monitoring did not improve the sufficiency or type of care a 
patient received. Indeed, for diarrhoea cases, Model A suggested it may even have 
reduced the sufficiency of care received. 
Hypothesis 6: More effort will be exerted on the insured than the non-insured (independent of the 
reward a doctor receives from a patient). 
Empirical proxy: Patients who have (and use) PHIC insurance are less likely to receive insufficient 
care, but more likely to receive inappropriate care. 
Having PHIC insurance reduced the probability of receiving insufficient care, as 
measured by the package of care a child received (Model A). Children who have and 
use PHIC insurance had 2.1 (pneumonia cases) to 2.5 (diarrhoea cases) times higher 
odds of receiving (at least) sufficient care, as compared with children not having or 
utilising PHIC insurance. Model Biii, though, gave contrasting results: children 
using PHIC insurance were 26% less likely to be satisfied with the sufficiency of 
care received (this variable was insignificant in other Model B variants). As with 
hypothesis 4, this result may be explained by PHIC members having higher 
expectations than non-PHIC members, rather than actual differences in sufficiency 
of care received. 
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There was also some evidence that children using PHIC insurance were more likely 
to receive medication by injection (Model Q. For pneumonia cases, children using 
PHIC insurance were 39.9% more likely to receive medications by injections than 
children not using PHIC insurance or being uninsured. For diarrhoea cases, though, 
results were insignificant. 
6.4.2 Limitations of analysis 
Each of Models A, B and C has its limitations. These can be separated into those that 
are essentially statistical and those that are more substantive. Substantive limitations 
relate to the assumptions inherent in empirical specifications, particularly the 
choices of dependent variables and some of the measures of incentives. 
Statistical limitations 
In all models, dependent variable specifications are based on recall of services 
received. If a patient's carer is more likely to forget care received than to over-report 
care they have not received, this introduces a systematic bias. Further, although 
proxies for severity of illness are included, and separate regressions are run for 
pneumonia and diarrhoea inpatient cases, these are still likely to be imperfect 
controls for severity. Statistical power is potentially limited by physician-level data 
being averaged at the hospital level. This weakens the strength of coefficients if 
doctors within a hospital face different incentives from one another. Data clustering 
also reduces the statistical power of regressions. 
In regressions based on patient satisfaction (Model B), respondents may have been 
reluctant to voice dissatisfaction, since they were interviewed within the hospital 
grounds. Still, respondents knew that the survey was confidential. The reluctance to 
voice dissatisfaction may well have explained the lack of variation in the dependent 
model (even after collapsing it from an ordered logit to logit specification), and 
consequent limited explanatory power of all Model B variants. 
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Substantive limitations 
More substantive limitations relate to there not being empirical proxies available for 
certain aspects of the incentive structure. As with the statistical limitations, the effect 
of most of these is to reduce the explanatory power of regressions. 
A first substantive limitation is that the incentive to provide more care to patients 
from whom the financial reward is higher is a hospital-level incentive. That is, it is 
the hospital as a whole that benefits financially from the patient. This financial 
incentive may only partially permeate down to the doctor, but there are no data to 
indicate how much this occurs. 
Secondly, LGUs have official discretion over the extent to which public district 
hospitals can retain revenues generated from health insurance or user charges. Thus 
hospitals retaining a smaller proportion of these revenues will face a weaker 
financial incentive to differentiate between patients for financial reasons. 
Unfortunately, the dataset does not include data on this revenue retention. 
In this chapter, it is also assumed that all doctors react in the same way to financial 
and non-financial incentives. Differences in how strongly doctors react to these 
incentives (for instance because of differences in the value attached to altruistic 
motivations) may well be important in explaining why there is not a systematic 
response by doctors to the incentives analysed in this paper, but there is no data 
available to test if this is the case. 
There are other substantive limitations specific to each of the three models. For 
clinical packages analysis (Model A), the analysis is predominantly limited to 
analysing the quantity rather than the quality (in terms of sufficiency) of care. As 
discussed in section 6.2.2, receiving less than the standard inpatient package can 
only be interpreted as insufficient if the doctor has correctly diagnosed the patient. 
Other data suggest, however, that diagnoses and treatment in the Philippines, like 
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other developed and developing countries, is done correctly only 50-55% of the time 
for patients with diarrhoea and pneumonia (Peabody and Liu 2007). 
For regressions based on patient satisfaction (Model B), their accuracy as a measure 
of the sufficiency of care is limited by any systematic variation in expectations of 
sufficiency (which may explain, for example, differences between PHIC insured and 
the non-insured). Indeed, a broad literature has pointed out to various biases in likert 
scales, including cultural, gender and literacy biases (see, for example, Noyes 1998). 
For analysis of the type of medical administration (Model C), administering 
medication by injection rather than intravenously is assumed to always be preferable 
for the patient, once disease severity has been controlled for. Consequently when 
physicians do not choose intravenous administration, this reflects less effort. 
However, there may still be patients for whom injected medication was not feasible. 
Further, recall problems may mean respondents incorrectly answer how their child 
received medications. Both of these concerns are addressed in part by excluding 
patients who received medication both intravenously and by injection. Perhaps more 
importantly, evidence elsewhere shows that patients (or their carers) may actually 
prefer to receive an injection even when there is no clinical reason for this (see, for 
instance, Paredes et al. 1996). That is, it may reflect a demand-side as well as a 
supply-side incentive. 
6.4.3 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter found that the medical effort a public physician exerts in treating a 
patient, as measures by the volume and type of health services provided, is 
influenced by the incentive structure. In particular, patients paying more for room 
and board, and patients treated in externally monitored hospitals were less likely to 
receive insufficient and inappropriate care. Further, bonus payments based on 
quality of care were effective in improving the appropriateness of care (though 
rarely in reducing the likelihood of insufficient care). Physicians also responded to 
the financial incentives inherent in patients with (and using) PHIC insurance. Such 
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patients were less likely to receive insufficient care. At the same time, patients with 
and using PHIC insurance were more likely to receive inappropriate care - that is, 
medication by injection rather than intravenously. This could be explained by 
reimbursement from PHIC being the same either way, and administering medication 
by injection is quicker (requires less effort) than intravenous administration. 
However, results indicated that these responses to supply-side incentives by 
physicians were never pervasive across all model variants. This may be explained by 
limitations of the analysis, particularly the likely low intensity of financial incentives 
faced by individual public doctors in the Philippines. Nevertheless, a physician's 
behaviour is not immune to the incentive structure s/he operates within, and 
consequently public hospital patients with equal health need are not always treated 
equally. 
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Chapter 7: An unhealthy public-private tension: 
pharmacy ownership, prescribing and spending 
7.1 Introduction 
Public sector doctors in LIC and LMIC settings are often poorly paid (Van 
Lerberghe et al. 2002). This is apparent in the Philippines, where salaries of public 
hospital physicians are low when compared with what they could earn in alternative 
employment (see chapter 4 for further details). Consequently, many doctors in such 
settings undertake additional work or invest in the private sector; some even leave 
the public sector altogether. Whilst the need to undertake extra work in these 
circumstances is understandable, it is a concern to policymakers if it adversely 
affects the healthcare a patient receives. 
When additional work is not related to healthcare, its only potentially negative effect 
on healthcare is if it results in physicians shirking from their regular duties. Whilst 
this can in extreme cases be serious, the adverse effect to patients is limited to 
reducing a doctor's medical effort. For example, physicians may rush through 
patient consultations, or reduce the number of hours spent in the public health 
facility, but otherwise there is no incentive for physicians not to give the best 
possible healthcare to their patients. 
However, if the doctor's additional work is healthcare related, more perverse 
financial incentives can emerge. This occurs since the healthcare given to a patient 
in a public facility can directly alter the doctor's income from their additional work 
outside this health facility. In particular, the conceptual framework in chapter 3 
showed how a doctor's referral behaviour can be affected when s/he owns or has 
financial links with ancillary health facilities, and how consequently patients can 
spend more on healthcare than is needed. 
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In this chapter, these insights are tested through analysis of physician ownership of 
private pharmacies in the Philippines. Coupled with low salaries for Philippine 
public sector physicians, is limited availability of medicines in public hospitals, 
particularly for hospitals located outside of the country's major cities. For example, 
in 98.7% of inpatient cases for children aged under-six in 30 public hospitals in the 
Visayas, the parent/carer had to obtain additional prescribed medicines outside of the 
hospital (source: QIDS dataset, 2002). Moreover, the amount spent outside the 
hospital by these patients was not insignificant - on average, it amounted to 751 PHP 
($19), or 62% of what they spent inside the hospital (1211PHP or $31). 
Analysis in this chapter is based on interviews of pharmacy customers from 7 
districts in the Philippines (see chapter 3 for details of this primary data collection). 
Customers were asked whether they had a prescription, if so, from whom, and how 
much they spent. Data on the price and availability of selected essential medicines 
were also collected from private pharmacies and public hospital pharmacies. 
Accordingly, the research analysed whether pharmacy-owning physicians are able to 
influence a patient's medical purchasing behaviour, both in terms of the pharmacy 
patients choose to use, and their health expenditure. 
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7.2 Methods 
7.2.1 Links with hypotheses from conceptual framework 
A patient's drug purchasing decision should depend primarily on the price and 
quality of medicines in difterent pharmacies, and on the convenience of a 
pharmacy's location fi)r the patient. But the conceptual framework developed in 
chapter > showed that doctors can influence a patient's purchasing decision in 
pharmacies and other ancillary health facilities, and why they might have the 
incentive to do so. It then showed how these supply-side incentives can result in 
patients spending more on medicines than is needed. Two related hypotheses derived 
from the conceptual framework are tested in this chapter. These hypotheses, along 
with their corresponding empirical proxies, are given in table 7. I below. 
Table 7.1: Testable hypotheses 
Hypothesis Empirical proxies 
7. Doctors owning (or having financial -- Physicians owning, or with direct familial links to, a 
links with) external ancillary health private pharmacy will encourage patients to 
facilities will refer patients to such purchase medicines from their pharmacy. 
facilities. 
8. Patients referred to doctor-owned - Patients with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning 
ancillary facilities will spend more on physicians will spend more in pharmacies than 
healthcare they need to. patients with prescriptions from other physicians. 
-- Patients with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning 
physicians would spend less on medicines if 
generic versions were fully available within their 
local public hospital. 
7.2.2 Model specification 
A. Can /p/hy. sic"icm. s influence a /)Mien! 'S drug ptºrchaving behaviour (hypothesis "): ' 
The approach is to model the probability that a patient (the pharmacy customer or 
the person for whom the customer was buying the medicines for) received a 
prescription from a public hospital physician. This uses a logit regression model: 
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where Pi denotes the probability of patient i receiving a prescription from a public 
hospital physician; X is a vector of patient-related characteristics; W is a dummy 
variable reflecting pharmacy ownership; V is a vector of other pharmacy-related 
characteristics; and ui l is a vector of patient-level and pharmacy-level residuals. 
Alternative dependent variable specifications are also explored, modelling the 
probability of receiving prescriptions from: a pharmacy-owning public hospital 
physician (A2), and a pharmacy-owning private physician (A3). Model Al was 
estimated for the full sample; A2 only used data from the 5 districts in which a 
specific public physician owned a pharmacy; and A3 only used data from the 2 
districts in which a private physician owned a pharmacy. In all model variants, a 
logit specification was chosen because of the binary nature of the dependent 
variable. Reasons given to why a customer chose to use a physician-owned 
pharmacy were also analysed. 
B. Consequently, are patients spending more on prescribed medicine than they need 
to (h)pothesis 8)? 
B 1: Analysis of pharmacy expenditures 
In a first stage, health expenditure in pharmacies was modelled, using a logarithmic 
ordinary least squares (OLS) specification: 
1n(HE, )=a+ßX, +VWI +UVI +p, 1 [B1] 
where HE, denotes the health expenditure of patient i; X is a vector of patient-related 
characteristics, W is a vector of dummy variables combining pharmacy ownership 
with prescription-related patient characteristics, V is a vector of other pharmacy- 
related characteristics; and pj, i is a vector of residuals. This was estimated for both 
the full sample, with auxiliary regressions for the sub-sample of pharmacy customers 
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with prescriptions from a public hospital. The data collected did not distinguish 
between patients with prescriptions for inpatient treatment or outpatient use. 
The logarithmic model specification was chosen as it transformed health expenditure 
into a normally distributed variable. Other transformations were considered based on 
a subset of the ladder of powers (Tukey 1977), but no others gave a successful 
normalisation of health expenditure. Box-Cox transformations supported this, giving 
a transformed dependent variable that was not significantly different from a log 
transformation, whilst rejecting linear and reciprocal transformations. 
B2: Comparison of pharmacy expenditures with simulated generic expenditures 
In a second stage, the sub-sample of individuals with a prescription from a 
pharmacy-owning public hospital physician was further analysed. These individuals' 
observed health expenditures in pharmacies were compared with what they could 
have spent on the same medicines if generic versions were fully available within 





where HE, refers to average observed health expenditure in pharmacies, and HE2 
the average simulated health expenditure on medicines in public hospitals. That is, 
HE, = (J b, * Qob, )meds 
HE2 = (PQ1, * Qbs )meds 
where Pobs denotes the observed prices paid by individuals for selected essential 
medicines (meds), and P,, << reflects alternative prices based on reported generic prices 
for the medicines in the sample frame. For PQif, the lowest, mean, median and 
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highest reported prices are all compared with Pobs. Table 7.3 in the next section 
provides details on the medicines used in this analysis. 
Note that quantities of medicines purchased in a hospital are assumed to be the same 
as observed quantities purchased in pharmacies. That is, it is assumed that a 
physician's prescription practice would remain unchanged, implying no demand 
inducement (or, equivalently, the same level of inducement for patients purchasing 
medicines inside or outside the hospital). 
For all econometric model specifications (i. e. Models A1, A2, A3 and BI), the 
approach was to first estimate a full model, including a full variable set. Then a 
restricted model was estimated, excluding statistically insignificant control variables 
on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). In the results section, only 
the restricted model is presented19, with odds ratios rather than coefficients reported. 
This is the same econometric approach as that used in chapter 6. 
7.2.3 Explanatory variables 
Regression model variables testing research hypotheses 
For Model A, the main variables of interest relate to pharmacy ownership (variables 
Link Public Dr, Link Pvt Dr, Indpt). In the case of model specifications Al and A2, 
pharmacies linked with a public hospital physician (Link Public Dr = 1) are 
compared with all other pharmacies. For model specification A3, pharmacies linked 
with a private clinic physician (Link Pvt Dr = 1) are compared with all pharmacies. 
The coefficients of Link Public Dr and Link Pvt Dr test hypothesis 7. 
For Model BI, pharmacy customers with a prescription from a pharmacy-owning 
public physician (Pres. type 1) are expected to spend more than those with a 
prescription from other public physicians (Pres. type 2), testing hypothesis 8. Patients 
with a prescription from a public physician (Pres. type 1 or Pres. type 2) are expected 
19 Full model estimates were consistent to restricted model estimates in the sense that there were no 
drastic changes in the odds ratios and standard errors of explanatory variables. 
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to spend more than those with a prescription from other physicians (Pres. type 3), 
who in turn should spend more than those making over-the-counter purchases 
(OTC), for severity of illness reasons. Note that the term `patient' refers to the 
person for whom the medicine/s was bought, whether or not this is the pharmacy 
customer. Each of these `prescription' variables is combined with the public 
pharmacy ownership variable (Link Public Dr). This is done to give a more precise 
idea of under what circumstances those with a prescription from a pharmacy-owning 
public physician spend more than others, and to test if those using public physician- 
owned pharmacies also spend more. Additional regressions separate these dummies 
for simpler (but less precise) interpretation. 
Regression model control variables 
Various control factors at both pharmacy and pharmacy customer levels are also 
included. Pharmacy-related characteristics include a pharmacy's proximity to the 
town's public hospital (Location). The variable Location has an expected positive 
coeff icient in Model A (specifications Al and A2), since it is likely to be more 
convenient for patients coming from a hospital to use the pharmacies that are closest 
to the hospital. The coefficient for Model BI is unclear a priori. 
Other pharmacy-related variables reflect within which district the pharmacy was 
located (one ofAbuyog, Bais, Bayawan, Guilhulgnan, Oras, Palompon or Taft). 
Districts which were QIDS `Access' sites (Bais, Palompon and Taft) were expected 
to have negative coefficients in Models A and BI because the public hospitals in 
such districts should have better availability of medicines than other districts, as a 
result of the QIDS intervention. Note that the coefficient for districts which were 
QIDS `Bonus' sites is unclear a priori (see section 3.3.2 in chapter 3 for further 
details on the QIDS policy interventions). 
Pharmacy customer characteristics act as controls for conventional demand factors. 
Variables that are proxies for case-mix (CMI - CM14) were included to control for a 
patient's severity of illness. These had expected positive coefficients as compared 
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with the reference case-mix of a customer having (that is, thinking s/he has) a cough 
or cold. The illnesses covered are: pneumonia, diarrhoea, high fever, problems 
related to delivery, other infection, accident/injury, vomiting, convulsions, 
abdominal pain, difficulty breathing, skin problem, tuberculosis, and other (specified 
by patient). 
Socioeconomic status is measured by an asset index measuring whether a household 
has one or more of 8 assets (HHAssets). The assets referred to ownership of a: radio, 
television, sala (living room) set, refrigerator, washing machine, air conditioning, 
cell phone and car. These are a subset of the asset list used in the QIDS study. The 
single asset index was derived using principal components analysis. The variable 
HH Income, measuring a household's reported annual income, provides an 
alternative measure of socioeconomic status. However, as it is measuring the same 
customer characteristic, only one of HHAssets or HHlncome was included in 
regression models. In both specifications, the expected coefficient is unknown a 
priori in Model A, since poorer individuals with a prescription from hospital may be 
less likely to purchase prescribed medicines in a private pharmacy (a negative 
effect), but may also be more likely to utilise public hospitals than richer individuals 
(a positive effect). In Model Bl, the expected coefficient is positive, since richer 
individuals have a higher ability to pay for medicines. 
A variable reflecting whether patients have PHIC insurance and plan to claim 
reimbursement (PHIC insured + claim) is also included. It has an expected positive 
coefficient in Model A because patients with prescriptions from a hospital are more 
likely to use private pharmacies if they expect their health insurance to cover the 
costs. In Model B1, its coefficient is expected to be positive for standard moral 
hazard reasons (since insured patients do not face the full cost of such purchases). 
Variables related to a patient's age (Age<=5, etc) and gender (Female) provide 
further controls reflecting potential severity, and/or cultural factors reflecting 
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prioritisation of different age or gender groups. Table 7.2 summarises the 
explanatory variables used in the regression analyses. 
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Variables used in simulated health expenditure analysis (Model B2) 
For Model B2, analysis was based on the price and availability of selected 
medicines, in both private pharmacies and public hospitals. Twenty-nine medicines 
were included, reflecting: 
- Core medicines that treat acute and chronic conditions causing a significant share 
of the global burden of disease, as identified by the WHO and Health Action 
International (HAI) and that were used in the HAI Philippine survey 
(http: //www. haiweb. org-/medicineprices); 
-Medicines for which availability was asked for in the QIDS facility survey. 
Table 7.3: Medicines for which price and availability data was collected 
Medicine Dosage form Reason for inclusion Prescribed* 
Aciclovir tablet/capsule WHO I HAI No 
Amitriptyline tablet/capsule WHO / HAI No 
Amoxicillin tablet/capsule WHO I HAI Yes 
Ampicillin tablet/capsule QIDS facility survey No 
Atenolol tablet/capsule WHO I HAI No 
Beclometasone inhaler inhaler WHO / HAI No 
Captopril tablet/capsule WHO I HAI Yes 
Ceftriaxone inj vial injection WHO I HAI No 
Cefalexin tablet/capsule QIDS facility survey Yes 
Chloramphenicol tablet/capsule QIDS facility survey Yes 
Ciprofloxacin tablet/capsule WHO I HAI No 
Co-trimoxazole paed suspension WHO I HAI Yes 
Diclofenac tablet/capsule WHO/ HAI Yes 
Erythromycin tablet/capsule QIDS facility survey No 
Fluconazole tablet/capsule WHO / HAI No 
Fluoxetine tablet/capsule WHO/ HAI No 
Glibenclamide (glyburide) tablet/capsule WHO I HAI Yes 
Hydrochlorothiazide tablet/capsule WHO I HAI No 
Metronidazole tablet/capsule QIDS facility survey Yes 
Nevirapine tablet/capsule WHO I HAI No 
Nifedipine tablet/capsule WHO / HAI Yes 
Ofloxacin tablet/capsule QIDS facility survey Yes 
Omeprazole tablet/capsule WHO / HAI No 
Oral rehydration salts tablet/powder QIDS facility survey Yes 
Paracetamol tablet/capsule QIDS facility survey Yes 
Phenoxymethyl penicillin tablet/capsule QIDS facility survey No 
Ranitidine tablet/capsule WHO / HAI Yes 
Salbutamol inhaler inhaler WHO/ HAI No 
Tetracycline tablet/capsule AIDS facility survey No 
by a pharmacy-owning public hospital physician and bought by in private pharmacy during exit survey 
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Pharmacists were asked if the medicine was available in a specified dosage form, 
and if so its price at all available dosage strengths. 
7.2.4 Regression diagnostics 
This section performs various regression diagnostics to check for and, if necessary, 
correct econometric problems. The theoretical rationales for the regression 
diagnostics used in this chapter are, unless stated, identical to those in the previous 
chapter (see section 6.2.5), and thus are not repeated here. 
Outliers, Leverage and Influence 
In all models, explanatory variable odds ratios/coefficients remained of the same 
direction/sign and had similar Z or t values after removal of influential observations. 
Furthermore, in models Al and B1, all odds ratios/coefficients also retained very 
similar values. In Models A2 and A3, though, noticeable increases to the already 
high odds ratios for their pharmacy ownership variable - Link Public Dr for A2 and 
Link Pvt Dr for A3 - occurred (although with similar statistical confidence intervals 
because of increased standard errors). 
Closer inspection of these influential observations showed that they shared relatively 
unique combinations of their model's dependent variable and the pharmacy 
ownership explanatory variable. In Model A2, this was observations where the 
pharmacy customer had a prescription from a pharmacy-owning public physician 
(PPUBDRWP=1) and visited a pharmacy not owned by a public physician (Link 
Public Di-O). Similarly, in Model A3, the influential observations were those where 
the customer had a prescription from a pharmacy-owning private physician 
(PPVTDRWP=1) and visited a pharmacy not owned by a private physician (Link Pvt 
Dr-0). That is, it was already rare for a customer to have a prescription from a 
pharmacy-owning physician and not use the physician's pharmacy (only 6% of 
customers in Model A2, and 2% of customers in Model A3). After removing 
influential observations (which shared this characteristic), this became rarer still, and 
thus the odds ratio became even higher. 
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Data clustering 
For all models, the intraclass correlation was statistically significant at the pharmacy 
level (at the 99% level, with intraclass correlations ranging from 0.25 to 0.47). Data 
clustering at the district level was of some significance in Models Al and BI (at the 
90% level, with intraclass correlations of 0.13 and 0.1 respectively), and 
insignificant in all other models. 
Whilst some dummy variables have been included to reflect various pharmacy and 
district level characteristics (see table 7.2), the high level of data clustering at the 
pharmacy level suggests that it needs to be adjusted for in the modelling process. 
This was done by using the cluster command in Stata (and clttest for t tests). 
Specification errors 
For the logit models (Al, A2 and A3), a link test was performed to evaluate model 
specification. For the OLS model (BI), a regression specification error test (RESET) 
using non-linear transformations of fitted values was also performed. No problems 
were revealed: the predicted value was significant and the predicted value squared 
was non-significant in all model variants. Further, for the RESET test, the associated 
F-values were not significant. 
Multicollinearity 
In all of the regression models (Al, A2, A3 and BI), there was no evidence of 
significant multicollinearity, with 1NIF values always higher than 0.25. 
Heteroscedasticity 
Some evidence of heteroscedasticity was found in Models Al and A2 through the 
variable AGE5 (no evidence was found in Model A3). However, this did not 
noticeably change regression results: all variables in the heteroscedastic-adjusted 
probit model other had near equivalent coefficients (the same sign and similar 
magnitude), standard errors and z statistics to the homoscedastic probit model. That 
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is, variables were not statistically different across the heteroscedastic-adjusted and 
homoscedastic models. Thus for consistency across Model A variants, and for ease 
of interpretation, this limited heteroscedasticity was not adjusted for in the final 
regression results presented. For Model Bl, plots of residual versus fitted values 
were inspected, and heterscedasticity was tested for using the Breusch-Pagan test. In 
both the full sample and sub-sample model variants, the null hypothesis of 
homogenous variance could not be rejected. 
Endogeneity 
There is no obvious theoretical reason to expect any of the explanatory variables to 
be endogenous to either the probability of a patient receiving a prescription from a 




7.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Phawýiucýc_ýit survey- pha macy characteristics 
Exit surveys were conducted in 29 private pharmacies across 7 towns. 12 
pharmacies were in QII)S 'access' sites, 8 were in QIDS `hones' sites and 9 were in 
control sites. In terms of ownership, 6 had links with a public hospital physician. 
That is, in every site other than Bais district, there was I sampled pharmacy owned 
by a public physician. Note, though, that in Abuyog district, ownership was by a 
collective of all public hospital workers, rather than an individual physician. 
Three pharmacies had links with a private clinic physician. Two of these pharmacies 
were located in Bayawan district, one was located in Palompon district. The 
remaining 20 pharmacies were independent (typically owned by local pharmacists). 
Finally, II ofthe 29 pharmacies were located in the direct vicinity of the town's 
public hospital; 18 were located five to thirty minutes walk away from the hospital. 
Figure 7.1 illustrates where pharmacies of each ownership type were located. 
Figure 7.1: Pharmacy characteristics: ownership types and location 
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Pharmacy ownership type 
Pharmacy exit survey -pharmacy customer characteristics 
A total of 1350 pharmacy customers were surveyed (a further 4 customers refused to 
be interviewed). Of these, 22 observations had missing or incorrectly inputted 
values, giving an effective sample size of 1322. From this sample, 348 customers 
used pharmacies linked with public physicians; 153 used pharmacies linked with 
private physicians; and the remaining 821 used independent pharmacies. 
Just under half of the sample (625 of 1322) had a prescription, whilst 697 (53%) 
customers made over-the-counter (OTC) purchases. Of those with a prescription, 
425 (32%) had a prescription from a public hospital physician - 221 (17%) from a 
pharmacy-owning public physician and 204 (15%) from other public physicians. 
Further, 77 (6%) customers had prescriptions from a pharmacy-owning private 
physician, with 123 (9%) having prescriptions from other health professionals 
(working predominantly in other private clinics or rural health units). 
Over 60% of the sample reported household incomes that were in the bottom income 
quintile (based on national-level data from Philippine National Statistics Office 
website: http: //www. census. gov. ph/data/sectordata/2003/ieO3frl8. htm). That is, their 
household income was less than 51,000 Pesos (2006 prices). Asset ownership was 
positively correlated with reported household income. Results from principal 
components analysis showed a noticeable drop in the eigenvalue between the first 
and second components. This suggested that the second and subsequent components 
were just sampling noise, and therefore that a single asset index based on the first 
principal component was appropriate. 393 (30%) customers had PHIC insurance, 
with 132 (10%) planning to claim reimbursement. Further details on these and other 
pharmacy customer characteristics are given in table 7.4. 
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Table 7.4: Pharmacy customer characteristics 
Variable N% 
OTC v PRESCRIPTIONS, & PRESCRIPTION TYPE 
Over-the-counter purchase 697 53% 
Prescription from pharmacy-owning public physician 204 15% 
Prescription from other public physician 221 17% 
Prescription from pharmacy-owning private physician 77 6% 
All other (i. e. non-hospital based) prescriptions 123 9% 
SOCIOECONOMIC / DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
Household assets 
Radio 1093 83% 
TV 930 70% 
Refrigerator 594 45% 
Washing machine 244 18% 
Air conditioning 57 4% 
Sala (living room) set 321 24% 




Annual household income 
<10,000 317 24% 
10,001-25,000 307 23% 
25,001-50,000 228 17% 
50,001-75000 157 12% 
75,001-100,000 93 7% 
100,001-150,000 99 7% 
150,001-200,000 50 4% 
200,001-600,000 67 5% 
>600,000 
........................ -1-1--............. ........................... ............................................................................... 
4 0% 
........... .. ... -..................... Health insurance status of patient ................................... .... ............... ........ ................. 
PHIC member and will claim 132 10% 
PH IC member but won't claim 393 30% 
Not PHIC member 
......... ... _.................................. ........ ................................. ................ _.......... ......................................................... . 
797 60% 
... _....... .... Age of patient ............ _. _................................. .. ................... ........ 
Age <=5 204 15% 
Age 6-17 146 11% 
Age 18-39 357 27% 
Age 40-59 364 28% 
A ge60+....... 
_..... __...... _. _. _ 
251 19% 
. Gender of patient 
Female 730 55% 
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7.3.2 Can physicians influence a patient's drug purchasing behaviour? 
Cross-tabulations 
Individuals with a prescription from a pharmacy-owning physician are much more 
likely to use that physician's pharmacy than any other pharmacy, as shown in Table 
7.5. For instance, of those customers visiting a pharmacy with familial links to a 
public hospital physician, 58% had a prescription from a pharmacy-owning public 
physician. This is a statistically higher proportion than that for customers visiting 
other pharmacies, where only 6% of customers had such a prescription (p-value < 
0.0001). 
The difference is equally noticeable when comparing prescriptions received from 
any public hospital physician: for customers visiting a pharmacy linked with a public 
hospital physician, 73% had a prescription from a public hospital physician, in 
contrast to 18% for those customers visiting all other pharmacies (difference 
statistically significant, with p-value < 0.0001). 
Similar results are also found when comparing prescriptions received from a 
pharmacy-owning private physician. For customers visiting a pharmacy linked with 
a private physician, 46% had a prescription from a pharmacy-owning private 
physician, in contrast to 2% for those customers visiting all other pharmacies 
(difference statistically significant, withp-value < 0.0001). 
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Table 7.5: Pharmacy customers with prescription, by pharmacy ownership type 
a. Prescription from (any) public hospital Received Prescription? Total 
physician Yes No 
- Pharmacy linked with public hospital physician 255 (73%) 93 (27%) 348 
- All other pharmacies 171 (18%) 803 (82%) 974 
Total 426 (32%) 896 (68%) 1322 
chi-squared (p-value) 364.5 p<0.0001 
b. Prescription from pharmacy-owning Received Prescription? Total 
public hospital physician Yes No 
- Pharmacy linked with public hospital physician 166 (58%) 122 (42%) 288 
- All other pharmacies 38 (6%) 623 (94%) 661 
Total 204 (21%) 745 (79%) 949 
chi-squared (p-value) 320.1 p<0.0001 
c. Prescription from pharmacy-owning Received Prescription? Total 
private physician Yes No 
- Pharmacy linked with public hospital physician 71 (46%) 82 (54%) 153 
- All other pharmacies 6 (2%) 347 (98%) 353 
Total 77 (15%) 429 (85%) 506 
chi-squared (p-value) p<0.0001 
A closer look at the sub-group of pharmacies owned by a public physician showed 
that the percentage of customers with a prescription from a public hospital physician 
was not homogenous across this sub-group. Whilst one of these pharmacies had a 
percentage identical to the average (73%), for two other pharmacies, the figure was 
considerably lower (43% and 47%), and for the remaining three pharmacies, the 
figure was 85% or higher. 
The reasons given by customers for using physician-owned pharmacies provide 
some further insights into the ability of physicians to influence a patient's drug 
purchasing behaviour (see table 7.6). For example, amongst the customers with a 
prescription from a pharmacy-owning public physician and using that physician's 
pharmacy, 61 % cited the influence of a health professional as the main reason. In 
particular, 52% said they were recommended, and 9% referred, by a health 
professional. Indeed, one customer in this sub-sample who sited an "other" reason, 
said that the main reason she went to this pharmacy was because when she returned 
to the hospital where her child was admitted, the "doctor advised that if I buy in 
other drugstore [the] purchased medicine will be returned [i. e. not used by the 
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doctor, even though it is needed to treat her child]". It is possible that more 
interviewed customers had a similar explanation, but did not volunteer such 
information since it was not listed as an option in the questionnaire. 
The respective figure' for customers with prescriptions from other public physicians 
was 26% (23% recommended, 3% referred). This difference (26% v 61 %) was 
statistically significant (chi-squared=5.29, p-value<0.025). Note, though, that non- 
combined comparisons of customers being recommended, or being referred, were 
not statistically significant. 
Table 7.6: Reasons given by customers for using a particular pharmacy 
Customer had a prescription from... 
Reason customer used a particular ... pharmacy-owning public ' ... 
other public doctor 
pharmacy 
doctor & used that doctor s (n=222) 
pharmacy (n=166) 
One of reasons Main reason One of reasons Main reason 
Proximity to home 24 14% 5 3% 59 27% 28 13% 
Proximity to work 4 2% 3 2% 24 11% 8 4% 
Proximity to hospital 14 8% 12 7% 41 18% 35 16% 
Knew medicine/s was available here 35 21% 20 12% 140 63% 52 23% 
Knew medicine/s was cheap here 18 11% 15 9% 72 32% 35 16% 
Recommended by health professional 88 53% 86 52% 77 35% 52 23% 
Referred here 15 9% 15 9% 6 3% 6 3% 
Other 12 7% 10 6% 6 3% 6 3% 
Regressions 
Logistic regression analysis produced results that were broadly consistent with these 
cross-tabulation analyses (see tables 7.7a, b and c). Model Al showed that pharmacy 
customers using a pharmacy owned by a public physician had 5.4 times higher odds 
of receiving a prescription from a public physician, as compared with customers 
using pharmacies not owned by a public physician. 
Alternative model specifications gave more pronounced results. Model A2 
demonstrated that the odds of a pharmacy customer receiving a prescription from a 
pharmacy-owning public hospital physician were 16.6 times higher for customers 
using a pharmacy owned by a public physician, as compared with all other 
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customers. In Model A3, the odds of a pharmacy customer receiving a prescription 
from a pharmacy-owning private physician are 82.7 times higher for customers 
using a pharmacy owned by a private physician, as compared with all other 
customers. These extremely high odds ratios can be explained by the rarity of a 
customer having a prescription from a pharmacy-owning physician and not using 
that physician's pharmacy (see tables 7.5b and 7.5c, and discussion on outliers in 
section 7.2.5). 
Many of the other explanatory variables also had odds ratios significantly greater 
than one. For instance, pharmacy customers with a prescription from a public 
physician (Model A1) / pharmacy-owning public physician (Model A2) had 6.15 / 
4.5 times higher odds of using pharmacies located in the immediate vicinity of the 
town's public hospital than other pharmacies. There was noticeable variability 
across districts, with pharmacy customers from Palompon and Taft districts most 
likely to have prescriptions from a public physician (Model Al). These were both 
QIDS access sites, although pharmacy customers in Bais, also an access site, were 
only the fifth most likely of seven district customer sets to have prescriptions from a 
public physician. 
Those with PHIC insurance and planning to claim were more likely to have 
prescriptions from a physician (public or private). Patients aged over 60 and/or those 
aged under 5 were the most likely to have prescriptions from a physician (public or 
private). Socioeconomic status (as measured by HHAssets or HH Income) and 
gender were statistically insignificant in all three models. Case-mix variables had 
odds radios that reflected their severity relative to the reference case of a 
`cold/cough', with pharmacy customers reporting more severe illnesses being more 
likely to have a prescription from a public or private physician. Table 7.7a, b and c 
shows the results for each regression model. 
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Table 7.7a: Regression results, Model Al 
Al: Probability of prescription from N =1322. Wald chi2=738 (Prob>chi2 <0.001) 
(any) public hospital physician Log pseudolikelihood = -521.4 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3725; AIC*n =1084.8 
Variable OR. se P>Izl 
_Pharmacy 
linked to public doctor 5.427 2.17 <0.0001 
Pharmacy located next to hospital 6.152 2.20 <0.0001 
Abuyog district 3.319 1.32 0.0020 
Bais district 2.034 0.83 0.0810 
Guilhulgnan district 
Palompon district 28.703 14.24 <0.0001 
Oras district 6.172 2.31 <0.0001 
Taft district 10.036 3.69 <0.0001 
Household assets 0.502 0.26 0.1880 
PHIC member and will claim 1.796 0.52 0.0430 
Age <= 5 
Age 6-17 
Age 18-39 
Age 40-59 0.632 0.15 0.0520 
Female 
Bayawan is reference district; case-mix proxies were also included, 
Table 7.7b: Regression results, Model A2 
A2: Probability of prescription from N= 949. Wald chi2=644 (Prob>chi2 <0.001) 
pharmacy-owning public hospital Log pseudolikelihood = -263.5 
physician Pseudo R2 = 0.4665; AIC*n = 551.0 
O. R. se 
Pharmac linked to public doctor 16.629 11.999 <0.0001 
Pharmacy located next to hospital 4.523 3.455 0.0480 
Guilhulgnan district 
Palompon district 46.999 21.236 <0.0001 
Oras district 1.552 0.408 0.0950 
Taft district 4.728 0.948 <0.0001 
Household assets 
PHIC member and will claim 2.961 0.888 <0.0001 
Age <= 5 1.963 0.594 0.0260 
Age 6-17 
Age 18-39 
Age 40-59 0.447 0.136 0.0080 
Female 
5 District analysis (excludes Abuyog and Bais). Bayawan is reference district; case-mix proxies were also included. 
1921Pagc 
Table 7.7c: Regression results, Model A3 
A3: Probability of prescription from N= 506. Wald chi2=644 (Prob>chi2 <0.001) 
pharmacy-owning private physician Log pseudolikelihood = -116.6 
Pseudo R2 = 0.4596; AIC*n = 257.2 
Variable O. R. se P>Izl 
Pharmacy linked to public doctor 82.689 43.635 <0.0001 
Palompon district 
Household assets 
PHIC member and will claim 2.097 1.274 0.2230 
Age <= 5 4.586 2.514 0.0050 
Age 6-17 
Age 18-39 0.312 0.194 0.0610 
Age 40-59 0.459 0.237 0.1310 
Female 1.741 0.685 0.1590 
2 District analysis (only Bayawan and Palompon). Bayawan is reference district; case-mix proxies were also included. 
7.3.3 Are patients spending more on prescribed medicine than they need 
to? Analysis of pharmacy expenditures 
Cross-tabulations 
Data on pharmacy expenditure shows that customers using pharmacies with links to 
a public hospital physician spent more than those using other pharmacies: 
Table 7.8: Average patient health expenditure (in PHP) 
OTC v Prescription, & if All pharmacies Link public dr Link private dr Independent 
prescription where from Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
Over-the-counter (OTC) 58 697 56 82 67 34 59 581 
escriptio n. 
_ 
Pr 261 625 358 266 212 mm 119 178 240 _ _ _ from hospital doctor (all) 299 425 366 255 185 31 202 139 
pharmacy-owning hospital doctor 335 204 379 166 135 5 143 33 
all other hospital docors_ 267 221 342_M ---89 195 26 221 106 __ from non-hospital doctor (all) 180 200 165 11 222 88 145 101 
pharmacy-owning non-hospital dr 222 » 100 2 227 71 189 4 
all other non-hospital doctors 154 123 180 9 200 17 144 97 
ALL RESPONDENTS 155 1322 287 348 180 153 94 821 
In particular, people purchasing medicines from pharmacies owned by public 
physicians spent an average of 287PHP per visit. This compares with 94PHP spent 
by those using independent pharmacies (p-value<0.0001), and 180PHP spent in 
pharmacies owned by private pharmacies (but p-value=0.1611). Note that all 
reported statistical tests in this section on cross-tabulation results were based on one- 
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sided t tests of means of logged health expenditure, with unequal variance between 
comparison groups. 
However, many of these differences are likely to be explained by variation in 
severity of illness rather than pharmacy type per se. People with prescriptions spend 
more than those making over-the-counter (OTC) purchases: an average of 261PHP 
as compared with 58PHP. This is relevant as public physician owned public 
pharmacies have a much smaller proportion of customers making OTC purchases as 
compared with independent pharmacies. Moreover, those with prescriptions from 
hospital physicians typically spend more than those with prescriptions from 
elsewhere (299PHP v 180PHP, p-value<0.0001). Public physician owned public 
pharmacies have a greater proportion of customers with prescriptions from the 
hospital, as compared with other pharmacy types. 
Still, differences in health expenditures across pharmacy ownership types remain 
even after an initial control for severity of illness. For instance, in the sub-sample of 
patients with a prescription from a hospital physician, those visiting pharmacies 
owned by a public physician spent 366PHP, significantly more (p-value<0.01) than 
both those visiting pharmacies owned by private physicians (185PHP) and those 
visiting independent pharmacies (202PHP). 
Further, customers with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning public physicians 
spent somewhat more than those with prescriptions from other public physicians 
(335PHP V 267PHP, butp-value=0.1164). This higher expenditure of customers 
with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning physicians, though, only occurs in 
pharmacies owned by public physicians (379PHP v 342PHP). Customers with 
prescriptions from pharmacy-owning physicians using other pharmacies spent 
somewhat less than customers with prescriptions from other public physicians in 
non-public physician owned pharmacies (143v221PHP in independent pharmacies; 
135v195PHP in private physician-owned pharmacies, or 142v215PHP in aggregate). 
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Note, though, that none of these within-pharmacy ownership type expenditure 
differences are statistically significant. 
Looking more closely at the sub-group of pharmacies owned by a public physician, 
average health expenditures for customers with a prescription from a public hospital 
physician were between 243-348PHP in 5 of the 6 pharmacies (n=288), but 776PHP 
in 1 of the 6 pharmacies (n=60). This difference was of marginal statistical 
significance (p-value=0.0838). 
Regressions 
Results of multivariate OLS regressions show that only under certain circumstances 
did customers purchasing medicines from pharmacies owned by a public physician 
spend more than customers using other pharmacies (see table 7.9). Those using 
pharmacies linked to public physicians and with a prescription from a pharmacy- 
owning public physician spent 40.5% more (p-value=0.023) than the reference group 
of customers using other pharmacies and with a prescription from a non-hospital 
physician. Yet customers using these public physician-linked pharmacies and with a 
prescription from other non pharmacy owning public hospital physicians also spent 
more than the reference group (52.6% more, p-value=0.022). 
In contrast, customers with prescriptions from a pharmacy-owning public physician 
but using non-physician linked pharmacies (Pres. type 1+ OTHPHARM) did not 
spend a statistically different amount to the reference group. This was also the case 
for customers using non-physician linked pharmacies and with prescriptions from 
other public physicians (Pres. type 2+ OTHPHARM); and customers using public 
physician-linked pharmacies and with a prescription from a non-hospital physician 
(Pres. type 3+ LPUBDR). Finally, customers without a prescription- i. e. making 
over-the-counter purchases - spent significantly less (over 100% less) than the 
reference group, whichever pharmacy type they used. 
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Regressions of the sub-sample of pharmacy customers with a prescription from a 
public hospital physician help clarify these results. A first regression, which 
simplified the dummies to a single ownership dummy and a single prescription 
dummy (see table 7.1 Oa), showed that customers using a public physician-linked 
pharmacy spent 49.3% more (p-value=0.005) than those using other pharmacies. 
However, it also showed that those with a prescription from a pharmacy-owning 
public physician spent 37.4% (althoughp-value=0.048) less than those with 
prescriptions from other public physicians. 
A second regression provides further insights into these unusual results (see table 
7.1 Ob). It compared four customer sub-groups: 
1. Customers with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning public physicians and 
using their pharmacies; 
2. Customers with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning public physicians but 
using pharmacies not linked to public physicians (regression reference 
group); 
3. Customers with prescriptions from non-pharmacy owning public physicians 
but using pharmacies linked to public physicians; 
4. Customers with prescriptions from non-pharmacy owning public physicians 
and using pharmacies not linked to public physicians. 
Of these, the second sub-group spent significantly less than all other sub-groups 
(regression coefficients indicate between 43.6%-88% less). That is, it is this sub- 
group that explains lower expenditure regression estimates for pharmacy customers 
with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning physicians as compared with non- 
pharmacy-owning physicians. Figure 7.2 helps illustrate this, by showing average 
health expenditures along with regression coefficients for these four customer sub- 
groups. 
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Figure 7.2: Health expenditures, by prescription and pharmacy ownership 
types 
Pharmacy customers with prescriptions 
from public district hospital 
n= 425; average HE = 299 
Prescription frm public dr wth pharm Prescription frm other public or 
Ln= 204; average HE = 335 n= 221; average HE = 267 
i. Pharm linked to public or iii. Pharm linked to public or 
n=166; ave. HE=379; coeff. =0.545 
r1 
n=89; ave. HE=342; coeff. =0.880 
il. All other pharmacies 
I iv. All other pharmacies 
n=38; ave. HE=142; coeff. =ref n=132; ave. HE=215; coeff. =0.436 
Many of the control variables also had statistically significant coefficients. 
Customers using pharmacies located in the immediate vicinity of a town's public 
hospital spent 28.5% more than those using other pharmacies (p-value=0.032). As 
with Models Al and A2, there was variability in results across districts. Pharmacy 
customers in Palompon district spent the most; customers in Bais spent the least. 
Customers with insurance and planning to claim spent 21.2% more than others (p- 
value=0.014). A 10% increase in socioeconomic status (as measured by HHAssets) 
was associated with a 7.48% increase in health expenditure (p-value=0.001). 
Pharmacy customers reporting more severe illnesses (as measured by case-mix 
variables) had the same or higher expenditures than those with the reference case of 
a `cold/cough'. Age and gender were significant determinants of health expenditure: 
significantly more was spent on patients aged less than 5 or greater than 60 than 
other age groups; 11.2% less was spent on female patients than male patients (p- 
value=0.08 1). 
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Table 7.9: Regression results, Model B1 
BI: Determinants of health expenditure 
(log HE), full sample 
N= 1322; F= 197 (Probability>F <0.001) 
R2 = 0.3801; AIC = 4004.7 
Variable Coefficient se P>Itl 
Pres. type 1+ used LPUBDR 0.405 0.169 0.0230 
Pres. type 1+ used other pharmacy -0.199 0.214 0.3590 
Pres. type 2+ used LPUBDR 0.526 '0.217 0.0220 
Pres. type 2+ used other pharmacy 0.076 0.198 0.7020 
Pres. type 3+ used LPUBDR -0.198 0.453 0.6660 
OTC, used LPUBDR -1.096 0.180 <0.0001 
OTC, used other pharmacy_ 
___ -1.529 
0.253 <0.0001 
Pharmacy located next to hospital 0.285 0.127 0.0320 
Abuyog district 
Bais district -0.386 0.150 0.0160 
Guilhulgnan district 
Palompon district 0.320 0.172 0.0740 
Oras district 
Taft district -0.201 0.192 0.3050 
Household assets 0.748 0.209 0.0010 
PHIC member and will claim 0.212 0.084 0.0180 
Age <= 5 
Age 6-17 -0.263 0.100 0.0140 
Age 18-39 -0.434 0.111 0.0010 
Age 40-59 -0.325 0.096 0.0020 
Female -0.112 0.062 0.0810 
Constant 4.491 0.222 <0.0001 
Key to prescription types: 1=prescription from pharmacy-owning public hospital physician; 2--from other public hospital 
physician; 3= from other non-hospital physician. /'LPUBDR = pharmacy linked to public hospital physician. 
Note: variables controlling for case-mix were also included. 
Table 7.10: Sub-sample regressions for Model B1 (customers with prescription 
from public hospital) 
a) Model B1: Pharmacy ownership and 
prescription dummies separated 
N= 425; F= 24.4 (Probability>F <0.001) 
R2 = 0.1831; AIC = 1252.8 
Variable Coefficient se P>Itl 
Pharmacy linked to public doctor 0.493 0.169 0.0050 
Pres. type 1 -0.374 0.180 0.0480 
12 reference groups = OTHPHARM and Prescription type 21 
Note: control variables used in original regression were also included. 
b) Model BI: Unadjusted model N= 425; F= 20.7 (Probability>F <0.001) 
R2= 0.1834; AIC = 1254.7 
Variable Coefficient se P>Itl 
Pres. type 1+ used LPUBDR 0.545 0.157 0.0020 
Pres. type 2+ used LPUBDR 0.880 0.256 0.0020 
Pres. type 2+ used other pharmacy 0.436 0.247 0.0900 
(1 reference group = Prescription type 2+ used other pharmacyl 
Note: control variables used in original regression were also included. 
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7.3.4 Are patients spending more on prescribed medicine than they need 
to? Comparison of pharmacy expenditures with simulated generic 
expenditures 
Medicine prices (from screening interview) 
From the 29 medicines for which data was collected, 13 were prescribed by a 
pharmacy-owning public hospital physician and bought by patients in a sampled 
pharmacy during the exit survey. Table 7.11 gives the minimum, mean, median and 
maximum price of both the generic and cheapest brand versions of these medicines. 
These generic prices were used to calculated simulated generic expenditures. - 
Table 7.11: Price of selected medicines bought during exit survey (PHP) 
Medicine Dosage I Generic version 





Amoxicillin 500mg/tab 38 3 4.8 4.25 9.0 10.7 26 13 12.4 
Captopril 25mg/tab 25 4.5 9.0 6.5 25 25 23 31 17.8 
Cefalexin 500mg/tab 20 7 10.2 10 16 16 19 26 8.1 
Chloramphenicol 500mg/tab 30 3.25 5.2 5 8.65 9.8 23 42 12.8 
Co-trimoxazole paed 200+40mg/susp 25 25 45.4 49 60 69 25 121 11.9 
Dicolofenac 50mg/tab 25 3 4.9 5 9 9 4 22 22.4 
Glibenclamide 5mg/tab 21 1.5 3.6 3.5 5 7 27 9 7.8 
Metronidazole 500mg/tab 34 2 4.9 5 10 10 28 21 20.1 
Nifedipine 5mg/tab 19 3 6.4 5.5 7 19.7 22 12 4.6 
Ofloxacin 200mg/tab 9 8 25.9 26 40 40 25 53 5.4 
Oral rehydration salts tab/powder - - - - - 34 11 - Paracetamol 500mg/tab 37 0.85 1.2 1 2 3.25 34 3 18.5 
Ranitidine 150mg/tab 22 5 12.3 10 25 30 29 24 4.6 
` t-test of mean values of generic & cheapest brand versions, based on equal variances 
"Maxi=maximum across private pharmacies; Max2=maximum across private & hospital pharmacies 
For all of these medicines, the price difference between the mean generic price and 
the lowest cost branded version was statistically significant at the 99% significance 
level (one-sided t test). Generic versions were more commonly available in private 
pharmacies and public hospitals than branded versions in 7 of the 13 medicines, but 
less frequently available for 4 of 13 medicines. Public hospital pharmacies rarely 
stocked branded versions (although branded ofloxacin was available in 2 of the 7 
hospitals; and branded oral rehydration salts plus cefalexin were available in 1 
hospital). 
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Table 7.12 compares the price of generic versions of these medicines in private 
pharmacies with public hospital pharmacies: 
Table 7.12: Average generic prices in hospitals and private pharmacies 
Medicine Dosage Hospital pharmacy Price (PHP) n 
Private pharmacy 
Price (PHP) n 
t stat 
Amoxicillin 500mg/tab 6.94 5 4.42 33 2.4* 
Captopril 25mg/tab 14.67 3 8.24 22 1.4 
Cefalexin 500mg/tab 11 3 { 10.09 17 1.1 
Chloramphenicol 500mg/tab 7.65 2 5 28 1.2 
Co-trimoxazole paed 200+40mg/susp 63.67 3 42.9 22 4.4* 
Dicolofenac 50mg/tab 6.6 2 4.74 23 2.8 
Glibenclamide 5mg/tab 6 3 3.24 18 4.3* 
Metronidazole 500mg/tab 4.31 4 4.98 30 -0.8 Nifedipine 5mg/tab I 10.65 4 5.28 15 1.7 
Ofloxacin 200mg/tab 26 t 25.88 8 
Oral rehydration salts tab/powder - - - - Paracetamol 500mg/tab 1.81 4 1.1 33 1.4 
Ranitidine 150mq/tab 30 1 11.44 21 
*Statistically significant at the 95% level 
The mean price was lower in private pharmacies for 11 of the 13 medicines. These 
differences were statistically significant at the 95% level (one-sided t test) for 
amoxicillin, co-trimoxazole paed and glibenclamide. For other medicines, the 
significance of statistical tests was limited by their low availability in public hospital 
pharmacies. 
In other sub-sample comparisons, no consistent price differences were found 
between pharmacies owned by a public physician and other pharmacies, for either 
generic or branded medicines. However, pharmacies located next to a hospital did 
have higher mean generic prices than pharmacies further away, in 10 of the 11 
medicines that were available in both pharmacy location types (for diclofenac and 
glibenclamide, these were only sold at pharmacies located next to the hospital). Such 
differences, though, were only statistically significant at the 95% level (one-sided t 
test) in the case of cefalexin. Further, there were no consistent price differences 
between these two pharmacy location types for branded medicines. 
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Medicine availability (froin screening interview) 
Medicine availability was higher in private pharmacies than in public hospitals, 
based on the 29 medicines for which data was collected: on average, 63% of these 
were available in private pharmacies - in either generic or branded Conn - as 
compared with 23%, in public hospitals. This difference was less marked when 
looking at availability of generic versions (40% v 20%), but in both cases the 
differences were statistically significant at the 99% level (one-sided t test of means). 
Further, availability figures for hospitals should be interpreted as upper-end 
estimates: all hospital pharmacists reported regular stock shortages, and consequent 
medicine rationing. 
Differences in general availability (i. e. generic or branded versions being available) 
between pharmacy ownership types were small and not statistically significant. 
I however, availability of generic medicines was noticeably lower in pharmacies 
owned by public physicians: 27% as compared with 42% for all other pharmacies. 
This difference was statistically significant at the 95% level (one-sided I test of 
means). Hgure 7.3 illustrates these differences in medicine availability: 







Public hospital Ohm macy linked with All other pharmacies 
public physician 
  Generic Q Generic or Brand 
2011 '. ý; 
Customer purchasing behaviour: generic and/or branded medicines? 
Pharmacy customers frequently purchase branded medicines in preference to generic 
versions, even though generics are often available. From the 1350 customers 
sampled, 991 (73.4%) purchased only branded medicine/s, 152 (11.3%) purchased 
branded and generic medicines, whilst 207 (15.3%) purchased only generic 
medicine/s. 
A similar pattern is discernible for the sub-sample of customers with a prescription 
from a pharmacy-owning public physician: 142 (68%), 42 (20%) and 26 (12%) were 
the equivalent figures for purchasing branded and/or generic medicines. Given that 
there are significant price differences between generic and branded versions (see, for 
instance, table 7.11), many pharmacy customers would spend markedly less on 
medicines if they purchased generic medicines. 
Simulation results 
Results from the simulation analysis show the extent of potential savings if generics 
rather than branded medicines were purchased, as table 7.13 shows. 
Table 7.13: Actual v Simulated average expenditures on surveyed medicines 
Branded drugs Only generics Full sub-sample 
purchased(n=32) purchased(n=16) (n=48) 
PHP %actual exp* PHP %actual exp* PHP %actual exp` 
Actual expenditure* 153 100% 121 100% 142 100% 
Sim_exp, lowest drug price 29' 19% 50' 41% 36' 25% 
Sim exp, mean price 62' 41% 82' 68% 69' 49% 
Sim_exp, median price 65' 42% 88b 73% 73' 51% 
Sim_exp, maxi price lo9' 71% 153 126% 124° 87% 
Sim exp, max2 price 124c 81% 170 140% 139 98% 
on drug/s for which pricing data was collected (average total expenditure in pharmacy is higher). 
Sim_exp = simulated expenditure; Maxl=maximum drug price across private pharmacies; Max2=maximum across private & 
hospital pharmacies. / Simulated expenditure statistically less than actual exp. at '99%. °95%, °90% significance level. 
For instance, the average health expenditure on surveyed medicines was 153PHP for 
those purchasing branded medicines. This compared with an expenditure of 
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-29PHP (19% of actual expenditure) if the generic medicine price equalled the 
lowest generic price in the sample, difference statistically significant (p- 
value<0.0001). 
- 62/65PHP (41/42% of actual expenditure) if prices equalled the median/mean 
generic price, difference statistically significant (p-value<0.0001). 
-109PHP (71% of actual expenditure) if prices equalled the highest private 
pharmacy generic price, difference statistically significant (p-value=0.0043). 
- 124PHP (81% of actual expenditure) if prices equalled the highest generic price 
(private or hospital pharmacy), difference of some statistical significance (p- 
value=0.0642). 
Note that estimates of statistical significance are based on one-sided t test of means. 
Expenditure differences for the full sub-sample are less marked, since this includes 
customers who already only purchased generics. 
Extrapolating these results to all pharmacy customers with a prescription from a 
pharmacy-owning public hospital physician shows that noticeable expenditure 
savings could be generated. For the 88% of these customers who purchased branded 
medicines, expenditure could be reduced by 58% on average (median), saving 
194PHP (US$4.6) per prescription (their average expenditure was 335PHP / 
US$7.7), if they purchased generic medicines. 
It is important to note that this extrapolation of results assumes: 
(1) Price differences between generic and branded versions for other medicines 
are the same as medicines analysed in the simulation sub-sample; 
(2) Generic medicines would be competitively priced in public hospitals; 
(3) Generic versions are always available in public hospitals. 
Further, the specification of model B2 assumed that quantities of medicines 
purchased would be the same if patients with a hospital-based prescription 
purchased the medicines inside the hospital. Results weakly suggest this may not be 
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the case: pharmacy customers with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning public 
physicians purchased slightly more medicine items per visit than other hospital 
physicians: 1.73 compared with 1.6 (i. e. an 8% difference). This difference is of 
some statistical significance (p-value=0.061, one sided t test of means). It implies 
that average savings would be somewhat higher than the 194PHP estimated above, 
although it is not possible to estimate the likely magnitude. 
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7.4 Discussion 
7.4.1 Evaluation of testable hypotheses 
Hypothesis 7: Doctors owning (or having financial links with) external ancillary health facilities will 
refer patients to such facilities. 
Empirical proxy. Physicians owning, or with direct familial links to, a private pharmacy will encourage 
patients to purchase medicines from their pharmacy. 
Results from this study showed that pharmacy-owning physicians are able to 
persuade patients to use their pharmacy in preference to alternative pharmacies 
(Model A). For instance, cross-tabulations showed that 57% of customers in public 
physician-owned pharmacies had a prescription from the physician owning that 
pharmacy, significantly higher than 6% in other pharmacies (p-value<0.0001). 
Indeed, 62% of customers using public physician-owned pharmacies and with a 
prescription from that physician cited recommendations or referrals from a health 
professional as the main reason for going to that pharmacy, significantly higher than 
the 26% of customers with prescriptions from other public physicians giving this as 
the main reason. 
After controlling for other factors in multivariate regressions, results demonstrated 
that customers of public physician-owned pharmacies had 5.6 times greater odds of 
having a prescription from a public hospital physician, and 16.1 times greater odds 
of having a prescription from a pharmacy-owning public hospital physician, as 
compared with customers, using other pharmacies (p-value<0.000I in both cases). 
Results for pharmacy-owning private physicians were consistent with these findings. 
These results thus support hypothesis 7. 
Hypothesis 8: Patients referred to doctor-owned ancillary facilities will spend more on healthcare they 
need to. 
Empirical proxy. Patients with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning physicians will spend more in 
pharmacies than patients with prescriptions from other physicians. 
The ability of pharmacy-owning public physicians to persuade hospital patients to 
use their pharmacy is a concern for policymakers if it has adverse health and/or cost 
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implications for the patient. Whilst health consequences are beyond the scope of this 
research, results suggest that customers using public physician-owned pharmacies 
are, under certain circumstances, spending more than other pharmacy customers 
(Model BI). Multivariate regression analysis showed that customers with 
prescriptions from a hospital physician (pharmacy-owning or not) and utilising a 
pharmacy owned by a public physician spent more than other customers in the full 
sample. Further, sub-sample analysis of customers with a prescription from a public 
hospital illustrated that customers using a public physician-owned pharmacy spent 
49.3% more (p-value=0.005) than those using other pharmacies, everything else 
being equal. 
However, results also showed that customers with prescriptions from pharmacy- 
owning public physicians spent 37.4% less (p-value=0.048) than those with 
prescriptions from other public physicians. Cross-tabulations of expenditure by 
pharmacy ownership and prescription type help explain these seemingly 
contradictory results. Customers with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning public 
physicians only spent (marginally) less than those with prescriptions from other 
public physicians if they used pharmacies not owned by these public physicians (142 
v 215PHP, butp-value=0.1663). They actually spent the same or more than those 
with prescriptions from other public physicians in pharmacies owned by public 
physicians (379 v 342PHP, difference insignificant). 
This suggests hypothesis 7 should be rejected, or at least modified. This is because 
results show that for pharmacy customers with a hospital prescription, which 
pharmacy type they purchased their medicines from is more important than who 
gave them their prescription in determining health expenditures, everything else 
being equal. That is, customers using public physician-owned pharmacies spend 
more, but this cannot be explained by pharmacy-owning physicians giving more 
expensive prescriptions than other hospital physicians. It is still a concern because 
Models Al and A2 suggested that pharmacy-owning public physicians are able to 
persuade patients to utilise their pharmacies. 
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Empirical proxy. Patients with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning physicians would spend less on 
medicines if generic versions were fully available within their local public hospital. 
Although it is not evident that customers with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning 
public physicians are spending more than all other customers, comparisons of their 
pharmacy expenditures with simulated generic expenditures show that they (and 
indeed other customers) are typically spending more on prescribed medicines than 
they need to (Model B2). This is because generics are significantly cheaper and 
customers often purchase branded rather than generic medicines (88% purchased 
branded medicines across the sub-sample of patients with prescriptions from 
pharmacy-owning public physicians). 
More precisely, for customers with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning public 
physicians and purchasing branded medicines, switching to generic medicines would 
reduce pharmaceutical expenditure to an estimated 19%-81% (and an average of 
42%) of their actual expenditure. This supports hypothesis 8, although it is also 
likely that other pharmacy customers will make similar cost savings. 
It is important to note that because data showed that prices of generic medicines in 
public hospitals were typically higher than in private pharmacies, cost savings will 
only be nearer the middle or lower part of this spectrum if public hospitals sold 
generic medicines at more competitive prices. Further, generic (and branded) 
medicine availability in public hospitals was significantly lower than in private 
pharmacies. 
7.4.2 Limitations of analysis 
A first limitation of this chapter was that data were not collected from patients that 
bought medicines in the hospital pharmacy, or from patients who did not buy any of 
the medicines that they-were prescribed. Nonetheless, other data from the QIDS 
study showed that for 98.7% of inpatient cases younger than six, the parent/carer had 
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to obtain additional prescribed medicines outside of the hospital, so bias from this 
source is unlikely. 
Secondly, districts and pharmacies were selected purposively. However, the 
participation rate among both pharmacies and pharmacy customers was high and 
there is no a priori reason to think that the results are driven by the sampling frame. 
Further, although there was a large sample of pharmacy customers, these were 
clustered into relatively few (29) pharmacies. Further, there was no analysis of a 
physician's decision to obtain pharmacy ownership stakes, and consequently if (and 
if so, how) pharmacy-owning physicians differ from other physicians. 
Third, there is a possibility that some physicians with links to pharmacies were not 
identified. Although pharmacy screening interviews ascertained whether pharmacies 
had direct familial links to specific physicians, it is still possible that more informal 
links between pharmacies and physicians were not captured. This would mean that 
certain pharmacies classified as "independent' 'actually had physician links. This 
form of misclassification would tend to underestimate the actual differences between 
pharmacy ownership types. Still, the interviewee was asked, under the guarantee of 
anonymity, if they knew whether other pharmacies in the site had links to a 
physician, as well as to describe any kind of interactions they had with physicians. 
This should limit such identification problems. 
Fourth, although results illustrated that pharmacy-owning public physicians were 
able to persuade patients to utilize their pharmacy, the research only began to 
explore how they are able to do this. Explanations did emerge as a by-product of the 
screening interviews with pharmacists working in pharmacies not owned by 
physicians. For instance, three of these pharmacists said that pharmacy-owning 
physicians' prescriptions did not include the generic name, listed an unusual brand, 
and/or a code that other pharmacies could not recognise. Another pharmacist said 
that if an inpatient's carer bought medicines from a pharmacy not owned by a public 
physician, that physician would not treat them (they are able to ascertain where the 
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medicine was purchased by asking the patient to show them the purchase receipt). 
However, these pharmacist explanations were subjective, potentially biased (since 
they were direct competitors of physician-owned pharmacies) and not explored 
using systematic qualitative interviewing techniques. Qualitative interviews of a 
sample of pharmacy customers would have been more appropriate. Indeed, one 
pharmacy customer did imply, unprompted, that the hospital physician would only 
treat her child if she bought the medicines from his/her pharmacy. 
A fifth limitation relates to analysis of within-group variation. In particular, although 
the analysis showed that physician ownership of pharmacies was an important 
determinant of both the probability of receiving a prescription from such a physician 
(Model A) and of health expenditure (Model BI), it could not explain variation of 
results within the sub-group of pharmacy-owning public physicians. This is relevant 
because noticeable variation within this sub-group was identified. Variation in the 
importance they attach to non-financial incentives could explain this variation, but 
could not be evaluated because of a lack of data. 
Finally, the analysis could not analyse the linkage between physicians owning 
private pharmacies and the number of prescriptions. Pharmacy-owning physicians 
face a stronger financial incentive to over-prescribe. Although Model Bl showed 
that health expenditures were higher in public physician-owned pharmacies, it 
cannot show if this is explained by more prescriptions or if it is just more expensive 
medicines being prescribed and thus it is not possible to disentangle price and 
quantity effects. Potential over-prescription also implies that the cost savings in 
Model B2 would have been under-estimated, since this model's simulations assume 
that a public physician's prescription practice would remain unchanged even if 
generic forms of required medicines were fully available within public hospitals. . 
7.4.3 Summary and conclusion 
The phenomenon of public physicians in LIC and LMIC settings engaging in private 
sector activities is widespread (Eggleston and Bir 2006; Ferrinho, Van Lerberghe et 
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al. 2004). This research found that ownership of private pharmacies by public 
physicians in the Philippines led to potential conflicts of interest that were 
detrimental to patients in terms of higher health expenditure. In particular, the 
research showed that: 
-Pharmacy-owning physicians are able to persuade patients to use their 
pharmacies; 
- Individuals using these pharmacies generally spend more than others, although 
this is also true for those not having a prescription from the pharmacy-owning 
physician; 
-Many individuals could save significantly if generic medicines were fully 
available within public hospitals. 
Such findings demonstrate that physicians respond to financial incentives, in this 
" case the incentives inherent within a physician's financial links to private 
pharmacies. Consequently patients too often spend more on prescribed medicines 
than they need to. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion and Policy Implications 
8.1 Key findings 
This thesis has explored how the incentives faced by doctors can influence the 
quality of healthcare a patient receives. Results were based on data from the lower- 
middle income country setting of the Philippines. This section brings together the 
main findings from the three results chapters, linking them to the overall objectives 
of the thesis. These findings are considered in relation to the literature on healthcare 
quality measures, and research evaluating the influence of incentives on the quality 
of health service delivery. 
8.1.1 Exploring the conceptual and empirical relationship between the 
quantity and quality of healthcare (Objective 1) 
The conceptual framework showed that supply-side incentives affect the quality of 
healthcare a patient receives through their impact on the amount of medical effort a 
doctor exerts on a patient. Thus before assessing the impact of incentives on medical 
effort (objectives 2 and 3), the first objective of this thesis is to explore the 
relationship between medical effort and the quality of care. 
Effort was empirically measured in terms of a doctor's recommended treatment plan. 
Insufficient effort equated to when a doctor provided less than a predefined essential 
treatment plan; unnecessary effort was when a doctor recommended treatments that 
were not in this essential treatment plan. Thus effort is empirically evaluated in 
terms of the quantity of healthcare given. 
At a general level, results showed that the relationship between the quantity and 
quality of healthcare is not well-represented by a simple two-dimensional plot. That 
is, based on doctors' responses to clinical vignettes, there is not a single `optimal' 
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quantity of care that can be defined, below which care is too little and above which 
care is too much. Instead, paths to better quality care require doctors to provide more 
sufficient care and less unnecessary care simultaneously. Indeed, in 69% of 
vignettes, doctors gave both insufficient and unnecessary treatment. Further, in 74% 
of vignettes, doctors gave non-essential treatments, yet in only 5% of the vignettes 
did doctors provide the complete essential treatment plan. 
Nevertheless, results showed that these two aspects of inappropriate care had rather 
different negative consequences. Moving from insufficient to sufficient care can 
bring large health gains for the patient without great expense. In contrast, reducing 
unnecessary care can lead to important cost savings, but it does not offer substantial 
health gains. Thus low effort is more likely to have adverse health effects than when 
doctors exert too much effort. 
More specifically, insufficient care always had expected negative health 
consequences (as adjudged by a panel of physicians), and in 65% of vignettes could 
be life-threatening or lead to hospitalisation. Further, moving from insufficient to 
sufficient care was not expected to be particularly costly in terms of required health 
inputs (for example, better advice on homecare and low-cost medications such as 
oral rehydration salts). In contrast, unnecessary care was often costly (for instance, 
doctors recommended unnecessarily hospitalising patients 34% of the time), but was 
typically health neutral. Thus although there is not a single optimal quantity of care, 
insufficient care is more likely to have worse health consequences for the patient 
than unnecessary care. An important caveat is that unnecessary care often took the 
form of doctors recommending antibiotics (i. e. 47% of the time). Although adjudged 
by physicians to be mostly health neutral on a case-by-case basis, overuse of 
antibiotics is a public health concern because it can cause higher antibiotic resistance 
to the population as a whole. Further, unnecessary hospitalisation also increases the 
risk of individuals acquiring nosocomial infections. 
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Results also indicated that doctors can be grouped in terms of how far they are likely 
to be from providing optimal care. Doctors who provided the least sufficient care 
were also the most likely to give harmful and costly unnecessary care. Moreover, 
these doctors were more likely to be those treating diarrhoea patients than those 
treating pneumonia patients, though there were no such consistent differences 
between public and private doctors. This may reflect unnecessary care having more 
likelihood of being harmful for diarrhoea than for pneumonia cases. 
In summary, results show that: 
- The relationship between the quality and quantity of care cannot be collapsed 
to a question of whether doctors provide too little or too much care, since 
doctors typically do both simultaneously. 
- Insufficient care (too little effort) is more likely to have adverse health 
effects than unnecessary care (too much effort). 
- Unnecessary care remains a concern since it can be costly for the patient and 
society overall, and because it often involves unnecessary use of antibiotics. 
- Doctors that provide the least sufficient care are the most likely to give 
harmful and costly unnecessary care. 
- These doctors are also more likely to be treating diarrhoea rather than 
pneumonia patients. 
Figure 8.1, adapted from Figure 5.1, helps to illustrate these empirical insights. 
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These findings on the relationship between quality and quantity of care add to the 
literature in the sense that existing research has typically evaluated the extent of 
insufficient care or unnecessary care, but not both at the same time. For instance, in 
other studies that have used vignettes, a doctor's technical quality of care is assessed 
by analysing whether s/he has provided a comprehensive set of actions needed to 
improve a patient's health (see, for example, Peabody, Luck, Glassman et al. 2004; 
Das and Hammer 2005a), and if not, which actions they did not provide. But no 
distinction is made in these studies between a doctor failing to recommend a needed 
treatment (or other action), and a doctor recommending an unnecessary treatment. 
Both are simply classified as incorrect. 
In this sense, most existing studies using vignettes to measure quality of care can be 
understood as focusing on the extent of insufficient care, with no direct analysis of 
unnecessary care. Indeed, most studies measuring healthcare quality can be 
understood in the same way. Structural quality measures, evaluating whether health 
providers have key inputs needed to provide adequate quality care, can (at best) 
assess whether doctors are likely to be constrained in their attempts to provide 
comprehensive care (e. g. Barber and Gertler 2002). However, they provide no 
information on the potential for over-provision. Studies using other process quality 
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measures - such as chart abstraction (e. g. Iezzoni 1997a), direct observation (e. g. 
Das et al. 2008) and standardised patient approaches (e. g. Beullens et al. 1997) - can 
also be interpreted in the same way. That is, they compare a doctor's healthcare 
provision against a checklist of required actions, with the focus being on which 
aspects of this checklist the doctor failed to complete. Outcome measures, assessing 
quality through the impact of healthcare on a patient's health, only provide an 
overall assessment of quality of care. That is, they cannot easily separate out the 
impact (positive or negative) of individual aspects of a doctor's treatment plan on a 
patient's health, and consequently cannot identify when doctors are providing too 
little and/or too much care. 
In contrast, the literatures on health provider efficiency and supplier-induced 
demand assess unnecessary care but not insufficient care. The sole focus of the 
supplier-induced demand literature is on whether, and if so how, doctors can 
influence patients to utilise more healthcare than is clinically necessary (McGuire 
2000). The efficiency literature has shown that hospitals (as a whole) have some 
costs that are due to waste or poor decision-making. But most of these efficiency 
studies implicitly assume adequate quality (Hussey et al. 2009). That is, they assume 
healthcare in these hospitals is sufficient to successfully treat patients. Some 
efficiency studies do account for quality, and consequently the possibility of 
insufficient care (McKay and Deily 2008; Mutter et al. 2008; Zuckerman et al. 
1994). Nevertheless, these studies concentrate on identifying when quantity of care 
can be reduced without negatively impacting upon healthcare quality, rather than on 
quality directly. 
8.1.2 Analysing the impact of supply-side incentives on the quantity and 
quality of healthcare received by public hospital inpatients (Objective 2) 
In the conceptual framework, doctors were hypothesised to be influenced by a 
variety of financial and non-financial incentives, with consequent effects on the 
healthcare a patient receives. This second objective of the thesis tested these 
hypotheses through analysis of the healthcare given by public hospital doctors to 
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under-five children diagnosed with diarrhoea or pneumonia and admitted as 
inpatients. 
Results found that public hospital inpatients with equal health need are not always 
treated equally. In particular, doctors responded to certain aspects of the incentive 
structure, with the following factors all influencing the amount of medical effort 
doctors exerted on patients: 
-The daily charge a patient paid for room and board; 
- Whether a patient had (and used) health insurance; 
- External monitoring of a hospital's structural quality; 
-Bonus payments to doctors; 
-Household income of the patient. 
However, doctor responses to supply-side incentives were never pervasive across all 
model variants. This was especially marked for bonus payments to doctors and a 
patient's household income. Moreover, patient perceptions of medical effort found 
much less evidence of doctor responses to incentives than when the two other 
empirical proxies of effort were used (whether the patient received the standard 
inpatient clinical package; and whether the patient received medication by injection 
rather than intravenously). Doctors were also more likely to respond to incentives 
for pneumonia rather than diarrhoea inpatients. Furthermore, non-financial factors, 
and increased breadth and depth of insurance coverage in selected districts, had little 
or no impact upon medical effort. These mixed results may be due to the limited 
power inherent in financial incentives faced by public doctors in the Philippines, in 
addition to statistical and more substantive limitations of the empirical models (as 
discussed in chapter 6). Mixed results may also simply reflect the fact that doctors 
are also motivated by professionalism and concern for a patient's well-being. 
Tables 8.1a and 8.1b highlight this variation in results across empirical 
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Notwithstanding this variation in findings across hypotheses and empirical specifications, 
these results suggest that doctors respond to incentives as well as health need when 
treating a patient. This is consistent with insights from a broad literature, which has 
shown how the incentive structure can influence a doctor's behaviour in a variety of 
settings, and consequently the healthcare a patient receives. Much of this literature has 
focused on how doctors facing different incentives provide different healthcare. This is 
the case with the literature on provider reimbursement mechanisms (for example, Gosden 
et al. 2001; Petersen et al. 2006; Yip and Eggleston 2001), and in comparisons of doctors 
working in different health facility ownership types (such as Das and Hammer 2004, 
2005a; Leonard and Masatu 2007). The results presented here complement this literature 
by showing how the supply-side incentives inherent in treating different patients can lead 
to unequal treatment across patients, an area where there has been less quantitative 
research in LIC/LMIC settings (McPake et al. 2004 and Sodemann et al. 2006 being 
notable exceptions). 
These results also contribute to the literature by bringing together a variety of financial 
and non-financial supply-side incentives into one analysis. In doing so, it allows a 
comparison of the relative, impacts of different aspects of the incentive structure on health 
service delivery. These aspects are broadly characteristic of many LIC/LMIC public 
hospital systems, where hospital doctors often operate within the context of a mix of 
financing sources and monitoring activities. Research outside the health sector has 
analysed the relative importance of financial and non-financial factors in worker 
motivation, including a more profound analysis than this research on the potential for 
conflicts between these factors (Fehr and Falk 2002; Frey and Jegen 2001). But such 
research has rarely been applied to the health sector (a recent exception being Franco et 
al. 2004), and even when it has, focuses more on how incentives affect worker 
motivation than the actual healthcare a patient receives. 
This research thus contributes to the literature by showing how different supply-side 
incentives affect the amount of medical effort doctors exert on different patients. But 
making inferences on the impact of incentives on the technical quality of care requires the 
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normative judgement that more medical effort results in better quality care. For two 
proxies of medical effort (CP and PP), greater effort is related to more sufficient, and in 
this sense better quality, care. This is consistent with findings from chapter 5 that, while 
cautioning against a simple relationship between the quality and quantity of care, showed 
that doctors providing the least sufficient care were the furthest away from providing 
optimal quality care. However, this assumes that effort proxies are accurate measures of 
the actual sufficiency of care, and data limitations mean this cannot be assured (as 
discussed in chapter 6). In the third medical effort proxy (MAT), more effort is related to 
minimising patient discomfort, and in this sense better quality care. But there may be 
cases when patient discomfort is related to illness severity factors (that are not captured in 
these regressions) rather than to the doctor's medical effort. 
In summary, results showed that doctors exerted more effort on some patients over others 
because of the incentives they face, with potential repercussions for the technical quality 
of care a patient receives. At the same time, responses to supply-side incentives were 
mixed. This implies that, amongst other factors, a doctor's concern for the patient's well- 
being moderates a physician's response to incentives. Nevertheless, doctors' responses to 
incentives lead to patients with equal health need being treated unequally. 
8.1.3 Assessing if doctors unduly influence patients' use and expenditure in 
ancillary health facilities with which they have financial links (Objective3) 
The conceptual framework showed that doctors with links to ancillary facilities have a 
financial incentive to refer patients to such facilities, and to encourage referred patients to 
spend more on healthcare than is needed. These theoretical insights were evaluated by 
investigating the behaviour of doctors who owned (or had familial links with) private 
pharmacies. Results indicated that doctors did indeed respond to this financial incentive, 
showing that: 
- Pharmacy-owning doctors appear to persuade patients to use their pharmacy in 
preference to alternative pharmacies. 
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That is, after controlling for other factors, customers using public physician-owned 
pharmacies had 5.4 times greater odds of having a prescription from a public hospital 
physician, as compared with customers using other pharmacies. Alternative model 
specifications, which assessed the odds of a customer having a prescription from a 
pharmacy-owning public or private physician, produced even more pronounced results. 
Customers using public physician-owned pharmacies had 16.6 times greater odds of 
having a prescription from a pharmacy-owning public hospital physician; customers 
using private physician-owned pharmacies had 82.7 times greater odds of having a 
prescription from a pharmacy-owning private physician. These extremely high odds 
ratios are explained by the rarity of a customer having a prescription from a pharmacy- 
owning physician and not using that physician's pharmacy. Indeed, amongst customers 
with a prescription from a pharmacy-owning public physician and using that pharmacy, 
61% cited the influence of a health professional as the main reason why they went to that 
pharmacy. The respective figure for customers with prescriptions from other public 
physicians was 26%, with the difference between these values statistically significant. 
-Customers using public physician-owned pharmacies spent 49% more than those using 
other pharmacies (this analysis was based on the sub-sample of customers with a 
prescription from a public hospital). 
However, in determining expenditures, the type of pharmacy customers purchased their 
medicines from was more important than who gave them their prescription. That is, 
public hospital doctors who owned pharmacies did not prescribe more expensive 
medicines than other hospital doctors. Nonetheless, physician ownership of pharmacies 
remains a concern because of the finding that pharmacy-owning physicians can persuade 
patients to utilize their pharmacies. 
-Many customers with prescriptions 
from a pharmacy-owning public physician 
purchased branded medicines. These customers could make substantial savings if they 
switched to generic versions., 
More precisely, for the 88% of these customers who purchased branded medicines, 
pharmaceutical expenditure could be reduced by an average of 58%, saving 194PHP 
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($4.2 USD) if they purchased generics instead. This finding implies that there are 
potentially significant savings for both individuals paying out-of-pocket and third-party 
payers. It should be noted, though, that for other pharmacy customers, a similar 
proportion purchased branded medicines. These customers are likely to make similar cost 
savings, with low generic usage a wider policy concern. 
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These findings add to the literature by demonstrating the impact financial incentives 
inherent in physician pharmacy ownership have on pharmacy customers, a 
phenomenon that has rarely been studied in LIC or LMIC settings. Results are 
consistent with other studies that analysed financial links between doctors and health 
facilities in higher-middle income or high-income country settings, which have 
shown that utilisation, expenditure and profits of various ancillary facilities were 
higher if these facilities had links with physicians (see, for example, Chou et al. 
2003; Lynk and Longley 2002). Results also show that the patient consequences of 
doctors owning pharmacies are similar to when doctors dispense drugs, in terms of 
higher health expenditures (Trap 2001). 
More generally, these findings, as with those related to the second thesis objective, 
provide further evidence that a patient's healthcare can be adversely affected 
because of a doctor's response to incentives. For physician pharmacy ownership, 
this adverse effect is in terms of unnecessary care: patients are spending more than 
they need to, though data constraints meant that quality implications were not 
analysed. Still, findings from the first objective tentatively suggest that such 
unnecessary pharmaceutical expenditure, though less harmful to patients than 
insufficient care, is likely to result in patients buying antibiotics that are not needed. 
Note this assumes part of the unnecessary expenditure reflects customers buying too 
many (in addition to higher price) drugs, yet the data cannot disentangle quantity 
from price effects. 
Whilst the effects on the technical quality of care can therefore only be inferred, 
what is unequivocal is that physician pharmacy ownership creates financial 
incentives that directly affect patients' drug purchasing decisions. This constitutes a 
clear conflict of interest that can be detrimental to patients. In particular, these 
supply-side incentives influence where a patient purchases prescribed medicine, and 
can lead to patients spending more on medicines than needed. 
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8.2 Methodological strengths and limitations 
Limitations specific to each set of results were discussed at the end of the three 
results chapters (chapters 5-7). This section focuses instead on the broader 
methodological strengths and limitations of the thesis. 
8.2.1 Reflections on the conceptual framework and its links to theory 
The conceptual framework, through its adaptation of the principal-agent model, 
provides insights into the theoretical effects of supply-side incentives on the quality 
of health service delivery, and develops hypotheses that can be empirically tested. 
The rationale for its specific design, including the decision to adapt the principal- 
agent model, was explained in chapter 3. 
Existing studies have already analysed extensions of the basic principal-agent model 
as applied to healthcare, particularly in relation to asymmetric information, but also 
when there are multiple principals, multiple agents and when non-financial factors 
enter a health worker's utility function (as discussed in section 2.4.1 of the literature 
review). The application of the principal-agent model in this thesis contributes to the 
literature by first showing how supply-side incentives affect the quality of health 
service delivery through their impact on the medical effort exerted by health 
workers. Then, recognising the importance of non-financial factors and other 
extensions to the basic principal-agent model, it explores the implications for equity 
in healthcare when the doctor-patient relationship varies across patients and across 
facilities, and analyses how doctor ownership of ancillary facilities can be expected 
to affect their referral behaviour. 
Nonetheless, the conceptual framework is limited in what it is able to analyse. This 
reflects the choice of the principal-agent model as the theoretical basis for the 
conceptual framework. It also is a consequence of focusing on the doctor-patient 
interaction within the principal-agent model application of the conceptual 
framework. 
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A first limitation of this use of the principal-agent model is that there is no analysis 
of how institutions affect the overall incentive structure. Yet the new institutional 
economics literature shows that the governance structure in which a doctor operates 
affects the intensity of incentives (see, for example, Leonard 2002). This could, for 
instance, provide further insights into why there are differential responses to specific 
incentives by health providers across different districts. However, this should not 
present a major limitation here, given that the empirical chapters predominantly 
analyse doctors working within similar governance structures. Still, more detailed 
district case studies may have found subtle differences in the institutional 
environments across districts, such as variation in the level of autonomy afforded to 
public hospitals by district leaders. 
A second limitation is that within the principal-agent application developed in the 
conceptual framework, there is only limited analysis of how group dynamics can 
affect an individual doctor's response to incentives. The conceptual framework does 
recognise that incentives faced at higher levels in a health system will have less 
effect on individual doctors if these doctors face different, conflicting incentives 
(Harris 1977). However, there is no analysis of an individual doctor's interaction 
with other health workers. 
At a more fundamental level, the conceptual framework is limited to addressing how 
doctors are expected to respond to incentives (and consequently the implications for 
patients). But it does not directly analyse the more intrinsic reasons why doctors 
respond to incentives. This is because although the principal-agent model is 
established as the predominant economic theory used to study how one group or 
individual (the principal) can affect the behaviour of another group or individual (the 
agent) through incentives (Dixit 2002; Laffont and Martimort 2002; Prendergast 
1999), principal-agent models do not analyse the underlying determinants of worker 
motivation. That is, in principal-agent theory the reasons why individuals respond to 
incentives are exogenously determined, being based on different assumptions about 
what motivates workers. To better answer the question of why, as opposed to how, 
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individuals respond to incentives, requires analysis of the determinants of worker 
motivation (Franco, Bennett et al. 2002 offer a recent example based on this 
alternative conceptual strategy). Still, whilst the conceptual framework is, because of 
its principal-agent approach, necessarily limited to analysing how doctors respond to 
incentives, this analysis was informed by theories of worker motivation that address 
the reasons why individuals respond to these incentives. 
8.2.2 Reflections' on the empirical approach 
The strengths and limitations of the empirical approach were shaped by the methods 
of data collection. Both primary and secondary datasets were based on survey or 
vignette data. This meant the data were predominantly quantitative in nature, and 
were derived from recalled or hypothetical events. 
Whilst these data collection methods were effective in demonstrating how supply- 
side incentives affected the quality of health service delivery, alternative approaches 
could also have been chosen. For example, qualitative techniques may have been 
better in understanding why doctors responded differently to the same incentive. 
However, qualitative methods are less useful in demonstrating the actual impact of 
incentives on health service delivery. 
A second alternative would have been direct observation of the doctor-patient 
interaction. This may have more accurately described the services received in 
hospitals than patient exit surveys, including a quantitative assessment of 
unnecessary as well as insufficient care. It could also have illustrated how 
pharmacy-owning doctors persuaded patients to utilize their pharmacies. Such direct 
observation methods, though, are likely to suffer from the "Hawthorne effect", at 
least when the observation is over a short time period (see, for example, Leonard and 
Masatu 2006), and are also comparatively expensive (as discussed in section 2.4 of 
the literature review). 
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On a more practical note, permission could not be obtained for either of these two 
alternative methods in the QIDS districts. This was because the QIDS research team 
were concerned that any direct interaction with health workers in the QIDS study 
sites could potentially bias the QIDS policy experiment (which was in progress at 
the time of research). 
For the parts of the thesis utilizing secondary data, an immediate and inevitable 
limitation is that the dataset was constructed to address the aims of the QIDS study, 
rather than the research objectives of this thesis. This meant certain variables were 
imperfect proxies for provider or patient characteristics, and other potentially 
interesting characteristics could not be included within empirical model 
specifications (discussed in greater detail in chapters 5 and 6). However, the 
secondary dataset was designed to analyse a policy experiment that was relevant to 
the overall research aim of this thesis. Further, utilizing secondary data meant that a 
large-scale dataset could be accessed, which had a wealth of information and thus 
the potential for substantial statistical power. 
Conversely, for the parts of the thesis using primary data, the general strength was 
that the dataset was explicitly designed to answer one of the thesis' research 
objectives. However, the primary dataset was considerably more limited in scope 
than the secondary dataset (discussed further in chapter 7). 
For both primary and secondary data, results are also limited by the fact that they are 
cross-sectional rather than time-series analyses. This implies that regression results 
are ultimately limited to showing associations between explanatory and dependent 
variables, as opposed to the stronger statement that a change in an explanatory 
variable causes a change in a dependent variable. Stronger statements might require 
experimental designs and more comprehensive controls for confounding. 
More generally, the empirical approach involved three separate analyses, each of 
which used different data and had different empirical model specifications. This was 
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borne out of the opportunity to utilise more than one data source, and had the 
advantage of providing empirical insights on the research aim and objectives of the 
thesis in a variety of ways. However, it also made it a challenge to ensure that the 
core research aim of this thesis - to analyse how the incentives faced by a doctor 
influences the quality of healthcare - is answered in a coherent, non-fragmented 
manner. Perhaps the main challenge was to link empirical analysis of the 
relationship between the technical quality and quantity of care (chapter 5) with 
subsequent results chapters (chapters 6 and 7) into an overall perspective on the 
effect of supply-side incentives. These latter two chapters focused on how incentives 
affected the quality of care through their effect on (empirical measures of) medical 
effort, with their quality implications largely reliant on the first empirical chapter's 
analysis of the relationship between medical effort and quality. But although-these 
analyses were conceptually linked through the conceptual framework, they remained 
separate analyses. 
8.2.3 Generalisability of results 
The study sites were broadly representative of the Philippines' level of economic 
development and health system structure, suggesting that findings can be generalised 
nationwide. In particular, results of this thesis were based on data collection that 
spanned a large area of the Philippines: the 30 study districts had a combined 
population of approximately 2.2 million, and were sampled from 11 provinces in 
which an estimated 12.1 million people live (source: 
http: //www. nscb. gov. ph/activestats/psac/listprov. asp). These study sites had per 
capita incomes and poverty incidence rates that were similar to the national average, 
and thus were broadly representative of the Philippines as a whole. They were, 
though, less representative of the National Capital Region, which is considerably 
wealthier and has a much lower poverty incidence than the rest of the country. In 
terms of the health system, the study districts were comparable to other districts in 
the Philippines, though with less private sector involvement in the provision of care 
than in the country's largest cities. That is, study sites were characterised by a main 
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public hospital within the district, typically complemented by a mixture of lower- 
level public and private health facilities. 
However, empirical analysis only analysed the technical quality and response to 
incentives of doctors working in certain facility types, namely those working in 
primary- or secondary-level public hospitals, or in private clinics. Applicability of 
results to doctors working in other facility types, such as private hospitals and 
tertiary-level public hospitals, may be limited for a number of reasons. First, the 
relationship between quality and quantity may be different for doctors working in 
higher-level facilities (public or private). For example, because these doctors have 
greater access to medicines and other health inputs, they may be less likely to 
provide insufficient care, but more likely to recommend non-essential treatments 
which have only marginal health benefits. Second, for doctors working in other 
facility types, the intensity of specific incentives faced may vary because these 
facilities have different governance structures. For instance, the strength of the 
observed positive relationship between health insurance membership and the 
quantity of care received may have been greater in private for-profit hospitals than 
sampled public hospitals, because of likely differences in the intensity of this 
financial incentive between these two hospital types. 
Nevertheless, this focus of the analysis on doctors working in certain facility types is 
unlikely to change the core insights on the relationship between the quality and 
quantity of care, and how supply-side incentives can impact upon the quality of care 
a patient receives. In the most general of terms, both public and private doctors are 
still expected to respond to financial incentives, with important implications for the 
quality of care a patient receives. But it does suggest the need to be cautious in 
generalising the precise quantitative findings of this thesis to doctors working in 
other facility types. 
It is contended that the same point about generalising the core insights but not the 
precise findings holds true in terms of applicability of results to other low and lower- 
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middle income countries. Indeed, the empirical work was based on testing insights 
and hypotheses from a conceptual framework derived from economic theory. That 
is, the conceptual framework was able to show there are theoretical mechanisms at 
work, and therefore empirical results are likely to be relevant in settings different 
from the thesis study area. 
Further, the literature review provides numerous examples of doctors responding to 
incentives in other low-middle income settings, with consequent impacts on the 
quality of healthcare. In addition, chapter 4 showed that the Philippines has 
comparable socioeconomic, health profile and health system characteristics to other 
countries at a similar level of economic development. However, the literature review 
also stressed that the exact response of doctors to different incentives will depend on 
the underlying determinants of worker motivation, and the institutional environment 
within which a doctor works. These are likely to vary across countries because of 
different social and cultural factors, as well as different laws and regulations of the 
health system. 
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8.3 Policy implications 
This section addresses the fourth and final objective of the thesis, namely to use the 
empirical results to inform discussion of incentive-related health policy reforms. 
8.3.1 Supply-side incentives and their broad implications for health policy 
In the most general terms, results from this thesis demonstrate the need for 
policymakers to understand better how the incentive structure influences the 
behaviour of health professionals. These incentives relate not only to hospital-based 
care, but also the wider context within which doctors operate. In particular, results 
revealed that supply-side incentives and monitoring were shown to be associated 
with doctors exerting more effort on certain patients, and to explain variation in 
healthcare delivery across doctors. Incentives were also associated with doctors 
encouraging patients to spend more on medicines than was needed. 
Policies designed to alter this incentive structure can therefore lead to doctors (and 
other health professionals) providing better quality care to all patients. Further, a 
clearer understanding of the incentive structure can help policymakers anticipate the 
perverse as well as desirable effects of a variety of health system policy reforms. 
At the same time, there are limits to what policies aimed at reforming the incentive 
structure can achieve. It was shown in this thesis that supply-side incentives affect 
the amount of effort doctors exert, and through their effect on effort, the quality of 
healthcare patients receive. But results also showed that the relationship between 
effort and quality is complex. Further, the incentives doctors are confronted with 
have no direct effect on a doctor's clinical skill or the availability of essential health 
inputs, both of which also impact upon medical effort and ultimately the quality of 
healthcare. Indeed, clinical skill may be more pertinent in the case of more complex 
cases than the relatively common pneumonia and diarrhoea cases analysed in this 
thesis. Thus supply-side incentives, whilst important, need to be placed within the 
broader context of reforms that are designed to improve the quality of care. 
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8.3.2 Implications for specific health policy reforms 
Incentives and public hospital care 
The following policy suggestions, though focusing on public hospital care, also 
briefly incorporate implications for private health facilities and public primary health 
centres. 
PHIC reimbursement 
If PHIC shifted from the current fee-for-service payment to hospitals to a 
prospective payment method, such as capitation, the incentive for doctors to exert 
more effort on the insured as compared with the non-insured would be removed 20 
This is also relevant for private hospitals accredited by PHIC. The literature on 
provider payments suggests such a policy would have the additional benefit of 
helping PHIC to contain healthcare costs. 
However, moving to a prospective payment method creates its own perverse 
incentives, notably to provide lower quality (insufficient) care and discriminate 
against patients who are costly to treat (patient `cream-skimming'). Thus movement 
to a prospective payment system would require supplementary measures (such as 
quality-related bonuses) to encourage better quality (more sufficient) care, as well as 
adjustments for case severity to avoid patient cream-skimming. 
Patient charges 
There are two main solutions to remove the incentive for doctors to exert more effort 
on patients from whom they receive a higher financial reward. Whether these policy 
options, though, are preferable to the status quo of price discrimination in favour of 
the poor, depends on the relative weight policymakers place on ensuring public 
hospital patients are treated equally versus the costs of these solutions. 
20 In the longer term, universal population coverage via PHIC would automatically remove this 
incentive, since everyone would be insured. But the Philippines are still quite far from achieving 
universal coverage. 
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A first option is for policymakers to simply eliminate all patient charges for room 
and board, consultations, medicines and diagnostic procedures. This implies moving 
from the fee-for-service payment inherent in patient charges to a financing system 
based on prepayment. In the medium to long term, such a policy could be financed 
through, for example, extended PHIC population coverage or increased 
contributions from general government finances. But in the shorter term, raising 
sufficient funds for such a policy may not be feasible, given the costs associated 
with hospital-based care. 
Alternatively, policymakers could equalise the payments made on behalf of patients. 
This does not have to mean poor and vulnerable patients should pay the same as 
others, since this would be likely to cause such patients financial access difficulties. 
Instead, the cost of patient charges for the poor and vulnerable could be paid for by 
third parties. Examples of such demand-based financing include vouchers, equity 
funds and subsidised health insurance. Such a policy is financially more feasible 
than eliminating patient charges in hospitals, although it can have higher associated 
administrative costs. 
It is interesting to note that private health facilities in the Philippines can also have 
differential charges across patients. Consequently, they may face similar incentives 
to treat patients differently according to the amount paid. However, equity issues are 
less of a concern here, because the poor rarely use such facilities (as shown, for 
example, in table 4.3). Further, the elimination of patient charges in private facilities 
is unrealistic; and even demand-side financing mechanisms are likely to be 
prohibitively costly because of the higher charges in private facilities. In contrast, 
public primary health centres are unlikely to face such equity issues, since patients 
are not charged in these facilities. 
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Quality-based bonus payments 
Although this thesis was not a direct evaluation of the QIDS quality-based bonus 
payments21, results nevertheless suggest that policymakers should consider the wider 
use of such bonus payments. This may be particularly valuable if combined with 
moves from fee-for-service to prospective reimbursement by PHIC. 
Quality-based bonus payments could also be extended to doctors working in other 
types of health facilities. However, results in this thesis showed that such payments 
were only effective in increasing the effort exerted on patients in some 
circumstances. 
Hospital autonomy; external monitoring 
Results related to the effects of PHIC reimbursement and patient charges also imply 
that increased autonomy of hospitals could lead to equity concerns within such 
hospitals. Indeed, studies in other LIC and LMIC settings stress the financial 
accessibility problems associated with public hospital autonomy reforms for poor 
and vulnerable population groups (see for instance Bossert et al. 1997 and 
Ssengooba et al. 2002). These equity concerns would need to be balanced against 
the expected benefits of hospital autonomy (as discussed, for example, by Jakab et 
al. 2002). 
External monitoring may counteract these potentially adverse effects, whatever 
degree of autonomy hospitals have. Indeed, results from this thesis suggest external 
monitoring in the form of `Sentrong Sigla' accreditation (which assesses and 
monitors a hospital's structural quality) was associated with doctors exerting more 
effort on patients. However, results elsewhere have shown that Sentrong Sigla was, 
in its early years, not effective in improving quality at the primary health care level, 
and was actually counterproductive for preventive activities (Catacutan 2006). Thus 
although this research suggests Sentrong Sigla can have beneficial effects, a detailed 
examination of the programme - rather than a simple comparison of accredited 
21 This topic is being researched by the QIDS team, and is ongoing. 
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versus non-accredited hospitals in this thesis - is first warranted before it is 
expanded to more public hospitals and to other types of health facilities. 
There are other ways in which hospitals can be externally monitored. Quimbo et al. 
2008 demonstrate the positive role PHIC can play in monitoring hospital quality. 
The Inter-Local Health Zones, established since 1999 in certain parts of the country 
to improve coordination between facilities, could also undertake monitoring 
activities (Department of Health 2005). 
Decentralisation offers further monitoring alternatives, not only by LGUs directly, 
but also through an associated increase in citizen participation in the health sector 
(Bossert and Beauvais 2002). 
Incentives beyond the health facility in which a doctor works 
This section analyses the example of physician ownership of private pharmacies, but 
(certain aspects of it) are likely to be applicable to ownership of all ancillary health 
facilities. 
Banning physician ownership of pharmacies 
At the one extreme, banning physicians from owning pharmacies would remove the 
perverse financial incentives associated with pharmacy ownership. However, such a 
policy is likely to be difficult to enforce, particularly for private physicians. 
Moreover, physicians might still maintain financial links with pharmacies without 
actually owning them, particularly if the underlying issue of low physician salaries is 
not addressed. Related experiences from South Korea (Kim and Prah Ruger 2008) 
and Taiwan (Chou et al. 2003) on dispensing doctors suggest that such a policy 
cannot succeed in isolation. 
Better availability of generic medicines 
Another policy option is to improve the availability of generic medicines in public 
hospitals. This could produce significant savings for patients and third-party payers, 
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and also offer revenue opportunities for hospitals. It may also improve adherence, 
since the purchase is less costly and in a more convenient location for public hospital 
patients. However, for such a policy to be successful would require significant 
reform of public hospitals' drug procurement process, since hospitals in the study 
sites reported regular stock shortages. 
Better generic medicine availability within public hospitals would have the 
additional benefit of putting pressure on outside pharmacies to carry generic 
medicines and to offer medications at competitive prices. However, as this study 
indicates, there would also need to be adequate monitoring of prescribing practices 
since there is no guarantee that pharmacy-owning public physicians would not 
continue to try and persuade patients to use their pharmacies. Physicians could do 
this, for instance, by not prescribing stocked medicines, and instead prescribing 
alternatives that were only available in their pharmacy. 
Policymakers might also focus on ensuring private pharmacies stock generic 
versions of essential medicines (already the law). However, if pharmacy customers 
regularly demanded generics, private for-profit pharmacies would more readily 
supply them. 
Assuring the quality and use of generics 
This lack of demand for generic medicines implies a more general problem: 
customers may perceive generics to be of inferior quality to branded medicines, 
and/or physicians recommend branded products. Indeed, anecdotal evidence from 
this study suggests that prescriptions often exclude the medicine's generic name, 
even though this is in conflict with Philippine law (Republic Act No. 6675). Such 
behaviour may reflect links between physicians and pharmaceutical manufacturing 
companies, with doctors financially benefiting from stocking these companies' 
brands (Wazana 2000). 
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Whilst some research has highlighted concerns on the comparability, and 
particularly bioequivalence, of generics with branded versions (Meredith 2003), 
experience from high-income countries shows that good manufacturing practice has 
been successful in ensuring equivalent quality of generics (see, for example, King 
and Kanavos 2002). 
Thus for generics to be more widely used, there needs to be better monitoring of 
physicians' prescriptions, and, more generally, any concerns about the quality of 
generics needs to be assuaged. PHIC could regulate physicians' prescribing 
practices, given their experience in evaluating physician claims, and since they have 
the incentive of significant cost savings to do so. However, for this to cover a large 
proportion of prescriptions, PHIC reimbursement would need to be expanded to 
cover outpatient prescription medicines. Expansion of "Botika ng Barangays", 
community-run pharmacies that stock quality-assured essential generic medicines at 
low prices, offers an additional way of improving the quality of generics 
(Department of Health 2005). 
Addressing low public sector salaries 
Finally, it should be remembered that public physicians' salaries are typically low, 
relative to what they could earn elsewhere. Policymakers must recognise this, since 
public physician ownership of private pharmacies, and the associated perverse 
financial incentives that emerge, are likely to be driven by the need to cope with low 
public sector wages. However, whilst revision of public salary structures would 
reduce the need for additional income, it does not remove the perverse incentives 
that emerge from physician ownership of pharmacies - as demonstrated by the 
experience of private physicians owning pharmacies. 
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8.4 Areas for future research 
8.4.1 Assessing the impact of different governance structures 
This thesis only analysed a limited range of governance structures. Yet insights from 
the new institutional economics literature suggest that health providers' responses to 
incentives depend in part on the governance structure within which a doctor works. 
Indeed, thesis results did show that private physician owning pharmacies appeared to 
more strongly persuade patients to use their pharmacy than public physicians 
owning pharmacies. Future research could expand on this, by comparing doctors 
working within a wider range of health facility types. For example, doctors working 
in primary health centres or public tertiary hospitals may face different incentives to 
doctors working in primary or secondary level public hospitals. Further, doctors 
working in private for-profit hospitals and not-for-profit private hospitals contracted 
with government are likely to have different responses to incentives as well as face 
different incentives than doctors working in public hospitals. 
It may also be valuable to more closely analyse the monitoring and regulatory role of 
third party purchasers of healthcare. In the Philippines, this involves a deeper 
understanding of how both LGUs and PHIC interact with health providers, 
particularly how they monitor doctor behaviour in hospitals and other health 
facilities. Monitoring and regulation may help explain observed differences in 
doctors' responses to incentives across districts. Indeed, results showed that external 
monitoring of public hospitals can increase the amount of effort exerted by doctors 
in such hospitals, but did not analyse why this was the case. 
8.4.2 Analysing the effect of incentives on medical effort and quality in 
other settings 
Results from this analysis of 30 districts in the Philippines are likely to be of value to 
other settings, both within the Philippines and in other countries. Nevertheless, 
findings are likely to vary in other settings, particularly because of differences in the 
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institutional environment. Undertaking similar research in countries with, amongst 
other factors, more autonomous public hospitals, a greater degree of contracting with 
private health facilities, tighter regulation of ancillary health facility ownership, as 
well as underlying cultural differences, may all contribute to doctors responding to 
incentives differently to Philippine doctors. Further, the relationship between 
medical effort and quality may also differ across countries, altering the impact 
supply-side incentives have on the quality of care patients receive. Therefore 
research in other settings would offer additional insights into how exactly the 
incentive structure influences the quality of health service delivery. 
8.4.3 Evaluating potential conflicts in incentives 
Results indicated that whilst doctors responded to a variety of predominantly 
financial incentives, effects were not always consistent. Research into potential 
conflicts between the incentives faced by different health providers and between 
different types of incentives could help explain this, particularly if undertaken on the 
same doctors analysed in this study. 
For example, research into the potentially conflicting incentives between different 
health providers, particularly between frontline health workers (such as doctors and 
nurses) and higher-level health workers (such as hospital managers), could help 
explain why doctors did not always respond to hospital-level incentives. More 
qualitative assessments comparing the motivating factors of health workers 
operating at different levels within the health system may highlight differences and 
potential conflicts between health workers. 
In terms of conflicts between different incentive types, the literature has suggested 
that altruistic concerns for a patient's well-being will counteract a doctor's more 
self-interested incentives. Capturing these conflicts between incentives requires 
empirical approaches based on psychological and more experimental economic 
methodologies (Frey and Jegen 2001). 
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8.4.4 Using more integrated approaches to analyse doctor behaviour 
It was noted earlier that a general limitation of the empirical approach was that 
although the three results chapters of the thesis were conceptually connected, they 
remained separate analyses. Future research could potentially combine aspects from 
these analyses into a more integrated empirical analysis. This requires an empirical 
measure of medical effort that is understood in terms of the technical quality of care 
(as in the first results chapter of this thesis), and at the same time is linked to 
different incentives that influence the amount of effort doctors exert. Such a measure 
could be based, for instance, on patient exit surveys which accurately compare the 
services a patient with a specific illness received against the services that should be 
received according to `best practice' guidelines. These surveys should also reflect 
whether the doctor recommended a patient to receive any healthcare in external 
ancillary facilities, and if so whether the doctor has links with such facilities. 
8.4.5 Evaluating the impact of specific policy changes 
A final area for future research relates to evaluations of specific policy changes that 
directly impact on the incentive structure within which doctors operate. This not 
only relates to pay-for-performance reforms and other provider payment 
mechanisms. For instance, analysis of changes to laws and regulations governing 
physician ownership of pharmacies would provide additional insights into the 
incentives inherent in ancillary health facility ownership. Another example relates to 
analysing the incentive effects of increased hospital autonomy, particularly how 
autonomy impacts upon the quality of healthcare received by different patients 
within the hospital. The advantage of such approaches is that, properly designed, 
they provide a natural experiment within which a change to the incentive structure 
can be analysed, and thus there is the potential for more robust conclusions being 
drawn from the results. 
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8.5 Concluding thoughts 
The often inadequate quality of healthcare in low and middle income countries is not 
only due to the lack of well-trained health workers, functioning medical equipment, 
effective drugs and other essential inputs. A large and varied literature has 
demonstrated that the incentive structure within which health providers operate also 
explains inadequate quality of care. Thus to improve healthcare quality, 
policymakers need a better understanding of how doctors respond to incentives. This 
thesis attempted to shed light on how different aspects of the incentive structure 
impact upon the quality of care, through analysis of the healthcare received by 
patients in the lower-middle income country setting of the Philippines. 
The thesis developed a conceptual framework based on the principal-agent model to 
show how financial and non-financial incentives can affect the amount of medical 
effort doctors exert on patients, and through this effort the quality of care. Empirical 
work derived from this conceptual framework showed that whilst the relationship 
between medical effort and quality is not straightforward, low effort typically results 
in lower quality care. Subsequent results illustrated how (predominantly financial) 
supply-side incentives can lead to: public hospital patients with equal health need 
being treated unequally; and pharmacy-owning physicians unduly influencing a 
patient's use and expenditure in pharmacies. 
At the same time, results indicated that doctors' responses to financial incentives 
were rather mixed. This suggests that whilst doctors are not immune to perverse 
incentives, a doctor's concern for a patient's well-being moderates more self- 
interested responses to incentives. Moreover, supply-side incentives were shown to 
have positive as well as perverse effects on the quality of health service delivery. 
Suggested policy reforms are therefore based on reshaping the incentive structure, 




Adams, A. S., Soumerai, S. B., Lomas, J. and Ross-Degnan, D. (1999). "Evidence of 
self-report bias in assessing adherence to guidelines. " Int J Qual Health Care 
11(3): 187-92. 
Aiken, L. H., Buchan, J., Sochalski, J., Nichols, B. and Powell, M. (2004). "Trends 
in international nurse migration. " Health Aff (Millwood) 23(3): 69-77. 
Arrow, K. J. (1963). "Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. " 
American Economic Review 53(5): 941-73. 
Atkins, D., Best, D., Briss, P. A., Eccles, M., Falck-Ytter, Y., Flottorp, S., Guyatt, G. 
H., Harbour, R. T., Haugh, M. C., Henry, D., Hill, S., Jaeschke, R., Leng, G., 
Liberati, A., Magrini, N., Mason, J., Middleton, P., Mrukowicz, J., O'Connell, 
D., Oxman, A. D., Phillips, B., Schunemann, H. J., Edejer, T. T., Varonen, H., 
Vist, G. E., Williams, J. W., Jr. and Zaza, S. (2004). "Grading quality of 
evidence and strength of recommendations. " Bmi 328(7454): 1490. 
Bach, S. (2003). International Migration of Health Workers: Labour and Social 
Issues. Geneva, International Labour Office. Working Paper 209. 
Balabanova, D. and McKee, M. (2002). "Understanding informal payments for 
health care: the example of Bulgaria. " Health Policy 62(3): 243-73. 
Balisacan, A. M. (2003). Poverty and Inequality. The Philippine economy: 
development, policies and challenges. Balisacan, A. M. and Hill, H. Quezon 
City, ADMU Press. 
Balisacan, A. M. and Hill, H. (2003). An Introduction to the Key Issues. The 
Philippine economy: development, policies and challenges. Balisacan, A. M. and 
Hill, H. Quezon City, ADMU Press. 
Barber, S. L., Bertozzi, S. M. and Gertler, P. J. (2007). "Variations in prenatal care 
quality for the rural poor in Mexico. " Health Aff (Millwood) 26(3): w310-23. 
Barber, S. L. and Gertler, P. J. (2002). Child Health And The Quality Of Medical 
Care, University of California, Berkeley. 
Barnum, H., Kutzin, J. and Saxenian, H. (1995). "Incentives and provider payment 
methods. " lnt J Health Plann Manage 10(1): 23-45. 
2431 Page 
Beauchamp, T. L. and Childress, J. F. (2001). Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Beullens, J., Rethans, J. J., Goedhuys, J. and Buntinx, F. (1997). "The use of 
standardized patients in research in general practice. " Fam Pract 14(1): 58-62. 
Bickerdyke, I., Dolamore, R., Monday, I. and Preston, R. (2002). Supplier-Induced 
Demand for Medical Services. Productivity Commission Staff Working Paper, 
Canberra. 
Bir, A. and Eggleston, K. (2003). "Physician Dual Practice: Access Enhancement or 
Demand Inducement. " Working Paper Tufts University. 
Birkmeyer, J. D., Dimick, J. B. and Birkmeyer, N. J. (2004). "Measuring the quality 
of surgical care: structure, process, or outcomes? " J Am Coll Surg 198(4): 626- 
32. 
Bitran, R. and Giedion, U. (2003). Waivers and Exemptions for Health Services in 
Developing Countries. Washington DC, World Bank. 
Blomqvist, A. (1991). "The doctor as double agent: information asymmetry, health 
insurance, and medical care. " J Health Econ 10(4): 411-32. 
Blumenthal, D. (1996). "Part 1: Quality of care--what is it? " N End J Med 335(12): 
891-4. 
Bossert, T., Kosen, S., Harsono, B. and Gani, A. (1997). "Hospital Autonomy in 
Indonesia. " IHSP working paper, Harvard university. 
Bossert, T. J. and Beauvais, J. C. (2002). "Decentralization of health systems in 
Ghana, Zambia, Uganda and the Philippines: a comparative analysis of decision 
space. " Health Policy Plan 17(1): 14-31. 
Bradford, W. D. (1995). "Solo versus group practice in the medical profession: the 
influence of malpractice risk. " Health Econ 4(2): 95-112. 
Bradley, E. H., Herrin, J., Elbel, B., McNamara, R. L., Magid, D. J., Nallamothu, B. 
K., Wang, Y., Normand, S. L., Spertus, J. A. and Krumholz, H. M. (2006). 
"Hospital quality for acute myocardial infarction: correlation among process 
measures and relationship with short-term mortality. " Jama 296(1): 72-8. 
Brekke, K. R. and Sorgard, L. (2007). "Public versus private health care in a national 
health service. " Health Econ 16(6): 579-601. 
2441PagC 
Brook, R. H., McGlynn, E. A. and Shekelle, P. G. (2000). "Defining and measuring 
quality of care: a perspective from US researchers. " Int J Qual Health Care 12(4): 
281-95. 
Capuno, J. J. (2006). "Social Health Insurance for the Poor Programs of the 
Philippines and Vietnam. " Philippine Journal of Development XXXIII. 
Carrin, G., Mathauer, I., Xu, K. and Evans, D. B. (2008). "Universal coverage of 
health services: tailoring its implementation. " Bull World Health Organ 86(11): 
857-63. 
Casalino, L. (2001). "Managing uncertainty: intermediate organizations as triple 
agents. " J Health Polfit Policy 26(5): 1055-68. 
Catacutan, A. R. (2006). "The health service coverage of quality-certified primary 
health care units in Metro-Manila, the Philippines. " Health Policy Plan 21(1): 65- 
74. 
Chaix-Couturier, C., Durand-Zaleski, I., Jolly, D. and Durieux, P. (2000). "Effects of 
financial incentives on medical practice: results from a systematic review of the 
literature and methodological issues. " Int J Qual Health Care 12(2): 133-42. 
Chalkley, M. and Malcomson, J. M. (1998). "Contracting for health services when 
patient demand does not reflect quality. " J Health Econ 17(1): 1-19. 
Chalkley, M. and Malcomson, J. M. (2000). Government Purchasing of Health 
Services. Handbook of Health Economics. Culyer, A. J. and Newhouse, J. P. 
Amsterdam, Elsevier. Chapter 15: 848-890. 
Chandler, C. (2008). Influences on non-physician clinician decision making in 
hospitals in northeast Tanzania. London, London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine. 
Chatterjee, S., Hadi, A. S. and Price, B. (2000). Regression Analysis by Example. 
New York, John Wiley & Sons. 
Chen, J., Radford, M. J., Wang, Y., Marciniak, T. A. and Krumholz, H. M. (1999). 
"Do "America's Best Hospitals" perform better for acute myocardial infarction? " 
N En lg J Med 340(4): 286-92. 
2451 Page 
Chen, T. J., Chou, L. F. and Hwang, S. J. (2006). "Application of concentration 
ratios to analyze the phenomenon of "next-door" pharmacy in Taiwan. " Clin 
Ther 28(8): 1225-30. 
Choo, V. (2003). "Philippines losing its nurses, and now maybe its doctors. " Lancet 
361(9366): 1356. 
Chou, Y. J., Yip, W. C., Lee, C. H., Huang, N., Sun, Y. P. and Chang, H. J. (2003). 
"Impact of separating drug prescribing and dispensing on provider behaviour: 
Taiwan's experience. " Health Policy Plan 18(3): 316-29. 
Crilly, T. and Le Grand, J. J. (2004). "The motivation and behaviour of hospital 
Trusts. " Soc Sci Med 58(10): 1809-23. 
Cutler, D. M. and Zeckhauser, R. J. (2000). The Anatomy of Health Insurance. 
Handbook of Health Economics. Culyer, A. J. and Newhouse, J. P. Amsterdam, 
Elsevier: 564-643. 
Das, J. and Hammer, J. (2004). "Strained Mercy: The Quality of Medical Care in 
Delhi. " WB Policy Research Working Paper 3228. 
Das, J. and Hammer, J. (2005a). "Money for Nothing: The Dire Straits of Medical 
Practice in Delhi, India. " WB Policy Research Working per 3669. 
Das, J. and Hammer, J. (2005b). "Which doctor? Combining vignettes and item 
response to measure clinical competence. " Journal of Development Economics 
78(2): 348-383. 
Das, J., Hammer, J. and Leonard, K. (2008). "The Quality of Medical Advice in 
Low-Income Countries. " Journal of Economic Perspectives 22(2): 93-114. 
Das, J. and Sohnesen, T. P. (2007). "Variations in doctor effort: evidence from 
Paraguay. " Health Aff (Millwood) 26(3): w324-37. 
de Dios, E. S. (2007). Local Politics and Local Economy. The Dynamics of Regional 
Development: the Philippines in Asia. Balisacan, A. M. and Hill, H. Quezon 
City, ADMU Press. 
de Dios, E. S. and Hutchcroft, P. D. (2003). Political Economy. The Philippine 
economy: development, policies and challenges. Balisacan, A. M. and Hill, H. 
Quezon City, ADMU Press. 
2461Pagc 
Department of Health (2005). National Objectives for Health: Philippines, 2005- 
2010, Philippines Department of Health. 
Dixit, A. (2002). "Incentives and organizations in the public sector - An 
interpretative review. " Journal of Human Resources 37(4): 696-727. 
Donabedian, A. (1966). "Evaluating the quality of medical care. " Milbank Mem 
Fund 44(3): Suppl: 166-206. 
Donabedian, A. (1980). "Methods for deriving criteria for assessing the quality of 
medical care. " Med Care Rev 37(7): 653-98. 
Donabedian, A. (1988). "The quality of care. How can it be assessed? " Jama 
260(12): 1743-8. 
Dranove, D. (1988). "Demand inducement and the physician/patient relationship. " 
Econ In 26(2): 281-98. 
Dudley, R. A., Frolich, A., Robinowitz, D. L., Talavera, J. A., Broadhead, P. and 
Luft, H. S. (2004). Strategies to Support Quality-based Purchasing: A Review of 
the Evidence. (Prepared by the Stanford-University of California San Francisco 
Evidence-based Practice Center). AHRO Publication No. 04-0057. Rockville, 
MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. 
Dudley, R. A., Miller, R. H., Korenbrot, T. Y. and Luft, H. S. (1998). "The impact of 
financial incentives on quality of health care. " Milbank 0 76(4): 649-86,511. 
Eddy, D. M. (1998). "Performance measurement: problems and solutions. " Health 
Aff (Millwood) 17(4): 7-25. 
Eggleston, K. and Bir, A. (2006). "Physician dual practice. " Health Policy 78(2-3): 
157-66. 
Eggleston, K., Shen, Y. C., Lau, J., Schmid, C. H. and Chan, J. (2008). "Hospital 
ownership and quality of care: what explains the different results in the 
literature? " Health Econ 17(12): 1345-62. 
Eichler, R. (2006). "Can "Pay for Performance" Increase Utilization by the Poor and 
Improve the Quality of Health Services? " Working Group on Performance-Based 
Incentives Center for Global Development Discussion Paper. 
Eichler, R., Auxila, P. and Pollock, J. (2001). "Performance-based payment to 
improve the impact of health services: evidence from Haiti. " World Bank 
2471 Pagc 
Institute Online Journal, Flagship Program on Health Sector Reform and 
Sustainable Financing. 
Eisenberg, N. and Miller, P. A. (1987). "The relation of empathy to prosocial and 
related behaviors. " Psychological Bulletin 101(1): 91-119. 
Ellis, R. P. and McGuire, T. G. (1986). "Provider behavior under prospective 
reimbursement. Cost sharing and supply. " J Health Econ 5(2): 129-51. 
Ellis, R. P. and McGuire, T. G. (1990). "Optimal payment systems for health 
services. " J Health Econ 9(4): 375-96. 
English, M., Lanata, C. F., Ngugi, I. and Smith, P. C. (2006). The District Hospital. 
Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries. Jamison D. T., Breman J. G., 
Measham A. R., Alleyne G., Claeson M., Evans D. B., Jha P., Mills A. and P., M. 
Washington DC, Oxford University Press and The World Bank: 1221-1228. 
Ensor, T. (2004). "Informal payments for health care in transition economies. " Soc 
Sci Med 58(2): 237-46. 
Evans, D. B., Edejer, T. T., Lauer, J., Frenk, J. and Murray, C. J. (2001). "Measuring 
quality: from the system to the provider. " Int J Qual Health Care 13(6): 439-46. 
Evans, R. G. (1974). Supplier-induced demand: some empirical evidence and 
implications. The Economics of Health and Medical Care. Perlman, M. London, 
Macmillan: 162-173. 
Fehr, E. and Falk, A. (2002). "Psychological Foundations of Incentives. " European 
Economic Review 46: 687-724. 
Ferrinho, P., Omar, M. C., Fernandes, M. D., Blaise, P., Bugalho, A. M. and 
Lerberghe, W. V. (2004). "Pilfering for survival: how health workers use access 
to drugs as a coping strategy. " Hum Resour Health 2(1): 4. 
Ferrinho, P., Van Lerberghe, W., Fronteira, I., Hipolito, F. and Biscaia, A. (2004). 
"Dual practice in the health sector: review of the evidence. " Hum Resour Health 
2(1): 14. 
Franco, L. M., Bennett, S. and Kanfer, R. (2002). "Health sector reform and public 
sector health worker motivation: a conceptual framework. " Soc Sci Med 54(8): 
1255-66. 
248Ill age 
Franco, L. M., Bennett, S., Kanfer, R. and Stubblebine, P. (2004). "Determinants 
and consequences of health worker motivation in hospitals in Jordan and 
Georgia. " Soc Sci Med 58(2): 343-55. 
Franco, L. M., Franco, C., Kumwenda, N. and Nkhoma, W. (2002). "Methods for 
assessing quality of provider performance in developing countries. " Int J Qual 
Health Care 14 Suppl 1: 17-24. 
Frant, H. (1996). "High-Powered and Low-Powered Incentives in the Public Sector. " 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 6(3): 365-81. 
Frey, B. (1997). Not just for the money. An economic theory of personal motivation. 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
Frey, B. (2000). Motivation and Human Behaviour. Risk, Trust and Welfare. Taylor- 
Gooby, P. Basingstoke, MacMillan. 
Frey, B. and Jegen, R. (2001). "Motivation crowding theory: a survey of empirical 
evidence. " Journal of Economics 26: 591-613. 
Fuchs, V. R. (2004). "More variation in use of care, more flat-of-the-curve 
medicine. " Health Aff(Millwood) Suppl Web Exclusives: VAR104-7. 
Garcia-Prado, A. and Gonzalez, P. (2007). "Policy and regulatory responses to dual 
practice in the health sector. " Health Policy. 
Gaynor, M. and Gertler, P. (1995). "Moral hazard and risk spreading in 
partnerships. " Rand Journal of Economics 26: 591-613. 
Gertler, P. J. and Solon, 0. (2002). "Who Benefits From Social Health Insurance in 
Developing Countries? ." Research paper, University of California at 
Berkeley/NBER and University of the Philippines, School of Economics. 
Giacomini, M., Hurley, J., Lomas, J., Bhatia, V. and Goldsmith, L. (1996). "The 
Many Meanings of Money: A Health Policy Analysis Framework for 
Understanding Financial Incentives. " McMaster University: Centre for Health 
Economics and Policy Analysis Working Paper 96-6. 
Goddard, M., Davies, H. T., Dawson, D., Mannion, R. and McInnes, F. (2002). 
"Clinical performance measurement: part 1--getting the best out of it. " JR Soc 
Med 95(10): 508-10. 
2491Page 
Goddard, M. and Mannion, R. (1998). "From competition to co-operation: new 
economic relationships in the National Health Service. " Health Econ 7(2): 105- 
19. 
Gonzalez, P. (2004). "Should physicians' dual practice be limited? An incentive 
approach. " Health Econ 13(6): 505-24. 
Goodson, J. and Jang, W. (2008). "Assessing nursing home care quality through 
Bayesian networks. " Health Care Manag Sci 11(4): 382-92. 
Gosden, T., Forland, F., Kristiansen, I. S., Sutton, M., Leese, B., Giuffrida, A., 
Sergison, M. and Pedersen, L. (2001). "Impact of payment method on behaviour 
of primary care physicians: a systematic review. " J Health Serv Res Policy 6(1): 
44-55. 
Granger, C. B., Steg, P. G., Peterson, E., Lopez-Sendon, J., Van de Werf, F., Kline- 
Rogers, E., Allegrone, J., Dabbous, 0. H., Klein, W., Fox, K. A. and Eagle, K. 
A. (2005). "Medication performance measures and mortality following acute 
coronary syndromes. " Am J Med 118(8): 858-65. 
Greene, W. H. (2007). Econometric Anal,, Prentice Hall. 
Groene, 0., Skau, J. K. and Frolich, A. (2008). "An international review of projects 
on hospital performance assessment. " Int J Qual Health Care 20(3): 162-71. 
Grol, R. (2001). "Improving the quality of medical care: building bridges among 
professional pride, payer profit, and patient satisfaction. " Jama 286(20): 2578-85. 
Grundy, J., Healy, V., Gorgolon, L. and Sandig, E. (2003). "Overview of devolution 
of health services in the Philippines. " Rural Remote Health 3(2): 220. 
Gujarati, D. (1999). Essentials of Econometrics, Irwin McGraw-Hill. 
Hamilton, L. C. (2006). Statistics with Stata, Thomson Brooks/Cole. 
Harris, J., Westerby, M., Hill, T., Sellers, T. and Hutchinson, A. (2001). "User 
satisfaction: measurement and interpretation. " J Fam Plann Reprod Health Care 
27(1): 41-5. 
Harris, J. E. (1977). "Internal Organization of Hospitals - Some Economic 
Implications. " Bell Journal of Economics 8(2): 467-482. 
2501Pagc 
Hausman, D. and Le Grand, J. (1999). "Incentives and health policy: primary and 
secondary care in the British National Health Service. " Soc Sci Med 49(10): 
1299-307. 
Hermida, J., Nicholas, D. D. and Blumenfeld, S. N. (1999). "Comparative validity of 
three methods for assessment of the quality of primary health care. " lnt J Qual 
Health Care 11(5): 429-33. 
Herrin, J. (2002). 'CLTEST': modules for performing cluster-adjusted chi-square and 
t-tests, Stata. 
Higashi, T., Shekelle, P. G., Adams, J. L., Kamberg, C. J., Roth, C. P., Solomon, D. 
H., Reuben, D. B., Chiang, L., MacLean, C. H., Chang, J. T., Young, R. T., 
Saliba, D. M. and Wenger, N. S. (2005). "Quality of care is associated with 
survival in vulnerable older patients. " Ann Intern Med 143(4): 274-81. 
Hillman, B. J., Olson, G. T., Griffith, P. E., Sunshine, J. H., Joseph, C. A., Kennedy, 
S. D., Nelson, W. R. and Bernhardt, L. B. (1992). "Physicians' utilization and 
charges for outpatient diagnostic imaging in a Medicare population. " Jama 
268(15): 2050-4. 
Holmstrom, B. (1982). "Moral hazard in teams. " Bell Journal of Economics(13): 
324-330. 
Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, P. (1991). "Multitask principal-agent analyses: 
incentive contracts, asset ownership and job design. " Journal of Law Economics 
& Organization 7: 24-52. 
Hsiao, W. C., Yntema, D. B., Braun, P., Dunn, D. and Spencer, C. (1988). 
"Measurement and analysis of intraservice work. " Jama 260(16): 2361-70. 
Hussey, P. S., de Vries, H., Romley, J., Wang, M. C., Chen, S. S., Shekelle, P. G. 
and McGlynn, E. A. (2009). "A Systematic Review of Health Care Efficiency 
Measures. " Health Serv Res. 
Ibrahim, J. E. (2001). "Performance indicators from all perspectives. " Int J Qual 
Health Care 13(6): 431-2. 
lezzoni, L. I. (1997a). "Assessing quality using administrative data. " Ann Intern 
Med 127(8 Pt 2): 666-74. 
lezzoni, L. I. (1997b). "The risks of risk adjustment. " Jama 278(19): 1600-7. 
2511Pagc 
Institute of Medicine (2001). Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for 
the 21st Century. Washington DC, National Academy Press. 
Institute of Medicine (2006). Rewarding Provider Performance: Alining Incentives 
in Medicare. Washington DC, National Academy Press. 
Iversen, T. and Luras, H. (2006). Capitation and incentives in primary care. The 
El ag r companion to health economics. Jones, A. M. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
Chapter 25: 269-278. 
Jack, W. (2003). "Contracting for health services: an evaluation of recent reforms in 
Nicaragua. " Health Policy Plan 18(2): 195-204. 
Jakab, M., Preker, A. S., Harding, A. and Hawkins, L. (2002). "The Introduction of 
Market Forces in the Public Hospital Sector. " WB. 
Kessner, D. M., Kalk, C. E. and Singer, J. (1973). "Assessing health quality--the 
case for tracers. " N Eng] J Med 288(4): 189-94. 
Kim, H. J. and Prah Ruger, J. (2008). "Pharmaceutical Reform In South Korea And 
The Lessons It Provides. " Health Aff (Millwood). 
King, D. R. and Kanavos, P. (2002). "Encouraging the use of generic medicines: 
implications for transition economies. " Croat Med J 43(4): 462-9. 
Klein, R (1998). "Can policy drive quality? " Qual Health Care 7 Suppl: S51-3. 
Kunin, C. M. (1993). "Resistance to antimicrobial drugs--a worldwide calamity. " 
Ann Intern Med 118(7): 557-61. 
Kwon, S. (2003). "Pharmaceutical reform and physician strikes in Korea: separation 
of drug prescribing and dispensing. " Soc Sci Med 57(3): 529-38. 
Laffont, J. and Martimort, D. (2002). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-agent 
Model, Princeton University Press. 
Lazear, E. (2000). "The future of personnel economics. " The Economic Journal 110: 
611-639. 
Le Grand, J. (2003). Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy: Of Knights and 
Knaves, Pawns and Queens. New York, Oxford University Press. 
Lee, Y. C., Huang, K. H. and Huang, Y. T. (2007). "Adverse pharmaceutical 
payment incentives and providers' behaviour: the emergence of GP-owned 
gateway pharmacies in Taiwan. " Health Policy Plan. 
2521Pagc 
Leonard, K. and Masatu, M. C. (2006). "Outpatient process quality evaluation and 
the Hawthorne Effect. " Soc Sci Med 63(9): 2330-40. 
Leonard, K. L. (2002). "When Both States and Markets Fail: Asymettric Information 
and the Role of NGOs in African Health Care. " Int Rev of Law and Economics. 
Leonard, K. L. (2003). "Incentives in Rural Health Care Delivery: Cameroon I. " 
UCIAS 5(4). 
Leonard, K. L. and Masatu, M. C. (2007). "Variations in the quality of care 
accessible to rural communities in Tanzania. " Health Aff (Millwood) 26(3): 
w380-92. 
Leonard, K. L., Masatu, M. C. and Vialou, A. (2005). Getting doctors to do their 
best: Ability, Altruism and Incentives, University of Maryland. 
Lieberthal, R. D. (2008). "Hospital quality: a PRIDIT approach. " Health Serv Res 
43(3):, 988-1005. 
Lindbeck, A. (1997). "Incentives and social norms in household behavior. " 
American Economic Review 87(2): 370-377. 
Lipper, M. H., Hillman, B. J., Pates, R. D., Simpson, P. M., Mitchell, J. M. and 
Ballard, D. J. (1995). "Ownership and utilization of MR imagers in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia. " Radiology 195(1): 217-21. 
Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public 
Services. New York, Russell Sage Foundation. 
Liu, X. and Mills, A. (2005). "The effect of performance-related pay of hospital 
doctors on hospital behaviour: a case study from Shandong, China. " Hum Resour 
Health 3: 11. 
Liu, X. and Mills, A. (2007a). Agency theory and its applications in health care. 
Public Ends Private Means. Strategic Purchasing of Health Services. Preker, A. 
S., Liu, X., Velenyi, E. W. and Barfis, E. Washington DC, World Bank. 
Liu, X. and Mills, A. (2007b). Economic models of doctor's behavior. Public Ends, 
Private Means. Strategic Purchasing of Health Services. Preker, A. S., Liu, X., 
Velenyi, E. W. and Barfis, E. Washington DC, World Bank. 
2531Page 
Liu, X. and Mills, A. (2007c). Economic models of hospital behavior. Public Ends, 
Private Means. Strategic Purchasing of Health Services. Preker, A. S., Liu, X., 
Velenyi, E. W. and Barfis, E. Washington DC, World Bank. 
Luck, J. and Peabody, J. W. (2002). "Using standardised patients to measure 
physicians' practice: validation study using audio recordings. " Bmj. 325(7366): 
679. 
Luck, J., Peabody, J. W., Dresselhaus, T. R., Lee, M. and Glassman, P. (2000). 
"How well does chart abstraction measure quality? A prospective comparison of 
standardized patients with the medical record. " Am J Med 108(8): 642-9. 
Lynk, W. J. and Longley, C. S. (2002). "The effect of physician-owned surgicenters 
on hospital outpatient surgery. " Health Aff (Millwood) 21(4): 215-21. 
Mainz, J. (2003). "Defining and classifying clinical indicators for quality 
improvement. " Int J Qual Health Care 15(6): 523-30. 
Manasan, R. G. (2007). Decentralization and the Financing of Regional 
Development. The Dynamics of Regional Development: the Philippines in Asia. 
Balisacan, A. M. and Hill, H. Quezon City, ADMU Press. 
Manchikanti, L. and McMahon, E. B. (2007). "Physician Refer Thyself: Is Stark II, 
Phase III the Final Voyage? " Pain Physician 10(6): 725-41. 
Mangione-Smith, R. and McGlynn, E. A. (1998). "Assessing the quality of 
healthcare provided to children. " Health Serv Res 33(4 Pt 2): 1059-90. 
Mant, J. and Hicks, N. (1995). "Detecting differences in quality of care: the 
sensitivity of measures of process and outcome in treating acute myocardial 
infarction. " Bmj, 311(7008): 793-6. 
McGuire, A. and Hughes, D. (2002). The Economics of the Hospital: Issues of 
Asymmetry and Uncertainty as they Affect Hospital Reimbursement. Advances 
in Health Economics. Scott, A., Maynard, A. and Elliot, R. Chicester, John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
McGuire, T. G. (2000). Physician Agency. Handbook of Health Economics. Culyer, 
A. J. and Newhouse, J. P. Amsterdam, Elsevier. Chapter 9: 461-536. 
McKay, N. L. and Deily, M. E. (2008). "Cost inefficiency and hospital health 
outcomes. " Health Econ 17(7): 833-48. 
2541Pagc 
McKee, M., Edwards, N. and Atun, R. (2006). "Public-private partnerships for 
hospitals. " Bull World Health Organ 84(11): 890-6. 
McNamara, P. (2005). "Quality-based payment: six case examples. " Int J Qual 
Health Care 17(4): 357-62. 
McPake, B., Hanson, K. and Adam, C. (2007). "Two-tier charging strategies in 
public hospitals: implications for intra-hospital resource allocation and equity of 
access to hospital services. " J Health Econ 26(3): 447-62. 
McPake, B., Nakamba, P., Hanson, K. and McLoughlin, B. (2004). "Private wards in 
public hospitals: two-tier charging and the allocation of resources in tertiary 
hospitals in Zambia. " HEFP working paper, LSHTM 05/04. 
McPake, B. and Normand, C. (2008). Health Economics: An International 
Perspective. London, Routledge. 
Meredith, P. (2003). "Bioequivalence and other unresolved issues in generic drug 
substitution. " Clin Ther 25(11): 2875-90. 
Mooney, G. and Ryan, M. (1993). "Agency in health care: getting beyond first 
principles. " J Health Econ 12(2): 125-35. 
Mutter, R. L., Rosko, M. D. and Wong, H. S. (2008). "Measuring hospital 
inefficiency: the effects of controlling for quality and patient burden of illness. " 
Health Serv Res 43(6): 1992-2013. 
Naylor, C. D. (1995). "Grey zones of clinical practice: some limits to evidence- 
based medicine. " Lancet 345(8953): 840-2. 
Needleman, J., Buerhaus, P., Mattke, S., Stewart, M. and Zelevinsky, K. (2002). 
"Nurse-staffing levels and the quality of care in hospitals. " N En l 
346(22): 1715-22. 
Neuhauser, D. (2004). "Assessing health quality: the case for tracers. " J Health Serv 
Res Policy 9(4): 246-7. 
Newhouse, J. P. (1970). "Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions - Economic 
Model of a Hospital. " American Economic Review 60(1): 64-74. 
Newhouse, J. P. (1996). "Reimbursing health plans and health providers: efficiency 
in production versus selection. " Journal of Economic Literature 34: 1236-1263. 
2551Pagc 
Normand, C. and Weber, A. (1994). Social Health Insurance: A Guidebook for 
Planning. Geneva, World Health Organization and International Labor Office. 
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
New York, Cambridge University Press. 
Noyes, J. (1998). "A critique of studies exploring the experiences and needs of 
parents of children admitted to paediatric intensive care units. " J Adv Nurs 28(1): 
134-41. 
O'Donnell, 0., van Doorslaer, E., Wagstaff, A. and Lindelow, M. (2008). Analyzing 
health equity using household survey data :a guide to techniques and their 
implementation. Washington DC, World Bank. 
Obermann, K., Jowett, M. R., Alcantara, M. 0., Banzon, E. P. and Bodart, C. 
(2006). "Social health insurance in a developing country: the case of the 
Philippines. " Soc Sci Med 62(12): 3177-85. 
OECD (2002). Measuring up: Improving health system performance in OECD 
countries. Paris. 
Palmer, N. and Mills, A. (2003). "Classical versus relational approaches to 
understanding controls on a contract with independent GPs in South Africa. " 
Health Econ 12(12): 1005-20. 
Paredes, P., de la Pena, M., Flores-Guerra, E., Diaz, J. and Trostle, J. (1996). 
"Factors influencing physicians' prescribing behaviour in the treatment of 
childhood diarrhoea: knowledge may not be the clue. " Soc Sci Med 42(8): 1141- 
53. 
Pauly, M. and Redisch, M. (1973). "Not-for-Profit Hospital as a Physicians 
Cooperative. " American Economic Review 63(1): 87-99. 
Peabody, J. W., Gertler, P. J. and Leibowitz, A. (1998). "The policy implications of 
better structure and process on birth outcomes in Jamaica. " Health Policy 43(1): 
1-13. 
Peabody, J. W. and Liu, A. (2007). "A cross-national comparison of the quality of 
clinical care using vignettes. " Health Policy Plan 22(5): 294-302. 
Peabody, J. W., Luck, J., Glassman, P., Dresselhaus, T. R. and Lee, M. (2000). 
"Comparison of vignettes, standardized patients, and chart abstraction: a 
256 IPagc 
prospective validation study of 3 methods for measuring quality. " Jama 283(13): 
1715-22. 
Peabody, J. W., Luck, J., Glassman, P., Jain, S., Hansen, J., Spell, M. and Lee, M. 
(2004). "Measuring the quality of physician practice by using clinical vignettes: a 
prospective validation study. " Ann Intern Med 141(10): 771-80. 
Peabody, J. W., Luck, J., Jain, S., Bertenthal, D. and Glassman, P. (2004). 
"Assessing the accuracy of administrative data in health information systems. " 
Med Care 42(11): 1066-72. 
Peabody, J. W., Nordyke, R. J., Tozija, F., Luck, J., Munoz, J. A., Sunderland, A., 
Desalvo, K., Ponce, N. and McCulloch, C. (2006). "Quality of care and its 
impact on population health: a cross-sectional study from Macedonia. " Soc Sci 
Med 62(9): 2216-24. 
Peabody, J. W. and Solon, 0. (2003). The Philippine Child Health Experiment. RO1 
Proposal to the National Institutes of Health. National Institute of Child Health 
and Human Development, University of California San Francisco and University 
of the Philippines. 
Peabody, J. W., Solon, 0. and Quimbo, S. (2004). The Philippine Child Health 
Experiment (QIDS) Implementation Manual, University of California San 
Francisco and University of the Philippines. 
Peabody, J. W., Taguiwalo, M. M., Robalino, D. A. and Frenk, J. (2006). Improving 
the quality of care in developing countries. Disease Control Priorities in 
Developing Countries. Jamison D. T., Breman J. G., Measham A. R., Alleyne G., 
Claeson M., Evans D. B., Jha P., Mills A. and P., M. Washington DC, Oxford 
University Press and The World Bank: 1293-1307. 
Perrot, J. (2006). "Different approaches to contracting in health systems. " Bull 
World Health Organ 84(11):. 859-66. 
Petersen, L. A., Woodard, L. D., Urech, T., Daw, C. and Sookanan, S. (2006). "Does 
pay-for-performance improve the quality of health care? " Ann Intern Med 
145(4): 265-72. 
Peterson, E. D., Roe, M. T., Mulgund, J., DeLong, E. R., Lytle, B. L., Brindis, R. G., 
Smith, S. C., Jr., Pollack, C. V., Jr., Newby, L. K., Harrington, R. A., Gibler, W. 
2571 Page 
B. and Ohman, E. M. (2006). "Association between hospital process 
performance and outcomes among patients with acute coronary syndromes. " 
Jama 295(16): 1912-20. 
Pitches, D. W., Mohammed, M. A. and Lilford, R. J. (2007). "What is the empirical 
evidence that hospitals with higher-risk adjusted mortality rates provide poorer 
quality care? A systematic review of the literature. " BMC Health Serv Res 7: 91. 
Preker, A. S., Harding, A. and Travis, P. (2000). ""Make or buy" decisions in the 
production of health care goods and services: new insights from institutional 
economics and organizational theory. " Bull World Health Organ 78(6): 779-90. 
Prendergast, C. (1999). "The provision of incentives in firms. " Journal of Economic 
Literature 37(1): 7-63. 
Pritchett, L. and Woolcock, M. (2004). "Solutions When the Solution is the 
Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development. " World Development 32(2): 
191-212. 
Pronovost, P. J., Jenckes, M. W., Dorman, T., Garrett, E., Breslow, M. J., Rosenfeld, 
B. A., Lipsett, P. A. and Bass, E. (1999). "Organizational characteristics of 
intensive care units related to outcomes of abdominal aortic surgery. " Jama 
281(14): 1310-7. 
Quimbo, S. A., Peabody, J. W., Shimkhada, R., Woo, K. and Solon, 0. (2008). 
"Should we have confidence if a physician is accredited? A study of the relative 
impacts of accreditation and insurance payments on quality of care in the 
Philippines. " Soc Sci Med 67(4): 505-10. 
Rabin, M. (1998). "Psychology and economics. " Journal of Economic Literature 
36(1): 11-46. 
Ratto, M., Burgess, S., Croxson, B., Jewitt, I. and Propper, C. (2001). "Team-based 
incentives in the NHS: an economic analysis. " Working Paper, Centre for Market 
and Public Organisation, Bristol 01/37. 
Reerink, E. (1990). "Defining quality of care: mission impossible? " Qual Assur 
Health Care 2(3-4): 197-202. 
Refre, G. R., Jorge II, M. C. and Lim, S. T. (2004). "M. D., R. N. as a second 
profession: the current trend. " Phil. J. Internal Medicine 42: 213-215. 
2581Pagc 
Robinson, J. C. (2001). "Theory and practice in the design of physician payment 
incentives. " Milbank 0 79(2): 149-77, III. 
Rowe, A. K., de Savigny, D., Lanata, C. F. and Victora, C. G. (2005). "How can we 
achieve and maintain high-quality performance of health workers in low- 
resource settings? " Lancet 366(9490): 1026-35. 
Rubin, H. R., Pronovost, P. and Diette, G. B. (2001). "The advantages and 
disadvantages of process-based measures of health care quality. " Int J Qual 
Health Care 13(6): 469-74. 
Saltman, R. B. (2002). "Regulating incentives: the past and present role of the state 
in health care systems. " Soc Sci Med 54(11): 1677-84. 
Scanlon, D. P., Swaminathan, S., Chernew, M., Bost, J. E. and Shevock, J. (2005). 
"Competition and health plan performance: evidence from health maintenance 
organization insurance markets. " Med Care 43(4): 338-46. 
Scott, A. (2000). Economics of general practice. Handbook of Health Economics. 
Culyer, A. J. and Newhouse, J. P. Amsterdam, Elsevier: 1175-1200. 
Scott, A. and Farrar, S. (2002). Incentives in Health Care. Advances in Health 
Economics. Scott, A., Maynard, A. and Elliot, R. Chicester, John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd. 
Scott, E. and Mitchell, J. M. (1994). "Ownership of clinical laboratories by referring 
physicians: effects on utilization, charges, and profitability. " Med Care 32(2): 
164-74. 
Shaw, C. (2001). "External assessment of health care. " Bmi 322(7290): 851-4. 
Shimkhada, R., Peabody, J. W., Quimbo, S. A. and Solon, 0. (2008). "The Quality 
Improvement Demonstration Study: An example of evidence-based policy- 
making in practice. " Health Res Policy Syst 6: 5. 
Sloan, F. A. (2000). Not-For-Profit Ownership and Hospital Behavior. Handbook of 
Health Economics. Culyer, A. J. and Newhouse, J. P., Elsevier Science. 1. 
Sodemann, M., Biai, S., Jakobsen, M. S. and Aaby, P. (2006). "Knowing a medical 
doctor is associated with reduced mortality among sick children consulting a 
paediatric ward in Guinea-Bissau, West Africa. " Trop Med Int Health 11(12): 
1868-77. 
2591 Pa 9c 
Soeters, R. and Griffiths, F. (2003). "Improving government health services through 
contract management: a case from Cambodia. " Health Policy Plan 18(1): 74-83. 
Ssengooba, F., Atuyambe, L., McPake, B., Hanson, K. and Okuonzi, S. (2002). 
"What could be achieved with greater public hospital autonomy? Comparison of 
public and PNFP hospitals in Uganda. " Public Administration and Development 
22(5): 415-428. 
StataCorp (2007a). Base Reference Manual, Stata Press. 
StataCorp (2007b). Stata Statistical Software: Release 10, College Station TX: 
StataCorp LP. 
Street, R. L., Jr., Gordon, H. S., Ward, M. M., Krupat, E. and Kravitz, R. L. (2005). 
"Patient participation in medical consultations: why some patients are more 
involved than others. " Med Care 43(10): 960-9. 
Suwandono, A., Gani, A., Purwani, S., Blas, E. and Brugha, R. (2001). "Cost 
recovery beds in public hospitals in Indonesia. " Health Policy Plan 16 Suppl 2: 
10-8. 
Thomas, J. W. and Hofer, T. P. (1998). "Research evidence on the validity of risk- 
adjusted mortality rate as a measure of hospital quality of care. " Med Care Res 
Rev 55(4): 371-404. 
Tirole, J. (1994). "The Internal Organization of Government. " Oxford Economic 
Papers 46: 1-29. 
Titmuss, R. M. (1970). The gift relationship. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Town, R., Kane, R., Johnson, P. and Butler, M. (2005). "Economic incentives and 
physicians' delivery of preventive care: a systematic review. " Am J Prey Med 
28(2): 234-40. 
Trap, B. (2001). The practices of dispensing and non-dispensing doctors in 
Zimbabwe. Copenhagen, Denmark, The Royal Danish School of Pharmacy. 
Trap, B., Hansen, E. H. and Hogerzeil, H. V. (2002). "Prescription habits of 
dispensing and non-dispensing doctors in Zimbabwe. " Health Policy Plan 17(3): 
288-95. 
Tukey, J. W. (1977). Exploratory Data Analysis. Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley. 
2601Pagc 
Van Lerberghe, W., Conceicao, C., Van Damme, W. and Ferrinho, P. (2002). "When 
staff is underpaid: dealing with the individual coping strategies of health 
personnel. " Bull World Health Organ 80(7): 581-4. 
Varian, H. R. (2006). Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modem Approach, WW 
Norton & Co Ltd 
Wagstaff, A. and van Doorslaer, E. (2000). Equity in health care finance and 
delivery. Handbook of Health Economics. Culyer, A. J. and Newhouse, J. P. 
Amsterdam, Elsevier: 1803-1862. 
Walker, L. and Gilson, L. (2004). "'We are bitter but we are satisfied': nurses as 
street-level bureaucrats in South Africa. " Soc Sci Med 59(6): 1251-61. 
Waters, H. R. (1999). "Measuring the impact of health insurance with a correction 
for selection bias--a case study of Ecuador. " Health Econ 8(5): 473-83. 
Wazana, A. (2000). "Physicians and the pharmaceutical industry: is a gift ever just a 
gift? " Jama 283(3): 373-80. 
WHO (2000). The World Health Report 2000: Health Systems, Improving 
Performance. Geneva, World Health Organization. 
WHO and UNICEF (2005). Model IMCI handbook: Integrated management of 
childhood illness. 
Williams, A. and Cookson, R. (2000). Equity in health. Handbook of Health 
Economics. Culyer, A. J. and Newhouse, J. P. Amsterdam, Elsevier: 1863-1910. 
Williamson, 0. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, 
Relational Contracting. New York, Free Press. 
Williamson, 0. E. (2000). "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, 
Looking Ahead. " Journal of Economic Literature: 595-613. 
Woolcock, M. and Narayan, D. (2000). "Social Capital: Implications for 
Development Theory, Research, and Policy. " The World Bank Research 
Observer 15(2): 225-249. 
World Bank (2004). Making Services Work for Poor People. New York, Oxford 
University Press. 
261 1 Page 
Xu, K., Evans, D. B., Kawabata, K., Zeramdini, R., Klavus, J. and Murray, C. J. 
(2003). "Household catastrophic health expenditure: a multicountry analysis. " 
Lancet 362(9378): 111-7. 
Yip, W. and Eggleston, K. (2001). "Provider payment reform in China: the case of 
hospital reimbursement in Hainan province. " Health Econ 10(4): 325-39. 
Yip, W. and Eggleston, K. (2004). "Addressing government and market failures with 
payment incentives: Hospital reimbursement reform in Hainan, China. " Soc Sci 
Med 58(2): 267-77. 
Zuckerman, S., Hadley, J. and Iezzoni, L. (1994). "Measuring hospital efficiency 
with frontier cost functions. " J Health Econ 13(3): 255-80; discussion 335-40. 
Zweifel, P. and Breyer, F. (1997). Health Economics. New York, Oxford University 
Press. 
262Ill age 
Appendix Al: Evaluating the health consequences of inappropriate care 
NOTES FOR DATA INPUT AND EVALUATION 
Scale for health consequences 
1. Expected health consequence (EHC) 
-3 definitely harmful 
-2 probably harmful 
-1 possibly harmful 
0 health neutral 
1 possibly beneficial 
2 probably beneficial 
3 definitely beneficial 
2. Severity (complete only if treatment is harmful) 
A severe adverse event (life threatening or being admitted to hospital) 
B moderate adverse event (neither lasting nor severe) 
C mild adverse event (minor effects) 
When evaluating the health consequence of specific treatment, evaluate it INDEPENDENTLY of anything else the 
physician does. 
E. g. if giving dextrose drink in itself is health neutral, then write "0". 
I. e. If physician gave this as substitute for IV fluids, that harmful health consequence will be captured separately. 
For essential treatments, you should evaluate the health consequence of NOT doing that treatment. 
For optional and additional treatments, you should evaluate the heatlh consequence of doing that treatment 
(whether beneficial, neutral or harmful to the patient). 
4 of the 15 QIDS vignettes are used here (diarrhoea vignettes #1 & #2, pneumonia vignettes #1 & #3). See AIDS vignette 
case sheets for full details on these 4 vignettes used. 
DIARRHOEA VIGNETTE 'A' (= QIDS diarrhoea vignette #1) 
itial treatments NOT done: 
Give oral rehydration solution in clinic over a period of 4 hours 
Estimate quantity based on weight/dehydration (75 cc/kg x4 hrs. or 400-600 ml in 4 hours 
Monitor for vomiting, urination, normalization of heart rate 
Reassess the child after 3-4 hours and treat accordingly. (If still with some dehydration, 
continue treatment with ORS, or if signs of severe dehydration develop, treat as severe 
dehydration, or reassess before 4 hours if the child has not been taking the ORS well or 
if condition appears to worsen). 
Antipyretic for fever (Paracetamol) 
Once qualified for discharge, advise mother to return immediately if the child worsens 
(increased diarrhea, poor feeding or inability to drink, develops fever, urinates less than 
2-3 times/day, or develops blood in the stool). 
Advise mother on continued home care (show mother how to mix and give ORS - 
frequent small amounts of fluid. if child vomits, wait 10mins then resume by giving it more 
slowly/good feeding practice/proper hygiene/continued sensory stimulation/emotional 
support/regular follow up/updating immunization) 
Recommend continued breastfeeding, give extra fluid several times/day 
Recommend vitamin A, zinc, and calcium supplementation 
lonal treatments done: 
Antibiotics (unspecified) - assume least harmful type & specify antibiotic 
Ampicillin & Gentamycin 
Cotrimoxazole 
Dilute milk formula or change to non-lactose preparation 
263 1 Page 
DIARRHOEA VIGNETTE'B' (= QIDS diarrhoea vignette #2) 
Essential treatments NOT done: EHC severity 
E1 Admit the child to hospital 
E2 Start IV fluids immediately. 
E3 Give IV fluids at appropriate rate. (Lactated Ringers or 0.9% saline, not dextrose containing 
solution, fluids to be given at 100cc/kg as follows: <12 months: 30 cc/kg for the 1st hour 
followed by 70 cc/kg for the next 5 hrs; 12 mos. to 5 yrs.: 30cc/kg for the first 30 minutes 
followed by 70cc/kg in the next 2 and % hrs. While infusing the 30 cc/kg fluids, reassess 
child every 15-30 minutes until a good radial pulse is present. Repeat the infusion of the 
initial 30cc/kg if pulse is still weak or not detectable. 
E4 Give ORS as soon as child can drink. If can drink, give ORS by mouth while the drip is set up 
E5 Estimate quantity of ORS based on weight/dehydration: (5 cc/kg). 
E6 Monitor for vomiting, urination, normalization of heart rate 
E7 1Reassess the child after 3 hours. Re-classify hydration status and treat accordingly: If the 
same, continue with IV fluids; if improved and can tolerate p. o. fluids continue ORS, and 
reassess again in 4 hours 
E8 Once qualified for discharge, advise mother to return immediately if the child worsens 
(increased diarrhea, poor feeding or inability to drink, develops fever, urinates less than 
2-3 times/day, or develops blood in the stool). 
E9 Advise mother on continued home care (same as Di1) 
Add itional treatments done: EHC severity 
Al Antibiotics (unspecified) - assume least harmful type & specify antibiotic 
A2 Ampicillin (for Ecoli) 
A3 Antacid 




A8 jFuroxone syrup 
A9 Lactobacilli 
A10 'Metoclopramide 
All 1 Metronidazole 
A12 
A13 
NPO for 24 hrs then soft diet 
02 inhalation 
A14 Paracetamol 
A15 'Potassium Chloride 
A16 Sodium Bicarbonate 
A17 'Vitamin A 
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PNEUMONIA VIGNETTE 'A' 1= QIDS pneumonia vignette #1) 
itial treatments NOT done: EHC 
Antibiotics. (oral cotrimoxazole for 5 days or oral amoxicillin for 5 days or Ceftriaxone) 
Treat fever (paracetamol) 
If improved, finish antibiotic for 5 days. If no improvement, change to second line antibiotic 
and reassess after 2 days or refer. If worse, admit to the hospital 
Outpatient management with a follow up visit scheduled after 2 days (earlier if the child is 
getting worse) to reassess 
Once discharged, advise mother to give home care (appropriate fluid intake, continued 
breastfeeding, small frequent meals, clearing the nose, avoiding overheating or chilling) 
nal treatment done: EHC 
Home made cough remedies and warm herbal teas 
ional treatments done: EHC 
----------- Oral phenoxymethyl-penicillin erythromycin; cefalexin: assume least harmful type & specify 







; oIylll: b - Ld1LUU bIC111C l. al 
: olytics; b-2 agonists 
iulization & Salbutamol 
Inhalation 
1 Vitamin A 
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PNEUMONIA VIGNETTE 'B' (= QIDS pneumonia vignette #3) 
itial treatments NOT done: EHC seve 
Outpatient management (can be implied) 
Treat fever (as needed) 
Outpatient follow-up scheduled to reassess after 2 days or earlier if child is getting worse 
Once discharged, advise mother to give home care (appropriate fluid intake, continued 
feeding appropriate for age, small frequent meals) 
nal treatment done: EHC seve 
Humidified oxygen 
Cough suppressants (eg dextromethorphan, homemade cough remedies, warm herbal tea) 
ional treatments done: EHC seve 
Antibiotics (unspecified) - assume least harmful type & specify antibiotic 
Expectorants or antihistamines (unspecified) - assume least harmful type & specify 
Ambroxol 








If patient don't get well, start after few days ampicillin and gentamycin, ceferroxine 
If secondary bacterial infect occur, may give antibiotics 
Isoprophine 
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Appendix A2: QIDS PATIENT EXIT SURVEY QUESTIONAIRE 
A. Sampling Information (Write In and provide codes on right hand margin) As 
A. 1. Region 
A. 2. Province 
A. 3. District 
A. 4. Type of study district 
A. 5. Round 
A. 6. Municipality 
A. 7. Facility ID 
Reg Prov Dis Typ Rd 
A. 8. Hospital name 
A. 9. Hospital address 
No. Street Barangay Municipality 
A. 10. Hospital GPS coordinates 
A. 11. Physician name 
A. 12. Patient primary diagnosis 
(Take from the medical record at time of discharge) p1 
D2 
03 
A. 13. Patient Name 
Page 1 of 38 
A. 14. Patient's Birth date 
_/ (If less than 6 months or above 4 years and 11 months old MM DDYY 
do not proceed, SELECTA NEW PATIENT) 
A. 15. What Is her age NOW in years and months? _years __months 
A. 16. Patient ID __ __ __ _ __ _ __! Re Pr Dis Con Age Rd MM/DD/YY Child 
of birth 
A. 17. Guardian/informant name 
(Mother should be requested to complete the survey whenever possible) 
A. 18. Guardian's relationship to patient (See codes below) 
Codes forA18 01- mother 04-uncle 07-yayaor house help 10-cousin 
02-father 05- stepparent 08otherrelative 11-other relative 
03- aunt 06-grandparent 09-neighbor 12- other non-relative 
A. 19. Patient home address 
No. Street Barangay Municipality 
A. 19.1 Do you plan to move In the next 4-6 weeks? Yes ............... 1 (If yes please see manual) No ................ 2 
A. 20. Date admitted MMDDYY 
A. 21. Date discharge 
MMDDYY 
A. 22. Primary language spoken by respondent (Circle one) Tagolog ................... 1 Cebuano/B isayan...... 2 
Ilongo ...................... 3 Waray ..................... 4 Other ....................... 5 
App. ndix A2 Page 2 of 38 
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B. Enumerator data As 
B. I. Date of Interview_ 
MMDDYY 
B. 2. Time started B. 3. Time completed 
B. 4. Total Time: 
B. 5. Interviewer ID B. 6. Interviewer signature 
B. 7. Tracking Information 
Instruction for Interviewer. Ask for the names, addresses, contact numbers and relatonship to household head of 1 family 
member and 1 dose relative that do not live In the respondent's house and for the name and address of I neighbor. This 
Information will be used to track the respondent for subsequent Interviews. 
Name in full Address Phone Numbers Relationship 
----------- 
2 Wd ---------- 
3 w" ---------- 
mob 
Page 3d 38 
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C. Instrument review 
C. 1. Field supervisor review datc _/ 
C. 1.1 Field Supervisor signature 
MM DDY Y 
C. 2. Editor. review date / __I 
C. 2.1 Editor signature 
MM DDY Y 
C. 3. Data encoder date I I C. 3.1 Encoder signature MM DDY Y 
C. 4 2nd encoder date C. 4.1 2nd encoder signature 
MM DDY Y 
Page 4 of 38 
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D. Consent A? 
Dear Respondent, 
The Quality Improvement Demonstration Study (QIDS) HSRA Is a four-year project supported by the U. S. National 
Institutes of Health. The partner Institutions In the Philippines are the Department of Health, PhilHealth, the 
University of California, San Francisco and the UPEcon Foundation. The primary objective of this study is to 
determine the effectiveness of certain health policy Interventions on the health status of children. The project will focus on 
children 0-4 years old who have suffered from common childhood Illnesses in the past week 
It Is with great pleasure to Inform you that you and your child have been selected to participate in this study. Specifically, 
we would like to know your opinions and experiences as clients of this hospital. The interview will take about 1 1/2 hours. 
We will ask you some questions, measure and weigh your child If that hasn't been done today, and take a very small 
sample of blood to do some tests. After we speak with you we will review your child's medical record to verify services 
received and hospital charges. Four to six weeks from today a member of the research team will come and visit you 
at your house to do a follow-up on the health of your child. 
The information that you will provide today and again in 4-6 weeks will be treated with utmost confidentiality. The data 
will be used for research purposes only, although we will tell you the results of your child's tests. Your name or address 
and other personal information will eventually be deleted from the questionnaire and only a code or number will connect 
your name with your answers. 
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Your participation Is voluntary. You may refuse to answer any question which you consider sensitive or confidential. Be 
assured that your answers will not affect your or your family's ability to receive care at this or any other hospital or clinic. 
If you have any questions, you can ask me or can contact our survey supervisor at UP Diliman by calling 
Romy Marcalda at (02) 928-1933. You can also call Dr Stella Quimbo at UP Diliman at (02) 920-5461. 
Your signature Indicates that you understood the purpose and mechanics of this study and that you are willing to 
participate. 




Consent and sign? 
Consent but not sign? 
Refuse to participate? 
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E. General Information on patlenNndex child AS 
From this point forward, we are collecting Information on a child we are referring to as the INDEX CHILD. 
This child Is the one selected and given an ID number on page one. You will need to confirm that this child Is 
not more than 4 years and 10 months old and has been hospitalized and is being discharged today or tomorrow. 
Wherever a question reads 's or (INDEX CHILD)'s, please substitute the name of the child. 
E. I. Sex (observe and verify by asking If necessary) 
Male ............. 1 Female.......... 2 
E. 2. What is the highest grade of schooling that 
(INDEX CHILD) has attended? Not attended .................. 1 Nursery ........................ 2 Kinder 1 ........................ 3 Prep or Kinder 2 ............. 4 Grade 1 ........................ 5 
E. 3. How many years of schooling were completed 
by the father of (INDEX CHILD)? yea rs 
Don't Know......... 99 
E. 4. How many years of schooling were completed 
by the mother of (INDEX CHILD) 7 years 
Don't Know......... 99 
E. 5. Who is (INDEX CHILD) currently living with? (Choose one) 
Both parents ....................... 1 Mother only ........................ 2 Father only ......................... 3 Grandparents ..................... 4 Other relatives .................... 5 Other persons, not relatives... 6 
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E. 6. Who Is the primary Income earner In the household? 
Mother .............................. 1 Father ............................. 2 Grandparent 
........................ 3 Sibling .............................. 4 Other relatives .................... 5 Other persons, not relatives... 6 
OFW not living In 7 
household 
Person not living a 
E. 6.1 What Is this person's name? In household, not OFW 
Note to interviewer. 
(In the following questions, please substitute this person's name 
where ever you see (PRIMARY INCOME EARNER)) 
E. 7. What is 'S (PRIMARY INCOME EARNER) 
work status at his/her primary job? 
(His/her primaryjob is the job that 
occupies most of his/her time) Self employed without help .............. 
1 
Self employed with help .................. 2 Government worker/employee.......... 3 
Work for a private firm or company... 4 
Unpaid family worker ...................... 5 
E. 8 What was the main activity of _(PRIMARY 
INCOME EARNER) 
during the last month? 
Working/helping to earn income....... 1 
Job searching ............................... 2 Housekeeping .............................. 3 Unemployed ................................. 4 Retired ........................................ 5 Retired government workerlemployee 6 
Retired private firm worker 7 
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E. 9. How much does (PRIMARY INCOME EARNER) 
earn at his/her primary job per month? 
E. 10. Does_ (PRIMARY INCOME EARNER) 
have a spouse? 
E. 11. If yes, is the spouse working? 
E. 12 What Is s (PRIMARY INCOME EARNER) SPOUSE'S work 
status at his/her primary job? 
(His/her primaryJob Is the job that occupies most of his/her time) 
E. 13 What was the main activity of 's 
(PRIMARY INCOME EARNER)'s SPOUSE during the last month? 
For E. 14-E. 20, earnings refer to net or take-home pay. 
E. 14 How much does (PRIMARY INCOME EARNER)'s SPOUSE 
earn at his/her primary job per month? 
A9 
______pesos 
Yes ......................... 1 No(Skip to E15)........ 2 
Yes . ................. 1 No(Skip to E15)........ 2 
Self employed without help .............. 1 Self employed with help .................. 2 Government worker/employee.......... 3 
Work for a private firm or company... 4 
Unpaid family worker ...................... 5 Retired government worker/employee 6 
Retired private firm worker 7 
Working/helping to earn income....... 1 
Job searching ............................... 2 Housekeeping .............................. 3 Unemployed ................................. 4 Retired ........................................ 5 
pesos 
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E. 15 How much TOTAL per month does both (PRIMARY INCOME EARNER) 
and 's (PRIMARY INCOME EARNER) SPOUSE usually earn at their jobs, 
after contributions for taxes, social security, the health fund, 
the pension fund, etc.? pesos 
E. 16 What was the TOTAL value of any bonuses, commissions, tips, or allowances 
received by (PRIMARY INCOME EARNER) and 's 
(PRIMARY INCOME EARNER) SPOUSE (for this work/at these jobs) 
In the last 12 months? ___ý__ pesos 
E. 17 What was the TOTAL value of other things received by the couple as payment 
for their work , (e. g.., food, transportation, 
housing) In the last 12 months? 
AN APPROXIMATION IS OKAY. pesos 
E. 18 How much TOTAL extra money did (PRIMARY INCOME EARNER AND 
PRIMARY INCOME EARNER'S SPOUSE) earn from all other work 
during the last 12 months? ___ý__ pesos 
E. 19 How much TOTAL money did (PRIMARY INCOME EARNER AND 
PRIMARY INCOME EARNER'S SPOUSE) receive from family and 
friends In the last 12 months? 
E. 20 What was the approximate TOTAL income of your household 
In the last 12 months? 
pesos 
pesos 
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F. Child Health Status Ato 
F. 1 How would you rate _'s 
(INDEX CHILD's) overall health? Excellent........ 1 
Very Good...... 2 
Good ............. 3 Fair ............... 4 Poor .............. 5 
F. 2 Compared to others his/her age, how would you rate s (INDEX CHILD s) 
overall health? Excellent........ 1 
Very Good...... 2 
Good ............. 3 Fair ............... 4 Poor .............. 5 
F. 3 How would you rate 's (INDEX CHILD's) overall health compared to 
one year ago? Much better now........ 1 
Somewhat better now 2 
About the same......... 3 
Somewhat worse now 4 
Much worse now........ 5 
F. 4 How would you rate 's (INDEX CHILD's) overall mental development? 
Excellent........ 1 
Very Good...... 2 
Good ............. 3 Fair 
............... 4 Poor .............. 5 
F. 5 Compared to others his/her age, how would you rate 's (INDEX CHILD's) 
overall mental development? Excellent........ 1 
Very Good...... 2 
Good ............. 3 Fair ............... 4 Poor .............. 5 
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F. 6 How would you rate 's (INDEX CHILD's) overall mental development 
compared to one year ago? Much better now........ 1 
Somewhat better now 2 
About the same......... 3 
Somewhat worse now 4 
Much worse now........ 5 
G. Symptoms just before this hospitalization 
G. 1 In the Immediate period leading up to this 
hospitalization, what symptoms did 
(INDEX CHILD) experience? 
(Circle all that apply) 
G. 1.1 Any fever 
G. 1.2 High fever (above 38,5 C or 101.5 F) 
G. 1.3 Cough 
G. 1.4 Difficult or fast breathing 
G. 1.5 Shortness of breath 
Yes......... 1 








No.. ... 2 DK/Ref..... 99 
Yes......... 1 
No. No. 2 
DK/Ref..... 99 




G. 1.6 Diarrhea Yes......... 1 
No.. ... 2 DK/Ref..... 99 
G. 1.7 Blood In the stool Yes......... 1 
No.. ... 2 DK/Ref..... 99 
G. 1.8 Vomiting Yes......... 
No........... 2 
DK/Ref..... 99 
G. 1.9 Abdominal cramping or pain Yes......... 1 
No.. ... 2 DKIRef..... 99 
G. 1.10 Loss of appetite Yes......... 
No.. ... 2 DK/Ref..... 99 
G. 1.11 Convulsions Yes......... 
No... ... 2 DK/Ref..... 99 
G. 1.12 Others, specify: Yes......... 
No. ...... 2 DK/Ref..... 99 
G. 2 Was_(INDEX CHILD) given initial treatment for his/her illness before visiting 
a medical care provider? 
Yes. 1 ....................... No (Skip to G. 4) ..... 2 
Page 13 of 38 
G. 3 What kind of Initial treatment was given to (INDEX CHILD)? (Circle all that apply) 
G. 3.1 Herbal medicine or other traditional methods .............................. 1 G. 3.2 Self medication/over the counter drugs purchased at pharmacy..... 2 
G. 3.3 Others (specify) 3 
G. 4 After the appearance of the first symptoms, when did you bring 
(INDEX CHILD) to a medical facility or clinic? 
G. 5 Did you bring -(INDEX 
CHILD) for this initial 
medical care to this district hospital? 
G. 6 What type of facility did you bring 
(INDEX CHILD) to initially? 
Yes (Skip to G. 8).. 1 
No ..................... 2 
Barangay Health Station.. 1 
Rural Health Center........ 2 
District Hospital ............ 3 Provincial Hospital.......... 4 
Regional Hospital........... 5 
Private hospital .............. 6 Private clinic........... 7 
Community Hospital...... 8 
Others .......................... 9 
Within 24 hours (1st day) ............... 1 Within 25-48 hours (2nd day).......... 2 
Within 49-72 hours (3rd day)........... 3 
After 72 hours (4th day or more)....... 4 
Don't know .................................. 99 
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G. 7 After the appearance of the first symptoms, 
when did you bring (INDEX CHILD) 
to THIS hospital? 
G. 8 Why did you choose to consult In this hospital 
Instead of other hospitals or clinics? 
A12 
Within 24 hours (1st day) ............... 1 Within 25-48 hours (2nd day).......... 2 
Within 49-72 hours (3rd day)........... 3 
-After 72 hours (4th day or more)....... 4 
Don't know .................................. 99 
(Circle up to two items) 
G. 8.1 Lower costs ............................................ 1 G. 8.2 Accredited by PhilHealth ........................... 2 G. 8.3 Accredited by other Insurance institutions.... 3 
G. 8.4 Short distance from home ......................... 4 G. 8.5 Easy transportation .................................. 5 G. 8.6 Adequate facilities ................................... 6 G. 8.7 Quality of care ....................................... 7 G. 8.8 Referred here .................................... 8 G. 8.9 Others (specify) 9 
G. 9 How much time did you spend traveling to this facility? minutes 
G. 10 How many times, if at all, has your child been 
hospitalized for this same condition since he/she 
was bom excluding this present hospitalization? 
Page 15 of 38 
H. Description of confinement 
H. 1 Which department did you visit when you first came to this hospital? 
Outpatient Department 
.............. 1 Emergency Department ............. 2 Pediatrics Department 
............... 3 Laboratory 
.............................. 4 X-ray or Ultrasound ................... 5 Others (specify) 6 
Don't know .............................. 99 
H. 2 What was the total number of days your child was confined In this hospital? 
_ 
days 
H. 3 What ward was your child confined in? 
H. 3.1 What type of ward was it? 
Pedia ............................... 1 Non- Pedia 
......................... 2 Mixed 
................................ 3 Other, Specify 4 
Don't know 
......................... 99 
Pay .................................. 1 Medicare ........................... 2 Charity .............................. 3 Mixed ............................... 4 Other, Specify 5 
Don't know ........................ 99 
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H. 4 Was your child cared for by a doctor? (Circle one) X13 
Yes, one main doctor .................................... 
1 
Yes several different doctors(Skip to H. 8)......... 2 
No, only nurses and other staff (Skip to H. 9)..... 3 
Don't know (Skip to H. 9) ................................ 99 
H. 5 What was that Doctors name? (Include first and last name) 
H. 6 Was your child's doctor a man or a woman? 
Man .............. 1 Woman......... 2 
H. 7 What kind of doctor took care of your child? (Circle one) 
General Practioner 
................... 1 Family Doctor .......................... 2 Pediatrician 
............................. 3 Sul-specialist ........................ 4 Other, 5 
DK ......................................... 99 
H. 8 How long did you wait after arriving at the hospital 
for a doctor to first attend to your child? (List in minutes) 
H. 9 How many times was your child visited by a physician during his or her confinement? 
H. 10 What was the outcome of your child's confinement? (Circle One) 
Discharged fully recovered ............................................ 1 Discharged feeling better but not fully recovered ............... 2 Discharged feeling worse and referred to another facility..... 3 
Discharged feeling worse with continued care at home....... 4 
Other, specify 5 
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1. Services and medical expenditures 





Number of 1.3 Cost per Unit 
1.4 Receivedl 
Given OUTSIDE of 
1.5 
Number of I. 6 Cost per Unit 
Yes No in pesos Yes No In pesos 
1 X-rays 12 12 
2 Ultrasound 12 12 









5 Lab tests 12 
---- 
12 
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1.7 How much did you pay for Room and Board? 
------ pesos 
1.8 What were the TOTAL charges IN the hospital? 
------ pesos 
1.9 What were the TOTAL charges OUTSIDE the hospital? 
------ pesos 
1.10 Was your child prescribed medicine to take 
once he or she Is discharged from the hospital? 
Yes.............................. 1 
No (Skip to Section 1.14).. 2 
1.11 Did you obtain any of these discharge 
medicines at the hospital? Yes .............................. 1 No ............................... 2 
1.11.1 How much did these medications cost? 
--, --- pesos 
1.12 Have you purchased any of the medicines or do you plan to 
purchase any of the medicines outside the hospital? 
Yes .............................. I No ............................... 2 
1.13 How much did/do these discharge medicine(s) cost? 
- pesos Don't Know.......... 99 
1.14 During your child's confinement, how much did you spend on 
non-medical things such as the following... 
Please include costs for both child and yourself or 
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J. Payment sources for this hospitalization 
J. 1 Is (INDEX CHILD) enrolled in PhilHealth? Yes ......................... 1 (Note: If they say no, probe by checking If the family has a GMA card No (Skip to J. 5) ......... 2 
or has Medicare Para sa Mass. ) DK 99 
J. 2 Were any of the services received services that are covered by PHIC? Yes ........................ 1 
No... (Skip toJ. 5)........ 2 
DK 
......................... 99 
J. 3 Did you make a claim? Yes .. (Skip to J. 5)...... 1 No ....................... 2 DK 
......................... 99 
J. 4 If not do you plan to make a claim? Yes......... 1 
No........... 2 
Of the total spent on this hospitalization, how much was paid for by... 
J. 5. Own HH resources/savings/income .................................... --- --- pesos 
J. 6. Personal loans including from family members that 
--- --- pesos do not live with you ............................................. 
J. 7. Sale of property .............................................................. --- --- pesos 
J. 8. Transfers, donations from charities or local 
--- --- pesos government officials .............................................. 
J. 9. PhilHealth ................................................................... --- --- pesos 
J. 10. Private insurance .......................................................... --- --- pesos 
J. 11 Other Insurance ............................................................. --- --- pesos 
J. 12 Others, specify 
--- --- pesos 
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K. Patient satisfaction SHORT FORM PATIENT SATISFACTION QUESTIONNAIRE (PSQ-18) 
These next questions are about how you feel about the medical care your child receives 
On the following pages are some things people say about medical care. Please listen to each one carefully, keeping in 
mind the medical care your child Is receiving right now. (If your child has not received care recently, think about what you 
would expect if you needed care today). We are interested in your feelings, good and bad, about the medical care 
your child has received. As with everything you tell us today, your answers will be kept strictly confidential. 
How strongly do you AGREE or DISAGREE with each of the following statements Circle response 
K1. Doctors are good about explaining the 
reason for medical tests ................... 
K2. I think my doctor has 
everything needed to provide 
complete medical care .................... 
Strongly Agree.......... 1 
Agree ..................... 2 Uncertain 
................. 3 Disagree 
.................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref 99 
Strongly Agree.......... 1 
Agree ..................... 2 Uncertain ................. 3 Disagree .................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref 99 
K3. The medical care my child has been 
receiving is just about perfect............ 
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K4. Sometimes doctors make me wonder 
if their diagnosis is correct ................ 
K5. I feel confident that I can get the 
medical care my child needs without being set 
back financially ............................... 
K6. When I go for medical care, they are 
careful to check everything when 
treating and examining my child ............... 
K7. I have to pay for more of my child's medical 
care than I can afford ...................... 
Strongly Agree.......... i 
Agree ..................... 2 Uncertain ................. 3 Disagree .................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref 99 
Strongly Agree.......... 1 
Agree 
..................... 2 Uncertain ................. 3 Disagree 
.................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref 99 
Strongly Agree.......... 1 
Agree 
..................... 2 Uncertain ................. 3 Disagree 
.................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref - 99 
Strongly Agree.......... 1 
Agree ..................... 2 Uncertain ................. 3 Disagree 
.................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref 99 
Strongly Agree.......... 1 
Agree ..................... 2 Uncertain ................. 3 Disagree .................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref 99 
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K8. I have easy access to the medical 
specialists my child needs ........................... 
K9. Where my child gets medical care, people 
have to wait too long for emergency 
treatment ...................................... 
K10. Doctors act too businesslike and 
Impersonal towards me and my child.,.,.. 
K11. My doctors treat my child in a very friendly 
and courteous manner ...................... 
K12. Those who provide my child's medical care 
sometimes hurry too much when they 
treat my child .......................................... 
KI 3. Doctors sometimes Ignore what I tell 
them .............................................. 
K14. I have some doubts about the ability 
of the doctors that treat my child .................. 
K15. Doctors usually spend plenty of time 
with my child ........................................... 
Page 23 38 
Ale 
Strongly Agree.......... 1 
Agree 
..................... 2 Uncertain 
................. 3 Disagree 
.................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref 99 
Strongly Agree.......... 1 
Agree ..................... 2 Uncertain ................. 3 Disagree .................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref 99 
Strongly Agree.......... 1 
Agree 
..................... 2 Uncertain 
................. 3 Disagree 
.................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref 99 
Strongly Agree.......... 1 
Agree ..................... 2 Uncertain 
................. 3 Disagree 
.................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref 99 
Strongly Agree.......... 1 
Agree 
..................... 2 Uncertain ................. 3 Disagree .................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref 99 
Agree ..................... 2 Uncertain 
................. 3 Disagree 
.................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref 99 
Strongly Agree.......... 1 
Agree 
..................... 2 Uncertain ................. 3 Disagree .................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DKJRef 99 
Strongly Agree.......... 1 
Agree ..................... 2 Uncertain ................. 3 Disagree 
.................. 
4 
Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref 99 
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K16. I find it hard to get an appointment for A17 
medical care right away ...................... Strongly Agree.......... 1 
Agree ..................... 2 Uncertain 
................. 3 Disagree .................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref 99 
K17. I am dissatisfied with some things 
about the medical care my child receives........... Strongly Agree.......... 1 
Agree ...................... 2 Uncertain 
................ 3 Disagree 
.................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref 99 
K18. I am able to get medical care for my child 
whenever I need It .................... "........ Strongly Agree......... 1 
Agree ..................... 2 Uncertain 
................. 3 Disagree .................. 4 Strongly Disagree...... 5 
DK/Ref 99 
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L TAPQOL Questionnaire for parents of children aged 6 months to 4 years 11 months 
INSTRUCTIONS 
The questions in this questionnaire relate to the different aspects of your child's health. 
You can answer the questions by telling me the answer that best describes your child. 
If things were not entirely satisfactory, you are also asked how your child felt when there was a problem. 
So, if you say that your child had ear ache 'occasionally' or'often', you can state, in the second part of the question, 
how your child felt at that time. 
in me fast mree months am iNUtx cnna nave. . 
L. I. Ear ache? (Circle one) L2. At that time, my child felt (Circle one) 
Never.. (SkIp to L. 3)... I Fine ................ 1 Occasionally............ 2 Not so good..... 2 
Often ...................... 3 Quite Bad........ 3 
Bad ................ 4 Not applicable 97 
L3. Stomach-ache or abdominal pain? (Circle one) L. 4. At that time, my child felt: (Circle one) 
Never.. (Skip to L. 5)... 1 Fine ................. 1 Occasionally............ 2 Not so good....... 2 
Often ...................... 3 Quite Bad.......... 3 
Bad ................... 4 Not applicable 97 
L5. Colic (Circle one) L. 6. At that time, my child felt: (Circle one) 
Never.. (Skip to L. 7)... I Fine ................. 1 Occasionally............ 2 Not so good....... 2 
Often ...................... 3 Quite Bad.......... 3 
Bad ................... 4 Not applicable 97 
L7. Eczema (Circle one) L. B. At that time, my child felt: (Circle one) 
Never.. (Skip to L. 9)... I Fine .................. 1 Occasionally............ 2 Not so good...... 2 
Often ...................... 3 Quite Bad........ 3 Bad 
.................. 4 Not anolicable 97 
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L. 9 Itchiness (Circle one) L. 10. At that time, my child felt: (Circle one) Ate 
Never.. (Skip to Li 1).. 1 Fine ................ 
1 
Occasionally............ 2 Not so good......... 2 
Often ...................... 3 Quite Bad........... 3 
Bad .................. 4 Not applicable 97 
L. 11. Dry skin (Circle one) L. 12. At that time, my child felt: (Circle one) 
Never.. (Skip to Li 3).. 1 Fine ................. 1 Occasionally............ 2 Not so good......... 2 
Often ...................... 3 Quite Bad.......... 3 
Bad 
................. 4 Not applicable 97 
L13. Bronchitis (Circle one) L14. At that time, my child felt: (Circle one) 
Never.. (Skip to L. 15).. 1 Fine ................ 1 Occasionally............ 2 Not so good....... 2 
Often ...................... 3 Quite Bad........ 3 
Bad ................. 4 Not applicable 97 
L15. Difficulty with breathing or lung problems L. 16. At that time, my child felt: (Circle one) 
(Circle one) Never.. (Skip to L. 17).. I Fine ................ 1 Occasionally............ 2 Not so good....... 2 
Often ...................... 3 Quite Bad........ 3 
Bad 
................. 4 
In the last three months, has your child been 
L 17. Short of breath (Circle one) L. 18. At that time, my child felt: (Circle one) 
Never.. (Skip to L19).. 1 Fine 
................ 1 Occasionally............ 2 Not so good....... 2 
Often ...................... 3 Quite Bad........ 3 
Bad ................. 4 
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L. 19. Nauseous (Circle one) L. 20. At that time, my child felt: (Circle one) 
Never.. (Skip to L. 21).. 1 Fine ................ 1 Occasionally............ 2 Not so good....... 2 
Often ...................... 3 Quite Bad........ 3 Bad 
................. 4 Not applicable 97 
How did your child sleep in the last three months? 
L. 21. Did your child sleep restlessly? (Circle one) L. 22. At that time, my child felt: (Circle one) 
Never.. (Skip to L23).. I Fine ................ 1 Occasionally............ 2 Not so good....... 2 
Often ...................... 3 Quite Bad........ 3 Bad 
................. 4 Not applicable 97 
L23. Was your child awake at night? (Circle one) L. 24. At that time, my child felt: (Circle one) 
Never.. (Skip to L. 25)., I Fine ................ 1 Occasionally............ 2 Not so good....... 2 
Often ...................... 3 Quite Bad........ 3 Bad 
................. 4 Not applicable 97 
L. 25. Did your child cry at night? (Circle one) L. 26. At that time, my child felt: (Circle one) 
Never.. (Skip to L. 27)., 1 Fine ................ 1 Occasionally............ 2 Not so good....... 2 
Often ...................... 3 Quite Bad........ 3 Bad ................. 4 Not applicable 97 
L. 27. Did your child have difficulty sleeping through L. 28. At that time, my child felt: (Circle one) 
the night? (Circle one) Fine ................ 1 Never.. (Skip to L. 29).. I Not so good....... 2 
Occasionally............ 2 Quite Bad........ 3 
Often ...................... 3 Bad................. 4 
Not applicable 97 
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How did your child eat and drink In the last three months? X19 
L29. Was your child's appetite poor i (Circle one) L. 30. At that time, my child felt: (Circle one) 
Fine....... 
.... 1 Never.. (Skip to L. 31).. 1 Not so good....... 2 
Occasionally............ 2 Quite Bad........ 3 
Often ...................... 
3 Bad................. 4 
Not applicable 97 
L. 31. Did your child have difficulty eating enough? L. 32. At that time, my child felt: (Circle one) 
(Circle one) Never.. (Skip to L. 33).. I Fine ................ 1 
Occasionally............ 2 Not so good....... 2 
Often ...................... 3 
Quite Bad........ 3 
Bad ................. 
4 
Not applicable 97 
L. 33. Did your child refuse to eat? (Circle one) L. 34. At that time, my child felt: (Circle one) 
Never.. (Skip to L. 35).. 1 Fine ................ 
1 
Occasionally............ 2 Not so good....... 2 
Often ...................... 3 
Quite Bad........ 3 
Bad ................. 4 Not applicable 97 
Your child's behavior in the last three months 




Often ..................... 3 
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L39. My child was restless or Impatient with me (Circle one) 
Never ................... 1 Occasionally........... 2 
Often ..................... 3 
L. 40. My child defiant/ awkward with me (Circle one) 
Never ................... 1 Occasionally........... 2 
Often ..................... 3 
L41. I could not manage my child (Circle one) Never ................... 1 Occasionally........... 2 
Often ..................... 3 
How was your child in the last three months? 
L42. In good spirits (Circle one) 
Never ................... 1 Occasionally........... 2 
Often ..................... 3 
L43. Cheerful (Circle one) 
Never ................... 1 Occasionally........... 2 
Often ..................... 3 
L44. Happy (Circle one) Never ................... 
1 
Occasionally........... 2 
Often ..................... 3 
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L45. Frightened (Circle one) 
L46. Tense (Circle one) 
A20 
Never ................... 1 Occasionally........... 2 
Often ..................... 3 
Never ................... 1 Occasionally........... 2 
Often ..................... 3 
L47. Anxious (Circle one) 
Never ................... 1 Occasionally........... 2 
Often ..................... 3 
L. 48. Energetic (Circle one) 
Never ................... Occasionally........... 2 
Often ..................... 3 
L49. Active (Circle one) 
Never ................... Occasionally........... 2 
Often ..................... 3 
L. 50. Uvely (Circle one) 
Never ................... Occasionally........... 2 
Often ..................... 3 
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(For children older than 18 months only. For children younger than 18 months skip to Section M. ) 
How was your child's behavior in the last three months? 
L. 51. My child was able to play happily with other children (Circle one) 
Never 
................... 1 Occasionally........... 2 
Often ..................... 3 
L52. My child was at ease with other children (Circle one) 
Never 
................... 1 Occasionally........... 2 
Often 
..................... 3 
L. 53. My child was confident with other children (Circle one) 
Never ................... 1 Occasionally........... 2 
In the last three months, did your child have, compared with other children of the same age, 
L54. Difficulty with walking? (Circle one) L55. At that time, my child felt 
No... (Skip to L56)..... I Fine ........................ 1 Yes, a little .............. 2 Not so good.............. 2 Yes, a lot ................ 
3 Quite bad................ 3 
Cannot walk............ 4 Bad ........................ 4 Not applicable ........... 97 
L56. Difficulty with running? (Circle one) L. 57. At that time, my child felt 
No... (Skip to L58)..... 1 Fine ........................ 1 Yes, a little .............. 2 Not so good.............. 2 Yes, a lot ................ 3 Quite bad................ 3 Cannot walk............ 4 Bad ........................ 4 Not applicable ... : ....... 97 
L. 58. Difficulty with walking up the stairs without help? L. 59. At that time, my child felt (Circle one) 
(Circle one) No... (Skip to L60)..... 1 Fine ........................ 
I 
Yes, a little .............. 
2 Not so good.............. 2 
Yes, a lot ................ 3 Quite bad................ 3 Cannot walk............ 4 Bad ........................ 4 Not applicable ........... 97 
Page 32 d38 
PEa 
L. 60. Difficulty with balance? (Circle one) L. 61. At that time, my child felt ß21 
No... (Skip to L62)..... 1 Fine ........................ 
1 
Yes, a little .............. 2 Not so good.............. 2 Yes, a lot ................ 3 Quite bad................ 3 Cannot walk............ 4 Bad ........................ 4 Not applicable........... 97 
In the last three months, did your child have, compared with other children of the same age, 
L. 62. Difficulty in understanding what others said? L. 63. At that time, my child felt 
(Circle one) Fine ........................ 1 No... (Skip to L64)..... 1 Not so good .............. 2 Yes, a little .............. 2 Quite bad................ 3 Yes, a lot ................ 3 Bad........................ 4 Not applicable ........... 97 L. 64. Difficulty In talking clearly? (Circle one) L. 65. At that time, my child felt 
Fine ........................ 1 Never.. (Skip to L66).. 1 Not so good .............. 2 Occasionally............ 2 Quite bad ................ 3 Often ...................... 3 Bad........................ 4 Not applicable ........... 97 L66. Difficulty in saying what he/ she meant? L. 67. At that time, my child felt 
(Circle one) Fine ........................ 1 Never.. (Skip to L. 68).. 1 Not so good .............. 2 Occasionally............ 2 Quite bad ................ 3 Often ...................... 3 Bad........................ 4 Not applicable ........... 97 L. 68. Difficulty in making it clear what he/ she wanted? L. 69. At that time, my child felt 
(Circle one) Fine ........................ 1 Never (Skip to Sec M) I Not so good .............. 2 Occasionally............ 2 Quite bad ................ 3 Often ...................... 3 Bad........................ 4 Not applicable........... 97 
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M. Anthropomentrics 
M. 1 Height (Take measurement while child Is lying down) 
First measurement 
Second measurement 







Appendix A2 Page 34 of 38 
2831 Page 
PEO 
N. Blood Tests X22 
Now we will take a small sample of blood from your child to measure levels of hemoglobin, lead, folate and c-reactive 
protein. These tests will give aa biological measure of your child's health and may provide you with Important health 
Information. We will bring you your results when we visit you at home in 4-6 weeks to do a follow-up survey. If the tests 
find anything that requires medical attention for your child we will notify you right away. 
Please record the status and/or result for each test: 
N. 1 Hemoglobin Circle all that apply 
Completed 1 
Done on site 2 
Sent to local lab 3 
Sent to Manila 4 
Result: 
N. 2 CRP 




If positive, 02b 
Result: 
Dilution Concentration 
1: 1 = 0.8 1 
1: 2 = 1.6 2 
1: 4 = 3.2 3 
1: 8 6.4 4 
1: 16 12.8 5 
1: 32   25.6 6 
Pape 35 c 38 
N. 3 Lead 
N. 4 Folate 
(Circle all that apply) 
N. 5.1 Arm ................... 
I 
N. 5.2 Hand ................. 2 N. 5.3 Foot .................. 3 N. 5.4 Finger stick......... 4 
N. 5.5 Other 5 
Hematocrit: 
For interviewer. 
N. 5 Where did you draw the blood? 
N. 6 Which side of the body? 
N. 7 Were you able to obtain a blood sample? 
Complete 
Done on site 
Sent to local lab 
Sent to Manila 
Complete 1 
Done on site 2 
Sent to local lab 3 
Sent to Manila 4 
N. 6.1 Left side ........... 
6 




If no, why not? 
If no, when will you go back to draw sample? 
Later today.......... 1 
Tomorrow............ 2 






Done on site 2 
Sent to local lab 3 
Sent to Manila 4 
(to be filled in at central office Result: __ 
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0. Record Review 
A2 , 
For this next section please review the patient's medical record and, lfpossible hospital billing records 
Services (list Individually) Total charge Billed to Philhealth Billed to other Charged to patient Charity 
In pesos In pesos In pesos In pesos In pesos 
Diagnostic tests 
(lab, Xray, etc) 
Drugs and medicines 
Professional fees 
Page 37 of 38 
Services (list Individually) Total charge Billed to Philhealth Billed to other Charged to patient Charity 
in pesos in pesos in pesos in pesos in pesos 
Room and Board 
Treatments 
Discharge diagnosis 
Doctor caring for patient: 
last name first name 
office telephone number other than this district hospital 
cellphone number 
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Appendix A3: QIDS FACIUTY SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
A. Sampling Information (Write in and provide codes on right hand margin) A24 
A. 1 Region 
A. 2 Province 
A. 3 District 
A. 4 Type of study district 
A. 5 Round 
A. 6 Municipality 
A. 7 Facility ID 
___ Reg Prov Dis Typ Rd 
A. 8 Hospital name 
A. 9 Hospital address 
No Street Barangay Municipality 
A. 10 Hospital GPS coordinates 
A. 11 Informants Please enter the name and position of each informant for this interview: 
Position Name Tile 
A. 11.1 Hospital Chief/Director 
A. 11.2 Senior Adminstrative Officer 
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B. Enumerator data 
B. 2. Time started B. 3. Time completed B. I. Date of Interview _ 
/---T) 
DD MM 
B. 4 Total time: 
B. 4. Interviewer ID B. 5. Interviewer signature 
C. Instrument review 
C. I. Field supervisor: review date 
C. 2. Editor: review date 
C. 3. Data encoder entry date 
CA 2nd data encoder entry date 
Appendix Al 
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/ C. 1.1 Field Supervisor signature 
DD/MM/ W 
_/_/ 
C. 2.1 Editor signature 
DD/MM/ W 
_/ 
/ C. 3.1 Encoder signature 
DD/MM/ W 
/ C. 3.1 2nd encoder signature 
DD/MM/ W 
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D. Informed consent 
The Quality Improvement Demonstration Study (QIDS) Evaluation of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (EHRSA) is 
a four year project supported by the US National Institutes of Health. The partner institutions in the Philippines are the 
Department of Health, PhilHealth, the University of California, San Francisco, and the UPEcon Foundation. The purpose 
of the survey is to learn how new government policies for insurance and provider payment systems might affect the health 
of Filipino children. 
You have been selected to give us information to help us complete the facility questionnaire. This facility survey will 
inquire about the services available at your health facility including your staff, equipment, supplies and costs. To obtair 
more accurate information, we may need to interview more than one person. If during the interview we ask yoL 
questions that you cannot answer but someone else can, please refer us to that other person. 
Please be assured that the Information you provide will be treated with the utmost confidentiality and will not be shared 
with anyone including your staff. This Information will be used for research purposes only. Your name and other personal 
information will eventually be removed from the questionnaire and only a code number will connect your name with your 
answers. Specifically we want to say that this information will not be used for disciplinary action or regulation. 
We hope that the Information will indirectly benefit you by informing the Department of Health of the problems within the 
public health sector so that they can make changes to improve the quality of health services in the hospital. The only 
cost to you in terms of participation is your time in completing the survey. 
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If there Is a question you do not want to answer, just tell me and we will skip to the next one; If you no longer want to 
continue, you can also tell me and we will stop the interview. If you have any questions, you can ask me, or you can 
contact our survey supervisor Laurie Ramiro through Romy Marcaida at (02) 525-4098. You can also contact Stella 
Quimbo at the UPEcon Foundation at (02) 920-5461. 
A25 
Your signature indicates that you understood the purpose and mechanics of this study and that you are willing to participate. 
Who read this consent form? 
Respondent l Read by respondent 
Read by Interviewer 
Signature of respondent 1 
Date: 
DD MM YY 
Signature of Interviewer 
Appendix All 
Respondent 2 
Signature of respondent 2 
Read by respondent 1 
Read by interviewer 2 
Date: /__ 
DD MM_ W 
Signature of interviewer 
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E. General Information A26 
El What year was this hospital opened? 
E1.1 What year was the last major renovation completed? 
E2 What municipalities does this hospital serve? What is the population of each municipality? 









E3 How many DOH licensed beds does this hospital have? 
E4 How many beds can actually be used for patients at this time? 
E5 Is this hospital PhilHealth accredited? Yes ................... I No(Skip to E7).... 2 
E6 If yes, what year was the hospital first given PhilHealth accreditation # 
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Yes ................... I E7 Is this hospital Sentrong Singla accredited? NokSkip to E9) .... 2 
E8 If yes, what year was the hospital first given Sentrong Sigla accreditation? 
E9 What are the departments In this hospital? / y) (Circle all that app 
E. 9.1 Clinical Services Department. 1 
E. 9.2 Medicine ............................ 
2 
E. 9.3 OB-Gyn ............................. 
3 
E. 9.4 Pediatrics ........................... 
4 
E. 9.5 Surgery ............................. 
5 
E. 9.6 Psychiatry .......................... 
6 
E. 9.7 Pathology .......................... 
7 
E. 9.8 laboratory 
......................... 
8 
E. 9.9 OPD ................................. 9 E. 9.10 Emergency ......................... 10 E. 9.11 Mortuary ............................ 11 E. 9.12 ICU ................................... 12 E. 9.13 Administrative Services......... 13 
E. 9.14 Others (specify) 14 
E. 9.99 Not departmentalized........... 99 
E. 10 Does the hospital have the following committees or bod ies....... (Read list and circle all that apply) 
E. 10.1 Quality assurance/review committee ...................... 1 E. 10.2 Morbidity and mortaility conference or committee...... 2 
E. 10.3 Medical Staff or Executive committee ..................... 3 E. 10.4 Infection control committee ................................. 4 E. 10.5 Pharmacy or therapeutics commmittee ................... 5 
Appendix All Page 6 of 36 
2881 Page 
FAC 
F. Hospital Management 
F1. What Is the plantilla for this hospital? Please write in the number of positions funded by the hospital budget 
seconded, filled and vacant , 
A BC DE F 
Position # of # seconded # full time 
# of # part-time 
# of 
positions positions from other positions positions positions positions funded sources rolled 
F. 1.1 Hospital chief 
F. 1.2 Deputy chief 
F. 1.3. Other Administrative 
-- -- F. 1.4 Residents/Fellows/Interns -- -- -- -- 
F. 1.5 Doctors/Consultants (by type) 
F. 1.5.1 General Doctors 
-- -- -- -- -- - F. 1.5.2 Pediatrics 
F. 1.5.3 Internal Medicine 
F. 1.5.4 Surgery -- 
F. 1.5.5 OB/GYN 
F. 1.5.6 Anesthesiology 
F. 1.5.7 Pathology 
-- -- -- -- -- 
- 
F. 1.5.8 Other specialists 
Specify: 
F. 1.6 Midwives 
-- -- -- -- -- F. 1.7 Chief Nurse 
F. 1.8 Nurses 
-- -- -- -- -- F. 1.9 Nutritionists 
F. 1.10 Psychologists 
F. 1.11 Dentist 
F. 1.12 Med techs 
-- -- -- -- -- F. 1.13 Social workers -- -- -- -- -- -- F. 1.14 Pharmacists 
F. 1.15 X-ray technician 
F. 1.16 Lab technician 
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F. 1.17 PhislotherapistlPhysical therapist 
F. 1.18 Billing/accounting staff 
F. 1.19 Utility workers 
F. 1.20 Other, specify 
Now I'd like more detailed information about all of the doctors that work full or part time In this facility. Please help me 
complete the following table with Information about each doctor. 
The chief of hospital should be listed in line 1 
F2 Physician Roster 
ABC DEF 
Name Worked anytime in Specialty 
Hospital Salary Has private 
24 hrs last Wed.? (see codes) Age Gender (monthly) practice? 
Yes..... I Yes..... I 
1 No...... 2 
-- -- - ----- 
No...... 2 
Yes..... I - Yes..... 1 
2 No...... 2 
-- -- 
No...... 2 
- ----- Yes..... 1 Yes..... 1 
3 No...... 2 
-- -- 
No...... 2 
- ----- Yes..... 1 Yes..... 1 
4 No...... 2 
-- -- - ----- 
No...... 2 
Yes..... I Yes..... I 
5 No...... 2 
-- -- - ----- 
No...... 2 
Yes..... 1 Yes..... 1 
6 No...... 2 
-- -- -- ----- 
No...... 2 
Yes..... I Yes..... 1 
7 No...... 2 
-- -- ----- 
No...... 2 
Yes..... 1 - Yes..... I 
8 No...... 2 No...... 2 
- Yes..... 1 - --- Yes..... 1 
9 No...... 2 
-- -- 
No...... 2 
-- Yes..... 1 - --- Yes..... 1 
10 No...... 2 
- 
No...... 2 




Yes..... 1 A28 
-- -- - ----- 
No...... 2 
Yes..... I 
-- -- - ----- 
No...... 2 
Yes..... 1 
-- -- - ----- 
No...... 2 
Yes..... 1 
-- -- - ----- 
No...... 2 
Yes..... 1 
-- -- - ----- 
No...... 2 
Yes..... 1 
-- -- - ----- 
No...... 2 
Yes..... 1 
-- -- - ----- 
No...... 2 
Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 -- -- - ----- 
Yes ..... 1 11 No...... 2 
Yes..... 1 
12 No...... 2 
Yes..... 1 
13 No...... 2 
Yes..... 1 
14 No...... 2 
Yes..... 1 
15 No...... 2 
Yes..... 1 
16 No...... 2 
Yes..... 1 
17 No...... 2 
Yes..... 1 
18 No...... 2 
Specialty Codes: DERMATOLOGY ..................... 8 PATHOLOGY ................... 16 GENERAL PRACTICE .................... 1 CARDIOLOGY........................ 9 ONCOLOGY.................... 17 
FAMILY PRACTICE ....................... 2 PSYCHIATRY ......................... 10 ANESTHESIOLOGY .......... 18 INTERNAL MEDICINE .................... 3 GASTROENTEROLOGY........... 11 RADIOLOGY .................... 19 SURGERY ................................... 4 PULMONOLOGY..................... 12 PUBLIC HEALTH.............. 20 
OBSTETRICS/GYNECOLOGY......... 5 OPHTHALMOLOGY 
................ 13 ENDOCRINOLOGY ........... 21 PEDIATRICS ................................ 6 SOCIAL MEDICINE.................. 14 DENTISTRY..................... 22 
EAR, NOSE, AND THROAT............ 7 EPIDEMIOLOGY 
..................... 
15 TRAUMATOLOGY............. 23 
Next I'd like to know more about the background of the chief of hospital... 
(This section must be asked of the chief. If the chief is unavailable now, schedule him or her for later. ) 
F. 3 What is your ( the hospital chiefs) highest educational degree earned? 
F. 4 Did this education include any courses specifically on hospital management? Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
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F. 5 Have you had any other continuing education courses specifically on hospital management? Yes..... I 
No...... 2 
F. 6 How many years have you (the hospital chief) worked as chief of this hospital? 
F. 7 How long have you served as chief of any hospital? 
F. 8 How would you rate your leadership In this hospital? 
F. 9 How do you think the doctors would rate your leadership? 
F. 10 How do you think the patients would rate your leadership? 
(Read list and circle one) 
Excellent. '..... 1 
Very Good..... 2 
Good............ 3 
Fair .............. 4 Poor ............. 5 
(Read list and circle one) 
Excellent...... 1 
Very Good..... 2 
Good............ 3 
Fair .............. 4 Poor ............. 5 
(Read list and circle one) 
Excellent...... 1 
Very Good..... 2 
Good............ 3 
Fair .............. 4 Poor ............. 5. 
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G. Implementation of Interventions A29 
G1 Have you heard of the Health Sector Reform Agenda or HSRA? Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
G2 Are there any HSRA activities being carried out in your interlocal health zone Yes ................... 1 (including your district hospital)? No(Skip to G3).... 2 
G. 2.1 What are these activities? 
G. 3 Are there any HSRA activities being carried out elsewhere In your province? Yes ................... 1 No(Skip to G4) .... 2 
G. 3.1 What are these activities? 
G. 4 Are you currently participating In any capitation arrangements at the district hospital level? Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
G. 5 Are you participating in a program that Includes a special coverage for children under 5? 
Yes ................... 1 No(Skip to G6).... 2 
G. 5.1 If so, how many chldren are enrolled In this special coverage in your district? 
G. 5.2 When did the hospital first receive payments under this program? 
(DDIMMIYY) 
G. 5.3 What Is the average length of time between payments? (in months) 
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G. 6 Are you participating in a program that gives bonuses based on measures of quality of care? 
Yes ................... I No(Skip to G7).... 2 
G. 6.1 If so, how many physicians qualified for the quality payment incentive? 
G. 6.2 How many of the physicians who work In this facility have received the quality payment incentive? 
G. 6.3 How many patients completed and submitted a satisfaction questionnaire in the last month? ____ (Verify answer by asking to see completed forms) (If none skip to G. 6.4) 
G. 6.4 What Is your average satisfaction score, this past month? 
G. 6.5 How many random chart reviews were done last month to monitor medical staff compliance with quality standards? 
G. 6.6 When did the hospital first receive bonus payments under this scheme? 
(DDMM/YY) 
G. 6.7 What Is the average length of time between bonus payments? (in months) 
G. 7 Are you participating in the PhilHealth Indigent program? Yes ................... 1 No(Skip to HI).... 2 
G. 7.1 How many PhilHealth Indigent Members did you serve last year? 
G. 7.2 When did the hospital first receive reimbursements for charges Incurred by PhilHealth Indigent members? 
_I_I_ (DD/MM/YY) 




G. 7.3 What Is the average length of time between submission of a claim and payment by PhilHealth 
for Indigent care? (in months) 
H. Patient Load and Mix This section should be completed while looking through patient logs for the hospital. 
If hospital records are not kept to this level of detail, give them a tally sheet and ask them to track it for one month. 
Outpatients/OPD 
H. 1 In the past month, how many outpatient (OPD) visits did the hospital have? 
H. 2 Of these OPD visits, how many were for pre-natal care? 
H. 3 Of these OPD visits, how many were for immunizations only? 
H. 4 Of these OPD visits, how many were for pediatric care? 
H. 5 Last week, how many total hours were your outpatient 
clinics open... 
H. 5.1 for all patients? 
H. 5.2 for pediatric patients? 
H. 6 Last week, how many total hours was your emergency 
room open for treating/admitting ... 
H. 6.1 for all patients? 
H. 6.2 for pediatric patients? 
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H. 7 Of the total OUTPATIENTS In the past month, how many were: 
H. 7.1 children less that 6 months old 
H. 7.2 children 6-11 months old 
H. 7.3 children 12-23 months old 
(1 to less than 2 years old) 
H. 7.4 children 24-35 months old 
(2 to less than 3 years old) 
H. 7.5 children 36-47 months old 
(3 to less than 4 years old) 
H. 7.6 children 48-59 months old 
(4 to less than 5 years old) 
H. 7.7 children 60-71 months old 
(5 to less than 6 years old) 
H. 7.8 children 72-83 months old 
(6 to less than 7 years old) 
H. 7.9 children 84-95 months yrs old 
(7 to less than 8 years old) 
H. 7.10 children 96-107 months old 
(8 to less than 9 years old) 
H. 7.11 pregnant women 
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past month, how many were: 
Charity cases (zero payments) 
PhilHealth Indigent Program members/dependents 
PhilHealth Regular Program members/dependents 
Private Insurance members/dependents 
Community Health Insurance Program members/dependents 
Pay patients (without third party payment arrangements) 
Inpatients 
H. 9 In the past month, how many TOTAL admissions did the hospital have? 
H. 10 Of the admissions in the past month, how many of the total 
admissions were admitted to the following departments? 
H. 10.1 Internal Medicine 
H. 10.2 OB-Gyn 
H. 10.3 Pediatrics 
H. 10.4 Surgery 
H. 10.5 Psychiatry 
H. 10.99 Not Departmentalized 
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H. 11 Of the total INPATIENTS In the past month, how many were: 
H. 11.1 children less that 6 months old 
H. 11.2 children 6-11 months old 
H. 11.3 children 12-23 months old 
(1 to less than 2 years old) 
H. 11.4 children 24-35 months old 
(2 to less than 3 years old) 
H. 11.5 " children 36-47 months old 
(3 to less than 4 years old) 
H. 11.6 children 48-59 months old 
(4 to less than 5 years old) 
H. 11.7 children 60-71 months old 
(5 to less than 6 years old) 
H. 11.8 children 72-83 months old 
(6 to less than 7 years old) 
H. 11.9 children 84-95 months yrs old 
(7 to less than 8 years old) 
H. 11.10 children 96-107 months old 
(8 to less than 9 years old) 
H. 11.11 pregnant women 
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H. 12 Of the total INPATIENT pediatric patients 
In the past month, how many were: 
A32 
H. 12.1 Pneumonia cases 
(acute lower respiratory tract infection) 
H. 12.2 Diarrhea (acute gastroenteritis) cases 
H. 12.3 Urinary tract infections 
H. 13 Of the total number of inpatients in the past month, how many occupied: 
H. 13.1 Charityward 
check here if the facility does not have a charity ward Q 
H. 13.2 Pay ward 
check here if the facility does not have a pay ward Q 
H. 13.3 Medicare ward 
check here if the facility does not have a Medicare ward Q 
H. 13.4 Others (specify) 
H. 14 Thinking of the overall patient load in an average year, 
what is the percentage breakdown for the following categories 
H. 14.1 OPD 
H. 14.2 Inpatient 
___ 
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Within OPD H. 14.1.1 Prenatal care % 
H. 14.1.2 Immunization only-- -% 
H. 14.1.3 Pediatric cases % 
H. 14.1.4 Other % 
I. Medical Equipment 
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How many of the following 
How many of the 
medical equipment are 
following are in 
found in this hospital? good/working 
condition today? 
1.1.1 Microscope 1.1.2 
1.2.1 Centrifuge 1.2.2 
1.3.1 X-ray 1.3.2 
1.4.1 Ultrasound 1.4.2 
1.5.1 Adult ventilator 1.5.2 
1.6.1 Child ventilator 1.6.2 
1.7.1 Pulse Oximeter 1.7.2 
1.8.1 Cardiac Monitor 1.8.2 
1.9.1 Incubator 1.9.2 
1.10.1 Warming bed for newborns 1.10.2 
1.11.1 Electrocardiogram 1.11.2 
1.12.1 Echocardiogram 1.12.2 
1.13.1 Defibrillator 1.13.2 
1.14.1 Anesthesia machine 1.14.2 
1.15.1 Operating room table 1.15.2 
1.16.1 Operating room lamp 1.16.2 
1.17.1 Cautery machine 1.17.2 
1.18.1 Casting equipment 1.18.2 
1.19.1 Oxygen delivery 1.19.2 
1.20.1 Nebulizer 1.20.2 
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FAC 
1.21.1 Backup generator Q 1.21.2 A33 
J. Medical Instruments 
How many of the 
How many of the following following medical 
medical instruments are instruments are in 
found in this hospital? good/working condition 
toda ? 
J. 1.1 Sterilizer J. 1.2 
J. 2.1 Baby scale J. 2.2 
J. 3.1 IV tubing J. 3.2 
J. 4.1 Regular stethoscope J. 4.2 
J. 5.1 Otoscope J. 5.2 
J. 6.1 Resuscitation equipment J. 6.2 
(bad, mask, and oxygen) 
J. 7.1 Suturing sets B J. 7.2 Q 
J. 8.1 Sterile disposable latex gloves 
K. Laboratory Services 
Do you perform the following laboratory tests In this hospital? 
K. 1 Urinalysis Yes..... I 
No...... 2 
K. 2 Fecalysis Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
K. 3 CBC Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
K. 4 Blood typing Yes.... .I No...... 2 
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K. 5 Gram stain Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
K. 6 TB sputum stain Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
K. 7 Serum glucose levels Yes..... I 
No...... 2 
K. 8 Serum creatinine test Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
K. 9 Electrolytes Yes..... I 
(sodium, potassium) No...... 2 
K. 10 VDRL or RPR test Yes..... I 
No...... 2 
K. 11 Liver function tests Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
K. 12 Hepatitis B test Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
K. 13 Bacterial culture Yes..... I 
No...... 2 
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L. Supplies Au 
L. Looking at the supplies you have on hand today, does this hospital have a supply of the following items? 
L. 1 Antiseptics Yes..... I 
No...... 2 
L, 2 Bandages Yes..... I 
No...... 2 
L. 3 Oxygen tank Yes..... I 
No...... 2 
L. 4 Suturing materials Yes..... I 
No...... 2 
L. 5 IV tubes Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
L. 6 Gloves Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
L. 7 Gram stain Yes..... I 
No...... 2 
L. 8 Acid fast Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
L. 9 Pregnancy test strips Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
L. 10 Urine strip Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
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L. 11 VDRL serology Yes ..... 1 No...... 2 
L. 12 Test for occult blood in stool Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
M. Medications prescribed 













how many have you filled for? 
Penicillin 









Oral rehydration salts or solution 
Paracetamol (acetaminophen) 
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M. 13 Oral Contraceptives A35 
M. 14 Injectable Contraceptives 
M. 15 IUD 
M. 16 Condoms 
M. 17 INH 
M. 18 Rifamipcin 
N. Administrative and Ancillary Services 
N. 1 Does the hospital have a functioning computerized system for tracking or organizing medical records? Yes..... I 
No...... 2 
N. 2 Does It have a functioning computerized system for laboratory results? Yes..... I 
No...... 2 
N. 3 Does it have a functioning computerized system for billing patients? Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
N. 4 Does It have a functioning computerized system for tracking expenditures? Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
N. 5 Does It have a functioning computerized system for tracking costs? Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
N. 6 Does It have a functioning computerized system for paying staff? Yes..... I 
No...... 2 
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N. 7 Does It have a functioning computerized system for drug Inventory? Yes..... I 
No...... 2 
N. 8 Does It have a functioning computerized patient medical record system ? Yes..... I 
No...... 2 
N. 9 Are you able to pull out a patient chart based on name or date of confinement? Yes..... 1 
(If yes, ask for demonstration and check here if successfully completed) No...... 2 
N. 10 Are you able to pull-out a patient chart for any patient under 5 years old who had Yes..... 1 
either Acute Gatroenteritis or Pneumonia last month? No...... 2 
If yes, ask for demonstration and check here if successfully completed) Q 
N. 11 Are you able to pull-out a patient chart for any patient whose charges were billed Yes..... 1 
against the PhilHealth Indigent Program in the last six months? No...... 2 
(if yes, ask for demonstration and check here if successfully completed) Q 
N. 12 Does this hospital have a pharmacy? Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
N. 13 How many hours was the pharmacy open last Wednesday? 
N. 14 During the day last Wednesday, how many hours was the pharmacy dosed for breaks? 
N. 15 Are there any private pharmacies within 200 meters from the hospital? Yes ............................. 1 No... (Skip to Section 0).. 2 
If there Is more than one, select the one with the longest hours... 
N. 16 If yes, how many hours was this pharmacy open last Wednesday? 
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0. Source of Hospital Funds (This should be done while reviewing hospital financial records) A36 
0.1 How much did the provincial government allocate for this hospital 
last year? pesos 
0.2 How much did the municipal/city government allocate for this 
hospital last year? pesos 
0.3 How much were hospital revenues from user charges last year? 
pesos 
0.4 How much were revenues from non-patient sources 
(rental, canteen etc)? pesos 
0.5 How much PhilHealth reimbursements did this hospital receive 
last year? pesos 
0.6 How much cash grants and donations did this hospital receive 
last year? pesos 
0.7 Did this hospital receive grants or donations in kind last year? Yes .................. 1 No... (Skip to 08). 2 
If yes, were these in the form of. (Circle all that apply) 
0.7.1 Drugs ................................ 1 0.7.2 Medical Equipment .............. 2 0.7.3 Civil Works ......................... 3 0.7.4 Medical Missions ................. 4 0.7.5 Others (specify) 5 
0.8 In the past year, did the hospital undertake activities to generate additional resources? Yes ......................... 
1 
No(Skip to 0.12) ........ 2 
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0.10 How many pesos were raised as a result of these resources? 
0.11 For gifts given in kind (not income) what was the value of these? 
Grants .............................................. 1 Loans ............................................... 2 Community-based fundraising activities... 3 
Others (specify) 4 
pesos 
pesos 
0.12 What was the total annual operating budget of this facility last year? pesos 
0.13 What Is the cummulative debt of this facility? pesos 
0.14 Have you experienced any delays In receiving the budget allocated to you by the province? Yes..... I 
No...... 2 
0.15 Have you experienced any delays In receiving the budget allocated to you by the municipalities? Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
P. Uses of Hospital Funds 
Last year, how much did this hospital spend on 
P. 1 PS (Personnel Services) 
P1.1 Salaries, allowances and wages for medical staff 
P1.2 Salaries, allowances and wages for non-medical staff 
P. 1.3 Retirement payments 
P. 2 MOOE (Maintenance and operating expenditures) 
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P. 3 Capital Expenditures 
P. 2.2 Medical supplies 
P. 2.3 Utilities (water and electricity) 
P. 2.4 Transportation and travel 
P. 2.5 Communications 
P. 2.6 Foodstuffs and linen 
P. 2.7 Other MOOE 
(cleaning supplies, etc) 
P. 3.1 Construction of a new building 
P. 3.2 Repair of existing building 
P. 3.3 Equipment repair 
P. 3.4 Equipment procurement 
P. 3.5 Other capital expenditures 





--' ---' --- pesos 






Q. Hospital Fee Policy 
Q What are the fees charged for the following types of service in this hospital by type of insurance? 





























































Q. 9 Basic suturing 
Q. 10 X-ray 
Q. 11 Bacterial 
Gram stain 
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Q What percent of the fees charged are actually paid for the following types of service in this hospital by type of insurance? 
4 Community 
I PhilHealth 2 PhilHealth 3 Private Health Insurance 
Indigent Program Regular Program Insurance Program 5 Self-financing 





Q. 20 All Inpatient 
evaluations ---% ---% ---% ---% --_% 
Q. 21 Normal 
Delivery 
---% ---% ---% ---% ---% 
Q. 22 C-section 





studies ---% -ý_-% ---% ---% ---% 
Q. 24 Laboratory 
tests 
---% ---% ---% ---% ---% 
0.25 Amoxicillin 
---% ---% ---% ---% -_-% 
Q. 26 Pediatric 
Outpatient 
visit 
---% ---% _ ý--% _ý--% ---% 
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Q. 27 Pediatric 
inpatient 
evaluation ___% 
Q. 28 Daily IV 
charge 
R. Enumerator's Observation 
ýýý% ___% ___% 
___% ___% ___% 
During the course of the day, away from the presence of the hospital chief ASK any ONE randomly chosen doctor, 
any ONE randomly chosen nurse and any ONE randomly chosen non-medical staff person the following question and 
record their answers in the appropriate space. 
R. 1 How would you rate the hospital chiefs overall effectiveness in running this hospital? (Read list and circle one) 
R. 1.1 Any doctots response 
(How would you rate the hospital chiefs overall effectiveness in running this hospital? ) Excellent... 1 




R. 1.2 Any nurse's response 
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R. 1.3 Any non-medical staff's response 
(How would you rate the hospital chiefs overall effectiveness in running this hospital? ) 
Excellent... I 




The following questions should be answered based on your observations made during your stay at the facility on the day 
you complete the facility Instrument. You may have to ask the staff to let you see certain areas, but except where 
otherwise noted these answers must based on direct observations rather than on answers supplied by hospital staff. 
R. 2 Condition of the General Examination Room 
R. 2.1 What Is the condition of the floor? 
(dirty-bits of paper, trash, dust, liquid on the floor) (Circle one) 
Dirty .................. I Somewhat dirty .... 2 Somewhat clean.. 3 
Clean ................. 4 
R. 2.2 What is the condition of the walls? 
(dirty=splderwebs, dirt, chipped paint, moisture, stains) (Circle one) 
Dirty .................. 1 Somewhat dirty .... 2 Somewhat clean.. 3 
Clean ................. 4 
R. 2.3 Is there a curtain that encloses the examination room 
(i. e., separates it from other areas)? (Circle one) 
Yes ................... I No ..................... 2 




R. 2.4 Is there a place in the outpatient exam room where the doctor A40 
can wash his or her hands? (Circle one) 
Sink with running water .... 1 Basin with liquid ............. 2 Nothing ........................ 3 
R. 2.5 Is there an examination bed for patients in the majority of outpatient exam rooms? (Circle one) 
Yes ............... I No ................ 2 
R. 3 Laboratory 
R. 3.1 Is there a laboratory in this facility, (please proceed to see It) (Circle one) 
Yes ........................ 1 No... (Skip to R. 5) ...... 2 
R. 3.2 What Is the condition of the laboratory floor? 
(dirty-bits of paper, trash, dust, liquid on the floor) (Circle one) 
Dirty .................. 1 Somewhat dirty.... 2 
Somewhat clean.. 3 
Clean ................. 4 
R. 3.3 What is the condition of the laboratory walls? 
(dirty=spiderwebs, dirt, chipped paint, moisture, stains) 
(Circle one) 
Dirty .................. I Somewhat clean.. 3 
Clean ................. 4 
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R. 3.4 Is there a place to wash one's hands in the laboratory area? (Circle one) 
Sink with running water.... 1 
Basin with liquid ............. 2 Nothing ........................ 3 
R. 3.5 Is there a special trashcan in the lab for disposing of biological specimans? 
(Blood, urine, etc) (Circle one) 
Yes ............... I No ................ 2 
R. 3.6 Is water continuously available in the laboratory during clinic hours? (Circle one) 
Yes ............... I No ................ 2 
R. 3.7 Is there an up-to-date log or book where laboratory results are recorded? (Circle one) Yes ............... I No ................ 2 
R. 3.8 Is there an up-to-date maintenance log or book that lists all of the laboratory equipment? (Circle one) 
Yes .............. .i No ................ 2 
R. 4 Pediatric Ward 
R. 4.1 What is the condition of the floor? (dirty--bits of paper, trash, dust, liquid on the floor) (Circle one) 
Dirty .................. 1 Somewhat dirty .... 2 Somewhat clean.. 3 
Clean ................. 4 
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R. 4.2 What Is the condition of the walls? A41 
(dirty=splderwebs, dirt, chipped paint, moisture, stains) (Circle one) 
Dirty ................. I Somewhat dirty.... 2 
Somewhat clean.. 3 
Clean ................. 4 
R. 4.3 Is there space for visiting family members? (chairs, etc) (Circle one) 
Yes ............... 1 No ................ 2 
R. 4.4 Is there a nearby place to wash one's hands? (Circle one) 
Sink with running water .... 1 Basin with liquid ............. 2 Nothing ........................ 3 
R. 4.5 Is there at least one bed per patient? (Circle one) 
Yes ............... 1 No ................ 2 
R. 4.6 Is there a mattress for each bed? (Circle one) 
Yes ............... I No ................ 2 
R. 4.7 What is the condition of the area around the ward? (Circle one) 
Dirty .................. 1 Somewhat dirty.... 2 
Somewhat clean.. 3 
Clean ................. 4 
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R. 5 Kitchen 
R. 5.1 What is the condition of the floor? (dirty-bits of paper, trash, dust, liquid on the floor) (Circle one) 
Dirty ................. 1 Somewhat dirty.... 2 
Somewhat clean.. 3 
Clean ................. 4 
R. 5.2 What is the condition of the walls? (Circle one) 
(dirty=spiderwebs, dirt, chipped paint, moisture, stains) Dirty .................. 1 Somewhat dirty .... 2 Somewhat clean.. 3 
Clean ................. 4 
R. 5.3 Is there a nearby place to wash one's hands? (Circle one) 
Sink with running water.... 1 
Basin with liquid ............. 2 Nothing ........................ 3 
R. 5.4 What Is the condition of the area around the kitchen? (Circle one) 
Dirty .................. 1 Somewhat dirty .... 2 Somewhat clean.. 3 
Clean ................. 4 
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Appendix A4: QIDS PHYSICIAN SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
A. Sampling Information 
A. I. Region 
A. 2. Province 
A. 3. District 
A. 4. Type of study district 
A. 5. Round 
A. 6. Municipality 
A. 7. Facility ID 
A. 8. Facility name 
A9. Facility address 
No Street 
A. 10. Hospital GPS coordinates 
A42 
Reg Pr Dis Typ Rd 
Barangay Municipality 
A. 11. Physician name 
A12. Physician ID 
__ ___ Reg Pr Dis Typ Rd Doc ID 
A13. Physician number from Facility Roster (F2) 
Page 1of18 
B. Enumerator data 
B. I. Date of Interview _ 
/ 
_/ _ 
B. 2. Time started 
DD MM W 
B. 3. Time completed B. 4. Total time of interview 
B. 4. Interviewer ID B. 5. Interviewer signature 
C. Instrument review 
C. 1. Field supervisor review date _/_/_ 
C. 1.1 Field Supervisor signature 
DD MM W 
C. 2. Editor review date C. 2.1 Editor signature 
DD MM YY 
C. 3. Data encoder entry date -- 
/ 
-/-- 
C. 3.1 Encoder signature 
DD MM YY 
C. 4. Second encoder entry date C. 4.1 Second encoder signature 
DD MM YY 
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D. Consent (Read) 
Dear Dr 
The Quality Improvement Demonstration Study (QIDS) EHSRA is a four-year project supported by the U. S. National 
Institutes of Health. The partner Institutions in the Philippines are the Department of Health, PhilHealth, the University of 
California San Francisco and the UPEcon Foundation. The primary objective of this study is to determine the 
effectiveness of certain health policy Interventions on the health status of children. The project will focus on children and 
diseases of childhood. 
It Is with great pleasure we Inform you that you have been selected to participate in this study. Specifically, we would like 
to know your opinions and experiences as health provider of this facility. The interview will take about one and a half 
hours. The Information that you will provide will be treated with utmost confidentiality. The data will be used for research 
purposes only. Your name or address and other personal information will eventually be deleted from the questionnaire 
and only a code or number will connect your name with your answers. After you complete the quesstionnaire we will 
give you the vignettes. These are paper cases. You will be asked to care for these patients as you would care for 
children In your own practice. They take 10-20 minutes each to complete. 
Your participation Is voluntary. You may refuse to answer any question which you consider sensitive or confidential. 
If you have any questions, you can ask me or can contact our survey supervisor Laurie Ramiro at UP Manila through 
Romy Marcaida at 02-525-4098. You may also contact Stella Quimbo at the Upecon Foundation at (02) 920-5461. 
Your signature Indicates that you understood the purpose and mechanics of this study and that you are willing to 
participate In this endeavor. 
D1. Signature of respondent 
Date: 
DD MM YY 
Signature of interviewer 
Did respondent... Consent and sign? 
Consent but not sign? 
Refuse to participate? 
Page 3 of 18 
Let me begin with a few questions asking about you... 
D. 2 Have you participated in previous interviews with our study team which included 
completing paper cases or vignettes? 
D. 3 When were you last Interviewed for this study? 
D. 4 At that time, were you practicing in this facility? 
E. General Information 
E. 1 How old are you? 
E. 2 Gender (Observe) 





3.1.1 Medical school in Metro Manila ................... 
1 
3.1.2 Local medical schools In Visayas .................... 2 3.1.3 Other Medical schools in the Philippines........... 3 
3.1.4. US/UK ..................................................... 4 3.1.5. Asian medical schools ................................. 5 3.1.6. Others ...................................................... 6 
Appendix A4 Page 4 of 18 
Yes (Go to D3) ............... 1 No (Go to Section E)........ 2 
DD MM W 
Yes (Skip to E. 6)....... I 
No ........................... 2 
A43 
D. 4.1 If no, which facility? 
305 1 Page 
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E. 4.1 After your medical degree, did you undergo specialty or subspecialty training? Yes (go to E. 4.2)... 1 
No (Go to E. 6)...... 2 
E. 4.2 In what specialty have you received training? Circle all that apply 
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4.2.1 GENERAL PRACTICE....... 1 
4.2.2 FAMILY PRACTICE 2 
4.2.3 INTERNAL MEDICINE ............... 3 4.2.4 SURGERY ............................... 4 4.2.5 OBSTETRICS/GYNECOLOGY 
.... 5 4.2.6 PEDIATRICS ............................ 6 4.2.7 EAR, NOSE, AND THROAT........ 7 
4.2.8 DERMATOLOGY ...................... 8 4.2.9 CARDIOLOGY .......................... 9 4.2.10 PSYCHIATRY ........................... 10 4.2.11 GASTROENTEROLOGY............ 11 
4.2.12 PULMONOLOGY ...................... 12 4.2.13 OPHTHALMOLOGY ................. 13 4.2.14 SOCIAL MEDICINE ................... 14 4.2.15 EPIDEMIOLOGY ....................... 15 4.2.16 PATHOLOGY ........................... 16 4.2.17 ONCOLOGY ............................ 17 4.2.18 ANESTHESIOLOGY .................. 18 4.2.19 RADIOLOGY ............................ 19 4.2.20 PUBLIC HEALTH ...................... 20 4.2.21 ENDOCRINOLOGY ................... 21 4.2.22 DENTISTRY ............................. 22 4.2.23 TRAUMATOLOGY .................... 23 4.2.24 Other specify: 24 
E. 4.3. Was your specialty training In a program affiliated with a medical school? 
Yes 
........................ 1 No (Skip to E. 4.5)..... 2 
E. 4.4 Where did you do specialty 
medical training? 
4.4.1 Medical school in Metro Manila ................... 1 4.4.2 Local medical schools in Visayas .................... 2 4.4.3 Other Medical schools in the Philippines........... 3 
4.4.4. US/UK ..................................................... 4 4.4.5. Asian medical schools ................................. 5 4.4.6. Others ...................................................... 6 
E. 4.5 How many months was your specialty training? __ 
Months 
E. 5 Status in Specialty society 
Not a member .......... 1 Associate member ..... 2 Diplomats ................ 3 Fellow ..................... 4 
E. 6 When was the last continuing medical education activity that you attended ? 
Please include all seminars or refresher courses that were 3 days or longer 
<1 year ago .......... 1 1-2 years ago ......... 2 3-5 years ago ......... 3 
>5 years ago ......... 4 
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E. 7 Have you attended any seminar or 
training in the last five years on... 
E. 7.1 Evidenced -based medicine? .................................. Yes...., 1 
No...... 2 
E. 7.2 Health technology assessment/ information technology? .. Yes..... 1 No...... 2 
E. 7.3 Quality assurance? ................................................. .. Yes..... 1 No...... 2 
E. 7.4 Management 
....................................................... Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
F. Practice 
F1 How long have you been practicing as a physician? 
F2 How long have you been practicing as a physician In this facility? 
F3 What is your current position In this facility? 
F4 How long have you been working in this position? 
Page 7 of 18 
F5 Do you hold any other professional positions or appointments? 




................................................. 1 General Practitioner .................................. 2 Medical Officer ....................................... 3 Medical Specialist ..................................... 4 Consultant ............................................ 5 Chief of department ............................... 6 Hospital Chief .......................................... 7 Other, specify 8 
_ years 
Yes .................... 1 No... (Skip to F6)... 2 
Teaching faculty .................................. 1 Hospital Administration 
...................... 2 Officer of professional society .................... 3 Government official .................................... 4 Others: specify: 5 
F6 Do you work in other hospitals? Yes..... 1 
No...... 2 
If YES, tell respondent: 
'in your answers to questions about your practice, please refer to your work In this district hospital or facility 
unless explicitly stated" 
G. Practice time allocation 
On average how many hours per week did you you spend on each of the following activities in the last month 
G. 1.1 How many hours per week do you spend in clinical practice? hours per week 
Of the hours spent In clinical practice.... 
G. 1.2 how many were spent seeing INPATIENT cases? hours per week 
G. 2.1 How many were spent seeing OUTPATIENT cases? hours per week 
Of the hours spent seeing OUTPATIENT cases.... 
G. 2.2 How many were spent seeing new patients? hours per week 
G. 2.3 How many were spent with follow-up visits? 
__ 
hours per week 




G. 3 How many hours a week do spend on administration? hours per week A46 
(e. g. budget, finance, planning, operations, personnel management) 
G. 4 How many hours a week do you spend on research and training? hours per week 
G. 5 On average, how much time would you estimate you spend on a new outpatient 
visit? minutes 
G. 6 On average, how much time would you estimate you spend on a follow up 
outpatient visit? minutes 
G. 7 On average, how much time would you estimate you spend evaluating and 
examining a patient admitted to the hospital? minutes 
G. 8 On average, how much time would you estimate you spend seeing an admitted 
patient while they are In the hospital? minutes 
H. Case Load mix 
H. 1 Approximately how many OUTPATIENT patients did you attend to last month 
(in this facility)? 
H. 1.1 Of these, what percent were... 
Pediatrics % 
OBGYN % 
Internal Medicine % 
Minor surgery % 
Other % 
100% 
Page 9 of 18 
H. 2 Approximately how many INPATIENT patients were you personally or primarily 
responsible for admitting last month(in this facility)? 
H. 2.1 Of these, what percent were... 
Pediatrics % 
OBGYN % 
Internal Medicine % 
Minor surgery %a 
Other % 
100% 
H. 3 Approximately how many INPATIENT patients were you personally or primarily 
responsible for attending last month(in this facility)? 
H. 3.1 Of these, what percent were... 
Pediatrics % 
OBGYN % 
Internal Medicine % 
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H. 4 Approximately how many OUTPATIENT patients did you attend last month 
in private practice? 
H. 4.1 Of these, what percent were... 
Pediatrics % 
OBGYN % 
Internal Medicine % 
Minor surgery % 
Other % 
100% 
H. 5 Approximately how many INPATIENT patients did you attend last month 
In private practice? 
H. 5.1 Of these, what percent were... 
Page 11 of 18 
Pediatrics % 
OBGYN % 
Internal Medicine % 





1.1 How many referrals do you personally make In an average month TO.... 
1.1.1 A lower level facility In this districti 
_ 
1.1.2 A lower level facility In another district? 
_ 
1.1.3 Another facility licensed at the same level in this district? 
1.1.4 A facility licensed at the same level in another district? 
1.1.5 A higher level facility In this district? 
1.1.6 A higher level facility in another district? 
1.1.7 Of these referrals what percent Include written correspondence TO the referral facility? % 
1.2. How many referrals do you personally receive In an average week FROM.... 
1.2.1 Lower level facilities in this district? 
1.2.2 Lower level facilities in other districts? 
1.2.3 Facilities accredited at the same level In this district? 
1.2.4 Facilities accredited at the same level In other districts? 
1.2.5 Higher level facilities in this district? 
1.2.6 Higher level facilities in other districts? 
1.2.7 Of these referrals what percent Include written correspondence FROM the referring physician? % 
Appendix A4 Page 12 of 18 
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1.3 Thinking of the referrals you make, what % of your referrals are for the following, on the average: 
1. Adult pulmonary cases 
2. Adult gastroenterology cases 
3. Other Internal medicine specialties 
4. Pediatric pulmonary cases 
5. Pediatric gastroenterology cases 




10. Radiology: (evaluation) 
11. Pathology: 
Page 13 of 18 
1.4 
1.5 
Approximately what % of patients that you see each week do you order: 
1. Radiology tests: 
2. Ultrasonography tests 
3. Laboratory tests: 
4. Other tests specify: 
(cat scan, mri, etc) 
5. No tests at all 
Where do the radiology tests come from currently? 
X-Ray Laboratory In this hospital ................. I Other Public X-Ray Laboratory ................... 2 Other Private X-Ray Laboratory ................... 3 
1.6 What percent of laboratory tests that you order are done at this facility? % 
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J. Equipment, lab and facility Usage A49 
In the past month how many times have you used or ordered use of the following equipment? 
J. 1 IV tubing/ infusion 
J. 2 X-ray 
J. 3 Ultrasound or Echocardiogram 
J. 4 Adult or child ventilator 
J. 5 Pulse Oximeter 
J. 6 Cardiac Monitor 
J. 7 Electrocardiogram 
J. 8 Otoscope 
J. 9 Resuscitation equipment (bad, mask, and oxygen) 
K PhilHealth 
K1. Do you currently receive professional fees from PhilHealth for your service in this facility? 
Page 15 of 18 
K2. If so are you happy with those fees? 
K3. Do you currently share the fees with other hospital staff? 
K4. Are you happy with those sharing arrangements? 
Yes ............... 1 No ................ 2 Don't know..... 3 
Refused......... 4 
Very happy 
.................... 1 Somewhat happy ................. 2 Neither happy nor unhappy...., 3 
Somewhat unhappy .............. 4 Very unhappy ................. 5 Refused to answer ............. 99 
Yes ............... 1 No ................ 2 Don't know..... 3 
Refused......... 4 
Very happy .................... 1 Somewhat happy ................. 2 Neither happy nor unhappy..... 3 
Somewhat unhappy .............. 4 Very unhappy ................. 5 Refused to answer ............. 99 
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L Income distribution by source A50 
L. 1 Compared to one year ago, has your income Increased? Yes .................... 1 No (Skip to K3)..... 2 
L. 2 If yes, by what percentage has your income increased? % 
L. 3 Recalling that this survey Is confidential, what Is your 
average total monthly Income from alil sources? pesos 
(This Is a very important question. Please make every Refused to answer..... 99 
effort to collect this answer) 
Thinking about your total yearly Income from all sources, how much would you estimate comes from..., 
L. 4 Your salary from working in this facility pesos 
Refused to answer..... 99 
L. 5 Salary received from working in other facilities pesos 
Refused to answer..... 99 
L. 6 Income from private practice pesos 
Refused to answer..... 99 
L. 7 Income from PhilHealth reimbursements In private or 
public practice 
L. 8 Income from all other reimbursements Including 
non-clinical work 
Page 17 of 18 
pesos 
Refused to answer..... 99 
pesos 
Refused to answer..... 99 
L. 9 Phil Health Bonuses pesos 
Refused to answer..... 99 
L. 10 Other bonuses pesos 
Refused to answer..... 99 
L. 11 A share of a global budget made to the hospital pesos 
Refused to answer..... 99 
END OF SURVEY SECTION. PLEASE PROCEED TO VIGNETTE IF NOT ALREADY COMPLETED. 
Attachments: 
1. PN vignette 
2. AGE vignette 
3. Other vignette 
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Appendix A5: Topic guide for pharmacy screening Interview, including information 
sheet and consent form 
0. Introduction [5-10 mins] 
-Introductions, establishment of rapport. 
-Talk them through what the research is about, giving them the Information 
Sheet (i. e. objectives, contact details, what they should expect, etc). 
- Stress that there is guarantee of full anonymity. 
- Stress that interview is voluntary. 
-Explain to interviewee nature of the interview (in particular that there aren't 
right or wrong answers). 
-Acquire consent (signed Consent Form) before continuing. 
1. Clientele [-5 mins] 
Qi. On average, how many people come to your pharmacy per day (not 
including those purchasing toiletries, other non-medical purchases)? 
Q2. What proportion came with prescriptions, as compared with over-the- 
counter purchases (i. e. no prescriptions)? 
Q3. Of these, what proportion of your customers is referred from hospital X? 
(I. e. study site's public district hospital --- see also section 3) 
2. Price and availability of medicines [-25 mins] 
Ql. Do you offer discounts for any specific patient groups? 
Probes (f needed): I. e. for indigents, elderly, prescriptions from different health 
facilities, those without health insurance. 
Q2. At the end of the interview, I'd also like to ask you about the price and 
availability of these medicines [show separate Medicines Data Sheet -20 mins]? 
-- do at end of interview 
3. Links with study site public district hospital [-15 mins] 
Ql. For how many years has the pharmacy been open? 
Q2. How long have you been working here? 
Q3. Do you own the pharmacy? 
If NOT interviewing pharmacy owner... 
a. Who is the owner? 
b. Does s/he also own other 
pharmacies? 
c. What is this person's profession? Le. 
where exactly does s/he work? 
[I. e. Find out if owner is company; 
individual businessman; health worker 
from other public or private facilities (and 
where these are located)] 
d. How often does the owner come to the 
pharmacy? 
If interviewing pharmacy owner... 
a. Do you also own other pharmacies? 
b. Do you also have other jobs? 
3131 Page 
Q4. How would you describe the relationship between this pharmacy and the 
nearby ......... public 
hospital? 
Probes (f needed): 
  Do you have any contact with the hospital? 
  Does the hospital recommend patients to come to your pharmacy? 
" Do you receive many patients who have been referred from this hospital? 
" How about other health facilities? I. e. do any other health facilities recommend 
patients here? [If yes... ] Which facilities, how many patients? 
4. Miscellaneous [-. 5 mins] 
Ql. Do you have any concerns or viewpoints that you haven't had a chance to 
express? 
- Reassurances about confidentiality, provision of my contact details. 
5. Permissions 
5.1 If didn't initially give answer on use of quotes, confirm now whether they do 
/ do not agree to any individual quotes or other results arising from my interview 
to be reported (adjust consent form accordingly) 
  Give reassurances about confidentiality and anonymity. 
  Remind them of my contact details 
  Thank them for their valuable contribution to this research. 
5.2. Confine permission for subsequent potential exit survey (show them survey 
if necessary). 
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INFORMATION SHEET (Pharmacies 
Study title: Incentives, medical effort and health service delivery: a study of Philippine 
health facilities. 
Principal investigator: Chris James. Note that this research is done in partnership with 
the QIDS study team. 
Contact details: 
" Email- christopher. jamcsnlshtm. ac. uk 
" Address in the Philippines- c/o Orville Solon, University of Philippines Economics 
Foundation, Economics Building, UP Campus, Quezon City 1101, Philippines. 
" Telephone- 09163437665 (mobile); ++63 9279686/92,9205463 (office). 
Objective of Interviews: to understand a pharmacy's relationship with other health 
facilities within the local health system and drug purchasing habits of pharmacy 
customers., 
Why Is your cooperation requested? Your participation will enable this study to better 
explore how pharmacies are integrated into the wider health system. In particular: 
(1) The interaction between pharmacies, public district hospitals and other health 
facilities 
(2) The kinds of patients who frequent pharmacies. 
(3) Pricing, availability and prescription practices. 
What should you expect? You will be interviewed in a private environment about 
points (1), (2) and (3) above. 
Are there any potential risks or distress? None are expected. Although the themes 
discussed in the interview are not expected to be discomforting, you can tell the 
interviewer at any time if you do not wish to answer questions / discuss particular 
themes. 
What about anonymity and data confidentiality? Your interviews will be recorded, 
but these recordings will not be shared with anyone. Transcripts of your interview will 
be used, but these will be fully anonymised before they are included in the study. Any 
direct (anonymised) quotes of what you said during an interview will only be used if you 
consent to this. 
Other information: 
The Ethical Committees of the University of the Philippines and the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine have approved this study. 
 Please note that your participation in this research is entirely voluntary and 
your withdrawal is possible at any time, without having to give a reason. 




Study title: Incentives, medical effort and health service delivery: a study of 
Philippine health facilities. 
Principal investigator: Chris James. Note that this research is done in 
partnership with the QIDS study team. 
Contact details: 
" Email- christopher. james u)lshtm. ac. uk 
" Address in the Philippines- c/o Orville Solon, University of Philippines 
Economics Foundation, Economics Building, UP Campus, Quezon City 1101, 
Philippines. 
" Telephone- ++44 7851046544 (mobile); ++63 9279686/92,9205463. 
I have read the information sheet concerning this study [or have understood the 
verbal explanation] and I understand what will be required of me and what will 
happen to me if I take part in it. 
Any questions I have on this study have been answered by ........................... 
I do / do not agree to participate in this study (delete as appropriate). 
Further, I do / do not agree to any individual quotes or other results arising from 
my interview to be reported (delete as appropriate). 

























rn o c 


































vY v o o 
O N ý9 Cm c - E 
°u a m t a, r m 













:3 i S] 1 
S] 0 
.0 .0 .0 0 9 
8) 
0) ztý 0) 0) 0) O) O7 
öö öö Ö E ° c E Ö CD E C) E C? E C) U N N N N U) ý p N 0) O Lr) 
+ t 
V YY U 
' 
N 
ý !) ca (13 Y U) 
o 
U) V) o 
E 
C) Li U U 
C 
U ý.. ) U U L) U 
x m '. W ° N W -- XX W 
J 
U W W W 
C 





o w Z w EE w E w a, w m W m w o w 




















' a' N (O 
+ - ýý N 
cD 
+ - ý, Q1 
c6 
a N a N 00. a to a a v a ýl a 0) a a) ý t a) ' Q) Q) L 
_C 






0 c O c O c O C C 0 Q) 

















i E v ß ä v ý ýI o Ü . Ü .SD Ü ON ä 
C [ '[ 
























4 y a, 
a 
c 










E -0 to n 
d' E E E -E °' ' y s 0' u QO p -i QO 
° Q O pp ý'ý , QOI ° _i Q O 











































. a IA > E 
C E N C) C 














>x Q :. 
it 
Q m r ca tu m ýn Ö Ö Ö to .0 (0 .0 (Ci ra 0) 1 rn E 
E 








ö oo ö' o ö N 
ä E 0 
fn D 
of 
















0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 
C öw 















m c) c3 
m 
m (7 > c3 
cc 
ww 0(2. 































ý. Nm N 
to 
N -Hi CS 0), ip 0) m 0 N 
N U 7hN 
N 
NQ N 0-0- '0 N NQ hN NQ N Cl 
'' N 
N N a Q) L. C) G) L 4) L G1 . -a Q) a. Q) L C) 
O c ö 0 O O O O0 2p l ao ý G) . " Q) 5 Q) 5-S ' G) C) 5 Q) 'C 07' \C 
p 
N 











CO C'. 61 
.N 
P CU Y h. I U 
V. ý v 0 0. ) N UbÜ 
-U C V' V, ''0 IU - .IU -g. - Ü 2. '0 V O 
ýI Q) 
Xö Q o n Q E L° cä 
`Q 
ý° n n sn Iä 







OI O U ý - U oO ý w0 -H IL 0. IIpl 






d CL M. a 
ü N ý 
t' 
C v O 
ý T 
T 
ýE Ü N ý N l9 C (0 a OU 



















y ,z ; 
Nä 
v 
o Ü ý 5 c ý c a 
.ý c 
" 










m m 0I a 
D) rn m t m 
0 
o 
































w z w z L 








NI (. 0 >a) 
LU 
Cý C7 
U)! U) U) U) 
! 
On . 0) 
tG 











, - Q > IG> G -5 G 
o 




u) n' Q . Q) 
U Ia u1 mä - I 
y 0- U) !ä 
yä U) ä c 
L - Q) LN q) oiu Q. 
n 
' G 





























' . i 'Ö' 
öIÜ 
E 
ü °' U G 














E `C° n , 



























s m m 
go 
3 
qý ýp m US i 
C7 zÖ J zlÖ J 











































































































Co I- fo 
















































a) C Y) 
N 
M 





YCp "p CM f0 
NCL 'ý OC 
.CE N 
p 0 
E E( a p p> jm 
}p CN 
cm E n' 
Z70 CL LjJ N 
m 
a 
E *0:, ä (0 m (0 




-N0,2 M 'C . 




IL) i E ä m 
C 
N O 7 
CL m 
O7 EE .c 
m O 
-x .nC 3 O Y cm 
äu 
C a aö m a' ,=E 









C m cc 
o f0 °1 m c rn 
cm Z cm o m «a CL 2 
c o c 
CC L p CL 
C t4 a AU pL O E 
td 
oc _ EE 
N Y 




n rn N 
rn 






32 jo m 
Em (U ca U 
E 
c 
E E_ mm 
_ E 





CM 0E m CO 
( -e- 1° :E 
'C fn 
>% dt 






p d' `cl a0 . m -ffi 
r- tu 
(0 MN CL N N co 0 Y p fE 0 Ca i 
EE p) 
ä Ec Yt nö 12 ää 
c 
ß 
p EC Ny N 
OÜ Ü 
CL A) u) 
CL 
, 3: m 
a 
gL j Cm O 
V 







AN Nh 'O 














a''' N 3 wM 
(0 
N 
p 0 "C 
8 0p 0y NjM 
C V 











- VN 7 O. 





























































N ý - OL 
3O + , 1C -' N Cp 0p 






N C3 Ö NL'> 
S 
(0 >, t,, 
L c N 




V 32 m 
is 
p Co) NN>. 
L 30 0 p o F - ö u, } ö 








































. M C0 > 
C 
CL r_ 
E rn Cm _ 
122 > U) 
0 
> 
cp C (0 Ip 
7 
01 
















O 'C tC 























m to 0 . c cE m m °) v 
"E 
-- cä 
L3C EE 3amw E co m 















c (d c 
0) 
0C ° O1ý 
O 
cE cä ö 










0.0. a0 h0 NM U) (0 
m C 
O 
E O NN E'_ g 
m 
ca rnA c 
M öý 0) r' 
yc c ct 
m CL 
c on m-, om 
m mOc rn .-. 
9 
0) ca a) 
L. 12) ID ca rn c- aý NE 92 Z .xEE 
dý E rnnm dý cm (2. 
















C a' >a O 











m _ E IM aý (U a 3 mom- ." CD 
ö 









y t] .ý7 NmV U 
E wd 
E Co a sO N` C) O 'C 0 
d °r 
cu -0 = E V 
0 
C 




rn r- c O N_ 
(U 
>y -V N_ O= 
aý c ai Z, E 
`0 ä 3O° 
t 
E _ 
'y 3a i 
yc 
C (p N N 




















-. N 0 
O .. 
7 













'S ä ý? 
0 
Cý 



























































































N c') - 
+ 
N 
N --ý E Q) cp 
a E c 
O (1 




- (13 C Ü ý 
f Ü 
m L Q) 
(D 
Q 
m j r_ 
7 L 























































































0 s h 
O 
º- E 
Q) 0 o Q) 
-a k 







N. Ü>O ýL1 h 



















o r- E 
ÜQNÜU 
o ý, möamm 
Ee, ao CO , Qn 
m' Co ° Öý x0Qö 
.c ate` ýý Wac `ý oL 
C: L VQy\c 
m 
0 QD ZEZaa 


























c w. a> o0 
üä 
Eä 




. SR IR 




















































































































































































































N ý- NM tt UA (D N Co O7 ONM ý- N '- N rn 
Icu 
I 
Ö ý Ö 
ö. Q- 3 











> dJ O CL: 
C gu L 
CN üf V 
72 C Q 
f0 E 
-EC p 
,C .CNNVC =' 
i/1 i O7vý... 
O ä` >Ö U3 ` of Vy a) 












CL 9. ) 












N a C 
Ir 
0. äN 












aý r O o co 
(0 c N a) o V , 4i 'b 
N y V E C Ö 
ä ä 0p ö c: 
W 
ro 












CL Z: Cý. e CL C: L O öO NO 
0 °O °) 
- ä 































































, Dtv r- >ö 
_O _aI 
LOO. 


















(0/) U) G) ßääu äääno0 
CD 0 
o00ö0öö a) CD CD CD 
OOOO0Ö CD yO Ö L[)' 
ÖrNOO 
N I- -''O 
rrr 






yo uA OuOOO 








































Appendix A8: Health Affairs Journal article (final accepted version), based on empirical 
results from PhD chapter 7 
An Unhealthy Public-Private Tension: 
The Impact of Physician Pharmacy Ownership on 
Prescribing Practices and Patient Spending in the 
Philippines 
Abstract 
Pharmacy ownership by physicians may create perverse 
financial incentives for doctors to over-prescribe, 
prescribe products with higher profit margins, and 
direct patients to their pharmacy. Interviews with 
pharmacy customers in the Philippines show that 
customers using pharmacies owned by public sector 
doctors had 5.4 greater odds of having a prescription 
from public hospital physicians, and spent 49.3% more 
than customers using other pharmacies. For customers 
purchasing branded medicines, switching to generics 
would reduce pharmaceutical spending by 58%. Controlling 
out-of-pocket expenditure on drugs requires policies to 
control financial links between doctors and pharmacies, 




Public sector doctors in low-middle income countries are 
often poorly paid (1). Consequently, many undertake 
additional work or invest in the private sector; some 
even leave the public sector altogether. One common 
strategy is for doctors to own, or have financial links 
with, pharmacies, diagnostic clinics and other private 
health facilities (2; 3; 4) . Pharmacy ownership by doctors potentially creates a perverse financial 
incentive to over-prescribe, prescribe products with 
higher profit margins, and convince patients to use 
their pharmacy. 
A doctor's incentive to obtain a share in a private 
pharmacy, and the perverse incentives that can emerge 
from this, are more marked when patients pay directly 
for drugs themselves or when drugs are retrospectively 
reimbursed by insurers on a fee-for-service basis (as 
compared with prospective drug reimbursement). In such 
circumstances, financial gain is directly linked to 
prescribing strategies. 
Whether or not doctors actually act on these incentives 
depends on the relative weight they place on personal 
financial gain and a patient's well-being, assuming 
these two objectives are not aligned. That is, their 
clinical behavior depends on how `perfect' an agent the 
doctor is for the patient (5) . If they are not a perfect 
agent, these perverse financial incentives will lead to 
patients (and third-party payers) spending more than 
they need to, purchasing medical care that is not 
needed, or forgoing an opportunity to substitute branded 
for generic medications. In some cases, this may even be 
detrimental to their health. 
To evaluate whether public sector doctors are affected 
by these personal financial incentives, we interviewed 
pharmacy customers in the Philippines after they had 
purchased medicines from a pharmacy. Customers were 
asked whether they had a prescription, if so, from whom, 
and how much they spent. Data on the price and 
availability of selected essential medicines were also 
collected from pharmacies and public district hospitals. 
Accordingly this paper addresses three related research 
questicns : 
2 
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1. Do physicians owning or having financial links with a 
private pharmacy influence patients to purchase 
medicines from their pharmacy? 
2. Do patients with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning 
physicians spend more in pharmacies than patients 
with prescriptions from other physicians? 
3. Would patients with prescriptions from a pharmacy- 
owning public physician spend less on medicines if 
generic versions were fully available within public 
district hospitals? 
2 Methods 
2.1 Study context and sampling issues 
Study context 
A network of public health facilities offers integrated 
healthcare services in the Philippines. There are also 
many private providers, particularly in larger urban 
areas. Public facilities are predominantly financed by 
Local Government Units (LGUs). However, this is not 
sufficient to cover their operating costs, with 
shortfalls financed through Philippine Health Insurance 
Corporation (PHIC) contributions and user charges. PHIC, 
the publicly sponsored national health insurance 
company, does not yet provide universal coverage. 
Benefits are capped and limited mainly to inpatient 
cases, so that co-payments for the insured can be high, 
particularly for those with protracted or serious 
illnesses. 
The pharmaceutical retail market in the Philippines is 
dominated by commercial pharmacies, which account for 
85% of drugs sold (6). Patients can also purchase 
medicines in hospital pharmacies but availability is 
limited, particularly in government hospitals. Patients 
with PHIC membership, however, can later claim 
reimbursement for prescribed medicines purchased in 
pharmacies up to a pre-specified ceiling if the 
medications and supplies were not available within 
public hospitals. 
Our study was connected to the Philippine Child Health 
Experiment, known locally as QIDS (see also the QIDS 
website http: //QIDS. ph). QIDS is an ongoing study 
exploring the impact of two policy interventicns: 
expanded insurance coverage for children; and 
performance-based payments for hospitals and physicians. 
It was undertaken in 30 randomly selected districts in , 
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the Visayan island group and the northern tip of Mindano 
(for a comprehensive discussion of the QIDS methodology, 
see 7). QIDS provided us with detailed information on 
these districts' hospital facilities, including the 
physicians working there; and anecdotal information on 
potential public physician ownership of private 
pharmacies. 
Pharmacy sample frame 
Seven districts were purposively selected from among the 
30 QIDS study districts. District selection was based 
on there being at least one pharmacy owned by a public 
hospital physician; all three intervention arms of the 
QIDS study were represented. 
The inclusion criteria for pharmacies in these seven 
districts were: (i) all pharmacies owned by, or with 
direct familial links (parent, sibling or offspring) to, 
a public hospital physician; (ii) all pharmacies owned 
by, or with direct familial links to, a private clinic 
physician; (iii) all pharmacies located next to the 
hospital (i. e. on the same street and within two 
minutes' walk); (iv) controls of two or more randomly 
selected independent pharmacies per site, with ideally 
at least one of these next to the hospital and at least 
one further away (i. e. 5 to 30 minutes' walk away). An 
independent pharmacy is defined as: a pharmacy that is 
not owned by, nor has direct familial links with, a 
public or private physician. 
Screening interviews were administered with the pharmacy 
owner and/or chief pharmacist, establishing who owned 
each pharmacy. They were undertaken for all pharmacies 
within each district's main commercial center. Of the 46 
pharmacies that were screened, 39 were eligible for 
study. Of the seven that did not participate, three 
refused to be interviewed (all independently owned), and 
four were closed throughout the study period (two 
independently owned; two with familial links to public 
hospital physicians). 
Patient data collection 
Data collection took place over the three month period 
of March-May 2007. We interviewed patient respondents 
immediately after purchasing medicines from a pharmacy. 
Respondents were asked if they received a prescription, 
and if so, from whom, what they bought, and questions 
4 
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related to their socioeconomic status and the illness 
for which medicines were purchased. 40-60 customers were 
interviewed per pharmacy, with a minimum timeframe of 
one day per pharmacy. In each pharmacy, all customers 
purchasing any kind of medication were interviewed. 
Interviewing was sequential and done by local research 
assistants trained by the lead author. Interviews were 
administered in the local dialect, encompassed 14 
questions, and took about 10 minutes to complete. All 
interviewees were adults, although approximately a 
quarter of them were purchasing medicines for children. 
2.2 Model specification 
Three models are specified, each addressing one of the 
paper's three research questions. They are summarized 
below, with further details given in the technical 
appendix. 
-1. Do physicians owning or having financial links with 
a private pharmacy influence patients to purchase 
medicines from their pharmacy? 
The approach is to model the probability that a patient 
(the pharmacy customer or the person for whom the 
customer was buying the medicines for) received a 
prescription from a public hospital physician. This uses 
a logistic model, with the main variable of interest 
indicating whether a pharmacy is linked to a physician. 
Various control variables at both pharmacy and pharmacy 
customer levels are included. Reasons given for why a 
customer chose to use a physician-owned pharmacy were 
also analyzed. 
-2. Do patients with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning 
physicians spend more in pharmacies than patients with 
prescriptions from other physicians? 
This analyzes pharmacy expenditures, using a semi- 
logarithmic ordinary least squares specification. It 
focuses on the sub-sample of pharmacy customers with 
prescriptions from a public hospital, comparing 
expenditures of customers with a prescription from a 
pharmacy-owning public physician with those having a 
prescription from other public physicians. The data 
collected did not distinguish between patients with 
prescriptions for inpatient treatment or outpatient use. 
-3. Would patients with prescriptions from a pharmacy- 
owning public physician spend less on medicines if 
5 
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generic versions were fully available within public 
district hospitals? 
This involved analyzing the sub-sample of individuals 
with a prescription from a pharmacy-owning public 
hospital physician. These individuals' observed drug 
expenditure in pharmacies was compared with what they 
could have spent on the same medicines if generic 
versions were fully available within public district 
hospitals. Quantities of medicines purchased in a 
hospital are assumed to be the same as observed 
quantities purchased in pharmacies. That is, it is 
assumed that a physician's prescription practice would 
remain unchanged, implying no demand inducement (or, 
equivalently, the same level of inducement for patients 
purchasing medicines inside or outside the hospital). 
3 Results 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Of the 39 pharmacies, 6 were owned by public physicians, 
3 were owned by private physicians and 30 were 
independently owned. 11 of 39 pharmacies were located on 
the same street as the hospital; the remaining 28 were a 
5-15 minute motorcycle ride away. 
Just under half of the sample (625 of 1322) had a 
prescription (compared with over-the-counter purchases). 
Further, 425 (32%) had a prescription from a public 
district hospital physician - 221 (17%) from a pharmacy- 
owning public physician and 204 (15%) from other public 
physicians. Over 60% of the sample reported household 
incomes that were in the bottom quintile of the national 
income distribution (source: Philippine National 
Statistics office: 
http: //www. census. gov. ph/data/sectordata/2003/ieO3frlB. h 
tm). Asset ownership was positively associated with 
reported household income. 
Exhibit 1: Pharmacy customer characteristics [INSERT 
HERE] 
3.2 Do physicians owning or having financial links with 
private pharmacies influence patients to purchase 
medicines from their pharmacies? 
Pharmacy customers using a pharmacy owned by a public 
physician were 5.4 times more likely (5.4 higher odds) 
to receive a prescription from a public physician than 
were customers using pharmacies not owned by a public 
6 
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physician. Further, those with a prescription from a 
public physician had 6.2 higher odds of using pharmacies 
located in the immediate vicinity of the town's public 
hospital than other pharmacies. Custaners with PHIC 
insurance and planning to claim had 1.8 greater odds of 
having a prescription from a public physician. There was 
also noticeable variability in results across districts. 
Exhibit 2: Probability of prescription from public 
hospital physician [INSERT HERE] 
To better understand the ability of physicians to 
influence a patient's drug purchasing behaviour, we 
analyzed the reasons customers gave for using physician- 
owned pharmacies (see exhibit 3). Among the customers 
with a prescription from a pharmacy-owning public 
physician and using that physician's pharmacy, 61% cited 
the influence of a health professional as the main 
reason (52% were recommended, and 9% referred, by a 
health professional). The respective figure for 
customers with prescriptions from other public 
physicians was 26% (23% recommended, 3% referred). This 
difference (26% v 61%) was statistically significant 
(chi-squared=5.29', p-value<0.025). 
Exhibit 3: Reasons given by customers for using a 
particular pharmacy [INSERT HERE] 
3.3 Do patients with prescriptions from pharmacy-owning 
physicians spend more in pharmacies than patients with 
prescriptions from other physicians? 
A first analysis (2a) showed that customers using a 
public physician-linked pharmacy spent 49.3% more (p- 
value=0.005) than those using other pharmacies. However, 
it also showed that those with a prescription from a 
pharmacy-owning public physician spent 37.4% (p-value = 
0.048) less than those with prescriptions from other 
public physicians. 
Patients using pharmacies located in the immediate 
vicinity of a town's public hospital spent 63% more than 
those using other pharmacies (p-value=0.019). There was 
also variability in results across districts. 
A second analysis (2b), comparing four customer 
subgroups, showed that customers with prescriptions from 
pharmacy-owning public physicians only spent less than 
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those-with prescriptions from other public physicians if 
they used pharmacies not owned by these public 
physicians. These subgroups were: (1) customers with 
prescriptions from pharmacy-owning public physicians and 
using their pharmacies; (2) customers with prescriptions 
from pharmacy-owning public physicians but using other 
pharmacies (regression reference group) ; (3) customers 
with prescriptions from other (non-pharmacy owning) 
public physicians and using pharmacies linked to public 
physicians; (4) customers with prescriptions from other 
public physicians and using other pharmacies. 
Exhibit 4: Determinants of pharmaceutical expenditures 
[INSERT HERE] 
3.4 Would patients with prescriptions from a pharmacy- 
owning public physician spend less on medicines if 
generic versions were fully available within public 
district hospitals? 
Exhibit 5 illustrates the extent of potential savings if 
customers purchased generics rather than branded 
medicines: 
Exhibit 5: Actual versus simulated average expenditures 
on surveyed medicines [INSERT HERE] 
Extrapolating these results to all pharmacy customers 
with a prescription from a pharmacy-owning public 
hospital physician shows that noticeable expenditure 
savings could be generated. For the 88% of these 
customers who purchased branded medicines, expenditure 
could be reduced by 58% on average (median), saving $4.2 
(since their average expenditure was $7.7), if they 
purchased only generic medicines. This assumes price 
differences between generic and branded versions for 
other medicines are the same as for medicines analyzed 
in the simulation sub-sample. 
4 Discussion 
This paper investigates whether doctors respond to the 
incentives created by financial links with pharmacies, 
and evaluates the financial implications of those 
behaviors. We found that pharmacy-owning physicians in 
the Philippines appear to persuade patients to use their 
pharmacy in preference to alternative pharmacies. After 
controlling for other factors, results demonstrated that 
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customers using public physician-owned pharmacies had 
5.4 greater odds of having a prescription from a public 
hospital physician. 
Customers using public physician-owned pharmacies spent 
49% more than those using other pharmacies. In 
determining expenditures, the type of pharmacy a 
customer purchased their medicines from was more 
important than who gave them their prescription. Doctors 
who owned pharmacies did not prescribe more expensive 
medicines than other hospital physicians. However, 
physician ownership of private pharmacies remains a 
concern because of the finding that pharmacy-awning 
public physicians persuade patients to utilize their 
pharmacies. Further, for customers purchasing branded 
medicines, switching to generic medicines would reduce 
pharmaceutical spending to an average of 42% (range of 
19%-81%) of their actual expenditure. This finding 
implies that there are potentially significant savings 
for both individuals paying out-of-pocket and third- 
party payers. 
Our research adds to the literature by demonstrating the 
impact physician pharmacy ownership has on pharmacy 
customers. Results are consistent with other studies 
that have analyzed financial links between doctors and 
health facilities. In the US, physicians linked to 
private facilities consistently had different referral 
behaviour, resulting in policy regulations - the Stark 
laws (see Manchikanti and McMahon 2007 for details) - 
that severely limited self-referrals. Many studies, 
dating back more than 20 years, showed how utilization 
and profits of facilities providing ancillary and 
outpatient services in the US were higher if these 
facilities had financial links with physicians 
(3.8,9.1041) . In Taiwan, researchers analysing outpatient 
clinics found that the probability of prescription and 
drug expenditure per visit were, respectively, 17-34% 
and 12-36% less amongst visits to clinics without "on- 
site" pharmacists - pharmacists hired by physicians to 
dispense the drugs they prescribe (2) . Later studies 
found that pharmacies linked with physicians accounted 
for a large and growing proportion of prescriptions in 
Taiwan (12,13) 
. 
Other studies evaluated the prescribing practices of 
dispensing doctors. In South Korea, prescriptions for 
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antibiotics and injections fell following the separation 
of drug prescribing and dispensing in 2000. However, 
these were offset by physician demands for compensatory 
higher medical fees and an increase in prescriptions of 
high-price drugs (14h15) . In Zimbabwe, dispensii doctors 
prescribed more medicines than non-dispensing doctors, 
and dispensing with prescription lowered the quality of 
care (16.1') . In the UK, dispensing practices prescribed 
more items per patient (and fewer of them generically) 
than non-dispensing practices1e. More broadly, the 
empirical literature on provider payment mechanisms 
demonstrated that the amount of services a physician 
gives a patient is dependent on the financial incentives 
s/he faces (19.20) . 
Still, our study has some important limitations. First, 
data were not collected from patients that bought 
medicines in the hospital pharmacy, nor from patients 
who did not buy any of the medicines they were 
prescribed. Nonetheless, other data from the QIDS study 
showed that for 98.7% of inpatient cases younger than 
six, the parent/carer had to obtain additional 
prescribed medicines outside of the hospital, so bias 
from this source is unlikely. Secondly, districts and 
pharmacies were selected purposively; however, the 
participation rate among both pharmacies and pharmacy . 
customers was high and there is no a priori reason to 
think that the results are driven by the sampling frame. 
Third, there is a possibility that some physicians with 
links to pharmacies were not identified. Although 
pharmacy screening interviews ascertained whether 
pharmacies had direct familial links to specific 
physicians, it is still possible that more informal 
links between pharmacies and physicians were not 
captured. This would mean that certain pharmacies 
classified as "independent" actually had physician 
links. This form of misclassification would tend to 
underestimate the actual differences between pharmacy 
ownership types. Fourth, although results illustrated 
that pharmacy-owning public physicians were able to 
persuade patients to utilize their pharmacy, the 
research only began to explore how they are able to do 
this. Qualitative research methods might have captured 
this more effectively. Further, we did not analyze a 
physician's decision to obtain pharmacy ownership 
stakes, and consequently if (and if so, how) pharmacy- 
owning physicians differ from other physicians. Finally, 
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the analysis could not analyse the linkage between 
physicians owning private pharmacies and the number of 
prescriptions. Pharmacy-owning physicians face a 
stronger financial incentive to over-prescribe. Although 
Model 2 showed that health expenditures were higher in 
public physician-owned pharmacies, it cannot show if 
this is explained by more prescriptions or if it is just 
more expensive medicines being prescribed and thus it is 
not possible to disentangle price and quantity effects. 
Potential over-prescription also implies that the cost 
savings in Model 3 would have been under-estimated. 
The phenomenon of public physicians in low- and middle- 
income countries engaging in private sector activities 
is widespread (21; 22) . Debate continues on 
how best to 
address such behavior. our findings suggest a range of 
policy responses to physician ownership of private 
pharmacies. At the one extreme, banning physicians from 
owning pharmacies would remove the perverse financial 
incentives associated with pharmacy ownership. However, 
such a policy is likely to be difficult to enforce, and 
physicians might still maintain financial links with 
pharmacies without actually owning them, particularly if 
the underlying issue of low physician salaries is not 
addressed. Experiences from South Korea" and Taiwan 
suggest that such a policy cannot succeed in isolation. 
Another policy option is to improve the availability of 
generic medicines in public hospitals. This could 
produce significant savings for patients and third-party 
payers, and also offer revenue opportunities for 
hospitals. It would have the additional benefit of 
putting pressure on outside pharmacies to carry generic 
medicines and to offer medications at competitive 
prices. However, as this study indicates, there would 
also need to be adequate monitoring of prescribing 
practices since there is no guarantee that pharmacy- 
owning public physicians would not continue to try and 
persuade patients to use their pharmacies. Policymakers 
might also focus on ensuring private pharmacies stock 
generic versions of essential medicines (already the 
law). However, if pharmacy custaners regularly demanded 
generics, private for-profit pharmacies would more 
readily supply them. 
This implies a more general problem with generics: 
customers may perceive them to be of inferior quality to 
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branded medicines, and/or physicians recommend branded 
products. Indeed, anecdotal evidence from this study 
suggests that prescriptions often exclude the medicine's 
generic name, even though this is in conflict with 
Philippine law (Republic Act No. 6675). Thus for generics 
to be more widely used, there needs to be better 
monitoring of physicians' prescriptions, and, more 
generally, any concerns about the quality of generics 
needs to be assuaged. PHIC could regulate physicians' 
prescribing practices, given their experience in 
evaluating physician claims, and since they have the 
incentive of significant cost savings to do so. However, 
for this to cover a large proportion of prescriptions, 
PHIC reimbursement would need to be expanded to cover 
outpatient prescription medicines. 
Finally, it should be remembered that public physicians' 
salaries are typically low, relative to what they could 
earn elsewhere. Policymalaers must recognise this, since 
physician ownership of private pharmacies, and the 
associated perverse financial incentives that emerge, 
are likely to be driven by the need to cope with low 
public sector wages. 
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Exhibit 1: Pharmacy customer characteristics 
Variable N % 
OTC V PRESCRIPTIONS, & PRESCRIPTION TYPE 
Over-the-counter purchase 697 53% 
Prescription from pharmacy-owning public physician 204 15% 
Prescription from other public physician 221 17% 
Prescription from pharmacy-owning private physician 77 6% 
All other (i. e. non-hospital based) prescriptions 123 9% 
SOCIOECONOMIC /DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
Household assets 
Radio 1093 83% 
TV 930 70% 
Refrigerator 594 45% 
Washing machine 244 18% 
Air conditioning 57 4% 
Sala (living room) set 321 24% 
Cell phone 735 56% 
Car 110 8% 
Annual household Income 
<10,000 317 24% 
10,001-25,000 307 23% 
25,001-50,000 228 17% 
50,001-75000 157 12% 
75,001-100,000 93 7% 
100,001-150,000 99 7% 
150,001-200,000 50 4% 
200,001-600,000 67 5% 
>600,000 4 0% 
Health insurance status of patient 
PHIC member and will claim 132 10% 
PHIC member but won't claim 393 30% 
Not PHIC member 797 60% 
Age of patient 
Age <=5 204 15% 
Age 6-17 146 11% 
Age 18-39 357 27% 
Age 40-59 364 28% 
Age 60+ 251 19% 
Gender of patient 
Female 730 55% 
Male 592 45% 
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Exhibit 2: Probability of prescription from public hospital physician 
n= 1322 Model 1: Probability of prescription from LR = 619, Prob>LR =0.00 a public hospital physician Pseudo R2=0 37; AIC'n=1085 
Venable OR. se z P>Izi 
PHARMACY LINKED TO DOCTOR 5.427 2.17 4.24 <0.0001 
Pharmacy located next to hospital 6.152 2.20 5.08 <0.0001 
Abuyog district 3.319 1.32 3.02 0.0020 
Baia district 2.034 0.83 1.74 0.0810 
Guilhulgnan district 
Palompon district 28.703 14.24 6.77 <0.0001 
Ores district 6.172 2.31 4.87 <0.0001 
Taft district 10.036 3.69 6.27 <0.0001 
Household assets 0.502 0.26 -1.32 0.1880 
PHIC member and will claim 1.796 0.52 2.02 0.0430 
Age <= 5 
Age 6-17 
Age 18-39 
Age 40-59 0.632 0.15 "1.94 0.0520 
Female 
Bayawan is reference district; case-mix proxies also included. Data clustering at the 
pharmacy level was adjusted for. Variables shown without statistics were excluded 
from the final model on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion. 
Exhibit 3: Reasons given by customers for using a particular pharmacy 
Prescription from pharmacy-owning Prescription from other public 
public doctor & using that doctor's doctor (n=222) 
pharmacy (n=166) 
One of reasons Main reason One of reasons Main reason 
n%n% n%n% 
Proximity to home 24 14% 5 3% 59 27% 28 13% 
Proximity to work 4 2% 3 2% 24 11% 8 4% 
Knew medicine/s was available here 35 21% 20 12% 140 63% 52 23% 
Knew medicines was cheap here 16 11% 15 9% 72 32% 35 16% 
Recommended by health professional 88 53% 86 52% 77 35% 52 23% 
Referred here 15 9% 15 9% 6 3% 6 3% 
Proximity to hospital 14 8% 12 7% 41 18% 35 16% 
Other 12 7% 10 6% 6 3% 6 3% 
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Exhibit 4: Determinants of pharmaceutical expenditures 
Model 2a 
Model 2: Determinants of expenditure In pharmacies n  425; F=24.4, Prob>F=0.00 
R2   0.1831; AIC. 1253 
Coed. se t Pt Coeff. se t P> r 
PHARMACY LINKED TO DOCTOR 0.493 0.16 3.06 0.0050 NA NA NA NA 
Prescription type-1 -0.374 0.18 -2.08 0.0480 NA NA NA NA 
Pres. type 1 4 used pharm. linked to doctor NA NA NA NA 0.545 0.16 3.46 0.0020 
Pres. type 2 + used pherrn. linked to doctor NA NA NA NA 0.880 0.26 3.43 0.0020 
Pros type-2 + used other pharmacy NA NA NA NA 0.436 0.25 1.77 00900 
Pharmacy located next to hospital 0.631 0.25 2.51 0.0190 0.644 0.26 2.46 0.0220 
Abuyog district -0.362 0.18 -2.06 0.0500 -0.345 0.20 -1.73 0.0960 
Bala district -0.493 0.25 -1.95 0.0640 -0.512 0.27 -1.87 0.0740 
Guilhulgnan district 
Palompon district 0.632 0.28 2.28 0.0330 0.645 0.28 2.29 0.0310 
Oros district 0.358 0.20 1.77 0.0890 0.357 0.20 1.77 0.0890 
Taft district 
Household assets 0.619 0.47 1.33 0.1970 0.613 0.46 1.34 0.1910 
PHIC member and will claim 
Age< 5 
Age 8.17 
Age 18-39 -0.166 0.12 -1.44 0.1610 -0.167 0.11 -1.46 0.1590 
Age 40-59 
Female 
Constant 4.261 0.24 17.45 <0 0001 3 835 0.30 12 81 <0 0001 
Key to prescription types: 1-from pharmacy-owning public hospital doctor, 2-from other public hosp doctor 
Bayawan is reference district; case-mix proxies also Included. Pharmacy level data clustering adjusted for. 
Variables without statistics were excluded from the final model on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion. 
Exhibit 5: Actual versus simulated average expenditures on surveyed medicines 
Branded drugs Only generics Full sub-sample (na48) 
purchased (n 32) purchased (n 16) 
Philippine % actual Philippine % actual Philippine % actual 
Pesos expenditure Pesos expenditure Pesos expenditure 
Actual expenditure' 153 - 121 - 142 - 
Simulated expenditure [Sim_exp], lowest drug price 29' 19% 50' 41% 36' 25% 
Sim_exp, mean drug price 62' 41% 82' 68% 69' 49% 
Sim_oxp, median drug price 88' 42% 88b 73% 73' 51% 
Sim exp, highest drug price In private pharmacy 109' 71% 153 126% 124' 87% 
Sim_exp, max drug price In private or hosp. pharmacy 124' 81% 170 140% 139 98% 
on drugfs for which pricing data was collected (average total expenditure In pharmacy Is higher) 
Simulated expenditure statistically less than actual exp. at 099%, b95%, 490% significance level. 
odel 2b 
  425; F 20.7. Prob>F=0.00 
2-0.1834; AIC-1255 
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